MILITARY POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN INDONESIA

Jun Honna

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Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia

The military has been a powerful political player in Indonesia: it has played a key role in its recent history and may well have a decisive role to play in her future. It was the dominant power under Soeharto's authoritarian regime and continues to influence post-Soeharto civilian rule. Understanding the dynamics of military politics is essential to understanding the nature and prospects of Indonesia's transition to democracy. Jun Honna reveals how politics amongst generals shaped the direction of military adaptation to democratic challenge during the late Soeharto era and the succeeding governments, led by B.J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid.

Drawing on military documents and interviews with key military figures, Honna depicts the development of faction fighting within the military and the way in which, since the late 80s, it has produced both accommodative and repressive demands. To explain the workings of such dynamics in detail, Honna examines five different dimensions of civil-military interactions: regime maintenance; doctrinal adaption; internal security; the development of military ideology; and civil-military discourse – both in the twilight of the Soeharto era and after his fall.

The author also examines such key features as human rights, reconciliation, civic-military discourse and ongoing security dilemmas. The book is unique in providing the best overview of the role of the military in the world's fourth most populous nation.

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To my parents and wife

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I dedicate this book to my parents, Nobuyuki and Chikako Honna, and my wife Minako.

Jun Honna
Kyoto
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Abbreviations

ABRI	*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia)
Akabri	*Akademi ABRI* (Military Academy)
AMD	*ABRI Masuk Desa* (ABRI in the village – civic mission programme)
AMN	*Akademi Militer Nasional* (National Military Academy)
Asrenum	*Asisten Perencanaan Umum* (Assistant for General Planning to the ABRI Commander)
Assospol Kassospol	A*sisten Sosial Politik Kassospol* (Assistant for Sociopolitical Affairs to Kassospol)
BAIS	*Badan Intelijen Strategis* (Strategic Intelligence Agency)
BAKIN	*Badan Kordinasi Intelijen Negara* (State Intelligence Coordination Agency)
Bakorstanas	*Badan Kordinasi Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional* (Coordinating Agency for the Maintenance of National Stability)
Balatkom	*Bahaya Laten Komunisme* (Danger of latent communism)
BIA	*Badan Intelijen ABRI* (ABRI Intelligence Agency)
CDEK	*Catur Dharma Eka Karma* (Four Missions, One Deed – ABRI's integral doctrine adopted in 1966)
Cilangkap	ABRI HQ is located in Cilangkap, East Jakarta
CSIS	Centre for Strategic and International Studies
DKM	*Dewan Kehormatan Militer* (Military Honour Council)
DKP	*Dewan Kehormatan Perwira* (Officers' Honour Council)
DPR	*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (Parliament)
Dwifungsi	Dual function – ABRI doctrine stipulating a dual role of defence and politics
F-ABRI	*Fraksi ABRI* (ABRI faction in the parliament)
FKPPI	*Forum Komunikasi Putra-Putri Purnawirawan Indonesia* (Communications Forum for Sons and Daughters of ABRI Veterans)
F-TNI/Polri	*Fraksi TNI/Polri* (TNI/Police faction in DPR/MPR)

G30S/PKI	*Gerakan 30 September/PKI* (September 30th Movement – an abortive 'communist coup' of 30 September 1965)
GBHN	*Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Nasional* (Broad outlines of state policy)
GDN	*Gerakan Disiplin Nasional* (National Discipline Movement)
Golkar	*Golongan Karya* (Functional Groups – the party of government)
Hankam	*Pertahanan Keamanan* (Defence and Security – *dwifungsi*'s first function)
Hankamnas	*Doktrin Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional* (Doctrine of National Defence and Security)
ICMI	*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia* (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals)
Kapuspen	*Kepala Pusat Penerangan* (Chief of ABRI's Information Centre)
Kassospol	*Kepala Staf Sosial Politik* (Chief of Social and Political Affairs to the Military Commander)
Kaster	*Kepala Staf Teritorial* (Chief of Territorial Affairs to the Military Commander)
Kasum	*Kepala Staf Umum* (Chief of General Affairs to the Military Commander)
KBA	*Keluarga Besar ABRI* (ABRI's Big Family)
KBG	*Keluarga Besar Golkar* (Golkar Big Family)
KEEM	*Kecil tetapi Efisien, Efektif dan Modern* (Small but Efficient, Effective and Modern – ABRI's slogan of professionalism)
Kekaryaan	Placing ABRI personnel in non-military posts
Ketahanan Nasional	National Resilience – Indonesian national doctrine which encompasses security–political–social–economic fields of national development to maintain Indonesia's autonomy in international society
Keterbukaan	Political openness
Kewaspadaan	Vigilance
Kodam	*Komando Daerah Militer* (Military Area Command)
Kodim	*Komando Distrik Militer* (Military District Command)
Komnas HAM	*Komisi Nasional untuk Hak Asasi Manusia* (National Human Rights Commission)
Kopassus	*Komando Pasukan Khusus* (Special Forces Command)
Kopkamtib	*Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban* (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order)
Koramil	*Komando Rayon Militer* (Military Subdistrict Command)
Korem	*Komando Resort Militer* (Military Resort Command)
Kostrad	*Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat* (Army Strategic Reserve Command)
KSAD	*Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat* (Army Chief of Staff)

Lemhannas	*Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional* (National Resilience [or Defence] Institute)
LIPI	*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia* (Indonesian Institute of Sciences)
Menhankam	*Menteri Pertahanan Keamanan* (Minister of Defence and Security)
Menko Polkam	*Menteri Kordinator Politik dan Keamanan* (Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs)
MPR	*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (People's Consultative Assembly)
NU	*Nahdlatul Ulama* (the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia)
OTB	*Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk* (Formless [Communist] Organization)
PAN	*Partai Amanat Nasional* (National Mandate Party)
Pancasila	The Indonesian national ideology consisting of five principles
Pangab	*Panglima ABRI* (Commander-in-Chief of ABRI)
Pangdam	*Panglima Kodam* (Kodam Commander)
Paradigma Baru	New Paradigm of the Military – ABRI's reform vision adopted in September 1998
PDI	*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (Indonesian Democratic Party)
PDI-P	*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perdjuangan* (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)
Pemadam Kebakaran	Fire Brigade – the argument that ABRI today has no independent mind to promote national interests and merely played the role of ensuring security through repression when ordered to do so by the government
Pembangunan	Development
Pendekatan Keamanan	Security approach
Pepabri	*Persatuan Purnawirawan ABRI* (Retired Soldiers' Association)
Petisi 50	Petition of 50 Group – an opposition group consisting of fifty members involving retired officers and civilians
PKB	*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (National Awakening Party)
PKI	*Partai Komunis Indonesia* (Indonesian Communist Party)
Poros Tengah	Central Axis
PPP	*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (United Development Party)
PRD	*Partai Rakyat Demokrasi* (People's Democratic Party)
Rakyat	the People
Reformasi	Reform
SDM	*Sumber Daya Manusia* (Human resources)
Seskoad	*Sekolah Staff dan Komando Angkatan Darat* (Army Staff and Command College)
Sesko ABRI	*Sekolah Staf dan Komando ABRI* (ABRI's Joint Staff and Command College)

Sesko TNI	*Sekolah Staf dan Komando TNI* (TNI's Joint Staff and Command College)
Sospol	*Sosial Politik* (Sociopolitical – *dwifungsi*'s second function)
Tarpadnas	*Penataran Kewaspadaan Nasional* (National Vigilance Refresher Course)
TNI	*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia)
TUÇ	*Tri Ubaya Çakti* (Three Sacred Vows – ABRI's doctrine first adopted in 1965 [revised in 1966])
Tut wuri handayani	A Javanese expression describing how a father supports his young children from behind as they learn to walk
UUD45	*Undang-Undang 1945* (the 1945 Constitution)
YKPK	*Yayasan Kerukunan Persaudaraan Kebangsaan* (Foundation for National Brotherhood Harmony)

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
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1 Introduction

The problem: the military in regime transition

On the morning of 21 May 1998, President Soeharto announced his resignation after ruling for three decades. His resignation, prompted by a devastating economic crisis, opened the door for political change and gave rise to high expectations about both political liberalization and economic recovery. Many celebrated the pre-millennium ending of Soeharto's regime as a good omen and a necessary step towards coping with the many challenges Indonesia faced at the end of the century.

The four years subsequent to his resignation demonstrated that the fall of Soeharto had an impact that went well beyond changes in government form and style, and shook the unity of the nation-state. As long-suppressed ethnic, religious and regional conflicts erupted throughout the archipelago, the nation was plunged into chaotic violence. The state seemed to be losing control and demands for autonomy and independence coupled with religious and ethnic strife suggested a nation unravelling. Although the fall of Soeharto launched a new era in Indonesia, there is no consensus on where Indonesia is headed. Indonesia's post-Soeharto transition has been hesitant and without clear direction. The civilian government seems ill prepared to navigate these uncharted and stormy waters of reform, reconciliation and transformation. Clearly, the legacy of three decades of authoritarian rule have taken a toll on civil society and complicate the process of recovery from the mismanagement, distortions, corruption, institutional atrophy and political oppression that marked Soeharto's 'New Order' era (1966–1998).

One key institutional actor in this transition process is the military. As the backbone of Soeharto's authoritarian regime, the military has been a primary target of public anger in the post-Soeharto era. The reform movement sought to return the troops to the barracks, to hold leaders accountable for their human rights violations and to eliminate the military's prominent political role. Yet widespread turmoil under Indonesia's nascent civilian leadership has worked to sustain the military's political power. Political instability has conferred considerable influence in political circles on the current military elite because their cooperation is deemed indispensable in trying to maintain the integrity of a fragile and fractious nation-state. In assessing prospects for democratic transition and national consolidation in the new Indonesia, the military factor remains of critical importance.

This book is about Indonesia's military politics in transition. The main focus is on the development of civil–military relations in the late Soeharto period. As a basis for understanding the course of events in the post-Soeharto era, it is essential to understand the dynamics of civil–military relations during the New Order. Do soldiers accept civilian control of the military? To what extent does the military support political democratization? How does reform within the military influence the nature of its political engagement? Such questions comprise a topic of great interest following the fall of Soeharto, and cannot be investigated fully without assessing the military's internal developments prior to his resignation. Change in organizational behaviour does not happen overnight and the legacy of the New Order casts a long shadow over contemporary Indonesia. Today's top officers were trained and came up through the ranks during the New Order and are a product of the patterns, inclinations and assumptions of that era. This book analyses the change and continuity of military politics before and after the fall of Soeharto, and illustrates how current military attitudes reflect changing civil–military relations during the late Soeharto era, particularly since the early 1990s.

The problem of the military in regime transition is a global issue. The collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War in 1989 ushered in challenges to right-wing authoritarian regimes in developing countries, which had legitimized their rule by insisting on the need for strong government both to defend the nation from the threat of communist subversion and to provide maximum political support – i.e. stability – for economic modernization. Authoritarian polities in Latin America, Asia and Africa faced similar societal challenges to open up the political system, as the principal premises of authoritarianism were significantly undermined. Scholarship on third-world democratization in the last decade has focused on the process through which authoritarian regimes have been undermined by such pressures for change. This literature probes the evolution of civil–military relations in the context of democratization by investigating the response of the military – a part of the authoritarian old guard – to the demands for political liberalization and 'civilianization' of government. This book builds on this scholarly endeavour by examining the case of the Indonesian military during the 1990s and the transition to civilian rule since 1998.

The theme: *dwifungsi* and democratization

The main question and core argument of this book are simple. What has conditioned the pattern of military responses to democratic pressures? Broadly we see two different attitudes assumed by the military when facing social demands for democratization – accommodation and repression. Why in some cases has the military accommodated such demands while in other cases it took repressive measures? How do we explain this positive–negative pendulum in the military response to democratic demands? It could be argued that the very nature of the military constrains tolerance and challenges to authority. This study, however,

argues that it is the internal power struggle within the military which has persistently been the primary factor influencing its response to democratic demands. The motivations of generals and incentives to either accommodate or repress democratic demands reflect more strongly cleavages within the military more than any commitment to certain political values. The cause of military factionalization varies over time. But competing factions are always motivated to take different approaches than competitors in order to show their ascendancy. Thus, if a group of officers takes a hardline approach, the competition appeals for a softer response. The result was that the military had a mixed response to the growing democratic demands in society during the 1990s, taking measures both to accommodate and to repress such requests. The mixed response could be seen to reflect strategic confusion of the military as an institution, but it is a rational consequence of the power struggle within the military. The book shows that this dynamic in the development of civil–military relations during the late Soeharto era even now shapes military responses under the two civilian governments that followed (led by B.J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid respectively). We go on to underline the sustained significance of intra-military politics in understanding the prospects of military adaptation to democratic change in the near future.

In analysing the military's role in democratization, this study focuses on the problem of *dwifungsi*, a concept that legitimated the military's involvement in social and political affairs extending well beyond the usual scope of maintaining national security and providing national defence. *Dwifungsi*, or 'dual function', was the central doctrine of the military during Soeharto's New Order regime. *Dwifungsi* insists that, apart from its normal defence function, the military has a sociopolitical mission to promote national development and to ensure political stability. This concept animated the military's systematic and pervasive political intervention and the formation of its political programme, organizational ideology, security policies and patterns of civil–military interaction during the Soeharto era.

Until his resignation in May 1998, Soeharto – who ousted former President Sukarno in the chaotic political situation in the mid-1960s – dominated Indonesian politics for more than thirty years. With backing provided by the military, or ABRI, General Soeharto established his authoritarian political system, named the New Order.[1] As the antithesis of Sukarno, who favoured nationalist adventurism and radical mass mobilization, the new regime led by Soeharto sought legitimacy in economic modernization, requiring, *inter alia*, political stability. Based on this logic, ABRI formulated the concept of *dwifungsi*. This doctrine legitimized the involvement of soldiers in non-military fields – the legislature, bureaucracy, regional government, to name but a few – and also encouraged the repression of government critics, political parties, a free press and other vestiges of civil society.

Three decades of relative political stability during the New Order reflected the military's political influence under the auspices of *dwifungsi* doctrine. *Dwifungsi* – a euphemism for military surveillance and control of national life – has, however, been challenged as an emerging middle class and a growing

popular political movement have started to demand democratic reforms, including the military's withdrawal from politics. A segment of the government elite during the 1990s also began to see the need for promoting political deregulation in order to accelerate economic development in the era of globalizing market capitalism. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, international criticism of the military's abuse of human rights increased, as allies have been less inclined to look the other way. ABRI has therefore been under strong internal and external pressures to diminish its *dwifungsi* commitment since the late 1980s.[2]

How did ABRI respond to these demands during the late New Order era? Why did the military adapt itself positively to democratic demands in some areas but negatively in others? What were the dynamics behind these responses? Discussions in the following chapters will show how intra-military power struggles led to and sustained these different patterns of adaptation and response, and why. This analysis demonstrates how these patterns constitute a significant legacy of the New Order for the Indonesian polity.

The structure of the book

The *dwifungsi*–democratization problem consists of various dimensions. Chapters are therefore organized in a thematic rather than a chronological manner. I try to identify specific patterns of change within a given dimension in order to clarify the complexity of *dwifungsi*–democratization problems. This multidimensional perspective is also aimed at illustrating how different military actors take initiatives over different issues in different areas. *Who* are the main actors in *what* fields? Elucidating this picture is key to understanding how internal power struggles influence the military response to democratic demands. This book examines the *dwifungsi*–democratization problem from five different analytical dimensions of civil–military interaction: regime maintenance; doctrinal adaptation; internal security policy; the development of military ideology; and civil–military discourse – both in the twilight of the Soeharto era and after his fall. These themes are addressed independently in the following chapters as an attempt to assess various military responses to pressures for democratization. We will see how different responses coexisted and why.

The focus of Chapter 2 is regime maintenance. We examine the politics of escalating *dwifungsi* criticism in society. Why did *dwifungsi* become a central topic of open critical debate in society? How could such political space be expanded under the authoritarian New Order regime? As we will show, societal demands for democratization were not sufficient to open up *dwifungsi* to public criticism. Several factors within the ruling elite circle significantly contributed to the breaking of the taboo on *dwifungsi* debate which had been in place during the first twenty years of the New Order. This process not only reflected and facilitated intra-military rivalry, but also effectively eroded ABRI's credibility, reaching a nadir at the time of Soeharto's resignation. This chapter clarifies officers' political motives and incentives in the growing *dwifungsi* criticism and how this issue was used in inter-factional competition and continues to influence the

transition to post-Soeharto military politics. I also regard this chapter – which discusses major political events and the historical development of military factionalism during the late New Order period – as the background chapter to this book.

What was the effect of such cleavage within the military? Important transformations were evident in many fields. The next two chapters focus on the conciliatory actions and postures taken by different groups of elite officers in facing democratic pressures. Chapter 3 details ABRI's doctrinal change during the New Order, especially after the demand for democratization was intensified in the final decade of Soeharto's reign. Doctrinal analysis is helpful to examine simultaneously individual officers' perceptions and responses and the military's institutional political evolution. We discuss how ABRI institutionalized its political activism by attempting to strengthen the legitimacy of *dwifungsi* doctrine; how this was adjusted and manipulated in order to maintain the relevance of *dwifungsi* in changing and hostile circumstances; and finally how some reform-minded officers attempted to revise the doctrine in coping with growing criticism. This final process of accommodation by ABRI's doctrine-makers to pressures for democratization sheds considerable light on the dynamics of military politics and the series of military reforms adopted since Soeharto's resignation.

Chapter 4 examines the internal security policy. ABRI's record of human rights violations is seen to reflect the emphasis on internal security and political stability enshrined in *dwifungsi*. We see how this controversial issue, a taboo topic during the New Order, gradually became a legitimate public criticism since the late 1980s. The growing concern about human rights was encouraged by changes in the international political system – the end of the Cold War and the subsequent trend towards respect for universal values. How did ABRI respond to this new international political paradigm in the late New Order period? We look at some major cases of military violence and discuss the civil–military struggle over accountability concerning ABRI's human rights abuses, and the ways in which ABRI has been forced to adapt its organizational procedures to incorporate human rights principles. Here, the erosion of ABRI's traditional internal security policy is discernible.

In Chapter 5, on the other hand, we focus on ABRI's ideological evolution, examining in particular the adaptation of hardline military ideology as a way to justify repression of popular democratic movements. For a variety of reasons, ABRI's permanent control of politics was deemed increasingly irrelevant as the threat of communist subversion disappeared and the regime seemed ill equipped to cope with the new challenges facing Indonesia. In short, the military-dominated polity was widely seen to be part of the problem and a significant handicap in realizing the goal of economic modernization. In the face of growing public hostility, it is revealing to examine ABRI's reformulation of old vigilance ideology to rationalize military repression of popular democratic movements and attempts to revive civil society – notably led by NGOs and students – which emerged in the late 1980s.

Chapter 6 analyses the development of civil–military discourse during the late New Order era. Our focus is on elite criticism, rather than popular protest, as the popular demand for the elimination of *dwifungsi* during the Soeharto regime was generally perceived by military officers as, at best, unacceptable and, at worst, as a security threat. However, 'debate' on the *dwifungsi* problem went on between civilian elites and serving officers, and we highlight the function of this political space – which was generally seen as too limited in the eyes of critics – in undermining ABRI's assertion of the permanence of *dwifungsi*. We analyse several systematic approaches employed by elite critics to delegitimize *dwifungsi* and ABRI's responses to them. Exploring these discursive styles also leads us to assess the characteristics of intra-military communication on *dwifungsi* problems. In what ways have serving officers discussed the issues within their circles, and how were reformist views presented among them? Analysis of this discursive dimension provides insight into how the problems of New Order civil–military dialogue remain a troubling legacy in post-Soeharto Indonesia.

Throughout these chapters, we try to clarify the complex patterns of military responses to democratic demands under the Soeharto regime. We may find that military adaptation cannot be explained by a simple linear continuum of negative–positive responses to democratic pressures, and also cannot be judged by looking at only one dimension. I argue that military adaptation was not monolithic but instead pervasive, albeit with differences in direction, pace and scope. Military responses were mixed, as certain officers became reform-minded while others took hardline approaches in the face of democratic pressures. As the demand for change increased, initiatives of adaptation in both doctrinal dimension and civil–military dialogues were gradually taken by reform-minded officers who saw the need to review the role of the military in order to ensure its institutional survival in society. However, these efforts ran counter to the *realpolitik* tactics of Soeharto's 'praetorian guard' of hardliners eager to protect the New Order from reform. President Soeharto attempted to recruit loyalist officers and strengthen control over top military leaders to preserve his political interests against growing demands for the opening up of the regime. It was these top officers who initiated negative adaptation in some arenas. The development of such contradictory responses of the New Order military clearly reflected power struggles within the officer corps – a core argument of the book. It is widely accepted in public that the military merely adapted itself after the fall of Soeharto. Such a simplistic view may lead us to misunderstand the real dynamics of civil–military relations in the late Soeharto government and therefore misjudge developments in post-Soeharto Indonesia.

Following the analysis of late New Order regime, Chapter 7 looks at the fall of Soeharto and the subsequent developments under the Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid administrations. There are currents of change and eddies of stagnation in the post-Soeharto military and the polity it has bequeathed to Indonesians. Our discussion builds on previous chapters to explain the development of presidential–military politics, intra-military power struggles and military reform policies that have characterized this transitional era. From the historical

perspective, it should be asked: what has and has not changed in military politics since the collapse of the Soeharto regime? In the age of democratic change, what has determined the pace and degree of *dwifungsi* reforms aimed at reducing military influence in political life? We will investigate the political process of the military in post-Soeharto Indonesia and clarify the dynamics in which the sustained intra-military rivalry has continued to shape the direction of military adaptation to democratic change.

Finally, the concluding chapter clarifies several lessons in managing the military institution and incorporating this powerful political force into the process of democratic transition, learnt from the experience of two civilian governments post-Soeharto. We look at the problems of incomplete military withdrawal from politics and weak civilian control of the military. Today's generals claim that *dwifungsi* is already abandoned as a result of their reform efforts while they simultaneously seek to retain political prerogatives once sanctioned by this doctrine. Thus, significant continuity in the *dwifungsi* mindset of the officer corps still impedes the process of democratic transition. Under these circumstances, our discussion looks at prospects and obstacles for the building of democratic civil–military relations in post-Soeharto Indonesia.

2 Eroding *dwifungsi*

Power politics and democratic movement in the late New Order regime

Criticism of *dwifungsi* was a prominent phenomenon of New Order politics during the period of so-called *keterbukaan* – political openness – which started in the late 1980s. Intellectuals and regime critics took advantage of the opportunity that *keterbukaan* provided to discuss the question of ABRI's involvement in politics. In this chapter, we examine the growing scope and depth of *dwifungsi* criticism in society and attempt to show how political events in the last decade strengthened the political autonomy of critical movement[1] against *dwifungsi* under the authoritarian New Order regime. To this end, I investigate here, chronologically, the pattern of interaction between the development of *dwifungsi* criticism and the process of political change – namely, the political power struggle and emerging democratic movements.

First I provide an overview of the authoritarian model of the early New Order and describe the established practice of *dwifungsi* in order to assess the background of *keterbukaan*. This is followed with an examination of the process by which the demand for political openness gradually incorporated the *dwifungsi* issue. It is generally understood that *keterbukaan* encouraged public criticism of *dwifungsi*. But, as we will show, it was not a simple co-evolution that linked societal demands for democratization and criticism of *dwifungsi*. How has political space for the open *dwifungsi* criticism been produced, suppressed and strengthened during the period of *keterbukaan* – and why? These questions are dealt with here. In-depth contextual analysis of each major issue in the *dwifungsi* debate will be the focus of Chapter 6 which examines the discursive problems in a thematic way.

Military domination and regime contradictions before *keterbukaan*

The structure of military rule in Indonesia was established during the early period of the New Order.[2] The abortive coup in September 1965 resulted in the concentration of power in the hands of Maj. Gen. Soeharto (the Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command, or Kostrad) who had led the army troops which crushed the coup attempt. Soeharto's military accused the communist party (PKI) of leading the coup and encouraged

students and Muslims to join in the army-orchestrated anti-PKI campaign throughout the archipelago. Pressured by the military which claimed that the political order could not be restored under the current situation, in March 1966 President Sukarno finally authorized Soeharto to take any necessary measures to restore law and order.[3] The PKI, which had exercised considerable political influence under the Sukarno regime, was quickly eliminated. It was the military which was the dominant power in determining the direction of post-1965 Indonesian politics. Following the official transfer of the presidency from Sukarno to Soeharto in March 1968, Soeharto consolidated military rule by emphasizing 'stability and order' as the necessary preconditions for economic recovery and development – long sidelined by Sukarno in pursuing his anti-Western foreign policies.

Unlike the previous regime led by Sukarno, who – as the leader of national independence – favoured populist mobilization of political forces to consolidate national integration and pursue his radical domestic/foreign policies, Soeharto's Indonesia made economic modernization the primary goal of the government in order to 'save' the nation from the disastrous economic situation during the final years of Sukarno. The military's political control was justified as necessary to safeguard national stability as the foundation for economic development and modernization. It was against this background that the concept of *dwifungsi* was created by ABRI to legitimize its involvement in non-military affairs, a move seen as the embodiment of ABRI's 'historical mission' to protect national unity since the war of independence.[4] Since *dwifungsi*'s primary goal in the New Order polity was the maintenance of national stability for economic development, several political programmes were introduced to this end.

Political repression and ideological surveillance were the major tools in constructing and maintaining the New Order regime. Soon after the 1965 coup attempt, the army established a security agency, the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib) – headed by Soeharto himself – which conducted a wide range of internal security activities, including the ideological screening of party candidates and government employees, the elimination of communist remnants and the suppression of campus and labour activists. With this 'military within the military' as the core of ABRI's repressive apparatus, everyday politico-ideological surveillance was institutionalized in the social life of Indonesia.[5] Kopkamtib's activities were backed by the military area commands which controlled political life in each geographic territory.[6] In remote areas of the archipelago – e.g. Aceh, Irian Jaya, and East Timor (annexed in 1976) – security operations against separatist elements became standard practice, terrorizing many local residents. In urban areas, military repression targeted the press, students, intellectuals, Islamic groups and labour and legal activists, who were often labelled anti-Pancasila.[7] Mass demonstrations were repeatedly repressed by security forces. The 1974 Malari Affair, the 1977–1978 student movements and the 1984 Tanjung Priok incident were notable cases.[8] In the name of establishing a stable political system, ABRI relied on repressive political control with the doctrinal backup of *dwifungsi*.

Together with the repression of opposition, social participation in the formal political structure was tightly restricted. To ensure the regime's stability, the influence of the existing political parties was reduced drastically by establishing a governmental party, Golkar (Golongan Karya, or Functional Group), which all public servants were forced to join and support. Since the first New Order election in 1971, Golkar always held a large parliamentary majority, while other political parties were compelled to merge into two – the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or United Development Party) consisting of the old Islamic parties, and the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, or Indonesian Democratic Party) which integrated secure-nationalist and Christian parties.[9] ABRI members were also 'appointed' to parliament (DPR) where they sat as members of the ABRI 'faction' (F-ABRI) both at national and regional levels as part of the *dwifungsi* mission to ensure political stability in the legislative sector. ABRI members also penetrated non-military administrative bodies, occupying key positions from department ministers to village heads. Sending officers to non-military sectors, called *kekaryaan*, was justified as a necessary measure to secure the smooth implementation of the government's development projects and to overcome alleged civilian incompetence in handling government tasks.[10] The implementation of *dwifungsi* – namely, the backing for Golkar, *kekaryaan* penetration, and military representation in parliament – tightly restricted political participation.

The development of the New Order regime was, however, not free from internal conflict. First, within the elite structure, the rivalries between officers frequently undermined the regime's cohesion. In the early 1970s, the antagonism between Maj. Gen. Ali Moertopo, who had served Soeharto as his personal adviser since the 1950s, and General Soemitro, who had led Kopkamtib, culminated in the Malari Affair.[11] In the early 1980s, several prominent retired officers, including Gen. (ret.) A.H. Nasution, to whom the *dwifungsi* concept is often attributed, accused Soeharto and ABRI of misleading the nation and established a critical group consisting of fifty members – including retired officers and civilian intellectuals – who called themselves Petisi 50 (Petition of 50).[12] Soeharto's inner circle of officers – Admiral Sudomo, Lt. Gen. Yoga Sugomo and Maj. Gen. Benny Moerdani – labelled these retired officers *sakit hati* (sick at heart) generals.[13]

Intra-regime friction re-emerged in the late 1980s. From 1983 to 1988, Moerdani, as ABRI Commander (Pangab), consolidated his power base by establishing the Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS), subsuming the role of Pusintelstrat and many of the intelligence functions of Kopkamtib. Soeharto's reliance on Moerdani's hardline ABRI was significant for the strengthening of political controls during 1984–1985 when the government forced all social organizations to accept Pancasila as their sole ideological basis in 1984 and in 1985 imposed five political laws to further restrict political participation.[14] Soeharto, however, began to find that he had become too dependent on ABRI and started to widen his power base by relying less on ABRI in non-security affairs. Under Soeharto's Fourth Development Cabinet (1983–1988), Sudharmono, the head of

the state secretariat (Sekneg), was given increased presidential trust. Sekneg had authority over development allocations and allocated much of it for the strengthening of the business activities of indigenous Indonesians, or *pribumi*, with the resulting decline of budget allocations to ABRI's business activities. Also, as the Golkar Chairman during 1983–1988, Sudharmono attempted to make Golkar more independent from ABRI, recruiting new cadres from the ranks of business who might provide financial support for Golkar, which would in turn reduce ABRI's influence in Golkar administration.[15]

It was against this background that Moerdani moved to block Soeharto's attempt to appoint Sudharmono vice-president in 1988, as seen in the 'interruption' of a meeting of the MPR (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, or People's Consultative Assembly) by a F-ABRI member, Brig. Gen. Ibrahim Saleh, who objected openly to Sudharmono's vice-presidency.[16] This move was not successful and exacerbated the cleavage between Soeharto and Moerdani. In this context, Soeharto's decision to abolish Kopkamtib in late 1988 was viewed widely as an attempt to weaken ABRI's institutional power base. The period between 1988 and 1993 saw a deepening conflict between Moerdani's group and Soeharto's Palace circle now led by Sudharmono.[17]

Apart from intra-regime friction, the New Order faced the need to accommodate historical and social change. Two decades of the Soeharto polity since the mid-1960s had produced an environment which delegitimized authoritarian practices. First, the very 'success' of economic development had created a new middle-class layer which embraced critical intellectuals and legal activists who forced the base of the critical sector in political society. Second, in the mid-1980s, Indonesia was required to implement a series of deregulation policies as its economy moved from resource-export and import-substitution to export-oriented industrialization.[18] This process inevitably demanded that Indonesia facilitate political transparency to attract more foreign investment for further economic growth. Third, it was ironic that Soeharto's 'successful' implementation of his political programme in 1984–1985 undermined the rationale for prioritizing 'security' in political life because it now seemed irrelevant to rely on the regime slogan of 'threat to Pancasila' in repressing political groups which had already accepted that very philosophy. Finally, military officers who had participated in the independence war gradually reached their retirement age in the mid-1980s, and ABRI was inherited by post-revolutionary generation officers such as Try Sutrisno, who became Pangab in 1988. Since *dwifungsi* had largely been legitimized as ABRI's historical right to participate in national affairs arising from its role in the independence war, the change in generation inevitably raised a reasonable question in society about ABRI's continuous dominance in politics: why should the younger generation officers who did not participate in the independence war also enjoy the political 'privileges' given to the 1945-generation officers.

These social changes all contributed to the erosion of the legitimacy of New Order authoritarianism. Growing social demands for political democratization resonated with the intra-elite conflict outlined above and led to the genesis of

keterbukaan in the late 1980s. How did the *keterbukaan* slogan evolve in political society, and how did it incorporate criticism of *dwifungsi* in its scope? We will scrutinize the first phase of the interaction between *keterbukaan* and the *dwifungsi* debate in the next section.

Keterbukaan and *dwifungsi*

The *keterbukaan* era was sparked by a comment in May 1989 by the retiring US ambassador to Indonesia, Paul Wolfowitz, who said that Indonesia would need openness in politics commensurate with the success of economic openness and deregulation.[19] Surprisingly, Wolfowitz's comment was quickly taken up by some members of the DPR from the ABRI and Golkar factions who called on the DPR to discuss the need for political openness. They invited the outspoken former Kopkamtib Commander, General (ret.) Soemitro, to a hearing of Commission II (Internal Affairs) of the DPR, led by Maj. Gen. Samsuddin from F-ABRI, to talk about the openness idea on 21 June and again the following week.[20] This signalled that permissible political discourse now included regime criticism in public, creating a new and uncharted political space in the New Order polity, especially when Samsuddin said that he had not received a warning from ABRI Headquarters, implying a tolerant posture taken by the ABRI leadership towards this debate.[21] It was widely believed that Defence Minister (Menhankam) Benny Moerdani and Pangab Try Sutrisno intended to use this new development in the DPR to put pressure on Soeharto, from whom they had become increasingly estranged. For the next few months, media coverage of *keterbukaan* dominated political society.

Initially the demand for political openness was not linked directly to the role of ABRI. Perhaps this was one reason why several officers contributed to the opening up of political space to discuss critical issues in public. An indication of military thinking was revealed in December 1989, when the Army Chief of Staff (KSAD), Gen. Edi Sudradjat, addressed the military academy (Akabri). Reflecting the new mood of political debate, he emphasized that unilateral decisions imposed by the government on the public were becoming counter-productive, and argued that ABRI officers in the current context needed the ability to accommodate the exchange of views and to conduct a rational political debate.[22] Two months later the *Jakarta Post* wrote in an editorial that 'some of the DPR members thought General Sudradjat's statement represented a new policy line that had been agreed upon within the army'.[23] As if emphasizing ABRI's new policy line, an ABRI intellectual, Maj. Gen. Z.A. Maulani, Commander of the Kalimantan Military Command (Kodam VI/Tanjungpura), said that even debating *dwifungsi* was not taboo.[24] This approach was echoed by the Interior Minister (Mendagri) Gen. (ret.) Rudini, an ally of Moerdani, who endorsed the initiative of F-ABRI in the ongoing political debate by saying 'F-ABRI's vocal role is due to its commitment to the Constitution (UUD45) and ABRI's *dwifungsi*'.[25] These comments were all viewed as messages indicating that ABRI was not against the escalation of 'regime' criticism.

The new trend was well reflected in a dialogue between top ABRI leaders and intellectuals in mid-May 1990.[26] In this two-day forum, both ABRI and the intellectual participants insisted on the need to give attention to the widening social gap between the rich and the poor. This consensus was well publicized in the media and seemed to confirm that reform-minded officers were now in leadership positions. From the perspective of the Soeharto–ABRI antagonism at that time, it was understandable that the Moerdani group tried to popularize the problem of the social gap (*kesenjangan sosial*) which implied that Soeharto's policy management should be criticized. Some commentators even regarded these officers as 'intellectuals in uniform' whose perceptions were not so different from civilian intellectuals.[27] The dialogue aired two new ideas which resonated powerfully in the political society. First, that open civil–military communication could be institutionalized, and second, that the new 'intellectual' officers were revisionists regarding the country's political-economic life. It was only after this that the political marketplace was opened up for a public debate about *dwifungsi*.

President Soeharto did not remain passive as the ABRI leaders encouraged public criticism directed at the regime. In early November 1990, Soeharto gave an important speech in which he turned the spotlight onto ABRI. Receiving a visit from high-ranking officers following an ABRI Leadership Meeting (Rapim ABRI), he emphasized that ABRI's role in society should be *tut wuri handayani*.[28] Although ABRI repeatedly said that *tut wuri handayani* was not a new term because it was already part of ABRI's ethical codes, critics kept asking whether or not Soeharto wanted ABRI to 'return to the barracks' and to what extent ABRI was actually changing its current posture in line with the President's request. Since it was Soeharto, as President and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, who seemed to be implying a need to shift ABRI's posture, it inevitably gave critics some ammunition to question ABRI's implementation of *dwifungsi*. For them, whatever the interpretation of *tut wuri handayani*, it at least contained a suggestion that ABRI should somehow reduce its presence in the political arena. From the perspective of critics, Soeharto's statement allowed them to seek visible changes in the ABRI-dominated political structure. A place to legitimately argue about the *dwifungsi* problem was provided in the country's public political arena.

The demand for ABRI to practise *tut wuri handayani* reflected Soeharto's strategy of relying more on civilian support. In December 1990, a month after his speech, Soeharto sponsored the formation of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI).[29] The ABRI leaders were very suspicious of ICMI, partly because of their ideological concern that political mobilization of Islamic forces could undermine the Pancasila-based state system, but mainly due to the following: (1) a suspicion among Moerdani's circle that Soeharto was attempting to counterbalance ABRI by creating ICMI for the securing of his political power; and (2) their concern that the chairman of ICMI, Professor B.J. Habibie, Minister of Research and Technology and Soeharto's long-time associate, would consolidate his independent power base outside of military control and challenge

ABRI in the presidential and vice-presidential elections in 1993. Soeharto's *tut wuri handayani* statement was followed by his overt rapprochement with Islam in 1991. Shortly after ICMI's establishment, the President gave permission to Muslim schoolgirls to wear the *jilbab* (religious veils) to classes. Then, in June, Soeharto himself made the pilgrimage to Mecca and became a *haji*, and in November, an Islamic bank, the Bank Muamalat, was established. In the eyes of the military leadership, led by Moerdani and Try Sutrisno, these actions were a clear indication that Soeharto no longer wanted to rely fully on them in securing his political power, and was trying to find a base outside ABRI.

Soeharto's attempt to undermine the Moerdani–Sutrisno coupling was also apparent after ABRI troops fired on thousands of demonstrators in Dili, East Timor, on 12 November 1991.[30] One day after the incident, Try Sutrisno condemned the demonstrators for causing chaos and claimed that the troops were forced to shoot when the mob brutally attacked soldiers. However, Soeharto – as ABRI's Supreme Commander – quickly decided to dismiss two officers, Brig. Gen. Warouw and Maj. Gen. Sintong Panjaitan, who, although not directly involved in the shooting, were considered formally responsible for violations taking place within their areas of command.[31] It was the first time in the New Order period that officers of the rank of General were held responsible for the shooting of civilians by their troops. In addition, soldiers directly involved in the shooting were court-martialled. Soeharto's measures were resented by many ABRI officers who believed that the shooting was the proper response. As a result, officers began to feel that Soeharto was not willing to protect ABRI's institutional interests.[32] It was also noted that the two dismissed senior officers were both Christians and regarded as being aligned with Moerdani.

The Dili incident was a perfect opportunity for political society to question the military's repressive behaviour. In the DPR's Commission I, this problem was quickly raised by the Interior Minister, Rudini, and Marzuki Darusman, an outspoken young Golkar parliamentarian. Rudini argued that ABRI's repressive approach could destroy political awareness in society. This comment by the Interior Minister was welcomed at the DPR meeting and Marzuki likewise stressed that it was time to end the repressive approach in conducting *dwifungsi*.[33] The comments by the outspoken retired general and the Golkar member of parliament – who were both supporters of *keterbukaan* – showed that although ABRI had encouraged the move towards more political openness, the new atmosphere could also be used to criticize ABRI itself. Reacting to the new turn in regime criticism, Moerdani's Chief of Staff for Social and Political Affairs (Kassospol), Lt. Gen. Harsudiono Hartas, insisted on the irrelevance of 'Western' human rights concepts applied in Indonesia where the cultural background was different.[34] The growing critical discourse continued to target ABRI, as was apparent in a conference held by the Indonesian Youth Forum (Forum Pemuda Indonesia) soon after the Dili incident. Despite the title of the conference, 'ABRI's Regeneration and National-State-Social Life', media reports indicated concern about ABRI's repressive practices.[35] It seemed that,

following his *tut wuri handayani* statement, Soeharto's decision to punish ABRI for the Dili case again provided an opportunity for society to openly criticize *dwifungsi* and bring it up as a central issue for the *keterbukaan* movement.

The evolution of *keterbukaan* was, in its early stages (1989–1991), largely a function of the deepening antagonism between Soeharto and Moerdani's ABRI. The weakening regime cohesion had effectively provided a space in political society to conduct critical debates under the slogan of *keterbukaan*. As long as criticism was believed to undermine Soeharto's political legitimacy, for example, by questioning the increasing gap between the rich and the poor, or more generally the regime's authoritarian structure, ABRI had allowed critics to express their views. On the other hand, Soeharto had played the leading role in bringing *dwifungsi* problems into the scope of *keterbukaan*. His attempt at marginalizing Moerdani's ABRI was reflected in his statement about *tut wuri handayani* and the decision to sack two generals after the Dili incident, which both contributed to the opening up of the *dwifungsi* question in society as a legitimate theme under the current atmosphere of *keterbukaan*. Thus, *keterbukaan* developed principally as a result of Soeharto–ABRI friction as each side encouraged public criticism of the other, and this trait coloured early *dwifungsi–keterbukaan* interaction.

Breaking old taboos

The Soeharto–ABRI antagonism was reflected in the June 1992 general election in which ABRI reduced its support of Golkar whose vote fell correspondingly from 73 percent in 1987 to 68 percent. The ABRI leadership also 'tolerated' retired officers giving support to the PDI.[36] While ABRI's reduced commitment to Golkar was explained by ABRI leaders as the embodiment of *dwifungsi*'s ideal to perform as the 'national guardian' – who should be neutral towards all political parties – and its respect for parliamentary life, it was also an effective reminder to Soeharto that the established New Order political system could not be maintained without ABRI's active support.

However, there was an unintended consequence. ABRI's appeal for 'neutrality' during the election encouraged political society to argue about the best way to promote ABRI's neutrality in parliamentary life. In June, a vocal politician from the PPP, Sri Bintang Pamungkas, proposed that ABRI's dual function should be reviewed in parliament every five years. The DPR's Commission II raised the ABRI issue for internal discussion. On 8 July, a long-standing critic of the New Order, Arbi Sanit (a political scientist at the University of Indonesia [UI]), was invited to the Commission's hearing. He argued that 100 ABRI members in the legislative body were too many, and asserted that, even without members of parliament, ABRI could still be a pressure group and thus maintain *dwifungsi*. Professor Miriam Budiardjo, also from UI, argued at the same hearing that the phased reduction in the number of ABRI members in the DPR would represent progress in the democratization process.[37] Their statements were welcomed by the media at large, enabling them to broach a political issue previously taboo.[38]

Military officers reacted negatively to these demands. Brig. Gen. (Police) Roekmini, one of the reform-minded officers in F-ABRI, who in general had been a strong supporter of *keterbukaan*, this time raised an objection. She stressed that debating *dwifungsi*, including ABRI's involvement in the DPR, was not relevant and not realistic. The Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs (Menko Polkam), the retired Admiral Sudomo, maintained that it was not impossible to reduce ABRI's seats in the DPR, but added that strong reasons and agreement among all four factions in the DPR would be needed first. In his view, if the purpose of the reduction was merely to encourage democracy, that would *not* constitute a strong reason.[39] Stimulated by these statements, the debate on F-ABRI reactivated the broader criticism of *dwifungsi*, albeit in a more cautious manner.

Soeharto was an active participant in the process and again intervened to curb debate. Speaking at the 19th anniversary of the National Youth Committee (KNPI) on 22 July, the President said that ABRI's participation in the DPR and MPR was intended to involve ABRI in the policy-making process in order to avoid a situation where ABRI might react with force against unwelcome policies.[40] This primitive threat was more a warning against the escalating critical debate in society than a defence of ABRI's position in parliament. In fact, in his independence day address a month later, Soeharto reopened the issue by suggesting that the number of F-ABRI could be adjusted.[41] These messages from above were soon deciphered in many ways by intellectuals and political elites. State Secretary (Sekneg) Maj. Gen. (ret.) Moerdiono decoded Soeharto's signal as a response to questions in society about the size of F-ABRI. He added that the important thing in ABRI's dual function was to maintain its sociopolitical role, not the practical number, implying a possible reduction in seats.[42] Sabam Sirait, a vocal PDI politician, responded by saying that 10 percent, i.e. 50 seats, would be enough for F-ABRI, while Marzuki Darusman of Golkar went further, arguing that ABRI's representation should eventually be limited to the MPR.[43]

The debate about ABRI's representation in the parliament was not new. The essence of this argument could be found in the criticisms made by the Petisi 50 Group in the early 1980s. Yet, this time there were telling differences in the surrounding political environment. First, the practice of *dwifungsi* was being debated in the national legislative body under the name of the government-endorsed *keterbukaan* programme. Second, the critical campaign was not led by a single group, such as Petisi 50, but had widespread support. Third, the debate seemingly covered technical issues rather than matters of principle, and thus effectively prevented it from being labelled anti-*dwifungsi* by ABRI. Fourth, but most importantly, it was Soeharto himself who gave the first green light after the 1992 election to 'break the taboo' with his suggestion of a reduction of the F-ABRI. For ABRI, escalation of criticism during this period revealed both that critical actors were no longer limited to certain small groups, which made it difficult for ABRI to pinpoint its counter-attack, as it had in the past against Petisi 50, and that the DPR's initiative in support of *keterbukaan* – which had also been

supported by ABRI – now involved a 'legitimate' movement against ABRI's traditional political interests. Significantly, such developments reflected Soeharto's counter-use of *keterbukaan* in his attempt to undermine the political influence of the military.

A few months later, ABRI's response to Soeharto was highlighted during the vice-presidential election at the MPR session in March 1993. In February, Kassospol Lt. Gen. Harsudiono Hartas announced ABRI's nomination of the military commander (Pangab), General Try Sutrisno, as the next vice-president. In facing ABRI's high-profile challenge, Soeharto – who is said to have favoured Habibie – finally accepted the *fait accompli*, choosing Try as his running mate for the Sixth Development Cabinet (1993–1998). This event, which illustrated ABRI's challenge to the President, was another 'breaking of a taboo', as it had been New Order practice for ABRI to wait for Soeharto to nominate his own vice-presidential candidate. Thus two taboos were broken during this short period, reflecting the Soeharto–ABRI cleavage. Meanwhile the *dwifungsi* issue was largely initiated by Soeharto in his contest with ABRI.

In March 1993 ten years of Moerdani's domination within the military came to an end when Soeharto reshuffled his Cabinet. Soeharto quickly moved to install loyal officers in the top military positions, which resulted in a massive personnel reshuffle in early 1993. This reshuffle was marked by the long-anticipated rise of an academy (AMN)-generation officer to the highest position in ABRI, with Edi Sudradjat, a graduate of AMN in 1960 (AMN 60), replacing Try Sutrisno as Pangab. This marked the beginning of a new phase in *dwifungsi* criticism – one generated by 'internal change' within ABRI and not just the product of Soeharto–ABRI antagonism.

Back-to-basics and professionalism

When Edi Sudradjat was promoted to the position of Pangab in February 1993, he retained his position as Army Chief of Staff (KSAD). He then also took Moerdani's post of Minister of Defence and Security (Menhankam) in March after the Cabinet reshuffle. Not only did the coupling of Pangab and Menhankam posts recall the pre-1983 situation before Moerdani became Pangab, but even more surprising was the fact that a single person occupied the three top military posts – Pangab, Menhankam and KSAD. Edi's pre-eminence, however, did not last long. On 8 April, General Wismoyo Arismunandar (AMN 63), a brother-in-law of Soeharto's wife, was appointed as the new KSAD and in May General Feisal Tanjung (AMN 62) succeeded to the post of Pangab. Edi was thus reduced to the function of Menhankam.[44] Both Wismoyo and Feisal were seen as closely allied to Soeharto. These leadership transfers in a very short time provided further stimulus to public debate regarding the new outlook of ABRI represented by new-generation officers.

A noted outspoken military intellectual, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Sayidiman, recognized that 'changes happening these days have a special colour in that it is the first time that all the command and staff functions from the Minister of Defence

downward are occupied by the "young generation" of officers who graduated from Army, Navy, Air Force and Police academies'. Regarding *dwifungsi*, he pointed out that 'it is indeed possible that there may be a certain change in the implementation of *kekaryaan* (posting officers to non-military jobs) as the modernization process of society requires more and more specialization and differentiation'.[45] It was also suggested in an editorial of the ICMI-affiliated *Republika* that 'with their professionalism, today's officers are capable of anticipating the change of the era. They are more prepared to face future challenges which are far more complicated than in the past and, by their nature, impossible to be handled by the military. This generation also understands civilian language and ways of thinking because they have grown up with peers who are now in civilian jobs. Thus we have no obstacle to mutual dialogue as Indonesians are no longer oriented to past merit, but to professionalism. This will purify the practice of *dwifungsi* that is still questioned by outsiders [non-ABRI]'.[46] This comment cautiously expressed 'hopes' about the new-generation officers, but its essential purpose was to downgrade any privileges ABRI had claimed in the past by emphasizing the new officers' similarity with their civilian counterparts. Here, the concept of professionalism which has long been associated with ABRI's self-esteem is tactically borrowed by civilians and reinterpreted to limit ABRI's special position in sociopolitical life.

Defending itself from this attempt to neutralize *dwifungsi*, ABRI's newspaper quickly responded: 'ABRI is professional military plus. The "plus" consists of its high consciousness that we are called on to defend the nation not only in the military field, but also in *ipoleksosbud* areas. ABRI formulates this role in the doctrine of dual function'.[47] ABRI's localized conception of professionalism represented an effort to reassert control of the public criticism which was threatening to erode ABRI's interpretation of its role.

The *dwifungsi* dispute took a new turn when Edi Sudradjat introduced his 'back-to-basics' concept. Officially the concept first appeared in 1992 when Army Chief Edi Sudradjat received Lt. Gen. Wismoyo as his new deputy on 22 August.[48] It was formally adopted as part of Edi's campaign to launch a moral movement aiming to refocus the army on its basic professional tasks and to correct several deviations within the army structure.[49] Media reactions, however, produced a new opportunity for extending the debate about ABRI's role by discussing the meaning of 'back-to-basics'. A cover story in *Tempo* (29 May 1993), for example, began as follows: 'All key posts in ABRI Headquarters were occupied by new people, and the concept of "back to basics" became popular. What is "back to basics" and how should it be practised?' A noted ABRI watcher, Dr Salim Said, argued that 'the concept implied a declining direct political role for ABRI. Edi Sudradjat has proposed the idea to develop ABRI as a security tool and it seems to follow the ideas of retired General A.H. Nasution who claimed soldiers should not intervene in all fields'.[50] The press also adopted the technique of locating this issue in a grey zone of hinted criticism. *Kompas* commented, for example, that 'as depicted in ABRI's self-motto that "we are loved by the people" (rather than scared by people), ABRI is nothing without the people. And because

ABRI is a fully armed group, it has to have strict discipline. Without this, ABRI is nothing more than a gang which intimidates the people. This is the "basic" of ABRI'.[51]

The back-to-basics idea raised two central questions: what was the purpose of this campaign?, and, what was the implication for *dwifungsi* practice? Regarding the purpose, the new Pangab, Gen. Feisal Tanjung, answered defensively in an interview that ' "back to basics" means refunctionalization of ABRI as freedom fighters and professional soldiers. It does not mean we now have deviations from basic norms'.[52] This assessment illustrated the lack of any single interpretation about ABRI's purpose, even within its top echelon, since the Edi Paper clearly mentioned that there were certain deviations within the military. Reflecting this, Soeharto warned in September that differences of opinion within ABRI, if aired publicly, would give the impression of conflict or tension which could create unrest among the people.[53] The second question about the implications for *dwifungsi* was raised again by Soeharto who repeated his *tut wuri handayani* instruction.[54] The coupling of *tut wuri handayani* and the back-to-basics concept was perceived in political society as a signal that Soeharto wanted ABRI to curtail its political role.

The escalation of the *dwifungsi* debate in this period – involving regeneration issues, the question of professionalism, and the back-to-basics concept – finally prompted ABRI to rein in the debate. Police Brig. Gen. Roekmini, a prominent advocate of *keterbukaan* in the DPR, provided an interpretation which reflected ABRI's official approach.[55] She stated, in a long article in *Angkatan Bersenjata*, that the recent critics could be divided into three groups. The first group consisted of those who viewed ABRI's extra-defence role as unconstitutional military intervention. They considered *dwifungsi* a political concept to legitimize and defend ABRI's political power, and they always placed ABRI in opposition to democracy, arguing that ABRI's presence limited democratic life. The second group consisted of those who were similarly unhappy with *dwifungsi*, stemming from their confusion about *dwifungsi* and *kekaryaan* in the extra-military field.[56] From their perspective, *kekaryaan* disturbed their careers and could not be accepted in terms of professionalism. The third group accepted *dwifungsi* as a concept which could not be separated from the Pancasila democratic system. They not only located ABRI in the context of national history, but also considered ABRI's presence as a 'must' to prevent national disintegration in this plural society. Roekmini then went on to claim that the first and second groups had recently interpreted back-to-basics as if it meant 'back-to-the-barracks', a concept associated with the military in Western democracies. Having denied the alleged decline of ABRI's political commitment, her article clearly articulated ABRI's view that back-to-basics was not intended to question *dwifungsi*.[57]

The question of ABRI's political role did not disappear however, and was highlighted by two events. First, the Golkar Congress was held in late October 1993. In accordance with Soeharto's wishes, the Congress elected Harmoko as its first civilian chairman. This civilianization of Golkar invited an extraordinary attack by the Deputy Head of F-ABRI, Maj. Gen. Sembiring Meliala, who said

that Harmoko and Habibie were nothing without the President and when the President was no longer in power, they would vanish.[58] The emergence of Harmoko certainly created a controversy regarding the prospects of the civilian sector in countering ABRI. *Kompas*, for example, argued that neither civilians nor ABRI today had revolutionary experience. Their ability was equal in their respective professional fields; thus the newspaper concluded that a rethinking of ABRI's political role was needed.[59]

Second, in January 1994 ABRI's strategic intelligence agency, BAIS, which had been developed by Benny Moerdani, was liquidated and replaced with the less powerful BIA (Badan Intelijen ABRI: ABRI Intelligence Agency). The end of BAIS saw the dismantling of the 'military within the military', in an institutional sense, and of Moerdani's powerful personal network. Justifying the change, Sudomo said that 'it was time to reconstruct the intelligence sector which has deviated from its "basic" task as seen in its direct involvement in land disputes, granting permits for fisheries and manipulation of sociopolitical organizations'.[60]

ABRI's previous attempt to depoliticize and reinterpret the concept of back-to-basics was not successful as unwelcome aspects of the *dwifungsi* debate continued. Backed both by the Golkar civilianization and the BAIS liquidation, the concept of back-to-basics started to provide a legitimate way to talk about the downsizing of ABRI's political role, regardless of ABRI's attempts to derail this possibility. Sri Bintang Pamungkas, for example, borrowed this concept to express his strong criticism of *dwifungsi*: 'considering today's very peaceful situation [in politics], back-to-basics of course equals back-to-the-barracks, because the basic function of the military is national defence'.[61] Retired military officers also called for a reduction of ABRI's political role. Lt. Gen. (ret.) Suhardiman, a member of Golkar's Central Leadership Council, called for the virtual abolition of ABRI's political role when he argued that 'the debate on back-to-basics, whether you like it or not, brings up the problem of *dwifungsi*. I think the sociopolitical function of ABRI should be conducted via Pepabri, and will not require Kassospol any more in the structure of ABRI'.[62] A less radical interpretation was proposed by Lt. Gen. (ret.) Soebijakto, former governor of the National Defence Institute (Lemhannas), who insisted that the Indonesian military under its first Commander, General Sudirman, engaged only in politics at the national level, and was not concerned with such posts as governor, regent (*bupati*) or ambassador. According to him, this was the meaning of 'basic' in the context of back-to-basics.[63] Retired Lt. Gen. Hasnan Habib also rejected an interpretation which limited back-to-basics to an internal technical adjustment, and insisted rather that it was a policy statement concerning *dwifungsi* practice, responding to the problems evident in the Dili incident and other cases of military repression.[64]

Reflecting this tendency to utilize the back-to-basics concept as an opening to limit *dwifungsi*, Gen. Edi Sudradjat himself finally claimed in February 1994 that 'the concepts of back-to-basics and *tut wuri handayani* today are manipulated by certain groups of people for their own interest'.[65] He regretted that some people

were deliberately misreading the term 'back-to-basics' as if it was 'back-to-the-barracks' and particularly mentioned the name of Sri Bintang Pamungkas, whose outlook he deemed too Westernized.[66] Edi's posture was soon adopted as ABRI's official answer to the recent back-to-basics debate. ABRI's official history, *50 Tahun ABRI*, recalled the dispute and also endorsed Edi's line that 'the concept developed outside of ABRI and reflected the interests of certain groups [*pihak tertentu*]'.[67]

For the ABRI leadership, back-to-basics had no implications for limiting ABRI's political role. Nonetheless, the use of the term 'back-to-basics' had opened opportunities to extend the criticism of *dwifungsi*. The concept not only provoked a political debate regarding its interpretation, but also supplied a useful umbrella for the media and society to use this opportunity to introduce wider criticisms concerning ABRI's role in the current political scene. The same could be said about *tut wuri handayani*, the new generation, and professionalism, all of which became common concepts in civil–military dialogue. The societal 'takeover' of these concepts in the evolving *dwifungsi* dispute during this period effectively expanded the arena of permissible political debate concerning the proper role of ABRI in the regime. Although Soeharto continued to play a role in triggering the *dwifungsi* debate, development of the criticism was largely carried by political society which had sought effective ways to pressure ABRI since the early *keterbukaan* period.

ABRI representation in the DPR

The next major phase in the *dwifungsi* dispute can be found after the MPR's decision to reduce in June 1995 the number of F-ABRI seats from 100 to 75. This stage showed the increasing autonomy of *dwifungsi* criticism as a social movement. As seen above, the reduction in parliamentary power of the F-ABRI was a product of the 1992 debate in which Soeharto and the ABRI leadership concluded that F-ABRI was still needed, but numbers could be reconsidered. Before discussing this development, it is important to assess the political background leading to the decision to scale down F-ABRI, which represents one of the strategic pillars of ABRI's political engagement.

Gen. Edi Sudradjat's statement in February 1994 regarding manipulation of the back-to-basics and *tut wuri handayani* concepts was a response to the growing influence and assertiveness of the political media which had enjoyed partial freedom under the *keterbukaan* phenomenon. For regime leaders, however, the amount of political leeway accorded to the media was still a function of regime stability as determined by them. Subsequent events in 1994 indicated that they had decided to put the media on a shorter leash. It was symbolic that Soeharto on 16 August, the eve of independence day, declared that '*keterbukaan* surely has a limit'.[68] Soeharto's desire to re-regulate political life had been evident two months earlier when three major weeklies – *Tempo*, *Editor* and the tabloid *DeTik* – were banned by the Minister of Information (and Golkar Chairman) Harmoko who cancelled their printing permits (SIUPP).[69]

The banning of the three magazines on 21 June resulted in demonstrations in Jakarta, demanding the reissue of the SIUPP for the banned magazines. These demonstrations were, however, soon repressed by security forces. Since then, Soeharto seemed to replace his *keterbukaan* rhetoric with the more familiar *ketertutupan* (closeness) style. This was the background to his speech of 16 August, which was followed by three events indicating a further tightening of political control. First was the recalling from parliament of two outspoken politicians, Bambang Warih Kusuma from Golkar and PPP's Sri Bintang Pamungkas, in January and February 1995.[70] Second, three journalists from *Independen*, an underground magazine published by the newly created association of sacked journalists, AJI, were arrested in March; two were former *Tempo* journalists. Shortly thereafter, PWI, the sole legal journalists' union, decided to expel thirteen PWI members associated with AJI, warning that any media group which continued to employ AJI members would lose its SIUPP.[71] Third, in May, a soothsayer Permadi – who the previous year had allegedly predicted that Soeharto would be replaced by Megawati in 1997 – was arrested on the charge of insulting the Prophet Mohammed by describing him as a dictator during an academic seminar at Gajah Mada University (UGM) in April of that year.[72]

This series of actions illustrated that the state still held the capacity to resort to repressive measures – without risking an intra-regime split – against democratic movements, regardless of growing criticism from the international arena and domestic civil society. In an attempt to wrongfoot his critics, Soeharto shrewdly moved to soften his image by making concessions in a liberal direction. The F-ABRI reduction in June was therefore in fact made in the context of re-regulating politics.

It is worth noting that the bill to cut the number of ABRI representatives in parliament, which was submitted on 23 April 1995 and passed by the DPR on 15 June, was not in response to pressure from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) whom Soeharto, on 21 February, had publicly assigned the task of conducting research on ABRI's representation in the DPR and the electoral system in general. Without waiting for the research results, which were finally announced in 1997, Sekneg Moerdiono, Interior Minister Yogie S. Memet and ABRI Commander (Pangab) Feisal Tanjung submitted the bill, undoubtedly with Soeharto's approval. Actually, in February and March, when the idea was still under consideration, Kassospol Lt. Gen. Moh. Ma'ruf had stated – possibly as a delaying tactic – that it would be necessary to wait until LIPI produced its results.[73] This indicated that the decision came from the highest levels prior to the submission of the bill, rather than from any consensus within the ABRI leadership, and gave rise to speculation that there was a gap between Soeharto's loyalist officers and ABRI's corporate interests.[74] If the aim was to create an image that the regime was still committed to the promotion of democracy, the timing of the bill was quite rational even though LIPI was left behind.

The reduction in F-ABRI seats provoked an active debate in the mass media. When the idea first appeared in February, Moerdiono reiterated that it was not intended to review *dwifungsi*, but was merely a technical review concerning the

proper number of F-ABRI seats.[75] This attempt to prevent a possible spillover of the debate and stifle critical views on *dwifungsi* was, however, easily side-stepped by the media which provoked a storm of debate. In response, the new Army Chief, General Hartono, who was installed in the post in February 1995, quickly warned the public not to link ABRI's sociopolitical role with the number of F-ABRI seats held.[76] Remarks made by Moerdiono and Hartono reflected well their anxiety about the increasing autonomy of the public movement to criticize ABRI's role in society.

Indeed, on 25 April, two days after the bill was submitted, Mulyana W. Kusumah, a leader of LBHI (Indonesian Legal Aid Institute), circulated a press release on the F-ABRI problem.[77] He argued, *inter alia*, that the plan to reduce the number of ABRI appointees in the DPR should also cover the regional parliaments. He went on to assert that although such a reduction in ABRI representation in the DPR certainly would not decrease ABRI's bargaining power in real politics, it surely would push forward the idea of redefining *dwifungsi* practice. On the same day, Gen. (ret.) A.H. Nasution cynically stated that 'it looks as if ABRI now recognizes that getting seats in the DPR without being elected is unconstitutional, and is also alien to the concept of *dwifungsi*'.[78] A critical view was also presented, before the bill's submission, by Arbi Sanit, who suggested that reducing the military presence in the DPR was necessary, and argued that the higher the number of appointees, the lower the level of democracy. He also proposed that the reduction could be done so incrementally, so eventually, after four or five elections, there would be no appointed members in the DPR.[79] The idea of limiting ABRI's participation to the MPR was also expressed by Afan Gaffar, a political scientist at the UGM, who urged that – in return for a reduction in numbers – it would be possible to give ABRI a veto-power in the MPR, which could be used to thwart efforts to replace Pancasila and also assure the military that it could continue to protect its vital interests.[80]

The idea of eradicating completely the presence of ABRI from the DPR was of course challenged by both moderates and conservatives in that group. Gen. (ret.) Rudini represented a middle-of-the-road position. Although reform-minded on most issues, as a former Army Chief, he also defended traditional ABRI positions. He argued that abandoning ABRI's presence in the DPR was not acceptable because ABRI, which also consists of 'citizens', had already given up (*melepaskan*) its voting rights in return for holding seats in the DPR. However, if the voting rights were restored to ABRI, this would invite a return to the negative situation witnessed in 1955 when the army was split along partisan lines.[81] Rudini's interpretation of F-ABRI's *raison d'être* – to avoid intra-ABRI conflict – seemingly strayed from official ideology, which insists that ABRI's sociopolitical function is legitimized in order to safeguard the nation, i.e. the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila, rather than for the sake of avoiding in-house conflict. However, this point was elaborated further by the ABRI spokesman (or Kapuspen), Brig. Gen. Syarwan Hamid, who emphasized practical rather than historical reasons for not restricting ABRI. He argued that F-ABRI was needed to fight against any threat to Pancasila, and in order to

perform this function effectively, the reduction in seats should not be too great.[82] Similarly, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Samsuddin, a *keterbukaan* advocate in F-ABRI who subsequently lost his position, emphasized the legal justification of the F-ABRI system which he saw as based on the National Consensus in 1967, Law No. 20/1982 and the 1985 political law.[83] These ideas were also supported by the 'civilian incompetence' theory. The political scientist, Amir Santoso of UI, also a director of the military-linked Centre for Policy and Development Studies (CPDS), noted the recent critical mood towards *dwifungsi* and the presence of F-ABRI, and argued that the demand to reduce ABRI's *kekaryaan* role was not the will of every social stratum, since the grass-roots people still needed ABRI because the authority and level of professionalism of civilians was still too weak. Moreover, he pointed to the fact that attendance of F-ABRI members in the DPR was higher than for the other three factions, thus providing a greater contribution to parliamentary life.[84]

The varying opinions outlined above certainly illustrate that even an essentially technical issue such as reducing the number of F-ABRI seats could easily be transformed into a matter of principle as the *dwifungsi* dispute developed. This implied that even after thirty years of *dwifungsi* institutionalization, there was still a large grey zone when it came to interpreting its legitimacy. Perhaps reflecting this fact, the mass media frequently brought in A.H. Nasution, the founder of *dwifungsi*, to judge whether or not the current situation met with the original intent. This time Nasution contributed to the dispute by reiterating his views in an article entitled 'Tut Wuri Handayani'.[85] His argument could be summarized as follows.

First, there is no restriction on ABRI entering the DPR – since the Constitution recognizes that all citizens have the right to vote and be elected. Recalling Indonesia's first election in 1955 where he himself was a member of the Preparatory Committee, Nasution emphasized the fact that he rejected Sukarno's proposal to appoint military representatives in parliament because, according to him, it was the people who should nominate and elect the parliamentary members. Thus, if military men want to be parliamentarians, they should be non-active during the campaign and go through the electoral procedure. If elected, they should give up their commissions and become politicians, but if not, they could return to active military service. However, the MPR is different since the Constitution provides for functional group representation in the MPR. Thus ABRI should only involve itself in big political issues ('P' *besar*) in the MPR, but not small ones ('p'*kecil*) in the DPR.[86] The two important points here are: rejection of ABRI's 'appointed' seats in parliament; and approval of 'semi-active' military personnel – whose status is non-active during the election but can be reactivated if not elected – participating in elections. In the evolving *dwifungsi* criticism, the first issue was often raised by critics of the military. Yet the second has never enjoyed large support either in critical circles or among *dwifungsi* old guard supporters.[87] It should be noted here that despite his symbolic presence as the *dwifungsi* creator-critic, Nasution's ideas did not become a major force in the ideological marketplace.

Even so, the fact that Nasution – now the only senior military officer who had ever exercised command over Soeharto during his military career – contributed energetically to the critical side in the debate provoked a negative reaction from Soeharto and a counter-interpretation concerning F-ABRI's rationale. In his address at the leadership meeting of FKPPI, on 18 June, Soeharto censured *dwifungsi* critics as follows:[88]

> There are some individuals who still raise the question of ABRI representation in the DPR. They wrongly interpret *dwifungsi* as if it is enough to be in the MPR, but ABRI's presence in the DPR is also a 'must' because Indonesia is based on *Ketahanan Nasional* which is strongly linked with development programs formulated on the basis of the cooperation between the government and the DPR. Thus if ABRI were to be excluded from the DPR, *Ketahanan Nasional* would also be in trouble. Those who insist that it is sufficient for ABRI to be represented in the MPR forget the fact that today's interpretation of *dwifungsi* is different from that of the pre-New Order period. Today, ABRI is recognised as a sociopolitical force equal to other sociopolitical forces in society, whereas in the past ABRI was just called on to play a sociopolitical role.[89]

Here, Soeharto turned to *Ketahanan Nasional* as the source of legitimacy for ABRI's institutional involvement in the legislative body. Though this logic seems to lack a plausible explanation for the link between occupying parliamentary seats and securing *Ketahanan Nasional*, F-ABRI is interpreted here as being an organic part of *Ketahanan Nasional*, and therefore an unquestioned national doctrine. It in effect implied that Soeharto read the criticism of F-ABRI as aimed at undermining the basic national doctrine or the national foundation, alarming critics who had developed different versions in deciphering F-ABRI's *raison d'être* and the art of *dwifungsi*. Needless to say, the main target was Nasution, the original interpreter of *dwifungsi*.

As seen above, the decision to reduce the number of F-ABRI seats inevitably raised the question of ABRI's legitimacy in conducting its non-military role. This stimulated a vigorous public political debate and finally resulted in Soeharto's defence of ABRI. What can be perceived during this period was the growing autonomy of *dwifungsi* criticism in the country's political life. The F-ABRI debate of 1995 indicated that the *dwifungsi* issue had already developed to the point at which it could not be handled by ABRI without the backing of Soeharto. By now, of course, Soeharto had rid himself of Moerdani and appointed a military leadership of his own choosing.

Nevertheless, in real politics, it was commonly understood that F-ABRI's numerical reduction would not affect ABRI's actual political power. Since ABRI's institutional power basis – largely originating from its territorial security structure, intelligence network, and sociopolitical command line extending from ABRI Headquarters down to the village level – remained untouched, critical intellectuals were generally pessimistic about curbing military influence in the

political arena.[90] Though ABRI's share of the parliamentary seats would formally decline after 1997, it was not difficult to suspect that ABRI might try to compensate for the loss by channelling its efforts through Golkar. In fact, Golkar–ABRI relations were soon to become a central political issue and invited another round of *dwifungsi* criticism.

Golkar–ABRI relations revisited

The empowered critical segment in political society then found a target in ABRI when the new military leadership under Feisal Tanjung overtly sided with Golkar in the 1997 election. ABRI's support of Golkar in the post-Moerdani era brought about a significant change in the constellation of elite politics.

Golkar's supremacy over ABRI?

In the midst of the F-ABRI debate, Harmoko, the first civilian chairman of Golkar, seemed to disparage ABRI's role in the party. He claimed that his own political success demonstrated that the civil–military distinction was not valid for Golkar, maintaining that 'once one becomes a Golkar candidate, he/she is a member of the Golkar Big Family (KBG), and no longer with ABRI'.[91] However, some significant mass organizations – such as FKPPI, Pepabri and Pemuda Panca Marga (the Youth of Five Duties, or PPM) – belonged to both KBG and the ABRI Big Family (KBA). Apart from this overlap in membership between the two Big Families, ABRI had been eager to influence non-KBA mass organizations in KBG by placing KBA members in leadership posts.[92] Given this, Harmoko's statement could not easily be accepted by ABRI.

As seen above, the civilianization of the Golkar chairmanship in 1993 was hard to swallow for ABRI. In response, ABRI strove to have KBA members elected as heads of Golkar Regional Leadership Councils, both at provincial (Tingkat I) and prefectural (kebupaten/kotamadya: Tingkat II) levels. This strategy was successful and resulted in 78 percent of Tingkat I and 70 percent of Tingkat II leaders also being KBA members.[93] Under such circumstances, it was not difficult to imagine that Harmoko's leadership might be threatened from below. It was in this context that Harmoko emphasized the independence of Golkar from ABRI.

Harmoko's remark soon stimulated a debate. At the end of June 1995, a well-publicized panel discussion was held in Jakarta and attended by a huge number of DPR politicians from Golkar, PPP and PDI. On this occasion, Gen. (ret.) Soemitro insisted that ABRI refrain once again from backing Golkar in the 1997 general elections, as it had in 1992. Of course it was not the first time that outspoken retired officers, including Soemitro, had spoken against ABRI's traditional commitment to Golkar. However, considering the timing and occasion of his comment, Soemitro's remark was picked up by the mass media.[94]

Harmoko reacted quickly, insisting at a meeting of Golkar cadres that ABRI itself did not support Golkar as its members were all individuals.[95] His implica-

tion was that ABRI as 'an institution' had no role in supporting Golkar. He argued that active ABRI members could not join Golkar unless they retired first, but ABRI-affiliated mass organizations, such as Pepabri, FKPPI, LVRI (the veterans' legion), could channel their political aspirations through Golkar as members of KBG. Such an interpretation placed KBA between Golkar and ABRI and also distinguished between ABRI and KBA. By denying ABRI's direct support for Golkar, Harmoko's argument was intended not only to rebut Soemitro but also to protect the autonomy of the Golkar leadership which could be questioned if it admitted ABRI's strong support for Golkar. Ironically, Harmoko's argument echoed an ABRI-created interpretation intended to rebut criticism that Golkar was a tool of ABRI – only this time it was reproduced by Harmoko to defend Golkar's independence. In early July, Harmoko reinforced his previous comment in an interview with a weekly magazine.[96] By emphasizing the difference between ABRI as 'organization' and 'individuals', Harmoko firmly denied the link with the military as an organization and stated that Golkar had only been backed by its cadres. Obviously the cadres included organizations under KBA, but he implied the supremacy of Golkar *vis-à-vis* ABRI in Golkar's management.

Military figures soon raised objections. The Secretary-General of Pepabri, retired Maj. Gen. Abdul Kadir, in an official letter, showed his distaste for Harmoko's explanation. Kadir claimed that it was baseless to see Pepabri as a unit of Golkar. Similarly, Achmad Tahir, head of LVRI, told Harmoko directly that not all members of LVRI channel their political aspirations through Golkar, as around 10 percent of its 800,000 members (or 11 million if their families are included) supported other political organizations.[97] From the active military side, Army Chief (KSAD) General Hartono further complicated the debate by saying that Pepabri as a mass organization (*ormas*) was not part of any political organization (*orsospol*), because only individuals in *ormas* may become cadres or members of *orsospol*.[98] At this stage Harmoko claimed that it was legitimate to say that the *ormas* in KBG supported Golkar in elections and therefore they were Golkar cadres. For Hartono, however, it was not *ormas*, but individuals (*orang-orang*) within the *ormas*, who supported Golkar and became its cadres – thus the *ormas*, in this case Pepabri and others in KBA, were not subordinate to Golkar. Hartono's remark did not deny ABRI's commitment to Golkar, but only rejected Golkar's control over KBA organizations affiliated to the KBG. It was under these circumstances that the dispute between Harmoko and KBA became apparent.[99]

This issue encouraged a more general debate on Golkar–ABRI relations. Afan Gaffar of UGM branded the recent argument regarding ABRI's link with Golkar as superficial, since it was common public knowledge that ABRI had a strong commitment to Golkar.[100] He labelled ABRI and Golkar as *loro-loring atunggal*, a Javanese expression for 'two but one'. Referring to Harmoko's statement that Golkar had never been backed by ABRI, Afan suggested that this was only for campaign purposes. Yahya Muhaimin at UGM also believed that it was impossible for Golkar to win elections without ABRI's backing at the Korem and Koramil levels.[101] Until this point, a large portion of the intellectual participation

in the debate seemed to be governed by a cynical view of Harmoko's statements. The mood changed, however, after Maj. Gen. Syarwan Hamid (Assistant to the ABRI Chief of Sociopolitical Affairs, or Assospol Kassospol) shifted the focus of debate from the Harmoko issue to the principle of *dwifungsi* in late September.

Syarwan's initiative

The lingering speculation that many ABRI officers were not satisfied with Harmoko's leadership of Golkar was clouded by the perception that General Feisal Tanjung had been close to the Habibie–Harmoko line. Before the Golkar Congress of 1993, Feisal had announced that ABRI would not nominate a candidate for the position of Golkar Chairman – a comment supporting Habibie's effort to promote Golkar civilianization and reversing Gen. Edi Sudradjat's (Minister of Defence and Security) previous statement that ABRI was ready to provide ten to twelve candidates for the race for the position.[102] It was in September 1995, when disharmony between ABRI and Golkar emerged in the public spotlight, that the ABRI Headquarters in Cilangkap, East Jakarta, again pursued rapprochement with Golkar under Harmoko. At a seminar entitled 'ABRI and Golkar', held by the Discussion Forum for Political Journalists on 28 September, Maj. Gen. Syarwan Hamid insisted that ABRI could not be neutral in politics because ABRI as a sociopolitical force needed to choose a partner to promote national well-being, and for this reason, ABRI's position was close to that of Golkar.[103] Five days later, Kapuspen Brig. Gen. Suwarno Adiwijoyo, who had inherited his post from Syarwan the previous March, asserted that 'if ABRI is asked to be neutral, it would mean that ABRI should abandon its principles (to maintain stability) and that is impossible'.[104] On the same day, just after a meeting with Soeharto, Feisal Tanjung further pushed the position taken by his staff by saying that 'KBA surely sides with Golkar, so ABRI, through the KBA, must channel its aspirations to Golkar'.[105]

Assessing ABRI as a whole, this rapprochement could be seen as an adjustment by Cilangkap – no doubt on Soeharto's instruction – to overcome the apparent gap between ABRI and Golkar. Feisal's statement effectively reversed Hartono's previous explanation on the KBA–Golkar relationship. More, the comments of Syarwan and Suwarno rejected ABRI's claim to 'stand above all groups'. Whatever their intentions, one obvious risk of proclaiming ABRI's proximity to Golkar was that it would raise the question of *dwifungsi*. This time, the dispute focused on two dimensions. One was the old argument about ABRI's neutrality in conducting *dwifungsi*. The other was the concern about a sectarian tendency in the ABRI leadership.

Neutrality in question

For many political observers, Syarwan's statement recalled Soeharto's famous speech at Pekanbaru in 1980 – similarly two years before an election – when he said that as a defence force ABRI was neutral, but as a sociopolitical force it

should side with forces which defend Pancasila and the Constitution.[106] Since Syarwan's and Feisal's comments were made just before the 50th ABRI Anniversary on 5 October, the argument exploded in the mass media and invited a huge outpouring of criticism from intellectuals.

The PDI and PPP reacted immediately. In the DPR Commission II, led by Maj. Gen. Hari Sabarno of F-ABRI, Subagyo of the PDI strongly criticized Syarwan's comment as contradicting Law No. 20/1982 which stated the official stance of ABRI on the dual function.[107] 'If ABRI cannot be neutral and only wants to work with a force which really respects Pancasila and the Constitution', he asked, 'does it mean PDI and PPP are not Pancasilaist and Constitutionalist?' He warned that Syarwan's comment would not only confuse people, but also invite social unrest. The PDI Head, Megawati Sukarnoputri, also showed her displeasure by warning that ABRI's stabilizing and dynamizing role should not end with merely becoming the implementor of government policy.[108] A similar criticism arose from PPP members who claimed that *dwifungsi* would lose its principles if it sided with Golkar, since by the mid-1980s all political parties already accepted Pancasila as their sole principle.[109]

Apart from the political parties, which would be directly harmed by ABRI's siding with Golkar, the mass media also focused on the issue. Soon after Syarwan's statement, *Suara Merdeka*, the leading Semarang newspaper, accused him of arbitrarily dichotomizing ABRI as a defence force and a sociopolitical force. Its editorial cynically argued that, 'however ABRI defines its role, it does not change the reality that ABRI was born from the *rakyat* (people), and thus must be neutral toward Golkar, PDI, and PPP, which all represent the people'.[110] Riswanda Imawan of UGM also stressed that the PPP and PDI were the products of the New Order just like Golkar, and claimed that Syarwan's announcement further blurred the legitimacy of *dwifungsi* which should be implemented in a neutral way as a tool for the state, not for the ruling political party.[111] Concern was also expressed in *Kompas*, which ran in its 5 October edition four long articles based on a panel discussion entitled 'Reflections on the 50th-anniversary of ABRI'. *Kompas* concluded that 'ABRI has already abandoned its neutrality, but given the fact that every political party now accepts Pancasila as its sole ideology, ABRI should reconsider its siding with one party and maintain the neutrality that is crucial to deter sectarian politics'.[112]

From revolutionary generation officers, the 'deviation' argument was typically heard. Navy Lt. Gen. (ret.) Ali Sadikin, the head of the critical Petisi 50 group, declared that ABRI today was not the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia but the Armed Forces of Golkar (AB-Golkar), and insisted on the need to return to the spirit of Indonesia's first Army Commander Gen. Sudirman, who said: 'the politics ABRI supports is the politics of the nation, not politics of the government'.[113] More direct censure came from Lt. Gen. (ret.) Kemal Idris, a man widely believed to have been one of the founders of the New Order political system in the mid-1960s under Soeharto. For him, Syarwan's comment was unacceptable and illustrated the arrogance of power which made power-holders believe 'I can do no wrong'. According to this former Commander of Kostrad

(the army's elite strategic reserve command), Syarwan's view was not in accord with the intention of *dwifungsi* as officially formulated at the second Army Seminar in 1966, with which he himself had been deeply involved.[114]

The opposition point of view was argued by a respected ABRI intellectual, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Z.A. Maulani, former Pangdam VI/Tanjungpura (1988–1991) and former secretary-general of the Ministry of Transmigration, who was now Habibie's adviser on ABRI and defence–security issues.[115] Appearing in *Kompas*, his argument questioned the current tendency to assume that ABRI–Golkar segregation would automatically promote democracy. He argued that ABRI was badly needed by Golkar to function as a binding force (*pengikat*) to hold together the various elements and factions within Golkar. He feared that Golkar's sectarian politics might explode if it freed itself from ABRI, which in turn would undermine the prospects for democracy.[116]

While these opinions were essentially aimed at the operational problem of ABRI's political role, Arbi Sanit commented on principles. 'There is nothing wrong with Syarwan's abandoning of neutrality because it is a natural consequence of having the dual function idea'. The simple fact, according to Arbi Sanit, was that as long as *dwifungsi* existed, ABRI could not be neutral.[117] His approach was to seek the cause of the problem in the existence of *dwifungsi* itself, rather than in its implementation. His analysis reflected the voice of civilian reformers who disagreed with those who argued that it was implementation, not principle, which was the source of the problem.

As the Golkar–ABRI debate fostered a critical mood in political society, General Feisal Tanjung returned to a simple pragmatic attitude. In a magazine interview, he asserted that there was no political activity without having partners; thus 'ABRI–Golkar' was a practical concept from this perspective. Asked further about how to distinguish between sociopolitical and defence forces, the ABRI Commander declared that they were overlapping and hardly distinguishable.[118] Despite frequent voices from ABRI leaders saying that ABRI as a sociopolitical force sides with Golkar whereas ABRI as defence force remains neutral, Feisal's statement suggested that the distinction had no meaning in the practical world, and ABRI's backing of Golkar would continue regardless of doctrinal niceties. In the public eye, this amounted to ABRI's rejection of the self-defined legitimacy of *dwifungsi*.

Concern about sectarian politics

Another aspect of ABRI's rapprochement with Golkar in 1995 was the growing influence of ICMI led by Habibie. This was related to what seemed to be the ongoing Islamicization of ABRI and its potential to erode the basis of Pancasilaism in the New Order's secular political practice. The top three men in ABRI, i.e. Feisal, Hartono and Syarwan, were widely seen as ICMI-affiliated figures.[119] It is significant that they openly promoted closer ties with Golkar, which was lead by Harmoko who was also a member of ICMI's advisory board. This network of connections was enough to boost suspicions among secular offi-

cers within ABRI and in society about the further Islamicization and ICMI-ization of political life and the threat this might poise to their political position. Such a concern was reflected in the creation of a new political association, the Foundation for National Brotherhood Harmony (YKPK), soon after ABRI's rapprochement with Golkar. On 23 October 1995, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Bambang Triantoro (former Kassospol [1985–1987] under Moerdani), in his capacity as general chairman, announced the establishment of YKPK and explained at a press conference that it was motivated by growing concerns about national unity and integration.[120] This new grouping attracted much attention in political society, partly because it was seen as opposed to the sectarian ICMI and partly due to its high-profile participants.[121] The establishment of YKPK was of course welcomed by the secular military officers, with Gen. Edi Sudradjat describing it as 'excellent because they are very much concerned with building up the national spirit'.[122] It was also publicly endorsed by MPR Chairman, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Wahono, Minister of Transmigration Siswono and Minister of Environment Sarwono, who were all commonly regarded as being in the 'nationalist' camp within the Cabinet. Equally interesting was the emerging prominence of senior officers who retired in the age of *keterbukaan*, such as Bambang Triantoro, Kharis Suhud and Samsuddin. The presence of these discontented officers significantly boosted the political role of retired officers in the organized public arena, long dominated by Petisi 50 figures. This phenomenon was encouraged by the growing concern about the split between ICMI and non-ICMI in political life, which was most recently facilitated by the ABRI–Golkar fusion led by Feisal and Syarwan.

This was not the first time that year Edi Sudradjat had expressed his nationalist concerns. In facing the visible decline of ABRI's credibility in society, Edi had stressed three times during the preceding three months the need for strengthening nationalism within ABRI – thus demonstrating his concerns about sectarian tendencies within the military and its overt alliance with one particular political party. In July and again in August 1995, Edi warned that ABRI was now thought of as a 'tool of the rich' given the reality that some ABRI members had close ties with business tycoons and therefore conveyed the impression that ABRI was not above manipulation.[123] On 8 September, addressing an ABRI seminar, entitled 'Actualization of Struggle Values on the Occasion of Indonesia's Golden Anniversary and 50 Years of ABRI', Edi reiterated the need to cleanse ABRI and set it above suspicion in both the economic and political fields.[124] Edi's demand for housecleaning and his emphasis on nationalism and probity apparently signalled his displeasure with the current style of leadership in ABRI.

The Islamicization of the ABRI leadership itself was already a political topic since Hartono replaced General Wismoyo – a brother-in-law of Soeharto's wife – as KSAD in February 1995. The appointment of Hartono established the 'Feisal–Hartono duet' with the blessing of ICMI. Nevertheless, concern about sectarian politics became somewhat more visible and intensified after the ABRI–Golkar rapprochement and the launching of YKPK with its counter-emphasis on nationalism unaffiliated with a particular religion.[125] Interestingly,

Golkar members who joined YKPK were apparently among those marginalized by Harmoko due to their closeness with former Golkar chairman, Wahono. Of course, in public YKPK Chairman Bambang Triantoro denied the alleged intention to curb the runaway influence of Habibie and his ICMI, but in an interview he admitted that his 68-member grouping shared the thinking of Gen. (ret.) Moerdani – a leading anti-ICMI figure – though he was not involved directly in the establishment of YKPK.[126]

Bambang's movement, which was endorsed by Edi and 'shared' by Moerdani, was soon viewed as an anti-ICMI rainbow group (*kelompok pelangi*). In response, Syarwan Hamid questioned the significance of YKPK. When asked about ABRI's perception of ICMI, he said that many in ABRI hoped that ICMI could bring Muslims – who comprised 88 percent of the Indonesian population – into the mainstream of national development. At the same time, in replying to a question about the emergence of YKPK which enjoyed support from a group within ABRI, Syarwan warned that if it did not contribute to the national interest, the system would ostracize it and cause it to fade away before it could develop.[127]

The gap in Syarwan's assessments of ICMI and YKPK was quite contrary to that of a Defence Minister who saw the establishment of YKPK as fulfilling a 'need' to deepen the comprehension of the Archipelagic Concept, or *Wawasan Nusantara*, which respected national integration rather than group interests. According to Edi Sudradjat, *Wawasan Nusantara* was of the utmost value, but was now in question due to the manoeuvring of certain interest groups.[128] An actual attempt of the ABRI leadership to stifle YKPK occurred in connection with the First National YKPK Discussion held in Surabaya on 8–9 January in 1996, with the opening ceremony chaired by Wahono. Maj. Gen. Iman Utomo, a close ally of Hartono, who had commanded Kodam V/Brawijaya, East Java, appealed to his soldiers, veterans and Golkar members not to attend the discussion. All this showed that the emergence of YKPK reflected different perceptions and policy stances within ABRI, especially between the heads of two organizations (the Defence Ministry [Dephankam] and ABRI), and that this gap was basically rooted in their contrary views on, and links with, ICMI.

The two issues discussed above – i.e. neutrality and sectarian problems – sharpened the contradiction within the regime as ABRI's rapprochement with Golkar became apparent. The rejection of neutrality by Syarwan and Feisal reinvigorated a political dispute regarding ABRI's *dwifungsi* legitimacy. Moreover, a concern for the sectarian resurgence – which is examined here as the second dimension of ABRI's approach to Golkar – led to the formation of a new political movement to counter ICMI's growing influence. Both provided perfect opportunities to expand political space for those retired officers concerned about the ABRI problem.

ABRI as a cadre of Golkar

If the divergence in perception between the Minister of Defence and Security (Menhankam), on the one hand, and the ICMI-aligned ABRI Commander

(Pangab) and KSAD, on the other hand, became increasingly apparent from early 1995, it was soon followed by signs of another gap, this time between Feisal and Hartono. In March 1996, when addressing a Golkar meeting in Central Java, where Siti Hardijanti Rukmana (also known as Mbak Tutut), the President's oldest daughter and a chairperson of Golkar's Central Leadership Council, was also present, Hartono made a controversial statement in front of 5,000 Golkar cadres. He said: 'every ABRI member is a cadre of Golkar and there is no need for them to be dubious about stating their allegiance to Golkar'. Giving extraordinary praise to Mbak Tutut, he continued: 'as a Golkar cadre, my duty is to receive advice and instruction from Mbak Tutut'.[129] Next day, on 14 March, at the Sabilil Muttaqien Pesantren (Islamic School) in Magetan, East Java, this former Commander of East Java again expounded his theory of ABRI–Golkar relations. After a speech by Mbak Tutut, Hartono, who was wearing a Golkar yellow jacket, declared in front of Golkar supporters that 'Kodim commanders and regional police chiefs are members of Golkar's regional advisory council, which means that all their staff are also Golkar members'. Since not only local commanders, but even the ABRI Commander was a member of the Supervisors' Council, he concluded that all ABRI members were in fact Golkar cadres.[130]

Although ABRI leaders often pointed out that ABRI had established Golkar, Hartono's remarkable statement was the first in which a high-ranking military officer had implied ABRI's subordination to Golkar in such an explicit way. It was also quite contrary to Hartono's own previously expressed views which, as seen above, had rejected Harmoko's statement – that the KBA was an organization of Golkar cadres – by insisting that only individuals in the KBA were Golkar cadres. However, this reinterpretation of Golkar–ABRI relations was quickly corrected by the Cilangkap circle in the following days, indicating that Hartono had overstepped ABRI's standard civil–military theory, and also exceeded his capacity as Army Chief by talking as if he represented all four services within ABRI.

The next day General Feisal Tanjung explained that ABRI members who joined Golkar did so to 'supervise' it, meaning he rejected Hartono's view on subordination, and it was only the KBA – not ABRI as a whole – that was affiliated with Golkar.[131] Hartono's apparent eagerness to receive instructions from one of the Golkar chairpersons and his view that all ABRI members were cadres of Golkar was thus neutralized by Feisal who felt it necessary to restore the KBA to its position as an intermediary between Golkar and ABRI. Then, on 17 March, Syarwan Hamid, who was recently promoted to Kassospol ABRI, replacing Lt. Gen. Moch Ma'ruf, made an official announcement on behalf of the Pangab.[132] The military spokesman for sociopolitical affairs firmly announced that it was the KBA which became a Golkar cadre, and said that Hartono's statement was made in his personal capacity, not as Army Chief.[133] Such dissociation from Hartono's statement that 'ABRI members are Golkar's cadre from Pangab to Kodim' gave rise to two questions in the political community. First was speculation about the gap between the Habibie–Harmoko–

Feisal–Syarwan line and the Siti–Hartono line. The other was the fact that Hartono's extreme statement consequently allowed Cilangkap to drop its inhibition about declaring its backing for Golkar. In other words, by correcting Hartono's extreme theory, both Feisal and Syarwan obtained a chance to adopt a position somewhere between Hartono and their own previous stance. Now there was no hesitation to declare openly that ABRI supported Golkar, though all the while denying its subordination to Golkar.

This new position, however, soon alarmed the Minister of Defence and Security. When asked about Hartono's controversial statement and the subsequent explanation by Syarwan Hamid, Edi Sudradjat implied his disagreement by saying that ABRI should work with other sociopolitical forces and not just Golkar to help develop the nation.[134] Referring to Law No. 20/1982, Edi stressed ABRI's neutral attitude towards all political parties and the supremacy of the law over any other considerations.[135] Edi's critical stance was also backed by several retired generals and civilian leaders. For example, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Hasnan Habib argued that 'if ABRI sides with one group, it does not need F-ABRI any more'. 'Law No. 20/1982', Hasnan continued, 'neither allows civilian nor military supremacy, so ABRI can never be a cadre of the civilian Golkar'.[136] A YKPK activist, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Samsuddin, also stressed the inconsistency with ABRI's official doctrine, by maintaining that ABRI's triple commitment – Pancasila, Constitution and 'people's security and prosperity' – was the basis of ABRI's role as a catalyst in society, thus precluding ABRI from siding with any one group whichever it was.[137]

Criticisms were also aired in the PDI, which had actually experienced ABRI's heavy-handed intervention in its East Java Chapter during the leadership split between pro- and anti-Megawati factions. PDI legislator Marcel Beding voiced concern that if Hartono's statement became official policy, a whole range of political laws would have to be overhauled, and F-ABRI would have to be scrapped because ABRI would be able to channel its aspirations through Golkar. Sophan Sophian of the PDI added that if Hartono's view prevailed, the PDI would withdraw its support for ABRI's *dwifungsi*.[138] The Petisi 50 soon sent a letter to the DPR, saying that Hartono's stance contradicted the spirit of ABRI as codified in Sapta Marga and Sumpah Prajurit, and asking that the DPR demand that Soeharto review Hartono's position as Army Chief.[139]

Responding to these criticisms, Syarwan and Hartono finally settled on an interpretation which technically segregated 'individual' from 'institutional' participation. It is obvious, according to Syarwan, that Law No. 20/1982 required ABRI to work together with other sociopolitical forces to develop the nation, thus making the relations among them like a family where every family member should be treated equally. However, variations exist within the family, as if it has a father, mother, brother, and so on. It was in reference to this family metaphor that Syarwan justified ABRI's right to choose, *primus inter pares*, a partner (*mitra*) such as Golkar, whereas in the family as a whole there is impartiality.[140] Hartono's reasoning was more direct, as seen in his interview with the weekly *Tiras* a few months later. In defending his earlier position, Hartono

argued that ABRI as an institution and the members of ABRI should be understood as separate and distinct: 'The former cannot differentiate one group from others, but the latter can do so; thus Hartono as an individual is a cadre of Golkar'.[141]

These interpretations differentiating between individuals and institutions seemed to reflect ABRI's determination to acquiesce in Soeharto's regime project, which necessitated Golkar–ABRI cooperation to ensure that the coming general election could run smoothly and predictably, thus paving the way for his presidential re-election in 1998. However, ABRI's support of this project, led by Feisal, Syarwan and Hartono, inevitably came at a cost – highlighting the *dwifungsi* problem in society. Since ABRI officers had rationalized *dwifungsi* as necessary to safeguard the 'national' interest and therefore required it to stand 'above all groups', ABRI's declared siding with Golkar during this period was seen as an implicit rejection of *dwifungsi* legitimation. As we have seen, debate on this issue exploded and expanded political space in society to legitimately – and directly – criticize the core principle of *dwifungsi*.

Furthermore, ABRI's overt backing for Golkar under the Feisal–Hartono leadership had three consequences: (1) it exacerbated the split within the elite (namely between ICMI and secular-nationalist camps); (2) it strengthened ABRI's public image as a mere tool of Soeharto's private interests; and (3) it brought to the surface the cleavage within the military leadership – respectively, between Feisal and Hartono, who had different partners in Golkar, and between them and Edi Sudradjat. From this moment, a visible trend in the *dwifungsi* criticism was its growing focus on the second aspect – ABRI as a tool of Soeharto – while the first and third aspects resulted in an increase in the number of elite actors, especially retired officers, who criticized publicly policy deviations by the military leadership. In the face of such movements, the ABRI leadership was totally unable to control the deepening and widening of *dwifungsi* criticism. One result of this was the dogmatization of ABRI's response to critics.

The 27 July riot and red purge

ABRI's dogmatic response to critics was very apparent in the so-called '27 July Affair' which saw ham-fisted and praetorian state intervention in the affairs of the leading opposition party, the PDI, which involved the ousting of Megawati as leader of the party. This event illustrated Soeharto's political strategy to defeat the charismatic daughter of Sukarno in preparing for the 1997 general election and the 1998 presidential election. We will see how ABRI's obvious subordination in this scenario reignited the *dwifungsi* criticism and how ABRI responded in a dogmatic way. In order to assess these developments, this section investigates the 27 July Affair and the next section examines the critical movement.

Megawati was elected as the PDI chairperson at the end of 1993. It was Soeharto who had ordered the overthrow of the former party chair, Soerjadi, whose achievement of boosting PDI votes in the 1992 general election encouraged him to be assertive in demanding several reforms of the electoral system

and presidential selection procedure (from 'consensus' to voting) at the 1993 MPR sessions. Having received orders from Soeharto, Pangab Feisal Tanjung intervened in the party congress at Medan in July 1993 but failed to dislodge Soerjadi. ABRI then pressured the PDI's regional councils to put forward an alternative candidate for party chairperson. Ironically, they nominated Megawati and ABRI soon reacted to prevent the party officially endorsing Megawati as party chairperson. The struggle continued until December 1993 when ABRI finally approved a party conference in Jakarta which decided on Megawati as the new head of the PDI.[142]

It was not until three years later that another PDI Congress was set up in Medan by General Feisal Tanjung, clearly under the instruction of Soeharto – this time to topple Megawati and reinstate Soerjadi. This congress was held on 20–22 June and officially backed by the Interior Minister Yogie SM and Feisal Tanjung who insisted that the PDI leadership conflict was still unsolved. The rebel congress elected former PDI chairman Soerjadi to replace Megawati, and soon received government endorsement. Megawati then filed legal suits against senior government and military officials, including Yogie and Feisal, alleging that they had manipulated the congress in order to divide the party. She also launched a daily 'free speech forum' (*mimbar bebas*) at the party headquarters in central Jakarta. The forum was joined not only by Megawati's PDI supporters, but also by student groups and NGOs which demanded democratization. Bambang Widjojanto of the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute (YLBHI) defined the movement as 'people power' – suggesting an analogy with the anti-Marcos movement in the Philippines – and formed an alliance named MARI with other noted democratic activists.[143]

As the free speech forum developed from an intra-party protest to an anti-Soeharto grass-roots movement, the ABRI leadership started to view the problem in security terms, warning Megawati supporters to halt the forum. Having received a request from Soerjadi to gain control of the PDI headquarters, Jakarta Commander Maj. Gen. Sutiyoso announced on 25 July that any political action which disturbed law and order would be repressed. The following day, Syarwan warned that the forum had already evolved beyond a free speech meeting and was being manipulated by an anti-government movement.[144] The next morning around 800 government-supported Soerjadi cadres and other unidentified men – with the help of security forces, possibly including elite Army Special Forces (Kopassus) personnel in mufti – physically took over the PDI building, sparking a two-day mass riot and clashes with military troops. Brig. Gen. Zacky, as the Director of BIA's Internal Affairs Section, was also in charge of cleaning up Megawati supporters in Jakarta. Nearly 200 people were arrested during the first day of the riot, and many of these are still unaccounted for.[145] A few days later, Maj. Gen. Sutiyoso issued a 'shoot-on-sight' order to his soldiers.

It was Cilangkap's wish to shift public attention from the ABRI-manipulated Medan Congress to the alleged masterminds (*dalang*) of the riot. At a special meeting held on 29 July, Feisal and Police Chief Dibyo Widodo reported to Soeharto that it was the PRD (People's Democratic Party) which had planned

the riot.[146] This was followed by an intense campaign to link PRD with communism, the *bête noire* of the New Order government. Syarwan Hamid and his assistant, Maj. Gen. Suwarno Adiwidjojo, explained that the riot had nothing to do with the Megawati–Soerjadi conflict, but was engineered by a third party (*pihak ketiga*) – identified as the PRD, whose political manifesto, organizational structure and action strategy resembled those of the banned PKI.[147] Internal dissemination of this theory within ABRI was conducted in more intense and direct ways. Kapuspen Brig. Gen. Amir Syarifuddin wrote that previous riots and demonstrations – Irian Jaya in March, Ujung Pandang and West Kalimantan in April, Surabaya in July, and of course Jakarta on 27 July – had all been instigated by the communist PRD, while ABRI's Territorial Staff (Ster ABRI) concluded its analysis by insisting on the need to tighten regional security surveillance in anticipation of counter-actions by the underground members of the ultra-left PRD.[148] It seemed that ABRI was presenting the incident as a security disturbance led by the communist PRD in order to counter widespread perceptions that the incident was a consequence of ABRI following Soeharto's order to topple Megawati, the only politician with a chance of threatening Soeharto's stranglehold on Indonesian politics. Armed with this justification – saving the nation from communism – ABRI launched a security operation to crush the *hantu PKI* (PKI ghost).

Initially, criticism of ABRI was mainly focused on this dogmatic ghost-hunting and the use of extreme military means, as reflected in Maj. Gen. Sutiyoso's order to 'shoot-on-sight'. A day after the riot, on 31 July, MPR/DPR Speaker, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Wahono, asserted that ABRI should limit its repressive behaviour because *dwifungsi* only succeeds when ABRI has public support.[149] Former KSAD Gen. (ret.) Rudini also insisted that the time had passed when ABRI could invoke the spectre of communism to justify repressive measures, and ABRI – if it wanted to do so – now had to show strong evidence to support its accusations. Otherwise, he said that ABRI and the government would lose the people's trust.[150] Rudini's point was seized on by government critics who openly wondered why, if ABRI claimed to have known for some time that the PRD was communist, it waited until 27 July to smash the group. It was widely perceived that ABRI had acted in response to a request from the President who wanted to overthrow the *mimbar bebas* because it was talking about corruption at the nation's highest level.

The ghost-hunting strategy generated new problems however. Probably relying on a report in the weekly *Sinar*, the spokesman for East Java's Brawijaya regional military command, Lt. Col. Soebagio, announced that ABRI had found that 25 percent of the PRD's key activists were the offspring of people who had links with the outlawed PKI. He also referred to ABRI's ongoing investigation of the PRD's alleged connection with the Australian Labor Party (ALP), which he suspected had financed them.[151] The following day, however, Syarwan Hamid revised this allegation by indicating that the PRD was supported by some Australian labour organization; he did not mention the ALP. Although backed by Soeharto's public announcement that the PRD resembled the PKI, the

inaccuracy of ABRI's accusations was undeniable and strongly condemned by government critics.[152] Moreover, the immediate replacement of Lt. Gen. Soeyono, Chief of General Affairs (Kasum), who was hospitalized during the riot, following a motorcycle accident, suggested that the military might not have been united on the matter of 27 July. Soeyono, a former presidential adjutant, implied in his interview with a weekly magazine that a gap existed within ABRI about its role in the government-manipulated political infighting.[153] Clearly, the 27 July incident and the subsequent security operation revealed ABRI's internal problems both in terms of information gathering and operational conduct, which were naturally interpreted by mass media as reflecting ABRI's internal disharmony.

Meanwhile, the ABRI-launched anti-communism campaign began to be exploited in intra-elite political manoeuvring. The report on the PRD – which was sent from CIDES and reprinted in *Sinar* – attempted to verify the communist nature of the PRD, but it seemed to backfire when the director of CIDES himself, Adi Sasono, was rumoured to be involved in the group and communist activities (which he of course denied).[154] The invisible war continued with the spread of a theory linking the PRD and Liberation Theology – introduced allegedly by radical Catholic groups. This theory implied that the PRD's activity was a product of cooperation between left-wing and radical Catholic elements.[155] It was also in this context that YLBHI, in mid-September, received insistent demands from some Islamic groups to reopen the investigation into the Tanjung Priok incident in 1984, in which hundreds of Muslim people were killed at a time when ABRI was under the leadership of Gen. Benny Moerdani, a Catholic. ABRI's political project was quickly exploited by civilian political struggle, and this greatly complicated the issue, blurring as it did the origin of the problem – i.e. ABRI's intervention in the PDI.

The PRD case revealed that the politics of symbolism was method shaded by the various political groups regardless of affiliation. In celebrating Pancasila day on 1 October, Jakarta's main street, Jalan Soedirman, was decorated with large colourful posters warning of *Bahaya Laten Komunisme* (danger of latent communism) and presenting a chronological portrait of alleged communist insurgencies: Madium 1948, G30S/PKI 1965, *and* PRD 27 Juli 1996.[156] From ABRI's perspective, it was hoped that invoking the powerful symbol of a resurgent communism would allow it to neutralize any civilian activist who continued to insist on the removal of political regulations and the *dwifungsi* system. For civilian democratic forces, this situation was a major setback on the path to democratization.[157]

New reform pressures

In terms of the *dwifungsi* dispute, the PDI incident provided ammunition for the retired generals whose role was spotlighted in the Golkar–ABRI debate earlier in the year. Throughout the affair – from the Medan Congress to the 27 July operation, the shoot-on-sight order, and the 'red purge' campaign – the old soldiers had voiced concern about what they saw as ABRI's deviation from its doctrinal

origins. It was during this short period that society firmly witnessed the intensifying conflict between various retired officers and the current military leadership. Under these circumstances, civilian intellectuals led by LIPI publicized the first systematic demands in the history of the New Order for *dwifungsi* reform. This demonstrated that *dwifungsi*'s critics not only enjoyed an autonomous political space to conduct their campaigns under the authoritarian regime but that they were now also capable of turning the civil–military debate in a way that prevented ABRI from reacting dogmatically.

Prominence of the retired generals

It was soon after the Medan Congress that the high-profile YKPK, with Abdurrahman Wahid in attendance, held a press conference on 1 July 1996 to announce their statement of concern, entitled 'Return to the Glorious Ideals of the Nation'. The statement was signed by twenty-four public figures, including civilian activists from mass organizations, and submitted to Wahono, Speaker of the DPR/MPR. A few days later, the Minister of Defence and Security, General Edi Sudradjat, backed the move by stating that national stability could never be built on authoritarianism.[158] Criticism from retired officers grew louder following the subsequent repression and red purge during July and August. In response, Soeharto was said to have complained that retired officers often voiced ideas opposing Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, and that they made statements which were not consistent with their actions and views while on active duty.[159]

It was Edi Sudradjat who first responded to Soeharto's reported remarks by insisting on the need for constructive criticism from retired officers to facilitate democracy. Lt. Gen. (ret.) Solichin GP, former Governor of the Military Academy (Akabri), defended outspoken figures such as Bambang Triantoro, Kharis Suhud, and A.H. Nasution by saying, '…they criticize for the well-being of the nation, so the regime should not consider those who criticize as the enemy; it will be a loss for everyone in the country'. Nasution himself defended criticism by retired officers, arguing that if one is still committed to Pancasila and the Constitution, being critical is quite logical.[160]

In response, Menko Polkam Lt. Gen. (ret.) Soesilo Sudarman, who also headed Pepabri, supported Soeharto's remarks by maintaining that some retired officers tended to behave in inconsistent ways if judged from Pepabri's view. Sudomo also showed his annoyance, saying, '…if retired generals want to correct the nation and its development, they should direct their views to the President rather than advertise their problems in the mass media, as I have suggested to Petisi 50'. General Feisal Tanjung echoed this stance towards outspoken retirees. Recalling the 27 July riot, he saw the real problem as arising from the ideological distortion generated by the so-called 'rainbow alliance' (*aliansi pelangi*) with the communist PRD as its rising-star. He then blamed recent political-security fluctuation on the PRD, which he branded as radical and anti-New Order-ABRI; he concluded, in a dogmatic way, that the group was trying

to replace Pancasila and the Constitution. He stated that this unfavourable political condition was exacerbated by individual retired officers, stressing that they 'were deviating from military discipline and loyalty'.[161]

Feisal's remark invited harsh reactions from retired officers.[162] As if challenging Feisal, retired generals became more assertive in criticizing *dwifungsi*, not only in the media but particularly at ABRI's internal meetings. In early September, the 1996 ABRI Seminar was held. The seminar was designed by Cilangkap to receive *masukan* (input) from several experts regarding ABRI's policy preparation for the Seventh Development Cabinet starting from 1998. Lt. Gen. (ret.) Hasnan Habib objected to a statement written in ABRI's draft paper for the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN) and requested its revision. Pointing to the original statement that said that the emerging criticism of *dwifungsi* in society was caused by a dichotomy between civilians and the military, Hasnan asserted that the real reason was not the dichotomy, but rather ABRI's obvious domination of national life, which restricted people's political participation. *Dwifungsi*, he continued, cannot stand on legal legitimacy alone but should be based on the legitimacy awarded by the hearts of the people. Furthermore, objecting to a section that claimed Pancasila ideology was now threatened by communism, he contended that the threat was due rather to the government's arbitrary interpretation of Pancasila.[163]

Two months later, ABRI's Staff and Command College (Sesko ABRI) held a seminar, entitled 'Actualization of ABRI's Sociopolitical Role', to which noted retired officers and civilian intellectuals were invited. Gen. (ret.) Rudini, who had established the private Indonesian Institute for Strategic Studies (LPSI), on this occasion claimed that the concept of *dwifungsi* should be renewed in order to cope with new social developments.[164] Lt. Gen. (ret.) Harsudiono Hartas, former Kassospol, more openly argued that *dwifungsi* now deviated from its ideal. If such deviation continued, he concluded, it might also undermine ABRI's traditional value as a freedom-fighter.[165]

On the same day as the Sesko ABRI seminar, the Army Staff and Command College (Seskoad) in Bandung also held a panel discussion on *dwifungsi*. One of the panellists, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Z.A. Maulani, presented a critical approach to the current conduct and interpretation of *dwifungsi*, but from a different angle. He argued that ABRI's role as stabilizer and dynamizer in national life should be redefined because the former was no longer the monopoly of the military in present stable conditions while the latter was needed to realize *tut wuri handayani*. Moreover, he pointed to the influence of business-capitalist groups in ABRI as, for example, in land conflicts and industrial relations where ABRI sided with capitalist groups. He warned that the coalition between ABRI and various business and conglomerate interests had created a condition which was far from the army's original ideal and which undermined popular acceptance of *dwifungsi*.[166] Ironically, judging from previous debates, if the arguments forwarded by Hasnan, Rudini, Hartas and Maulani had been presented by civilian critics and NGOs, ABRI might have accused them of being too Westernized, as ignoring history, or possibly as anti-*dwifungsi* and thus anti-Pancasila and subversive.

Instead these retired generals played an important role in countering the growing dogmatism of the ABRI leadership. Nonetheless, responding to the intensive criticism at ABRI-sponsored seminars, Feisal Tanjung merely claimed that it was an irony of *dwifungsi* that its success invited criticism.[167]

The LIPI report: civilian control of the dwifungsi *debate*

As if to confirm Feisal's remark, a civilian group led by LIPI completed a two-year research project on the political role of ABRI, and held a seminar at the end of February 1997. This event can be assessed as the second stage of the evolving *dwifungsi* criticism, after the Jakarta riot and following the series of internal military meetings. When it was announced in February 1995 that LIPI had been asked by President Soeharto to conduct the research, public reaction was basically cynical because LIPI, a civilian organization operating under the government, was hardly expected to produce any drastic reform proposal.[168] Despite such speculation, the LIPI report – edited by a research team coordinated by Dr Indria Samego – soon became a focus of *dwifungsi* dispute by proposing that F-ABRI should be abolished by the year 2007. This was the first official voice from 'within' a governmental organ that proposed total dismantling of military representation in the DPR within a definite time limit.

The report compiled civilian views of *dwifungsi*, not only at the national level, but also including regional political elites as the target of research. The result provided an extensive analysis of current *dwifungsi* problems approached from various perspectives.[169] Backed by empirical data which distinguished it from typical petition-style papers, this civilian study presented systematic reform proposals. Among other things, the proposal to totally demilitarize parliament both at the national and regional levels by 2007 attracted the attention of political society because of its similarity to the ideas of outspoken retired officers. Indria Samego promptly explained that 'in almost all regions we surveyed, members of F-ABRI were too numerous and they are assessed by the people as lacking regional commitment due to their prior loyalty to the military command structure'.[170] In legitimizing its proposal, and presumably to avoid possible attack, LIPI emphasized two points. First, the study was conducted on the direct orders of *orang nomor satu* (No. 1 man: Soeharto); and second, it was empirically oriented and *melihat dari dalam* (viewed from within), asserting LIPI's objectivity and apolitical stance.[171] LIPI's approach aimed to prevent ABRI from employing its usual dogmatic approach as a means of shutting down communication.

Here, one interesting aspect was that, to defend its proposal, Indria actively borrowed ABRI's own conceptual distinction between *kekaryaan* and *dwifungsi*, which was originally invented to blur criticism of ABRI's takeover of non-military jobs, as we saw earlier in a statement by Brig. Gen. Roekmini concerning 'back-to-basics'. Now using ABRI's own weapon, the LIPI team emphasized that *kekaryaan* was not ABRI's sociopolitical role and therefore it was not *dwifungsi* that was being questioned, but *kekaryaan* as a structural reality.[172] Carefully managing

the debate in order to avoid being labelled anti-New Order, LIPI castigated the real institutional impediment, which in fact resulted from *dwifungsi*. In other words, *dwifungsi* language was used to criticize *dwifungsi* itself. Civilians now seemed to establish a discursive technique to condemn ABRI in a way that did not result in a dogmatic response. Here, for the first time, it seemed that civilians were controlling *dwifungsi* discourse.

In fact, military reactions to the proposal were mostly technical, moderate and defensive. Z.A. Maulani, who participated in the seminar as a panellist, commented in a weekly magazine that LIPI's study was generally acceptable but he regarded setting a time limit as not viable. Maj. Gen. Hari Sabarno, Deputy Head of F-ABRI, emphasized his group's contribution to the DPR by pointing to societal demands that ABRI remain in the parliament.[173] Maj. Gen. Prabowo Subianto, Kopassus Commander and a son-in-law of Soeharto, also responded by saying that whether *dwifungsi* should be limited or not depends on the people, not on ABRI, but regarding the LIPI study, he questioned the validity of the methodology which did not include the voices of non-elites. Brig. Gen. Slamet Supriyadi, who replaced Amir Syarifudin in the Kapuspen post in March, echoed ABRI's official rebuttal of this type of criticism. It was predictable, he said, that society would become more and more critical of the role of ABRI in the future, but whatever the situation, political power was dominated neither by civilians nor the military because ABRI's participation was adjusted in a proportional way.[174] On the civilian side, a noted ABRI watcher, Dr Salim Said, joined in the criticism. Mentioning a point in the LIPI study that called on ABRI to encourage better governance, he questioned how it would be possible to play such a role if ABRI were restricted – as suggested by LIPI – to the defence–security field.[175]

Regardless of the feasibility of the reform proposal, the fact that the LIPI team provoked an open debate on military withdrawal from the parliament put sufficient pressure on the Cilangkap circle for it to disseminate a 'correct' interpretation of *dwifungsi* prospects. Another seminar at Lemhannas regarding the future role of ABRI was held one month after the LIPI seminar. Lt. Gen. Hendropriyono argued that it was a fact that reorientation and redefinition of ABRI's political role were needed as ABRI, in facing globalization, was experiencing the erosion of traditional values, especially *semangat kejuangan* (spirit of struggle). However, *dwifungsi* should remain because it aimed to promote democratic practice in national political life where societal democratic forces were still weak and fragmented.[176] This well-publicized seminar proposed an official version of the adaptation of *dwifungsi* to growing democratic demands, as if in response to LIPI's challenge, although it avoided reference to the year 2007 and only provided a conceptual explanation. This seminar marked ABRI's final acceptance of the need for reforming *dwifungsi*, but the questions of scope, pace and degree of reform remained unanswered.

The next major stage of the *dwifungsi* dispute could be seen after the fall of Soeharto in May 1998. As we will see below, ABRI faced tremendous pressures to eliminate *dwifungsi* from ABRI's organizational practice. *Dwifungsi* would not

only become an open topic for political discussion but the principal target of political reform under the Habibie government. Why did this happen? In order to understand this development, we need to look at political events between the general election in May 1997 and the last day of Soeharto's rule on 21 May 1998. ABRI's internal unity was threatened and some elements turned to the use of terror in handling the political situation. 'Disunity and terror' significantly weakened the military 'capacity and legitimacy' to lead the pace and direction of the post-Soeharto political reconstruction. The demand to abolish *dwifungsi* soon became dominant in political society. In the final two sections, we scrutinize developments up to Soeharto's presidential re-election in March 1998 in order to elucidate why *dwifungsi* was on a collision course.

The 1997 general election

The general election of 1997 required military backing for the purpose of securing a landslide victory for Golkar in the face of growing public discontent with the regime's ousting of Megawati. ABRI's subordination to this project, as alluded to earlier, was accompanied by the intensification of *dwifungsi* criticism and a certain dogmatization of the military response to democratic movements. Public criticism now included the demand for substantial reform of *dwifungsi*. The military's apparent inability, even unwillingness, to maintain political stability during the eight months prior to the election day on 27 May resulted in an unprecedented series of mass riots spread around the archipelago.[177] Political society strongly suspected ABRI of engineering some of the riots, and two cases in particular were confidently described by the media as being provoked by the military. This inevitably reinforced public distrust of '*dwifungsi* as stabiliser'; the very rationale of the New Order military in politics.

First, following the riots in Situbondo and Tasikmalaya, which were both known as strongholds of NU (Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia), the NU leader and a major opponent of ICMI, Abdurrahman Wahid, claimed that riots had been instigated as part of what he called *Operasi Naga Hijau*, or Operation Green Dragon (green referring to Islam), which – according to Wahid – was a government attempt to discredit the NU and Wahid himself. This operation was portrayed as the next step after *Operasi Naga Merah* (Operation Red Dragon, referring to the PDI's symbolic colour of red) that had already toppled Megawati. In countering such pressure, Wahid stated publicly that he would form a coalition with the 'professional' side of the military to counter the 'political' side, implying ABRI's partial involvement in the riots.[178] A few days after the Tasikmalaya case, he insisted that 'there is an indication that the two riots were engineered by officers who used their staff in Korems to discredit my NU'.[179] Of course such a conspiracy theory was denied by Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid, who asserted that Indonesia was no longer employing methods characteristic of the Kopkamtib era.[180] Instead, he suggested that the riots were masterminded by intellectuals, but avoided mentioning the names which were, according to him, already known to intelligence staff.[181] Despite these measures,

no one was actually identified as the *dalang* (masterminds) and the rioting broke out in other places post-Tasikmalaya. Suspicion about ABRI's riot engineering also grew in political society.[182]

Second, in the case of the riots in Tanah Abang, Jakarta in January, Syarwan's earlier comment that ABRI was not involved in the riot was questioned by the mass media when local *preman* (hoodlums) living in the crowded Tanah Abang district spoke about their closeness to one of the rising generals, Maj. Gen. Prabowo, a son-in-law of Soeharto, despite his denial of the allegation in a national daily.[183] However, when another riot happened in Ambeno, 300 kilometres from Dili, in mid-February, Prabowo's link with the rioters was again publicized, because it was *pemuda* members of Garda Paksi Timor Timur, a Kopassus-established pro-integration organization, who started the riot. This time, he was forced to explain his relationship with the youth organization and announced that Kopassus never gave them military education or training, but only trained them in discipline and nationalism.[184] Whatever the relationship actually was, the disclosure that one army agency had an overt link with rioters in one case and a possible tie in the other sufficiently clouded Syarwan's efforts to eliminate the impression that elements in ABRI were *main api* (playing with fire).

Repeated announcements during the eight months prior to the election stating that riots were instigated by *pihak ketiga*, but without successfully identifying the actor, posed questions about ABRI's principal role as the political stabilizer. Reflecting such an assessment, Christianto Wibisono, a critic of *dwifungsi* who also signed the YKPK-led 'Statement of Concern on 1 July', wrote a lengthy article in which he concluded that 'it is nothing more than a myth to think that *dwifungsi* is a system unique to Indonesia, as always emphasized by ABRI. Rather it is not different from the military's political involvement typically seen in other praetorian military regimes'.[185] His argument which labelled *dwifungsi* as a myth was surely a reflection of the reality that political society no longer accepted ABRI's claim to be the national stabiliser.

In the wake of continuing riots, the general election of 1997 resulted in a victory for Golkar which received 74 percent of the votes (325 seats in the DPR), up from 68 percent in 1992. The PPP also increased its share to 23 percent (89 seats) from 17 percent in 1992, whereas the PDI, badly hit by a leadership battle between the ousted Megawati and government-backed Soerjadi, saw its share drop dramatically to 3 percent (11 seats) from 14.9 percent in the last election (Appendix 3). As a result, the New Order polity was transformed into a *de facto* two-party system which consisted of the governmental alliance, Golkar and F-ABRI, which together occupied 80 percent of the DPR seats, and one weak opposition party, the PPP. The election results also signified the virtual elimination of the PDI whose seat-share was only 2.2 percent. Therefore, the 1997 election succeeded in securing the victory of Golkar but failed significantly to retain the New Order's traditional 'corporatist strategy' in which political opposition was represented in the parliament by two tiny parties.[186]

The government's failure to neutralize the opposition power of Megawati circles – due to the simple exclusion of them from parliamentary politics – resulted in the further expansion of opposition 'outside' formal political channels. The subsequent growth of the student movement strongly reflected public distrust of the existing political mechanisms. It was as a result of this that street politics, faced with the military's security operations, began to give priority to the elimination of *dwifungsi* as the core target of the movement, together with the removal of Soeharto. The elite demand for *dwifungsi* reforms in recent years was now in synch with the expanding student movement, which had as its target the abolition of *dwifungsi*. The 1997 general election, in this sense, gave significant momentum to such dynamics.

The 1998 MPR sessions and declining cohesion within the military

Once the election was over, Soeharto's military focused on a new assignment with new players. Soeharto's command of the situation was obvious, and permitted him to secure presidential re-election at the general session of the MPR in March 1998. He made leadership changes to this end, and they significantly diminished ABRI's capacity to cope with the mounting social distrust of its political role.

The first wave of personnel transfers came soon after the 1997 election, when on 6 June Hartono was replaced as KSAD by the Kostrad Commander and former presidential adjutant Lt. Gen. Wiranto.[187] Wiranto was succeeded at Kostrad by another ex-adjutant, Maj. Gen. Soegiono, who had commanded the Presidential Security Squad (Paspampres). Finally, Pangdam IV/Deponegoro Maj. Gen. Soebagyo, a close associate of Hartono and a former presidential bodyguard, was elevated to Deputy Army Chief (WaKasad) under Wiranto. Two significant facts should be noted here.

First, as a result of the reshuffle, Soeharto loyalists and/or Palace generals dominated key positions in the security apparatus of ABRI: Wiranto as Army Chief, Widodo as Police Chief, Prabowo as Kopassus Commander and Soegiono as Kostrad Commander. Except for Prabowo, who was Soeharto's son-in-law, all were former adjutants/bodyguards of the President.[188] The leadership change within ABRI was Soeharto's final step in personalizing the military command in order to secure his presidential re-election. It was perceived as a signal that *dwifungsi* practice would now become a tool for preserving Soeharto's personal political interests.

Second, Wiranto's promotion effectively smoothed the way for Akabri graduates, as represented by Soebagyo (Akabri 1970) who became the first Akabri officer of three-star rank, followed by Soegiono (Akabri 1971) whose promotion also made him a three-star-general.[189] These officers only knew Soeharto as national leader, since their military schooling began after 1967 when Soeharto was already Acting President. The rise of Akabri officers was also seen when Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid and another 53 general-rank officers from all four services

were transferred to F-ABRI for the DPR 1997–2002.[190] This move, which replaced the top two sociopolitical staff and four Kodam Commanders, was followed by a massive overhaul of ABRI's strategic posts affecting nearly 300 officers. What attracted the attention of political society was the new sociopolitical leadership consisting of Lt. Gen. Yunus Yosfiah (an AMN graduate of 1965) who replaced Syarwan, and Maj. Gen. Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Akabri 1973) who succeeded Budi Harsono. Yudhoyono's function as the eventual spokesman for ABRI's future political programme was generally welcomed in the political community as an indication of Cilangkap's willingness to deepen civil–military communication.[191] It was the largest wave of personnel change since Hartono became KSAD in 1995. In August, Maj. Gen. Zacky Anwar Makarim (Akabri 1971) became the head of BIA (KaBIA) and in September, Brig. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin (Akabri 1974) – a close associate of Prabowo – replaced Sutiyoso as Pangdam Jaya. These post-election personnel changes reinvigorated the debate on the declining legitimacy of *dwifungsi* given that the Akabri graduates had even less claim to historical legitimacy than the AMN graduates.

The hard fact was that the leading generation had changed and now a group which had not been involved during the national crisis of the mid-1960s when the New Order regime was established was in charge of the army. As already stated, this invited further questions about the legitimate role of ABRI in future political life and the rationale of *dwifungsi*. As Indonesia's political community emphasized the professionalism and modernity of the Akabri graduates and distinguished them from preceding military generations, this changing of the guard could in turn be an opportunity for dismantling ABRI's historical legitimation of *dwifungsi*. It was Gen. (ret.) Rudini who drew attention to the nature of the new generation of leaders in ABRI. He wrote that the Akabri generation lacked 'basic principles', namely a historical commitment which justified the dominant role of preceding generations in Indonesian politics.[192]

In the view of the Minister of Defence and Security, such privileges were not limited to the broadly defined right of political intervention, but also included many opaque organizational practices. General Edi Sudradjat stressed to the succeeding generation that ABRI officers were forbidden to conduct any business activity. 'If there is one who is doing business', he said, 'the commander should discipline him'. 'If he is not disciplined, the commander will instead be disciplined, as written in the military discipline rules'.[193] Whether or not Edi's comment had any specific target was not clear, but the perception that the officers of the new generation should gradually relinquish social privileges was well reflected in Edi's unusual remark which resonated widely in society.

Since one of the features of the Akabri generation officers was their high educational level, and some in key posts even held overseas Master's degrees, society expected that their approach to *dwifungsi* management would be less dogmatic and more responsive to social change than their predecessors.'[194] One observer of ABRI politics, Josef Kristiadi, head of the political department in CSIS, noted that figures around Wiranto – such as Yudhoyono and the two

Aguses – recognized a need to redefine *dwifungsi*, and such a mood had been getting stronger within ABRI.[195] It was perceived that not a small number of ABRI officers recognized the danger of the increasing personalization of military commands by Soeharto, which weakened ABRI's capacity to protect its 'corporate' interest – i.e. promoting social legitimacy of *dwifungsi*. The rise of new intellectual officers therefore involved a potential challenge to existing Soeharto–ABRI relations constructed under the Feisal–Hartono leadership.

The possibility of such a move within ABRI was of course acknowledged by Soeharto himself. His balancing strategy had typically been implemented in a manner designed both to avoid ABRI as a whole becoming a cohesive challenger and to keep every actor dependent on him. Quick personnel transfers and the continuing rejigging of ABRI's leadership had been the means to achieve this end. The recent series of reshuffles between 1995 to 1996, and tactical switching from the non-Islamic Moerdani–Edi line to the ICMI-affiliated Feisal–Hartono line, and then the less controversial Wiranto-led middle way, represented Soeharto's style. Even in this last case, Soeharto did not forget to put Soebagyo – a friend of Prabowo – directly under Wiranto.[196] For those who were concerned about Prabowo's political ambitions when backed by Soeharto, Wiranto – regarded as a more professionally oriented officer – was the man to support, although he was a former presidential adjutant. Soeharto, master of the 'divide-and-rule' strategy, let the intra-military competition continue in order to create a power balance which would make both sides rely on him. The new military leadership was arranged by Soeharto, based on this strategy, to ensure the smooth presidential and vice-presidential elections in March 1998.

Lessons learnt from the previous two elections (in 1988 and 1993) were also reflected in this leadership change. First, Syarwan's move to F-ABRI seemed intended to ensure that F-ABRI did not take any independent action against Soeharto as had happened in 1988 when (as discussed above) a F-ABRI member, Brig. Gen. Ibrahim Saleh, openly objected to Soeharto's choice of Sudharmono as vice-president at the MPR session. Second, Yunus' appointment as Kassospol was also seen as following a similar tactical line. In 1993, as mentioned earlier, Kassospol Lt. Gen. Harsudiono Hartas announced Try Sutrisno as ABRI's candidate for vice-president, virtually ensuring Soeharto's reluctant endorsement. In contrast to Hartas who was an anti-Habibie general, Yunus was considered a Habibie supporter, especially after expressing his admiration for Habibie in a magazine interview.[197] Thus he was most unlikely to mobilize ABRI to resist Soeharto's wishes by opposing Habibie. As a result, Habibie was now guarded by military allies – Feisal, Syarwan and Yunus – reflecting Soeharto's calculations with regard to the vice-presidential race. These moves showed Soeharto's approach of *alon-alon asal kelakon* (slow but sure) to avoid the kind of ABRI–Soeharto antagonism that had been experienced in the vice-presidential elections in 1988 and 1993. Other conditions being equal, Soeharto's control of Kassospol and F-ABRI ensured that his wishes would be respected.

Together with these arrangements, ABRI was also given a direct order by Soeharto regarding its desired posture. The Supreme Commander asserted that

dwifungsi needed to be carried out with full caution because the Indonesian people were now enjoying political stability and economic development.[198] This was viewed as a sign that Soeharto would not allow ABRI a free hand, and would pay special attention to keeping ABRI quiet and united in the run-up to the MPR election.

These developments illustrated well Soeharto's plan to use ABRI as a tool for his own political interests. Key ABRI figures who worked alongside Soeharto to endorse Habibie as vice-president – and support Soeharto's re-election – were Feisal Tanjung, Syarwan Hamid, Yunus Yosfiah, Prabowo and Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin. It should be noted that officers such as Wiranto and Yudhoyono adopted a very low profile during this period.

The disastrous currency crisis, which started in Thailand in July 1997, soon affected Indonesia. The value of Rupiah dropped dramatically. Amid the economic meltdown, it was reported that CSIS – which had shown its support for re-election of the incumbent vice-president, Try Sutrisno – expressed strong opposition to Habibie. Key ABRI figures quickly responded to the move to re-nominate Try Sutrisno: ABRI Commander (Pangab) Feisal Tanjung attacked Sofyan Wanandi, an ethnic Chinese businessman who sat on the Board of CSIS, by accusing Sofyan of not being interested in helping the government solve the national crisis because he did not join the 'I Love Rupiah' movement.[199]

As the presidential election approached in 1998, further pressure came from Sjafrie. His Kodam Jaya 'accidentally' found an alleged PRD document after a bomb blast in the apartment of a young radical activist. The document – an e-mail message – stated that Sofyan had offered financial support for the group's activities. Sjafrie's Kodam Jaya interrogated Sofyan and suggested the possibility of calling in other CSIS associates, which in turn led to speculation that Benny Moerdani would also be questioned. Meanwhile, Sofyan's interrogation led to a series of Muslim youth demonstrations in front of CSIS, asking for the dissolution of the think-tank and the re-interrogation of Sofyan and his brother, Yusuf Wanandi, whose name was also said to be mentioned in the above document. However, it was widely believed that the demonstrations were not spontaneous but mobilized by the security apparatus and possibly by Sjafrie and Prabowo, who had been eager to organize radical Muslim youth under Kopassus authority.

Perhaps also such high-profile political manoeuvring was not unrelated to Wiranto's elevation to Pangab in February 1998, which – in the eyes of Prabowo circles – would reinforce the consolidation of Wiranto's leadership against the Prabowo group.[200] Actively backing Soeharto's project was one way to show loyalty to the Supreme Commander, which in turn might be helpful in underlining a competitor's relative lack of loyalty. Prabowo seemed to like this strategy, and three days after Wiranto took up his new position, he broke the Muslim Ramadan fast along with about 5,000 guests, including many representing radical Islamic groups, and warned them that a political conspiracy of certain groups was behind the current economic crisis. He distributed a list of Chinese-owned Asian business groups and asked these Muslims to fight with ABRI against this conspiracy.[201] One of Sutrisno's supporters, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Bambang

Triantoro, stressed that the pressure on the CSIS could hardly be separated from the conflict over the vice-presidency.[202] Nor however could it be separated from Prabowo's effort to demonstrate his ability to achieve Soeharto's goals in the ongoing patrimonial competition with Wiranto.

Amidst the escalating attack on anti-Habibie circles, Wiranto made a public statement, insisting that society should not be influenced by those who tried to bring up ethnic-religious sentiments.[203] Unfortunately the Muslim bandwagon did not stop. It was only a day after Wiranto's announcement that the Indonesian Ulemas Council (MUI), a key government-appointed Islamic body, declared a *jihad* against 'a group of irresponsible people who dominate 70 percent of the country's economy even though they are only four percent of the total population, in order to prevent their political conspiracy to topple the government and Islam'.[204] The target was obviously the Chinese minority. This series of events was enough to bury the possible emergence of a call to re-nominate Try Sutrisno.

The day after the *jihad* declaration, Feisal announced that ABRI already had a candidate for vice-president even if it was still too early to disclose his name. On the same day, Kassospol Lt. Gen. Yunus Yosfiah stressed that ABRI would not repeat its past 'mistake' – referring to Kassospol Lt. Gen. Harsudiono Hartas' nomination of Try Sutrisno as ABRI's vice-presidential candidate before the MPR session in 1993 – which he said did not follow the constitutional mechanism.[205] It was also Yunus who negated the possibility of any 'interruption' by a F-ABRI member at the forthcoming MPR session, like that of Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Saleh in1988.[206] Instead, Yunus stated that ABRI's criteria for the vice-president were the same as those of Golkar. Meanwhile, the ABRI spokesman Brig. Gen. Abdul Wahab Mokodongan ultimately took the approach of *asal bapak senang* ('as long as the boss is happy') by insisting that even if Soeharto picked Amien Rais, ABRI would follow this.[207] With the full backing of the palace generals, Habibie was finally selected as the vice-president for 1998–2003.

However, ABRI as a whole had to bear the price of the deepening social suspicion towards it. In conducting Soeharto's major regime projects since 1996 – i.e. the removal of Megawati, Golkar's electoral victory, Soeharto's re-election and Habibie's election to the vice-presidency – ABRI's role had been sharply criticized: the group was accused of being *pemadam kebakaran* (a fire brigade) and *alat mati pemerintah* (a dead tool of the government). Both phrases suggested that the military had no independent mind to promote 'national' interests and merely played the role of ensuring security through repression when ordered to do so by the government. Such perceptions accumulated in particular during the Feisal era, but even after the leadership change, the split among top generals effectively blocked ABRI from taking the initiative to meet the demands of society, although there were now several 'reform-minded' officers in the top ranks.[208] The growing internal split within ABRI – especially between Prabowo and Wiranto – which was fuelled by Soeharto's divide-and-rule strategy effectively incapacitated both sides to emphasize ABRI's commitment to an independent role in political life.

The cost of this was high. ABRI lost the final chance to restore *dwifungsi* legitimacy, and it was only two months after Soeharto's re-election when Indonesia faced the nation-wide anti-Soeharto movement which successfully brought him down on 21 May 1998. Following this, there was widespread public demand for the total eradication of *dwifungsi* and ABRI was forced to implement reforms. The reforms themselves will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7, but before doing so, it is necessary to evaluate the developing patterns of *dwifungsi* criticism under the New Order regime. Why did it grow in strength? What were the impacts of the eroding *dwifungsi* legitimacy on the regime maintenance? As we have seen already, *dwifungsi* criticism was not a political debate of little or no influence; it was a distinct reflection of the power struggle between the regime and society, and between different groups within the military.

Conclusion

The period of *keterbukaan* was one during which ABRI was forced to adapt its attitude to meet new challenges, but the process was not smooth. The debate over the proper implementation of *dwifungsi* was initially a by-product of an intra-regime struggle between President Soeharto and ABRI under the leadership of General Moerdani but soon resulted in widespread questioning of *dwifungsi* by members of political society. We outlined the arguments about back-to-basics, *tut wuri handayani*, the rise of AMN–Akabri officers, and the military relinquishing 25 parliamentary seats, all of which contributed to the breaking of taboos in *dwifungsi* criticism and implications for possible change in ABRI's political involvement. On the other hand, there was the media crack down, Golkar–ABRI fusion, the attack on retired officers critical of *dwifungsi*, the 'shoot-on-sight' order, and the red purge campaign, all of which suggested a degree of continuity with ABRI's pre-*keterbukaan* hardline approach. There was a degree of institutional inertia at work and a reliance on established praetorian methods that had worked in the past. It is in this context, however, that a series of new approaches (emerging in the 1990s) can be assessed as a reflection of the declining utility of ABRI's simple reliance on such methods.

The debate about *dwifungsi* was largely started by President Soeharto. Our discussion revealed that, in the early stages, the trigger was primarily Soeharto's own statements. Kopkamtib's abolition, *tut wuri handayani* and the reduction in F-ABRI seats were initiated by Soeharto, and thus effectively legitimized political society to expand political space to include critical discourse on *dwifungsi* under the authoritarian regime. However, it was also Soeharto who preserved *dwifungsi*'s traditional approaches, such as intervention in opposition party affairs, repression of popular political movements, support for Golkar, and the elimination of elite opponents to secure re-election. From Soeharto's standpoint, these two directions were not contradictory: they were both targeted at consolidating his political power and regime. However, when viewed from the perspective of *dwifungsi* legitimation, the two involved a serious institutional contradiction: the former implied the decline of the military's political influence in general while the latter

suggested an increasing – or at least an unchanging – role for ABRI in protecting Soeharto's political interests. Both tendencies contributed to the *dwifungsi* dispute in the public arena.

In this chapter we have seen how the *dwifungsi* criticism in political society gradually reached the point at which ABRI could no longer curb its direction. Prior to *keterbukaan*, and especially when the New Order was still in the process of establishing a political system based on ideological conformity to Pancasila, regime criticism – including attacks on *dwifungsi* – was easily identified as anti-Pancasila (i.e. as anti-national philosophy) or as ideological subversion which should be defeated by security operations. Under these circumstances, any social movement to criticize *dwifungsi* was regarded as taboo and could not exist. (Note that this does not include criticism by disenchanted 1945-generation officers such as Ali Sadikin, A.H. Nasution and Soemitro, who claimed that the *dwifungsi* created by their generation had been 'misconducted' by existing officers.) The strictly limited political space allowed for *dwifungsi* criticism did, however, gradually increase during the *keterbukaan* era.

Public criticism under *keterbukaan* had as its original aim the activation of the role of the DPR as a democratic check on the government's power. ABRI, led by Moerdani, supported this movement because it could be used for attacking Soeharto. Soeharto countered ABRI's manoeuvres by raising issues which would initiate public argument about ABRI's *dwifungsi* in the context of *keterbukaan*. In this way, the first step towards incorporating *dwifungsi* criticism under the scope of *keterbukaan* was largely a 'by-product' of the conflict between Soeharto and Moerdani's ABRI. However, this process effectively widened elite participation in *dwifungsi* criticism in the public arena. It was through this process that outspoken army officers such as Gen. (ret.) Rudini, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Sayidiman, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Hasnan Habib, and Maj. Gen. (ret.) Z.A. Maulani began to participate actively in public discourse on the subject. As an unintended consequence of the antagonism that encouraged both Soeharto and ABRI to award – for very different reasons – legitimacy to the *keterbukaan* campaign, *dwifungsi* criticism gradually began to enjoy increasing autonomy, and ABRI found it more and more difficult to curb the escalating critical debate and demands for *dwifungsi* reform. Two events further helped promote political autonomy of *dwifungsi* criticism under the authoritarian New Order polity. One was the rise of a new generation of officers and the other was ABRI's total subordination to Soeharto's personal interests during the final few years of his reign.

Critics in the 1990s increasingly questioned the legitimacy basis of *dwifungsi*, since the new generation (especially the Akabri generation) had no role in the 'struggle history of nation-building' which had legitimized earlier military involvement in politics.[209] They claimed that political privileges should not be given to the current military officers who were no longer superior to civilians in service to the nation. In addition, Soeharto's elimination of Moerdani's influence within ABRI and the resulting subordination of the military leadership to Soeharto also strengthened the autonomy of critical discourse on *dwifungsi* in the public arena. As with generation change, the legitimacy basis of *dwifungsi* was

seriously challenged by political figures who argued that *dwifungsi* was now no more than *pemadam kebakaran*. The development of this argument – notably since the toppling of Megawati in 1996 – also did not rely on the free political space created by the inner-regime conflict between Soeharto and ABRI, as in the early stage of the *keterbukaan* movement.

Throughout these developments, ABRI was gradually put on the defensive. How did it respond to the demand to change? Some officers recognized ABRI's need to accommodate such demands by reforming ABRI. Such initiative was discernible in ABRI's doctrinal management. We will examine this development in Chapter 3.

3 Reinventing legitimacy

Doctrinal adaptation in a changing society

The legitimacy of *dwifungsi* had been brought into question in line with escalating societal demands for democratic *keterbukaan*. Whether a political activity is perceived as legitimate or not (both by the subject and object) is a significant factor which influences political behaviour, and the military has endeavoured to expand the modes of legitimation as it faces changes both in the military and in society. Our focus here is on ABRI's internal manufacturing of *dwifungsi* legitimation in the New Order. By examining this process, we can assess not only the manner in which ABRI has legitimized its doctrine of political activism, but also the types of resources ABRI has mobilized to this end, and how it has become difficult for ABRI to secure these resources since the mid-1980s and particularly the 1990s. In facing this difficulty, elements within the military started to work towards doctrinal revisions in an effort to cope with growing democratic demands. What motivated them to review *dwifungsi*, and what initiatives were taken? As seen in Chapter 2, ABRI was factionalized during the late New Order period, especially during the process of eliminating Moerdani-linked officers and recruiting officers loyal to Soeharto. It was this power struggle that effectively produced the reform incentive within the military. Here we investigate the development in the historical context.

We first examine the making of *dwifungsi*'s doctrinal framework which reflected and fortified ABRI's role in the New Order, especially up to the mid-1980s. We then analyse how the established interpretation of *dwifungsi* faced an internal challenge – namely the generation change of the officer corps – which forced ABRI to seek further legitimation, and how new logics were introduced to this end. Here, the notion of professionalism played the significant role. We then look at the process by which the adjusted *dwifungsi* legitimation gradually awakened the officers' perception about the gap between ABRI's corporate interests and Soeharto's political interests. Such an assessment was presented officially in the early 1990s under the initiative of General Edi Sudradjat who promoted the intra-military programme called "back-to-basics". In the following two sections, we examine how ABRI officers – especially those who had been affiliated with the military education sector – endeavoured to reconstruct interpretations of both *dwifungsi* and the political situation, in their attempt to produce a viable legitimation of ABRI's political role in response to the growing social pressure

for democratization. This process also illustrated how the reform-minded officers identified contradictions between ABRI's long-term institutional interests and Soeharto's short-term political strategy in the final years of the New Order. Throughout the chapter, we investigate the evolution of ABRI's role perception and the way in which factors both internal and external to ABRI influenced its pattern as reflected in *dwifungsi*'s doctrinal formulas.

Laying the doctrinal foundations, 1966–1982

The New Order's civil–military relations model was first designed at the Second Army Seminar of 1966, when ABRI leaders systematically fused several military doctrines based on anti-communism, Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (UUD45). ABRI's ideological and doctrinal foundation was developed further and by 1982 was virtually complete, at which point the ABRI leadership published a guidebook which provided the first comprehensive official explanation of *dwifungsi*.[1] In subsequent doctrinal writings, ABRI modified and strengthened the established framework of 1982 according to the needs of the time, but its core was unvarying during the New Order period. Let us now examine developments until 1982.

The Second Army Seminar in August 1966 revised the doctrinal format adopted at the First Seminar in April 1965 during the Soekarno era. This 1965 doctrine was largely coloured by the radical and revolutionary concepts favoured by the President himself. For instance, it defined the role of the army as an 'instrument of revolution' which constituted part of the national progressive-revolutionary forces integrated under the Golongan Karya (Functional Groups) – led by President Soekarno – in establishing a Pancasila-based socialist nation in Indonesia.[2] The army also identified itself as both a sociopolitical force and a military force, insisting on the construction of a socialist nation based on Pancasila as the primary goal of sociopolitics.[3] Thus the First Army Seminar distinguished between the sociopolitical and defence roles of the army and also claimed that the former role was performed as a member of Golongan Karya.

Needing to formulate a new posture after the defeat of the PKI and the subsequent fall of Soekarno, General Soeharto, in November 1966, formally abolished the doctrinal format designed at the First Army Seminar and adopted the results of the Second Seminar as the army's official doctrine.[4] Old revolutionary military doctrines under the rubric of *Tri Ubaya Çakti* (TUÇ) were revised and ABRI's total commitment to all fields of national 'modernization' was asserted.[5] The new TUÇ doctrine illustrated ABRI's perception of its political engagement at the beginning of New Order, when no other political force could counter ABRI's political dominance. It remained the foundation of ABRI's perception of its political role during the New Order period.

The first chapter of the new TUÇ, entitled 'Conceptual Foundations for the Army's Struggle', depicted ABRI's commitment to the New Order. Among other things, it insisted that 'the military possesses basic tasks in the defence field and also in all areas of social life, and it wishes to play a vital role in the process of

modernization'.[6] Moreover, it stated that 'the military's role expansion (*meluaskan peranannya*) was forced (*terpaksa*) by conditions leading to the national crisis, and consequently the military became a strategic social force in national politics'. The doctrine, however, stressed that the military did not seek unlimited power because 'it – as a freedom-fighter – always desires to be a constitutional force and a champion of democracy'.[7]

In clarifying the subsequent development of ABRI's ideology, four aspects revealed in the revised TUÇ should be noted here. First, since the beginning, or more precisely since the First Army Seminar, the military described itself as both a defence force and a non-military (or social) force, thus laying the basis for the *dwifungsi* conception which had not yet been devised.

Second, the perception that ABRI's expanding role in the New Order resulted from the national crisis was obviously aimed at cultivating its legitimacy, but simultaneously it left room for the logical loss of legitimacy once the crisis was over. The concept of role expansion used in the doctrine indicated that the role played by ABRI in the New Order would not be the same as its original role. This, in effect, provided space for subsequent criticism of *dwifungsi*. 'Crisis legitimacy' and consequent 'role expansion' were used to justify military involvement in politics at the first stage of the New Order, but they were highly vulnerable to changed circumstances when the crisis had passed.

Third, the military claimed long-term legitimacy for its involvement in non-military affairs by insisting on the need for political stability if Indonesia were to attain economic development – a national goal. They argued that the military had no choice but to take responsibility for building the New Order: 'Without it, economic stability would never be achieved, and the military's role was demanded by the historical need (*panggilan sejarah*)'.[8] Here, ABRI insisted on its total commitment to the New Order project of national economic development, and since it was a long-term goal, the military used this to legitimize engagement in non-military affairs on a permanent basis, not just during the emergency. This 'permanency' was a notable characteristic of New Order military thinking standardized in the 1966 doctrine, a characteristic moreover that could not be found in the 1965 version. The revised doctrines also interpreted the military's new role as builder of the New Order by employing the concept of *panggilan sejarah* to emphasize the legitimacy of such a role as a continuation of its nation-building role since the independence war. That the leading officers in the military at that time had participated in the independence war in fact encouraged them to stress this rationale. These two aspects – developmentalism and historicism – thus provided evidence for the military's assertion of the long-term legitimacy of its political involvement, when 'crisis legitimacy' could only provide a short-term justification.

Finally, the original army perception that its political engagement was 'forced' by national conditions showed that ABRI's political involvement was not motivated by professional concerns, but by the alleged lack of alternative civilian forces capable of handling national affairs. Lt. Gen. Panggabean – the deputy army commander and the head of the seminar-organizing team – strongly

emphasized that ABRI was forced to act by the lack of civilian political capacity.[9] There was also not a single reference to military professionalization in this new TUÇ document comprising 126 pages, even in the section on military education. This fact should be noted before our discussion later of the nature of professionalism in the 1990s, and the argument that ABRI's political role was motivated by its professional commitment.

Based on this stance, the new TUÇ document presented four sub-doctrines, as follows.

- *Doktrin Pertahanan Darat Nasional* (Hanratnas) or National Land Defence Doctrine. This doctrine defined the army's basic defence burden which emphasized the twin use of purely military operations and social mobilization (social weapons system, or *sipersos*) in conducting internal/external security missions, especially to counter internal subversive actions and security disturbances.[10]
- *Doktrin Kekaryaan* or Non-military Function Doctrine. This doctrine manifested ABRI's non-military function in a quite basic way without mentioning actual programmes. It argued that ABRI – as a functional group (*golongan karya*) of a social force (*kekuatan sosial*) based on Pancasila – was eager to involve itself in constructing democracy inspired by UUD45 to fight against dictatorship and autocracy. In implementing this task, it said, ABRI provided security for both the executive and legislative branches to defend Pancasila ideology in the ideological, religious, cultural, political, social, economic and military field.[11]
- *Doktrin Pembinaan* or Fostering Doctrine. This doctrine fostered the above two doctrines. It stated the necessity for Pancasila education in all governmental and private educational institutes, indoctrination of mass organizations, political organizations and Golkar, and the utilization of the mass media. It was also argued that *kekaryaan* (sending army personnel to non-military posts) should be implemented to benefit national economic development and the people's prosperity.[12]
- *Doktrin Perang Rakyat Semesta* (Perata) or People's Total War Doctrine. This doctrine emphasized, among other things, the weak national economy and geographical diversity which made the army's defence strategy dependent on low-technology intensive social mobilization of the 'total people' and territorial activities led by Kodams (Military Area Commands) to fight against infiltration and subversion.[13]

In addition, the new TUÇ renewed the Doctrine of National Defence and Security (*Doktrin Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional*, or Hankamnas) which was the trans-service and mother doctrine of Hanratnas. It first stated that the PKI and its supporters were still active and that the major internal threats were infiltration and subversion, both in the mental and physical senses, conducted by social groups which were reluctant to accept Pancasila and UUD45, and which opposed the transformation from Old Order to New Order.[14]

In this way, the threat perceptions mentioned in Hankamnas during this embryonic period of the New Order illustrated clearly that the goal of military operations was essentially political, i.e. a smooth transition to the Soeharto regime. Significantly, the doctrines described above were all intended to back up Hankamnas' political goal. In this doctrinal environment, ABRI's defence structure was easily transformed into a political control mechanism. Maj. Gen. Soemitro – the head of the syndicate formulating New Order military doctrines – clearly stated at the seminar that all doctrines in the new TUÇ were intended to deal with the PKI and its Marxist–Maoist ideology.[15] This doctrinal characteristic during the early New Order period should be noted.

It was just three months later that the four army doctrines were rearranged under the overarching military doctrines of Hankamnas and *Doktrin Perdjuangan ABRI* (ABRI's Struggle Doctrine) at a nine-day seminar held by the Department of Defence and Security (Dephankam) in November 1966. The two ABRI doctrines are jointly called *Catur Dharma Eka Karma* (CDEK), forming ABRI's integral doctrine under the New Order.[16] Therefore, the army version of Hankamnas in August was reframed in this CDEK scheme. More systematized explanations and definitions were given in Hankamnas, but the basic threat perception expressed in the previous version of this doctrine was replaced by a more abstract and hypothetical one.

In the August version, the PKI was clearly depicted as the main doctrinal target, as seen above, but this time there was no reference to the PKI in the explanation of the Hankamnas objective – instead, the threat was defined as any challenge to the Pancasila ideology.[17] It was obviously a revision intended to make the doctrine more durable in the anticipated PKI-free political environment of the next decades. What was also interesting was that the second doctrine in CDEK, the *Doktrin Perdjuangan ABRI*, was not explained in the CDEK document but was replaced by *Doktrin Kekaryaan ABRI*, as if it were identical to the former. Thus, the actual content of the CDEK document consisted of the Hankamnas and Kekaryaan doctrines, which could be understood as statements of ABRI's military and sociopolitical roles. Though the term *dwifungsi* had not yet been invented, this scheme was the basis of the New Order's concept of *dwifungsi*, which proposed two functions in a non-zero-sum fashion, a perception attainable only under a military-led political regime.[18] The upgraded Kekaryaan doctrine confidently argued that the non-military role was not a trade-off with ABRI's capacity as a military force since ABRI was after all the foundation of all state power.[19]

In this way, ABRI's official stance in politics was formulated during the first two years of the New Order. ABRI manifested its commitment to everyday political life to ensure political stability for economic development, while failing to provide any actual programmes at the two seminars in 1966 and 1967. ABRI inevitably faced challenges as political society soon perceived that the reality of *dwifungsi* was little other than political domination, given the appointment of ABRI personnel to many key non-military posts at the national and regional levels despite the formal restoration of party politics after the 1971 election. This

was the birth of *kekaryaan* criticism. By 1977, more than 20,000 ABRI members were posted to the civilian sector, occupying 53 percent of the top posts in the central government and 76 percent of all governorships.[20] Although in 1967 the parliament had affirmed ABRI's commitment in daily political life, this had not legitimized ABRI's domination of the executive branch.[21] Such developments illustrated the process by which ABRI gradually revealed the real direction of its political engagement. Once this became apparent, criticism inevitably emerged, both within ABRI and society. To cope with the rising criticism, the ABRI leadership set to work developing *dwifungsi* doctrines, resulting in at least five internal works on *dwifungsi* during 1977 to 1982.

First, in March 1977, Defence Minister/ABRI Commander (Menhankam/Pangab) General Panggabean ordered his staff to formulate the Doctrine of Sociopolitical Operations, 'as guidance for the successful conduct of *kekaryaan*'.[22] The doctrine advocated that ABRI's sociopolitical operations should be based on the 'prosperity approach' rather than 'security approach'.[23] On the other hand, ABRI's organic cooperation with each member of ABRI's Big Family (KBA) was first depicted in the doctrinal format.[24] KBA was expected to consistently support ABRI's conduct of *kekaryaan* activities. The doctrine's emphasis on the increasing role of the KBA was aimed at promoting indirect measures in order to alleviate the growing public suspicion about *dwifungsi*.

Second, in October 1977 another attempt was made to provide legal justification for *dwifungsi*. The document, 'The Legal Basis of *Dwifungsi* and Identity of ABRI', first noted that the influx of Western political literature now encouraged Indonesian people to view ABRI's role in politics critically, and warned that this would result in ABRI being viewed as a foreigner (*orang asing*) within its own society.[25] In responding to this trend, the document mobilized cultural relativism. It stated that every country had its own culture which influenced its political style, although terms like democracy, representative, election, and the military were universally used. Unlike the West, the document continued, which was based on the dualism of individual and society, Indonesia saw these two things in harmony due to the culture of *Bhineka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity) which could only be attained by *gotong-royong* (mutual help), *musyawarah* (deliberation) and *kekeluargaan* (family atmosphere). Thus the military role should be assessed in this context too.[26] Such an insistence was not new to ABRI, but it was now more frequently used when facing criticism based on the link between foreign criticism and domestic complaints about *dwifungsi*.

As well as this cultural legitimation, the document listed several presidential instructions and MPR decisions which since 1945 had 'instructed' ABRI to take a bigger role, repeating the established interpretation that it was responding to the needs of the people rather than being motivated by ABRI itself. On legality, it admitted that *dwifungsi* could not be found in UUD45 in an explicit way, but neither could the existence of political parties and elections. The document also attributed weaknesses in the implementation of *dwifungsi* to society. 'If there is anything wrong with *dwifungsi* conducted by ABRI members', the document

concluded, 'it is a reflection of social problems because excessive activities of *karyawan* [military personnel placed in non-military posts] are not the policy of ABRI'.[27]

Although ABRI's culturalism was apparently adopted in this document, it was not enough to explain the reasons for maintaining the current style of military intervention. In fact, civilian criticism which claimed that the implementation of *dwifungsi* was nothing more than militarism still enjoyed considerable support within political society.

To counter such an argument, in 1978 ABRI – more specifically the *karyawan* section in Dephankam (Skar Hankam) headed by Lt. Gen. Daryatmo – then moved to strengthen the official rationale of current *kekaryaan* activities.[28] This time ABRI responded to criticism by saying that ABRI's involvement in legislative bodies both at the national and regional levels, and its filling of jobs, such as governors, regents and village heads, were all based on the 'trust' (*kepercayaan*) given by the people to ABRI in order to foster the security, effectiveness and efficiency needed for national development.[29] This 'social contract' legitimation was followed by a historical legitimation – as seen in the new TUÇ – which insisted that *de facto dwifungsi* had existed since the birth of the military in 1945 to safeguard the nation, thus emphasizing that its current position was an expression of ABRI's 'natural right'.[30] This was to replace the concept of role expansion outlined in 1966.

Alongside the emphasis on social contract and historical right, the document stressed that ABRI's *kekaryaan* was not due to militarism (interestingly it did so by employing 'Western literature' on politics[31]). What was also notable here compared with previous versions of *kekaryaan* papers was that ABRI formally adopted the technical separation of *dwifungsi* from *kekaryaan*, envisaging that the latter could be withdrawn in certain circumstances without risk to the former.[32] Although such references were not new in public speeches by officers at that time, it was probably the first time that this distinction had been codified in an official instruction paper. In facing nearly a decade of criticism of *dwifungsi*, ABRI finally established an interpretation which detached the problematic *kekaryaan* from the overarching *dwifungsi* ideology as a way to meet such criticism.

This interpretation, however, did not provide an effective response to demands for an actual reduction of *kekaryaan* appointments and the excesses of *dwifungsi*. During this period, and as discussed in Chapter 2, major criticism was expressed by a group of retired officers including A.H. Nasution, Ali Sadikin, Dharsono, and other disenchanted generals who had in the past contributed to the creation of the New Order in the mid-1960s.[33] This new development became a central issue at ABRI's annual leadership meeting (Rapim ABRI) in March 1980, held a few months before the birth of Petisi 50.

Before the meeting, which was led by Pangab/Menhankam Gen. Yusuf, ABRI prepared a document to be used for the discussion at the Rapim. This asserted that some individuals (*oknum-oknum*) within ABRI had jeopardized ABRI's *dwifungsi* and *kekaryaan*, encouraging misunderstanding among ABRI members that *dwifungsi* was solely the responsibility of *karyawan* officers.[34] Regarding the

problem of retired officers, the document insisted on the need to make these officers supportive of ABRI's current policies, and to this end called for the strengthening of control over retired officers through Pepabri.[35] The document branded the activities of LKB (Institute for Constitutional Awareness) as an attempt to discredit *dwifungsi* and *kekaryaan* by criticizing the presence of F-ABRI.[36] In defending *kekaryaan* activity, the ABRI leadership explained that the total number of active officers being sent to *kekaryaan* posts during the Second Defence Strategic Plan (Renstra Hankam II) 1979–1983 was originally set to be 10,000 but was actually only 6,879 in February 1980, thus indicating the declining *kekaryaan* role according to the needs of the time.[37] Finally, the Rapim document listed some policy priorities, among which were: (1) to produce further materials on *dwifungsi/kekaryaan* for officer education; (2) to enhance civic-mission programmes of *kemanunggalan ABRI–Rakyat* (integration of ABRI and the people) for the dissemination of the *dwifungsi* principle; and, interestingly, (3) to avoid providing candidates for regional governmental heads from F-ABRI and instead offer these opportunities to the Golkar faction.[38] We will discuss the second and third decisions before returning to the first.

The emphasis on *kemanunggalan ABRI–Rakyat* clearly reflected the growing criticism that ABRI had become a tool of the government and that *dwifungsi* was merely implemented in the form of *kekaryaan*. This perception conflicted with ABRI's belief in its role as the people's military. It was in this context that Pangab/Menhankam Gen. Yusuf launched a new programme called 'ABRI Masuk Desa' (ABRI in the village, or AMD) in 1980. This annual civic-mission project sent ABRI units to the villages to assist community development in various fields.[39] Apart from the perceived need for doctrinal adjustment, AMD was a significant attempt to indoctrinate younger-generation soldiers who had entered the military not as freedom-fighters but for career reasons, and who thus lacked spiritual commitment to *dwifungsi* management. AMD was intended to provide an opportunity for them to communicate with the *rakyat*. Moreover, it was also notable that AMD was designed to support the Total People's Defence System as a channel to mobilize the *rakyat*. It was also easily transformed into a grass-roots surveillance tool, given the political control aspect of this doctrine.

On the other hand, the decision adopted in the Rapim document to avoid providing F-ABRI candidates for the positions of local governmental heads was a significant decision which if fully implemented could drastically reduce the amount of *kekaryaan* activity. This decision too reflected Yusuf's attempt to respond to the recent criticism of *kekaryaan*-heavy *dwifungsi* practices. Giving up ABRI's occupancy of regional government heads implied that ABRI – more specifically, ABRI's Chief of Kekaryaan Staff, Lt. Gen. Kharis Suhud – already perceived Golkar as a reliable tool for maintaining local political stability, as it seemed to imply that ABRI's civilian allies could replace ABRI officers. This itself indicated a significant change in perception concerning New Order civil–military relations, but in this document it was still not clear how ABRI would deal with Golkar. The above description, on the one hand, suggests that ABRI

began to see Golkar as an independent force, which in effect allowed ABRI to 'stand above all political groups'. However, on the other hand, it could also be understood as ABRI's re-emphasis of its backing for Golkar in regional political management.

This raised the issue of whether ABRI actually did 'stand above all political groups' or whetehr it linked itself directly with Golkar. Given Yusuf's general outlook, the former possibility seemed strong. During this time, Pangab/Menhankam Gen. Yusuf was regarded as a *dwifungsi* revisionist who insisted on ABRI's solidarity with the people and its stance as 'above all groups', which, according to David Jenkins in his book *Suharto and His Generals*, was regarded by Soeharto and his closed military advisors as unrealistic.[40] It seems, therefore, that Yusuf's influence was strongly reflected in these policy initiatives. However, the new approach which was to have been formally adopted at the Rapim was largely neutralized by Soeharto's 'Pekanbaru' speech at the opening of the Rapim.[41] Soeharto declared that ABRI as a defence force should stand above all social groups whereas as a social force it should choose partners who truly defend Pancasila.[42] Moreover, he insisted that the task of *dwifungsi* was to ensure a successful election in 1982, and, in this context, that ABRI should acknowledge when to behave as a defence force and when to act as a sociopolitical force.[43] This was aimed at encouraging ABRI to side with Golkar in the 1982 election, in its capacity as a sociopolitical force. Yusuf's attempt was therefore rejected by Soeharto. As seen in Chapter 2, Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid – in facing criticism of his speech backing Golkar in 1995 – referred to the Pekanbaru speech in order to justify himself.

Returning now to the first decision in ABRI's Rapim document, the most comprehensive internal guidebook of *dwifungsi* was prepared under the leadership of Gen. Yusuf in 1982.[44] It was comprehensive in the sense that all major doctrinal papers of the previous sixteen years were integrated in this book, and also instructions and explanations for the wide range of *dwifungsi* activities were given to each command level in a systematic way. In light of our discussion, the following points are important.

First, the source of *dwifungsi* legitimation was now widened. The guidebook argued that there were five approaches to understanding the root of *dwifungsi* – historical, philosophical, legal, *wawasan nusantara* (i.e. geostrategic), and *ketahanan nasional* (i.e. national defence) – and asserted that these were mutually reinforcing.[45] The key concepts for each were: revolutionary war and the PKI's coup attempt (historical); Pancasila, Sapta Marga and *keluarga* (philosophical); Articles 2 and 30[1] in UUD45, MPR decisions, and laws on elections/DPR members (legal); national integration in a plural society (*wawasan nusantara*); total defence (*ketahanan nasional*).[46] All were asserted as the factors encouraging ABRI to actively involve itself in non-military affairs. During the past sixteen years of the New Order, ABRI had developed its doctrinal interpretation to strengthen *dwifungsi* legitimation. This institutional effort was aimed at maintaining the 'permanency' of *dwifungsi* commitment which was first set by the new TUÇ doctrine in 1966 by emphasizing the need for political stability to rescue the

national economy. After sixteen years of New Order development, ABRI needed to diversify the sources of *dwifungsi* legitimacy in order to insist on its relevance and to counter, in various ways, the critical view in the public.[47]

Second, the implementation of *kekaryaan* was distinguished from *dwifungsi*, endorsing an interpretation adopted in the 1978 Kekaryaan doctrine. However, the goals of the two were explained as the same, leaving the nature of the distinction between the two vague. This conceptual uncoupling became ABRI's standard interpretation and it convinced the officers that social criticism of *kekaryaan* did not undermine the relevance of *dwifungsi*'s permanent political engagement.

Throughout the guidebook, it seemed obvious that ABRI's *dwifungsi* doctrine tried to oversee all fields of social activity for the fulfilment of ABRI's institutional role as the guardian of Pancasila and stabiliser/promoter of national development. This was the perception first formulated in the 1966 doctrine, which now seemed to have various logics to defend it. *Dwifungsi*'s doctrinal framework was virtually complete by this point. As discussed below, the subsequent internal development of *dwifungsi* was largely on the level of interpretation, absorbing numerous criticisms and re-inventing various logics to counter these critical arguments. Such a conceptual involution of *dwifungsi* was practised by post-revolutionary officers who inherited the leadership of ABRI after the mid-1980s, and it was they who were in charge of managing the legitimacy of *dwifungsi* in the face of expanding social pressure for democratization. In this process, two phenomena significantly coloured the nature of *dwifungsi* interpretation. One was the implantation of the professionalism concept, the other was the global trend towards democratization which required ABRI to defend *dwifungsi* in the face of universalism. We discuss these in the following sections.

Infusing the concept of professionalism

As seen earlier, the creation of the New Order and the legitimation of *dwifungsi* were the product of military officers who had participated in the independence war of 1945–1949. Having emphasized their historical role as the defender of the nation, the Second Army Seminar at Seskoad in 1966 declared that the expansion of the role of the military under the New Order was a *panggilan sejarah*. The rise of a new post-revolutionary generation in ABRI, therefore, could potentially undermine the basis of *dwifungsi* legitimation. It was particularly in the early 1970s that Seskoad acknowledged the necessity to fill the gap between the two generations after conducting a survey which targeted all students of Seskoad who had joined the Regular Course of the Year 1971–1972 (KR IX). KR IX was the first time that the proportion of younger-generation students had reached nearly 50 percent of the total number of Seskoad students. The survey – which was soon expanded outside of Seskoad under the full responsibility of Z.A. Maulani (at that time a Major and himself a member of the younger generation) – found that there was a big gap between the two

generations. The younger side was said to have the following problems: (1) their motivation to join the army was economically-financially oriented; (2) mentality was too formalistic, risking ABRI's identity as 'freedom-fighters'; (3) the 1945 values were thought of only as the legacy of the older generation; (4) they were easily directed (*terarah*) by non-ABRI groups, and so possibly influenced by conflicting ideologies; and (5) their career path was different from the older generation, which might produce immature leaders in the near future.[48] Based on the results of this research, the Third Army Seminar was held in 1972 to bridge the gap between 1945-generation and academy-generation officers, and to transfer the spirit of the freedom-fighter to the post-revolutionary generation of soldiers. Try Sutrisno was one of the representatives of the younger generation officers at the seminar, and earned a good reputation as the leading new-generation officer.[49]

It was in the early 1980s that academy-generation officers began to occupy several key military positions. Alongside this process, ABRI launched internal projects to rationalize the military system. In the lead up to this rationalization, *dwifungsi* was first codified in the form of law. By securing *dwifungsi*'s legal status under Law No. 20/1982, the ABRI leadership could avoid giving the impression that the process of rationalizing ABRI would risk undermining its political commitment. 'Operation Rationalization' was handled in the main by Gen. Benny Moerdani, who had succeeded Yusuf as Pangab in 1983.[50]

The split of functional responsibility between the Department of Defence and Security (Dephankam) and ABRI Headquarters, and the consolidation of power under Moerdani, were soon explained by the ABRI leadership as the process of reorganization (*reorganisasi*), aiming at dismantling the top-heavy, politicized and inefficient command structure which was a legacy created by the 1945-generation officers. This project was followed in 1985–1986 by the replacement of the existing territorial military structure with a simplified ten-Kodam system. Before this reorganization, ABRI had sixteen Kodams under the command of four Kowilhans (Area Defence Commands). Moerdani's streamlining abolished the Kowilhan system and merged sixteen Kodams into ten, enhancing the strategic importance of lower-level commands, especially at the Korem level, which was now given major combat forces for the first time (at least one infantry battalion). It was inevitable that Moerdani's policy package generated a fear of unemployment among the officer corps who found that rationalization reduced the number of posts and higher ranks available to them. As anticipated, ABRI's total number of general-grade officers decreased by about 200 in 1985 from nearly 500 at its peak in the mid-1970s.[51]

Recalling this time, Gen. (ret.) Rudini – the Army Chief (KSAD) during this period – claimed that those who were displeased with the reorganization were persuaded by an explanation that *reorganisasi* was not rationalization but professionalization.[52] Moerdani also took every opportunity to explain that his reform was intended to create an 'efficient and professional ABRI'.[53] Indeed, the reorganization was packaged with slogans such as KEEM (*Kecil tetapi Efisien, Efektif dan Modern*: Small but Efficient, Effective, and Modern) and PEEM (*Profesional,*

Efisien, Efektif dan Modern: Professional, Efficient, Effective, and Modern), which matched the self-identity of the academy-generation officers whose military schooling at the AMN produced a sense of professionalism which could not be shared with the 1945-generation officers. By emphasizing this point, Moerdani and Rudini attempted to transform ABRI into a compact organization without risking internal cohesion. In this process, the concept of professionalism was apparently implanted into the organizational values of ABRI, and it inevitably influenced the subsequent interpretation of *dwifungsi* doctrine.

The way in which the concept of professionalism was infused into the interpretation of *dwifungsi*, however, had some variations. For Gen. Moerdani, who started the professionalization movement, 'the new generation officers are – unlike the 1945 Generation – trained as the "soldier-with-*dwifungsi*" so the nature of ABRI is inevitably *prajurit pejuang Indonesia modern* (*modern* Indonesian warrior-soldier)'.[54] Although this only added adjectives to the standard notion of *prajurit pejuang* (warrior-soldier), Moerdani's emphasis on the modernity was aimed at professionalizing the officer corps.[55] Recalling his leadership period, Moerdani argued that 'professionalisation was to improve the quality of ABRI personnel and organisation in order to effectively conduct its defence function', therefore 'it is wrong to link professionalism and *dwifungsi* because professionalism is the *hankam* concept, nothing to do with the *sospol* role'.[56]

This perception indicated that the former Pangab saw clearly the boundary between the two functions, and professionalism was only attached to the side of *hankam*. For Moerdani, however, 'it does not mean that the process of professionalization undermines *dwifungsi* because the latter is based on the logic of politics, not something affected by military training'.[57] What should be noted here is that Moerdani believed that professionalism did not weaken *dwifungsi*, not because the former strengthens the latter but because the two are totally different matters. If we suppose that this perception was projected at least initially during Moerdani's ABRI leadership, we could see some changes in interpretation regarding the relationship between the two concepts in subsequent developments.

In August 1986, a well-publicized ABRI seminar was held under the chairmanship of Lt. Gen. Try Sutrisno, the leading post-revolutionary generation officer at that time who had replaced Gen. Rudini as KSAD. The theme of the seminar was 'Based on the Fighting Spirit of the 1945 Generation, the Next Generation is Determined to Make National Development Successful' and the conclusions were intended to be reflected in GBHN 1988 as ABRI's contribution.[58] Regarding *dwifungsi*, the seminar stated that 'it was built into the ABRI system from the beginning and its quality has been improved until today to encourage ABRI's professionalism both in the fields of defence-security and social-politics'.[59] Here *dwifungsi* and professionalism were linked and the latter was conceptually fused with the conduct of the sociopolitical role.

Such an interpretation was further strengthened by Try Sutrisno in December when he expounded his ideas about professionalism at Seskoad.[60] Quoting Huntington's classic work, he argued as follows:

> There is a universality of military professionalism, since its aspects such as management of violence, commitment to the nation, and *esprit de corps* are the fundamentals of any military institution…. However, as the characteristic of the nation varies, the form of military commitment to the nation also differs…. In ABRI which also shares such universality, its commitment to the nation is expressed in Sapta Marga in order to devote ABRI's spirit to Indonesia's national unity based on Pancasila and UUD45 … and it is in this context that ABRI is different from other militaries.[61]

Based on this logic, he further explained:

> I think improvement of professionalism is the most important thing in today's ABRI because through this process we can strengthen the leadership capacity which forms ABRI's posture as *pejuang prajurit* and *prajurit pejuang*…. In facing various challenges of national development which become more and more complex, we have no choice but to professionalise ourselves in conducting the second function (along with the first function) … and today's situation requires professionalism of *karyawan* staff and other ABRI members in the sociopolitical field.[62]

These assessments illustrated how ABRI started to utilize the concept of professionalism to tackle the problems concerning *dwifungsi*.

Try's views were supported by a report aimed at improving standards within Akabri. The report – which compared domestic and foreign military education – noted that, 'like ABRI, the civilian-controlled Japanese Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) has a strong loyalty to the nation, making JSDF the tool of the state power (*alat kekuasaan negara*) but unlike ABRI whose commitment is toward Pancasila, UUD45, and Sapta Marga, JSDF's commitment is only to the constitution, and as a result, there is no *dwifungsi*'.[63] The ideas underlying this were: (1) military commitment to the nation is a universal phenomenon but its character varies depending on the nation (in this case, Indonesia and Japan); (2) as Indonesia is based on Pancasila and UUD45, it is this fact that produces *dwifungsi* when the military shows its commitment to the nation; and (3) since the commitment to the nation is the key to any military institution, professionalization of ABRI would not undermine *dwifungsi*.

In this way, the comparison of ABRI – which was politically active and 'less-professional' – and a civilian-controlled but professional military did not provide negative implications for the former, but rather fortified ABRI's established self-esteem inherited from the revolutionary generation, while at the same time appealing to the professional identity of the new generation in ABRI. In this sense, the succeeding generation established the notion that *dwifungsi* and professionalism were mutually compatible and did not involve a trade-off. This replied to earlier civilian hopes that professionalization would somehow modify ABRI's commitment to *dwifungsi*.

Once the concept of professionalism was incorporated into the language of *dwifungsi*, it was then employed to explain *dwifungsi*'s prospects in facing new social demands. This was reflected in the assessment of Mabes ABRI's *sospol* sector regarding the problem of generation change, which was expressed soon after Try's promotion to Pangab in 1988.[64] The report stated, among other things, that 'the spirit of service (*semangat pengabdian*) possessed by the 1945 Generation has enabled it to develop *dwifungsi*, but it is in this context that the problem of regeneration has a special meaning for *dwifungsi*, especially for the *sospol* function, and its preservation becomes one of the most difficult matters for the following generation'.[65] The success of *dwifungsi*, the report continued, could be judged by whether or not *karyawan* tasks were performed successfully in non-*hankam* institutions, including both executive and legislative bodies. In this sense, excesses in its implementation should be corrected, the placing of ABRI *kekaryaan* had to be selective, and their conduct should also be more professional.[66] Coupled with the *karyawan* problem, 'today's social environment which is getting modernised requires ABRI personnel to become more professional in order to be capable of managing *dwifungsi* in a sophisticated way, particularly in the *sospol* field and other non-*hankam* areas'.[67]

These assessments all indicated that professionalism was becoming a kind of panacea for the *dwifungsi* issues of the time, both in conceptual and practical terms. Conceptually, professionalism was said to form the identity of the new-generation ABRI and also to facilitate the indoctrination of the 1945 spirit inherited from the older-generation officers, as if relegitimizing *dwifungsi*'s eternal relevance regardless of revolutionary experience. At the practical level, professionalism was interpreted as: the means to achieve better *kekaryaan–sospol* conduct; the means to overcome the 'excesses'; the key to maintain ABRI's leadership role in society; and the basis for claiming that *dwifungsi* implementation would be adjusted depending on the level of national development. The expanding utilities of the concept of professionalism obviously contributed to the interpretative management of *dwifungsi* within ABRI.

Further development of ABRI's adaptive professionalism could be seen when the concept of national discipline was apparently absorbed into this professionalism–*dwifungsi* paradigm. The National Discipline Movement (*Gerakan Disiplin Nasional*: GDN) itself was a government's social policy campaign which attempted to tackle the increasing crime rate and the perceived decline of social norms and morality, apparently resulting from rapid economic growth and urbanization.[68] Since GDN provided a perfect opportunity for ABRI to project its self-image as the most professional and disciplined group in society, this programme was not unrelated to *dwifungsi* in the eyes of the ABRI leadership, who felt it allowed ABRI to demonstrate its leadership role in society. A book was soon published by ABRI's Information Centre (Puspen) with the title *ABRI's Dwifungsi and National Discipline*.[69] The material consisted of ABRI's explanation of the link between *dwifungsi* and national discipline, and included thirty-two interviews conducted by Puspen with noted intellectuals, ministers, business leaders and local administrators regarding their opinions about the two concepts.

In the introduction, Pangab Try Sutrisno insisted that '*dwifungsi* is *permanently* needed as long as Indonesia exists on the earth and ABRI is committed to its professionalism. To illustrate its work, ABRI plays a role in improving national discipline and it is the motivation of this book'.[70] Interestingly, however, despite Try's outward-looking posture in linking *dwifungsi* and national discipline, many of the interviewees in this book essentially linked the two issues in an inward-looking manner, i.e. by emphasizing the need for further discipline within ABRI. For example, Interior Minister Gen. (ret.) Rudini, who was replaced by Try as KSAD in 1986, argued that ABRI still needed to improve internal-moral discipline (*disiplin bathiniah*), which might go towards preventing behaviour such as corruption.[71]

Whatever the source of the lack of discipline, GDN soon became a theme of *dwifungsi* implementation, both for the national project and the internal reform programme.[72] The former was well reflected in the 1990 Army Seminar and the following ABRI Seminar. The latter was summed up in the back-to-basics movement, led by Try's successor, Gen. Edi Sudradjat, in 1993, and the subsequent study initiative taken by Seskoad with Akabri-generation officers. Through these developments, the professionalism argument under the *dwifungsi* concept further expanded in scope – as seen in its new commitment to the management of human resources (*sumber daya manusia*: SDM) in non-military sectors.

The 1990 Army Seminar at Seskoad was regarded as one of the major seminars held by the army leadership, following those in 1965, 1966 and 1972. The seminar discussed the most outward-looking theme in the history of army seminars – the Strategy for the Development of Human Resources in the Second Long-term Development Plan.[73] This, to some extent, reflected the changing patterns of civil–military relations over the last twenty-five years. ABRI had originally been preoccupied with establishing its institutional posture in the state and society, but was gradually compelled to shift its attention to broader developments in society in order to catch up with the multiple impacts of capitalist development. Although this issue was obviously beyond the capacity of the military profession in any normal sense, it was incorporated in ABRI's all-encompassing doctrinal design due to the nature of the *dwifungsi* thinking which had pushed ABRI into a role for which it was not professionally prepared. Under these circumstances, it seemed inevitable that the military's policy initiative became conceptual rather than practical, and even tended to insist on traditionalism as reflecting the fear of losing leadership in society.

Such aspects were visible at the 1990 Army Seminar. In the opening session, Pangab Try Sutrisno maintained that:

> As we anticipated at the ABRI seminar in 1986, the world is now in transition, mainly due to the development of transportation, telecommunication and information, which leads to the post-industrial society characterised by the era of information…. As a result of this development, change in one country easily affects other countries, making it hard to avoid the influx of foreign influence (experiences and thoughts) into our society.[74]

In facing these challenges, Try insisted on the need to build on strategic values in order to improve the quality of society and human life, in eight areas in particular – struggle motivation, knowledge of science, professionalism, creativity, discipline, responsibility, physical health, and harmony with the natural environment.[75]

Needless to say, these targets did not constitute defence policy. However, by emphasizing struggle, professionalism and discipline, said to be the pillars in defending national values from the invasion of foreign values in the era of free information flow, the ABRI leadership was reinventing a space for further *dwifungsi* missions. It was in this context that *dwifungsi* was linked during the seminar with SDM (*sumber daya manusia*: human resources). Try asserted that, 'as a logical consequence, *dwifungsi* (which is based on struggle motivation) becomes a "service" (*pengabdian*) of ABRI in our efforts to defend Indonesia's national aspirations and direction'.[76] In developing this argument, he further emphasized that 'the national aspirations are realised in the forms of Pancasila and UUD45 which provide the philosophy of harmony and equilibrium for our society, based on *kekeluargaan* and *gotong-royong*, to avoid confrontation and domination. Therefore, in developing SDM, our social structure does not distinguish civilian and military matters in a dichotomous way'.[77] Try, in this way, relied on traditionalism in order to construct a new logic for *dwifungsi*'s role in promoting SDM.

Try's remarks reflected ABRI's concern during this period that the improvement of SDM in the industrializing society would inevitably invite a conclusion which emphasized rational allocation of human resources and functional specialization of social sectors, which would hardly fit with the image of *dwifungsi*. The threat of foreign values and the mythification of national character became ABRI's linguistic weapons in meeting this challenge. In this communication pattern, terms such as 'declining nationalism' and 'negative influence of foreign values' were fully mobilized.[78]

Based on the result of this seminar, Mabes ABRI held an armed forces seminar in 1991 in order to produce the basis of ABRI's policy stance for the GBHN 1993 and the second twenty-five-year long-term development plan (PJPT II). The arguments devised were used to incorporate the concept of SDM into ABRI's long-term doctrine and to face the perceived *tantangan globalisasi* (challenges of globalization). The major themes were as follows.

First, ABRI's own SDM condition was explained. It was claimed that an efficient ABRI could not be fully realized due to budgetary constraints, which had led to the deterioration of ABRI's six basic capacities – intelligence, defence, security, territorial, *sospol*, and back-up systems.[79] Second, the seminar assessed that the security challenges in PJPT II remained the latent extreme-right or extreme-left movements and GPK (security disturbance movements) in remote areas, whereas political problems centred on issues concerning human rights, *keterbukaan*, legal justice, freedom of expression and association, and democratization.[80] In facing these two challenges, the seminar emphasized the significance of improving ABRI's SDM and concluded that it would need a higher level of professionalism which should be integrated with leadership ability, national disci-

pline, *dwifungsi* and *kemanunggalan ABRI–Rakyat*.[81] The concepts of *dwifungsi*, professionalism and discipline were juxtaposed – as already seen – and formulated as ABRI's stance to counter problems over the next few decades.

Given the new assessment of the environmental shift, ABRI's place in it, and ABRI's internal tasks, Menhankam Gen. (ret.) Benny Moerdani then moved to fine tune ABRI's doctrinal position by introducing the doctrine of Hankamneg (*Pertahanan Keamanan Negara*: National Defence and Security) the following year. This doctrine standardized the military interpretation that: globalization would threaten Indonesian nationalism; SDM needed to be improved to counter this threat; 'professionalism and discipline' in society are the keys to improve SDM; and thus ABRI's *dwifungsi* could contribute to promotion of these two needs.[82] In this way, ABRI's external projection of its professionalism began to involve the concept of SDM which emphasized the threat of foreign values and the need to uphold 'Indonesianness' through the 'disciplined' *rakyat*. Importantly, in the eyes of the ABRI leadership, this SDM scheme secured the place of *dwifungsi* as a tool for managing social transformation driven by the global wave of capitalist development. Such aspirations were actually reflected in ABRI's official five-year Strategic Plan (Rencana Strategi – Renstra) when SDM was made the prime goal for the period 1989–1993 (Renstra IV), following themes such as 'Regrouping' (Renstra I 1974–1978), 'Kemanunggalan ABRI–Rakyat' (Renstra II 1979–1983), and 'KEE and Professionalism' (Renstra III 1984–1988).[83]

As we have seen, all of these strategic targets are linked to the management of *dwifungsi*, and the concept of professionalism played the important role, particularly since the mid-1980s, in the process of reproducing the legitimacy of *dwifungsi* missions. As mentioned earlier, however, such an externalization of the professionalism concept in fact ran parallel to ABRI's internal reform programmes. We now shift our attention to these programmes, among which the most notable is the 'back-to-basics' campaign, which also provoked a public debate on *dwifungsi*.

Back-to-basics and the awakening of corporate interests

The first systematic attempt made by an academy-generation officer to delineate internal problems with the potential to seriously undermine the army's institutional integrity in conducting military operations, including sociopolitical ones, was issued in 1993, following the decision in the Rapim ABRI 1992 to improve the moral standard of the officer corps. Based on this, KSAD Edi Sudradjat formed a task force which formulated a document, entitled 'Basic Ideas about the Maintenance of Fundamental Norms for Soldiers', with its campaign name of 'Back-to-Basics'.[84] This forty-three-page paper comprised four parts: basic ideas about back-to-basics; environmental factors influencing the army; identification of problems; and conceptual measures needed to tackle such problems.[85] Edi explained that there had been certain deviations (*penyimpangan*) from the army's basic norms which had resulted in the urgent need for therapy (*terapi*).[86]

The main external factor which had caused deviations, according to the paper, was the shortage of budgetary allocations to the defence field. Before describing the budgetary problem, however, the paper emphasized the significance of the current security situation to back up Edi's claim for a budget increase. The Edi paper argued that:

> The global change in recent years effectively ended international antagonism between Eastern and Western blocs…, but it certainly raised an international campaign coloured by issues such as democracy, human rights and environmental preservation…. No country, including Indonesia, can avoid being influenced by this international campaign … and its domestic reflection can actually be seen in our current process of transition from a traditional-agrarian society to a modern-industrial one, which is accompanied by changes in the social system and order…. To mention an example, the widening socioeconomic gap has an obvious impact on politics in this heterogeneous society.[87]

The emphasis on current political vulnerability was followed by a call for the balanced allocation of the national budget between prosperity and security aspects. The paper argued:

> The annually increasing national budget is not accompanied by an increase in the defence budget, rather the allocation for the Hankam sector is declining…. This has always caused a perception gap – regarding prosperity and security – between technocrats and military circles…. It is often not recognized that development throughout the New Order was due to ABRI's successful maintenance of national security…. Some non-ABRI circles instead take security as a given thing without recognising the big contribution ABRI has made…. If the defence budget continues to decline, it will surely affect the security aspect which cannot be separated from prosperity in national development…, leading to an inequilibrium between prosperity and security.[88]

The paper emphasized several political challenges. It argued that although Pancasila ideology had been disseminated in society, issues of democratization and political change were emerging every year, as were the issues of the socioeconomic gap and related rioting. Under these conditions, the paper concluded, people could be manipulated politically in ways that would lead to security problems.[89]

The declining budgetary allocation was also identified as the main obstacle to improving ABRI's professionalism. It was argued that, over the previous ten years, the insufficient budget had had a negative impact on various programmes, notably the maintenance of military bases, educational quality, military exercises and the maintenance of weapons.[90] These difficulties had resulted in a shift in values relating to *kejuangan* (struggle) in today's society.

> In the past, becoming a soldier was considered prestigious among the youth population. Now, however, people's willingness to join the army has declined. For example, among nearly 900 students who entered Akabri, those who had 45 points or higher in the NEM (Real Score of the Final Examination) were less than 10%, while the majority had points between 30 and 39. Moreover, according to a survey, 60% of them choose the army merely to find a job, and most are those who could not pass the Sipenmaru (Entrance Examination for State Universities).[91]

If the declining budgetary allocation was coupled with declining SDM in the army, it could result in a serious threat to ABRI's institutional integrity. The Edi Paper saw such conditions as the cause of certain deviations. The following five were discussed.

First, illegal behaviour was apparent – for instance, going to prohibited places, breaking traffic rules and even conducting criminal activities.[92] Second, the gap in perception between old and current generations regarding the understanding of *kejuangan* was suggested as a case of deviation. The paper warned of the current tendency to use *kejuangan* as synonymous with *kepejuangan* (warriorship) during the revolutionary war; this was inaccurate because *kejuangan* consisted of 'love' and 'spirit of sacrifice' for the nation, and was thus eternal as long as Indonesia existed.[93] Third, it was admitted that the problem of low salaries had motivated soldiers to find extra jobs even during office-hours.[94] Given the circumstances, the paper also criticized the tendency for those in positions of authority (*atasan*) to be reluctant to discipline any staff deviation (*bawahannya*), something which was clearly in conflict with the army's slogan: 'there is no soldier who is wrong, but if there is, it is officers who have responsibility for what is done by their staff'.[95] These deviations, the paper claimed, had been assessed by several reports and evaluations, as well as in forum discussions and daily conversations, and proved the decline of professionalism as a central problem of the army.[96] Fourth, and related to the third case, the paper mentioned a tendency for officers to dislike being posted to combat units and/or positions outside of Java because of their expectations that non-combat and Java postings could provide more opportunities for material well-being (*kesejahteraan*).[97] One reason forwarded for this was, again, the low level of salaries. The fact that salaries were hardly sufficient to cover basic needs had brought about a deterioration in military discipline and the work ethic, which in turn further undermined professionalism.[98] Finally, the paper implied the negative impact of a politically oriented career system by suggesting that 'the declining spirit of *kejuangan* is often caused by the reality of uncertainty in career paths'.[99]

In conducting 'therapy', the back-to-basics campaign placed priority on improving *kepemimpinan* (leadership) and *manajemen* (management) capacities within the organizational mechanism. For example, given the difficulty of increasing the soldiers' welfare budget, one suggestion was better management of Primkopad (Primer Koperasi AD: the army's cooperative association) coupled

with strict punishment of 'erring' soldiers. It was also hoped that the defence budget would be increased in proportion with the increase in the national budget.[100] These two concepts of leadership and management were intended to overcome shortcomings resulting from the 1984 reorganization.[101]

In this way, the back-to-basics movement seemed to be an attempt to overcome problems which arose in part from reduced budgetary allocations. It highlighted major problems in all three levels of civil–military relations – the environment surrounding ABRI, civil–military interactions, and internal military affairs. In other words, the paper identified the trouble outside ABRI (i.e. national budget allocation) as the prime source of difficulties in civil–military interactions (i.e. deviations/declining prestige) and internal military matters (delayed professionalization). Since the deviations outlined affected civil–military interactions, they could easily spill over to the controversial issue of *dwifungsi* legitimacy.

Gen. (ret.) Moerdani, for example, understood back-to-basics as meaning a move to prioritize the defence function above ABRI's sociopolitical role, for example, the occupation of *bupati* posts.[102] Lt. Gen. (ret.) Sayidiman insisted that the movement was a return to the real intention of *kekaryaan*, which meant abandoning the current dictatorial style.[103] Lt. Gen. (ret.) Soebijakto saw the issue more critically: 'Back-to-basics is intended to return to the ideal of 1945 values which are represented by Sapta Marga, but it still could be interpreted in various ways, as some people say it is back-to-barracks. It is in part the responsibility of Edi who provided such an unclear concept'.[104] More fundamentally, Gen. (ret.) A.H. Nasution, the father of *dwifungsi*, insisted that 'I totally agree with Edi's back-to-basics idea that ABRI should return to the basics of the struggle-soldier (*tentara pejuang*) who is totally a tool of nation, not of a certain group'.[105]

However, in the eyes of serving officers who had participated in the formulation of back-to-basics, the concept had no direct link with *dwifungsi*. Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo, for example, argued that 'it was a micro-managerial problem, and the movement was to re-functionalize each part of the organization to play its designed role, which had been undermined by a tendency within ABRI to avoid risk and responsibility. So it is basically self-evaluation to enhance professionalism, which has no link with civil–military relations'.[106] Another officer, Brig. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, who also contributed to the formulation of back-to-basics, endorsed a concern reflected in the paper which was shared by a majority of those in the ABRI circle: 'There is a huge salary gap between ABRI and civilian sectors, which inevitably raises a question in the minds of soldiers – being professional and loyal to the nation for what?'[107] This graduate of Akabri 73 argued that this psychological problem contributed to the erosion of the *semangat kejuangan* (struggle spirit) among ABRI members.

As seen above, concern was not directed at the limited allocation of the national budget in itself, but at its growth rate, which did not match the increase in national budget. This point was very important in facing the potential accusa-

tion that ABRI was only concerned with its own interests. Edi himself, when Menhankam, insisted that this was not the case, maintaining that 'we have to develop professionalism with a very limited budget, because we know that the largest portion must be used for the improvement of the people's prosperity'.[108] Clearly the limitations of the budget were not the central issue. On the contrary, such a situation dovetailed nicely with ABRI's nationalist/heroic self-perception of *mengorbankan diri bagi bangsa* (sacrificing self for the nation). Instead, the concerns expressed regarding this issue focused on the relative gaps between security and prosperity in national policy; the increase in the defence budget allocation compared to other sectors; and the salaries of officers compared to those of middle-class civilians. In this regard, although the budget shortage itself had already been mentioned (most recently at the 1991 ABRI Seminar), Edi's claim in his paper provided a new angle on an old theme.

There are several implications of the back-to-basics programme for our analysis of ABRI's *dwifungsi* management during this time. First was its impact on the *dwifungsi* debate in society. As mentioned by Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo, back-to-basics was no doubt primarily an exercise to rejuvenate the army's organizational life, and thus was not concerned directly with civil–military relations in the eyes of ABRI policy-makers. Despite this, the back-to-basics programme easily merged with the debate in political society over *dwifungsi* excesses (see Chapter 2), which, according to Edi, was manipulated by certain groups to express their own political interests. This indicated in itself that the *dwifungsi* dispute had reached the point at which ABRI could no longer maintain a hegemonic interpretation of perceived role.

Second, negative connotations involved in the Edi Paper regarding national policy revealed that the back-to-basics promoters were actually concerned with the declining institutional integrity of the army resulting from Soeharto's state administration which had reduced the defence–security budget. This perception was inherited by Edi's successor, Wismoyo, as KSAD, who not only proceeded energetically with Edi's back-to-basics programme but was also said to be active in protecting the army's own financial sources through business activities – thus distancing himself from the Palace, despite his earlier image as a 'palace general'.[109] The back-to-basics idea, therefore, coincided with the reality that the army's institutional interests were not necessarily in sync with Soeharto's political interests. Together with the budget issue, the problem of political promotion within ABRI – as mentioned in the Edi Paper – also reflected the army's concern about Soeharto's disregard of its corporate interests.

In summary, there were at least two unintended political consequences of the back-to-basics programme. One was the boosting of critical space given to the *dwifungsi* debate in public political discussion. The other was the awakening of the army's organizational concerns about Soeharto's political stance. In other words, if the project was an attempt to tackle ABRI's internal problems and to promote professionalism, discipline and SDM, it also paid the price of opening up *dwifungsi* to social pressure and fallout as a result of objecting to some of Soeharto's policies.

Seskoad officers' search for *dwifungsi*'s new paradigm

In parallel with the back-to-basics movement, there was the initiative of Seskoad-linked officers to support the Edi project, as if to revive the reputation of Seskoad as the *dapur pemikiran* (idea-kitchen) of ABRI in the early period of the New Order.[110] The re-emergence of Seskoad indicated that ABRI, especially the army, was searching for a new format for its role in the changing society. A year after the Rapim ABRI 1992 which promoted the issue of back-to-basics, Seskoad introduced a programme to promote leadership capacity among officers. As seen above, the need for leadership (*kepemimpinan*) skill was one of the conclusions in the Edi Paper, and Seskoad's educational curriculum supported this orientation. In 1993, it produced the first material which warned of the declining discipline among the officer corps by insisting that officers should not be 'salon officers' (*perwira-perwira salon*) who only enjoyed having parties and ceremonies.[111] The document called for 'authoritative leadership' at all command levels to uphold strong discipline, because without it the military organization would simply become an 'armed gang'. Such authoritative leadership was described as necessary within ABRI, especially in conducting its *hankam* role. On the other hand, in implementing its *sospol* role, the paper insisted that officers had to improve 'democratic leadership' in order to accommodate the people's political aspirations.[112] Although ABRI's emphasis on leadership was not new, it was the first time it had been introduced as an internal education programme for the officers.

Disregarding the simple question of how a body organized along authoritarian lines could democratically lead others, these arguments distinguished between the two functions in the *dwifungsi* doctrine. This dichotomous approach was soon revised by Mabes ABRI which also produced a document on ABRI's leadership in 1993. This Mabes ABRI version argued that the *dwifungsi* leadership – without the distinction between *hankam* and *sospol* aspects – would be greatly needed in the era of globalization in order to defend Indonesian values from the influx of individualistic foreign concepts such as human rights.[113]

Seskoad took further initiatives to promote its internal programme along with Edi's back-to-basics. The Study Forum was newly established within Seskoad under the leadership of Maj. Gen. Herman Musakabe, Seskoad Commander, with full support from Edi (Menhankam) and Wismoyo (KSAD). On the occasion of the 42nd anniversary of Seskoad in 1993, the Forum published a collection of working papers written by noted intellectual officers. The book was entitled 'Challenges of Development: Dynamic Thoughts of Seskoad'.[114] In his introductory note, Edi stressed that this work should begin a new tradition of Seskoad to improve the intellectual quality of the officer corps, while Wismoyo claimed that the book proved Seskoad's constant role as the conceptual centre of the army. In fact, the articles ranged from internal problems of ABRI to international relations, and all were written by active officers. We focus only on ABRI issues here, but before looking at each article, it is worth examining the ideas of

Agus Widjojo who was not only involved in Edi's back-to-basics movement but was also recruited by the Study Forum as the sole source of intellectual input from outside Seskoad. Among both active and retired officers, it was widely understood that Widjojo's contribution in developing the two programmes was critical.

Widjojo published a working paper in Sesko ABRI in 1992, which was – as mentioned earlier – selected as the best paper in the annual regular course. In his analysis of national trends, he pointed out that young people aged 25–35, who had no experience of serious political conflict in the nation, would dominate the population by the year 2000; inevitably they would not understand the background of ABRI's political commitment.[115] Because these young people, especially in the urban areas, would receive a higher level of education than now, he continued, it was demographically predictable that more people would become critical and outspoken about the role of ABRI. For him, this trend was coupled with the change in political culture from the current traditional-paternalist one to a more modern-rational one. In facing these challenges, he argued that ABRI needed to abandon its conservative military culture, represented by such features as lack of respect for pluralism and difference of opinion; tendency to see society as monolithic like the military; and lack of tolerance to different ideas within the military, which had made officers unfamiliar with the persuasive approach in politics.[116] He argued that these aspects did not suit modern political culture – which was open, rational, argumentative and dynamic – and that the current officers' general lack of curiosity in reading books had encouraged such a gap.

Regarding *dwifungsi*, Widjojo mentioned Professor Juwono Sudarsono's view – usually welcomed by other officers – which saw 'ABRI as the only institution capable of creating nation-wide concepts and interests; therefore *dwifungsi* should not be challenged'. According to Widjojo, Juwono's view was too static and failed to consider current social changes which in the twenty-five years since the Second Army Seminar of 1966 had seen the establishment of many social institutions capable of managing fields previously dominated by ABRI.[117] In his view, there were various factors which would influence ABRI's *dwifungsi*. Among external factors, he identified: the perceptional change in society regarding ABRI; the rise of the educated middle class; the growing complexity of the modern nation; the erosion of the paternalistic society due to modernization; and problems and challenges posed by economic development. On the other hand, the internal factor he mentioned was the increasing professionalism within ABRI. This was quite contrary to the mainstream interpretation that professionalism would not influence *dwifungsi*. Instead, he saw the possibility of perceptional change within the professional circle (*kalangan ABRI profesional*), which would influence *dwifungsi* and the role of ABRI in general.[118] On the conduct of *dwifungsi*, Widjojo warned of the growing tendency towards dogmatization in implementing *dwifungsi*. 'Ideology [of *dwifungsi*] has to be adjustable to the times, and guided by the rational, open, and discussable methods rather than dogmatic indoctrination.'[119]

Widjojo then analysed various shortcomings in ABRI's organizational and personnel policies. He pointed out the uncertain career system, also flagged as an issue in the Edi Paper. The need to establish a predictable career system, which was not affected by the 'external' factors such as politics and patronage, was strongly emphasized. Widjojo argued this was important to encourage officers' work motivation, rank-prestige, and self-confidence, as well as to prevent both indifference (*masa bodoh*) and the seeking of short-cuts.[120] As discussed in Chapter 2, the uncertainty in the career system at that time was largely due to Soeharto's political manipulation of ABRI in making ABRI amenable in the midst of his conflict with Menhankam Gen. (ret.) Benny Moerdani. Widjojo also made a pragmatic suggestion aimed at improving the quality of personnel. 'We should be brave enough to decide the priority between the two functions in *dwifungsi*, because ABRI does not have enough time to produce personnel who are competent in both functions simultaneously'.[121] ABRI's priority was no doubt the defence role, not *sospol*. Such a progressive suggestion was followed by his argument calling for the transformation of officers' values from traditional to rational ones in order to improve ABRI's SDM, and – as argued in the Edi Paper – the acquisition of leadership and management skills.[122]

Widjojo's paper had two significant implications. First, it revealed that there was no single assessment within ABRI regarding the linkage between *dwifungsi* and professionalism, and the latter was now legitimately used as a foundation to express criticism of the current situation within ABRI. In explaining the need for professionalism, one could describe what should be corrected, and this in effect opened the space to legitimately raise concerns about the existing system. Perhaps without using the umbrella of professionalism and SDM, Widjojo might have been taking a risk in describing ABRI as paternalistic, irrational, dogmatic, uncertain, and therefore less capable of performing two functions at the same time. As we saw above, the concept of professionalism had been widely used to expand the scope of *dwifungsi* legitimation since the mid-1980s, but Widjojo's paper illustrated that it also could be used by ABRI officers to question the current conduct of *dwifungsi*. However, a question which still remained was: how much support could be expected for Widjojo's line of thinking? According to a general-ranking officer close to him, 'we are still a minority within ABRI; the majority is not even willing to communicate with civilian intellectuals because they do not want to feel inferior'.[123] However, in ABRI as a whole, this was not to deny the potential support of the silent majority of lower-ranking officers who were naturally concerned about uncertain career paths.

Second, the fact that he was employed both in the back-to-basics and the Seskoad project also revealed that Widjojo's ideas and stances were at least welcomed by certain groups within the military leadership in conducting internal reform programmes. Widjojo's ideas were basically reflected in the Edi Paper, though some of the more drastic elements were hardly visible. As we will see below, his contribution was also apparent in the Seskoad project, although his critical perspective was balanced by the outward-looking approach provided by Lt. Col. Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a close friend of Widjojo.

Returning to the Seskoad book, three articles are relevant here. First is the one written by Lt. Col. Heru Sukmadi discussing the challenges to ABRI's ethical system.[124] Heru argued that ABRI's current organizational culture was not yet fully based on the Sapta Marga principle. According to him, largely due to the influx of business values within ABRI, the military ethic was in serious danger of being replaced by a commercial ethic among ABRI officers.[125] Heru elaborated further on the problem of military ethics by arguing that the formation of the DKM (Military Honour Council) in the wake of the Dili affair in November 1991 highlighted ABRI's lack of proper ethics. However, he asserted that the blame for the incident could not be attributed entirely to ABRI.[126] As discussed in Chapter 2, this assessment reflected a general concern within the officer corps about Soeharto's disregard for military voices.

Heru's paper was followed by that of Lt. Col. Agus Wirahadikusumah who argued about the professionalism of ABRI from a critical perspective.[127] Quoting Edi's previous speech on back-to-basics, Agus called for its urgent implementation, due to the shared concern that the level of professionalism was declining. As if to reinforce the Edi Paper, he noted: the perceptional gap between the two generations regarding the understanding of *kejuangan*; the growing deviations from ABRI's standard norms; the lack of financial support to improve the quality of professionalism; and the rapid economic growth which had a negative influence on ABRI in that it tended to erode the discipline of military officers. Like Heru, Agus also regarded the Dili affair as an example of lack of professionalism in conducting security operations, but, again, he believed that the blame could not be laid solely at ABRI's feet.[128] For Heru and Agus, the Dili affair contributed a significant momentum to the professionalism campaign within ABRI, while at the same time causing concern that ABRI's corporate interests were not properly protected by the national leaders in the face of international pressure.

In terms of Soeharto–ABRI relations, therefore, the Dili incident provided significant momentum for young officers in Seskoad – who had studied the army's 'long-term' strategic plans – to discuss the problems of the state leadership whose interests did not resonate with those of ABRI. In the military campaign for professionalization, these officers developed an intra-military communication space to discuss such perceptions within the officer corps. In this sense, the concept of professionalism, which was first used to legitimize *dwifungsi* practice for post-revolutionary officers, but was later used to express problems of ABRI's internal/external policy orientations, now provided officers with a lens to identify the gap between ABRI's corporate interests and Soeharto's private interests. This enabled the officers to more clearly see Soeharto as an obstacle to military development.

Agus' article was followed by a reprint of Yudhoyono's writing on professionalism. It is difficult to find any recent Seskoad paper on professionalism which does not quote Yudhoyono's paper, first circulated within Seskoad in 1990.[129] Unlike the previous two articles, Yudhoyono's argument was largely centred on prospects and hopes rather than problems. As he identified ABRI's central

concern today as the actualization of professionalism in facing the complex challenges of social change, his argument was all-encompassing in nature, insisting on the prospective role of the professionalized ABRI during the next decades. This aspect seemed to be the major factor which made his writing so popular within ABRI, whose legitimate place in society had been in question since the *keterbukaan* movement.

In starting his argument, Yudhoyono rejected the views of Guy Pauker, Ulf Sundhaussen, Harold Maynard and Harold Crouch, which he labelled as the liberal presumption of civilian supremacy over the military. In understanding the legitimacy of ABRI's sociopolitical role, he insisted that Western notions were not suitable. His concept of military professionalism was distinguished from the Western approach which tended to limit the utility of a profession to a certain field. He argued that in the case of ABRI, Law No. 2 in 1988 – which claimed that ABRI should be professional in military affairs with the spirit of Sapta Marga – embodied the essence of ABRI's professionalism. 'With *dwifungsi*', he argued, 'ABRI is expected to have two dimensions of professionalism, i.e. *hankam* and *sospol* fields. Therefore, all ABRI officers have to be professional in conducting their tasks in regard to defence and social-politics'.[130] This approach differed from that of Agus Widjojo, who reacted to such an interpretation by saying that 'I personally do not believe that professionalism can be adopted in ABRI's sociopolitical role'.[131]

Yudhoyono also saw the issue of democratization as the major challenge to Indonesia. The world-wide wave of democratization, according to Yudhoyono, would have a negative impact on Indonesian society – which was still in transition – because of the possibility that radical political ideas from abroad could easily gain popular support in domestic society.[132] Quoting foreign media which placed Indonesia's country risk on a ranking with China, mainly due to the uncertainty of national leadership succession, he insisted on the importance of ABRI's continuing role in providing maximum security and order in society to maintain investors' confidence.[133] Moreover, and despite his earlier comment on Western-biased studies, Yudhoyono supported an opinion of Harold Maynard which noted ABRI as the only institution in Indonesia which was capable of handling security, stability and development in an effective way. In discussing how ABRI should fulfil these 'hopes of society', the concept of professionalization again played a key role. It was argued that ABRI officers were expected to be professional as patriots, experts, leaders, managers and thinkers.[134]

Among these professional capacities, Yudhoyono emphasized leadership and management. In order to improve the quality of SDM in Indonesia, according to him, it was important to promote discipline, efficiency, productivity and the work ethic in society, and it was in these areas that ABRI's social leadership would be needed. Regarding management, he stated that this ability was crucial in peace time. 'With good management, we are not only able to utilize limited resources effectively and efficiently but also to arrange organizations, weapons, facilities, and exercises in optimal ways'.[135] In sum, Yudhoyono claimed that leadership and management were the key capacities of ABRI's professionalism,

and it was in this context that he concluded that professionalization would promote ABRI's role in society rather than relegate it to the role of *pemadam kebakaran* (fire brigade).[136] Bambang's catch-all conception of professionalism, therefore, provided a military discourse to counter any attempt in society to diminish the utility of *dwifungsi* in response to the perceived threat of social change.

The new concepts recently incorporated into the *dwifungsi* language by Seskoad officers – namely, professionalism, SDM, discipline and leadership – were in fact reflected in ABRI's subsequent policies. For example, F-ABRI, according to Maj. Gen. Hari Sabarno, now focused on SDM and national discipline issues after the *keterbukaan* campaign of the early 1990s.[137] In territorial operations, the internal magazine of Kodam Jaya – then under the command of Maj. Gen. Wiranto – asserted that the National Discipline Movement reflected ABRI's role as *ing ngarsa sung tuladha* in carrying out *dwifungsi*'s second function.[138] Above all, Yudhoyono's contribution was crucial in the making of this theory which integrated perceived needs in ABRI and society – such as SDM, discipline, and professionalism – and linked them with the viability of *dwifungsi*. Though there were subtle differences between Agus Widjojo's and Yudhoyono's focuses, the latter's catch-all paradigm was soon adopted as the *de facto* official interpretation of *dwifungsi*.

The Forum's first *Tantangan* project enabled Seskoad to institutionalize the series in the following years. Up until 1996, the *Tantangan* series was conducted every year, although the documents were only circulated within ABRI from the second edition in 1994 onwards. In the 1994 edition, which mainly focused on the strategic issues of Hankamneg, the Forum took a different approach by inviting civilian intellectuals for the five-day discussion.[139] The aim was to promote communication between Seskoad and civilian intellectuals, which would strengthen the image of Seskoad as the leading idea-maker in civil–military relations.

Interestingly, the Forum in 1994 broke a taboo, i.e. by discussing the presidential succession. On the assumption that President Soeharto would remain in power, the Forum said:

> by the year 2003, ABRI will still behave as it does today. But if succession takes place [in 1998], ABRI – at least for the following five years – will lead domestic politics. Then if the political situation in 2003 is satisfactory, ABRI will revise its *kekaryaan* role, which is distinguished from the *sospol* role of *dwifungsi*. Despite the possible reduction of *kekaryaan*, the quality of ABRI's *sospol* role will be improved as Seskoad's new admission policy – which limits candidates to those who hold university degrees – will be implemented after 1997.[140]

These assessments were important in two ways. First the succession problem was discussed internally within ABRI and it was perceived as the major turning point for ABRI's political management. Here, Seskoad indicated ABRI's possible

claim to lead the nation after the Soeharto regime. Given the fact that this book was circulated within ABRI, it seemed understood that ABRI was preparing for the succession, even if this was usually denied in official public comments. Second, Seskoad's distinction between *dwifungsi* and *kekaryaan* implied that in post-Soeharto politics – when ABRI would lack a strong military leader who could claim the dominant role as the national-crisis solver and ABRI would merely become 'one among equals' in the political arena – a plausible policy to be taken by ABRI would be the reduction of *kekaryaan*, which was no longer regarded as the essence of *dwifungsi* in the eyes of the Seskoad circle. Actually, as we shall see in Chapter 7, ABRI first implemented this policy after the fall of Soeharto in 1998 in order to show its reform effort. The Seskoad assessment in the second *Tantangan* project provided some important insights concerning *dwifungsi* in the regime transformation.

In contrast to previous editions, the third edition of 1995 focused on the economy, particularly the role of ABRI in developing cooperative associations (*koperasi*).[141] It was argued that ABRI's *koperasi* should help strengthen the nationwide small business groups, and would also help prevent exploitation of resources and opportunities by big business groups at the expense of small business resulting in political instability.[142] In this way, Seskoad's recent initiative to establish new strategic concepts now added another virtue to *dwifungsi* in the face of criticism that ABRI disregarded the interests of the people. Seskoad's young officers might acknowledge that ABRI's top generals had long been associated with big business groups which were mostly Soeharto cronies, and had engaged in systematic corruptions since the beginning of the New Order. The Forum's criticism of big business implied either its opportunistic stance or the idealism of officers who were not yet involved in this 'tradition' of top generals. However, since the book was only circulated within the military and had no chance to be read widely in society, there was no incentive to be opportunistic. Thus, the criticism outlined above might be understood as a reflection of idealism.

Finally, the fourth edition of *Tantangan* series in 1996 focused on democratization issues – including the role of ABRI.[143] Seskoad attempted to systematize ABRI's views on democratic prospects in preparing for the formulation of GBHN 1998. In the 1996 edition, Maj. Gen. Arifin Tarigan, Seskoad Commander (DanSeskoad), first discussed the problems of national disharmony.[144] Arifin called on the government to be less involved with corruption and ready to accept criticism from any direction, in order to prepare for the era of *keterbukaan*-democracy.[145] He emphasized how globalization would bring to the surface the problem of the current socio-economic gap between the rich and poor, and how it could threaten national cohesion. From this security perspective, Arifin anticipated the increase in the number of mass riots.[146] The Seskoad Commander believed that civilian leaders in the government needed to establish consistent measures for the lessening of the economic gap without prioritizing their factional interests in the government.

The article by the DanSeskoad was followed by that of another Major General, Tayo Tarmadi, the Commander of Kodam III/Siliwangi.[147] His

argument was highly conceptual but defined '*memberdayakan masyarakat*' (empowering society) as *dwifungsi*'s major aim in future political development. At first he distinguished between super- and infra-structures, insisting on the need for empowering the latter for the creation of a viable political system. The dichotomy of superstructure and infrastructure can roughly be equated with: the state and society; government and people; or the executive and legislative bodies. It was argued that since the early 1990s, Indonesia had faced political issues such as *keterbukaan*, democratization, human rights and civil society which were all new for the political system. These new trends were accompanied by limited social participation and bureaucratic dominance of the political system. It was against this background that the civil society issue emerged, involving the promotion of the bargaining position of society *vis-à-vis* the state and government.[148] Although he pointed to the potential danger of a weak superstructure and a too-strong infrastructure, Tarmadi insisted on the need to empower the infrastructure, considering the current situation. In the future *dwifungsi* should be aimed at encouraging this process, he concluded. The super- and infrastructures were further conceptualized by Lt. Col. Ade Djamhuri, Chief of Information in Kodam III, who emphasized the importance of improving mutual communication between the two structures in order to maintain harmony and equilibrium in their interactions.[149] Overall, Arifin provided Seskoad's assessment regarding the political threats in the coming decades, whereas both Tayo and Ade attempted to formulate a new framework for assessing current political distortions by employing the state–society approach.

The *Tantangan* project – which Seskoad hoped would rejuvenate its prestige as a *dapur pemikiran* as envisaged by Edi and Wismoyo in the first edition – was successful in the sense that it institutionalized the army's internal discussion about future political problems and *dwifungsi*'s response to them. As seen in Chapter 2, the ABRI leadership under Feisal and Hartono had become dogmatic in its responses to the growing social criticism during this period, but Seskoad's Study Forum, which consisted of a small intellectual circle, seemed to envisage the practical need for accommodating *dwifungsi* in a changing society without resorting to the dogmatism adopted by ABRI leadership. Many problems identified by the Forum clearly reflected a concern within ABRI that the Feisal–Hartono leadership had risked the military's position in society by fully committing itself to Soeharto's short-term private interests. The Army Seminar at Seskoad in 1996 – which was held amidst deepening government intervention in Megawati's PDI – further reflected such postures shared among these officers who were involved in the designing of ABRI's 'long-term' political interests.

The 1996 Army Seminar

For ABRI, the 1996 Army Seminar was significant in two ways. First, it was the First Army Seminar totally managed by the academy-generation officers to prepare for the army's inputs to a GBHN. Menhankam Edi Sudradjat, Pangab

Feisal Tanjung and KSAD Hartono were all AMN graduates whereas the seminar's working committees were largely led by Akabri graduates, or the New Order-generation officers who entered the academy after the army took power under the New Order.[150] Second, as General (ret.) Soemitro put it, 'this seminar, like it or not, needed to calculate a possible scenario of presidential succession and this factor might influence ABRI's medium-term political stance, provided that ABRI already knows its role will change positively after Soeharto'.[151] Though the succession issue was still uncertain at that time, Soemitro's assessment was plausible in the sense that the seminar was primarily intended to formulate ABRI's medium-term political vision which would be included in the 1998 GBHN. Thus it was not strange for the 'professional' military group to anticipate the change in national leadership, take into account its impact and determine ABRI's place in relation to other political forces. We now examine the result of the 1996 Army Seminar – the final one of the New Order – and the ways in which such aspects were reflected in it.

The seminar was held on 18 and 19 June, with the theme 'Perspectives on the Construction and Development of the Political Arena for the Seventh Five-Year Development Plan'.[152] The seminar produced three documents which would become the army's inputs to the subsequent ABRI Seminar in September and to the GBHN 1998–2003. The first document, the core paper, contained the army's political guidelines for the period 1998–2003, while the second described the major differences between it and the GBHN 1993, and the last explained the background to the formulation of the army thinking presented in the guidelines.[153] The central statement was that ABRI should play the role of improving the communication between political superstructure and infrastructure – a framework of reference adopted by Seskoad's internal discussion which we discussed above. It was assessed that, in order to respond to the complex challenge of globalization, the improvement of communication between the two sides – which could be equated with state and society, or government and people – would be crucial as a way to avoid mutual misunderstanding and antagonism. ABRI thus does not seem to have identified with the state or government but viewed itself as standing between state and society. Based on this core assumption, the seminar raised three issues: problems currently existing on both sides; the need to encourage the role of the *masyarakat menengah* (middle society), a concept newly introduced to define the group of people situated between political elites and the political mass; and ABRI's role. We examine them one by one.

The political superstructure – which could be viewed as a euphemism for the government – was criticized in various ways. The seminar evaluated the state apparatus as inconsistent in its policies, lacking discipline, corrupt, feudalistic, egoistic and nepotistic.[154] Moreover, the documents criticized the intervention of the executive branch in the problems of the infrastructure and, in order to empower the latter, called on the former to urgently reduce its dominance through open-democratic communication.[155] In this light, the seminar stated that the recent governmental interventions in Golkar and the two political

parties had been too explicit, suggesting instead that it use opaque methods (*jangan terlalu transparen*) – if it really had to (*terpaksa*) intervene – in order to avoid cultivating negative social feelings.[156]

Criticism was also directed at the Department of Information (Deppen). Mentioning the banning of three magazines in 1994, the seminar claimed that 'because the current SIUPP system was handled by one organization, it established the dominance of that organization, and such a condition has diminished objectivity'. Thus it was recommended that an impartial institution handle press cases.[157] Regarding the press, the seminar also asserted that because the bureaucracy had given 'bland information' (*komunikasi dingin*) to the press, journalists were motivated to expose 'off-the-record' comments; thus here the government was criticized rather than the press.[158] Needless to say, the initial target was Harmoko, who, as Minister of Information, had withdrawn the printing permits of the three magazines, but the claim also confirmed the existence of dissatisfaction within ABRI concerning the handling of the 1994 event which was originally caused by the conflict between ABRI and Habibie regarding the procurement of German warships (see Chapter 2). That such an assessment was officially adopted in the seminar documents was a significant sign that the army's concept-makers viewed critically the distortions caused by some of Soeharto's political decisions.

Moreover, regarding growing international pressure on Indonesia over issues of democratization, human rights and the East Timor problem, the seminar acknowledged that there was a gap between the ideal and practice; in other words, between the ideal of an active-independent foreign policy and the practical national interest. Using the Dili incident as an example, the seminar questioned the attitude of the government which bent the ideal for practical reasons, especially in order to obtain foreign economic investment and aid.[159] ABRI's dissatisfaction with government handling of the Dili case was formally expressed in this way. It also implied that many officers believed ABRI had been humiliated by the Dili solution – in which ten soldiers were sentenced – and that it was the government, or more precisely Soeharto, who had encouraged the process.

Finally, the seminar claimed that it was mainly due to the expanding number of civil servants that the problems of corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency and arrogance of power never seemed to disappear both at the national and local levels.[160] As the number increased, their salaries decreased, and their work incentives and professionalism declined. In this regard, it was strongly suggested that the government adopt a 'zero growth' policy, and that it should promote quality through training and education.[161] This suggestion again touched on an aspect of Soeharto's political management since the early days of the New Order. As many previous studies have shown, Soeharto controlled political participation channels and ensured Golkar's victory in general elections by forcing civil servants to join the Golkar-affiliated Korpri (civil servants' cooperative) under the slogan of *monoloyalitas* (mono-loyalty). Therefore, the increasing number of civil servants was partly a by-product of this corporatist interest-

representation mechanism. The seminar's suggestion implied that the army now saw the risks of maintaining this system as outweighing the benefits. It was a signal which hinted at a demand for a revision of the New Order political framework.

Linked with this, the seminar pointed out that the political representation system – namely, legislative and electoral mechanisms – was not functioning properly, causing several problems in the political infrastructure. Two tendencies were mentioned here. On the one hand, the DPR was seen by society as incapable of representing the aspirations of the people in law-making.[162] On the other hand, the rise of NGOs and new social groups such as KIPP and PUDI was explained as a reflection of social dissatisfaction with the current representation system which was seen as having existed for the sake of political parties rather than for the people.[163] The poor reputation of political parties was criticized as the cause of people seeking extra-system channels to present their political aspirations. Given this assessment, it was argued that the vital task of ABRI would be to empower these components within the formal political infrastructure in order to absorb the complex demands of society in facing the global phenomena of democratization and *keterbukaan*.

The army seminar therefore attempted to locate the primary role of ABRI as dynamizer to facilitate the interaction between the political superstructure and infrastructure. Here, a new concept of *masyarakat menengah* was introduced. It was defined as 'the group of people who have influential roles in society and give advice to policy-makers; for example, high-ranking bureaucrats, big business circles, the industrial world, bankers, leaders in various interest groups, and consultants'.[164] They were expected to have the ability to analyse government policies and support national development from the bottom as opinion-makers in society and form the bridge between the *Elite Politik* (political elites) and *Masyarakat Bawah* (lower or mass society) whose mutual communication was not always good.[165] It was suggested that in order to promote democracy, the *Masyarakat Menengah* could play a bridging role, and ABRI's sociopolitical role was defined as to encourage the formation of such a 'middle-society'. Therefore, *dwifungsi*'s new dynamizing role would be highlighted here.[166] The seminar argued that this point was not mentioned in GBHN 1993 but should be adopted in GBHN 1998. It was suggested that 'it [GBHN 1998] needs to present ABRI's new policy of promoting its sociopolitical function in order to realize democratic society and middle-class society (*masyarakat klas menengah*) which will play active and constructive roles in political development'.[167]

In sum, the 1996 Army Seminar clarified ABRI's *dwifungsi* design with three conceptual pillars: ABRI would bridge two structures in politics: ABRI as dynamizer supports the rise of the 'middle-society'; and ABRI would promote its sociopolitical function.

Having examined the seminar results, we can detect ABRI's critical stance on the political conduct of the Soeharto government, although it was expressed in very conceptual terms. However, the seminar also revealed the gap in civil–military perception during this period. The following three aspects were apparent.

First, military and civilian perceptions differed in defining the components of the political infrastructure, especially the place of Golkar. Golkar was defined in the ABRI view as the major player in the infrastructure but was widely seen in society as a tool of the state, and therefore as a part of the superstructure. In this regard, the seminar's slogan of 'empowering the infrastructure' could be interpreted by critical civilians as ABRI's attempt to empower a tool of the state – making the slogan tautological. For civilians, the same logic applied to the position of ABRI itself.

Second, some of the political phenomena such as NGOs, KIPP and PUDI were recognized in the seminar as a consequence of the malfunctioning infrastructure. However, it could be argued – perhaps more convincingly – that these phenomena arose in response to problems in the state authority, or superstructure, thus undermining ABRI's unilateral blaming of the political infrastructure.[168]

Finally, in searching for a legitimate conceptual place for *dwifungsi* in the growing demands for political openness, ABRI found it unavoidable to refer to democratization and, in effect, attempted to incorporate the middle class/society in its doctrinal scope. Though it was possible for ABRI to claim that *dwifungsi* would encourage the rising middle class, the fact that ABRI's security preoccupation had always been aimed at compressing the interests of the middle class – for example, free press and free speech – further confirmed the existing gap between concept and practice, leading to public scepticism about ABRI's language of political discourse.

Turning back to ABRI's *dwifungsi* legitimation, we can see that the 1996 Army Seminar located ABRI in the middle, between the state and society. This might be the answer to our earlier question about the extent to which ABRI synchronized its corporate interests with Soeharto's political blueprint. The seminar leaders' criticism of the Soeharto-led government's projects showed that although ABRI was hardly independent from Soeharto, who was after all its Supreme Commander, this did not mean that there was no independent thinking in ABRI concerning its corporate interests.

Apart from this, we could also conclude that the seminar completed its formulation of a new conceptual link between *dwifungsi* and democratization. A notable feature of the new interpretation adopted in the seminar was its dichotomous structural perspective. This could not be seen in the previous arguments based on alarmism concerning stability, the uncoupling of *kekaryaan* from *dwifungsi*, professionalism, discipline and SDM, which were all oriented towards policy perspectives. Now ABRI invented an interpretation to bring all these perspectives into a total picture of political reform in the New Order, with the resulting emphasis on *dwifungsi*'s dynamizing role. In doing so, the use of the dual structure in depicting the country's political system was quite effective. Employing vague terms – infrastructure and superstructure – helped ABRI both to argue about the need for broader political participation and to criticize the misconduct of the government. For ABRI, these postures could be justified in the name of promoting mutual communication which was believed necessary in

the era of globalization. It was in this framework that the seminar decided to criticize Harmoko's SIUPP management, the overstretched bureaucracy, the rubber-stamping DPR, nation-wide corruption and the arrogance of governmental power. In the eyes of the army's concept makers, it was hoped that these claims would counter ABRI's popular image as *alat mati pemerintah* ('the dead tool of the government'). It was ironic to see that the army which had formulated its doctrines to back up the Soeharto regime in the 1966 seminar now alarmed Soeharto and tried to 'save' *dwifungsi* from him at the seminar held thirty years later by the New Order-generation officers.

As if reflecting the new approach adopted by the seminar, ABRI's internet homepage (ABRI-NET) circulated an article written by Lt. Col. Herman Ibrahim, the head of the information section in the Siliwangi Division, with the title 'Empowering Society Through the Implementation of *Dwifungsi*'.[169] The article endorsed what we discussed above, insisting that *dwifungsi* would be the bridge between government policies and social demands. Having emphasized this consensus, however, he argued that ABRI should push the government not to side too much with big capitalists. By mentioning the example of the Marcos regime in the Philippines which Herman viewed as having had collapsed due to corruption and hypocrisy, the article insisted that ABRI officers should learn from such history, thus indirectly identifying Soeharto with Marcos. Moreover, regarding the increasing mass riots in 1996–1997, he asserted that 'the optimisation of the role of legislative bodies is significant both in order to restrain mass movements and anarchic situations such as the July 27 incident and the Situbondo riot, *so that ABRI is not always made the fire brigade*'.[170] Herman was a young officer with prospects, but this article angered the ABRI leadership of the time and he was sidelined and retired as a colonel.

Herman's assessment was, however, widely shared by other Seskoad-linked officers. It was argued that 'the current *dwifungsi* under Pak Harto (Soeharto) is not independent, compared with the Bung Karno (Sukarno) era, but after this regime, *dwifungsi* will become more autonomous and based on UUD45'.[171] All this illustrated that *dwifungsi*'s new slogan, 'empowering the political infrastructure', was perceived at least by some ABRI officers as a way to make *dwifungsi* practice more independent under the current regime, which had widely been described in society as the Soeharto empire, in order to cope with the growing democratic demands in society.

Conclusion

We can now summarize the development within ABRI of *dwifungsi*'s doctrinal interpretation since 1966. Our arguments in this chapter have shown that, broadly, there were six stages up to 1997. First, between 1966 and 1969, ABRI endeavoured to consolidate its basic doctrinal design for the launching of the New Order regime, led by Gen. Soeharto. The primary goal of doctrinal formulation was the management of political stability and the standardization of modes of political involvement. Pro-Sukarno and PKI-affiliated elements within ABRI

were purged, the new TUÇ was formulated, *kekaryaan* was intensified and ABRI seats in the parliament were secured. Building on its historical legitimacy arising from its role in the national revolution, ABRI's political domination was explained as the need to restore the political order destroyed by the coup attempt in 1965 and its plans to ensure stability promised future economic well-being.

Second, after experiencing the first election in 1971, ABRI faced growing criticism of *kekaryaan* in society. Although '1945 values' as the ideal of *dwifungsi* were symbolically asserted at the Third Army Seminar in 1972 to emphasize the continuity of *dwifungsi*'s values, the Doctrine of Sociopolitical Operations (*Doktrin Operasi Sosial Politik*) in 1977 officially moved on to deal with the negative image of *kekaryaan* by placing KBA in the front line of *kekaryaan* policy. This aimed to emphasize indirect intervention measures in order to counterbalance the growing criticism of *dwifungsi*. Also through the debate with outspoken retired officers, ABRI seemingly established the conceptual distinction between *dwifungsi* and *kekaryaan* at the end of 1970s, as officially adopted in the 1978 *kekaryaan* doctrine.

Third, after 1980, following the critical debate in previous years, ABRI started to re-emphasize its unity with the people, under the doctrine of *Kemanunggalan ABRI–Rakyat*, while at the same time it completed the legalization of *dwifungsi* in Law No. 20/1982. Then the first comprehensive guidebook was prepared to explain systematically the various legitimacy bases of *dwifungsi* – namely, historical, philosophical, legal, cultural, geostrategic and national defence. The diffusion of legitimacy arguments was expected to counter any form of *dwifungsi* criticism.

The above process could be assessed as the construction phase. After this, ABRI seemed to enter the adjustment phase. First, in the mid-1980s, ABRI faced a major structural change, both in terms of personnel and organization. Regeneration of the officer corps inevitably led to the loss of *dwifungsi*'s historical legitimacy, thus raising the question of *dwifungsi*'s relevance in the future, while the reorganization/rationalization of ABRI required the explanation of its new institutional orientation. To meet these two demands, the professionalism movement was launched and it was soon built into the concept of *dwifungsi* as a means of strengthening legitimacy. A widely proliferated interpretation argued that ABRI needed to be a professional organization in order to conduct effectively the missions conferred by society. The key was that these missions included the sociopolitical aspect. The concept of professionalism was incorporated into *dwifungsi* language in order to claim that, with professionalism, ABRI could better manage *dwifungsi* – an interpretation which uncoupled *dwifungsi* from historical legitimation.

Second, after the successful inclusion of professionalism in official *dwifungsi* doctrine, ABRI found that social policies themselves could be the source of *dwifungsi* legitimation, as seen in the cases of the national discipline movement and SDM improvement. Although such ideas were based on an assumption that ABRI possessed the ability to strengthen discipline and SDM, they involved an interesting development in terms of *dwifungsi*'s goals and means. Since the early

days the New Order ABRI had insisted that political stability and national development were the goals and rationales of *dwifungsi*. With this logic, ABRI's involvement in social policies was stressed as the means to achieve these goals and to legitimize the virtue of *dwifungsi*. Now, we saw a new tendency, in that the means itself was transformed into the source of *dwifungsi* legitimation. This assessment was formalized in the doctrine of Hankamneg 1991. It did however reflect the erosion of *dwifungsi*'s original means of justification.

Finally, in the early 1990s, a group within ABRI started an internal revision programme under the code name 'back-to-basics'. This implied that ABRI's institutional interests did not necessarily tally with Soeharto's recent political projects. Our examination of ABRI's internal documents has confirmed this, which previously was known only through the personal comments of officers. Furthermore, the New Order-generation officers began to be posted to the leadership positions within ABRI, and it was they who needed to establish a viable interpretation of *dwifungsi* legitimation in response to the incremental demands for political liberalization. Such a threat perception was reflected in the series of Seskoad studies which produced some of the fundamentals of the new interpretation applied in the 1996 Army Seminar. In the eyes of army intellectuals, the *dwifungsi* interpretation was reshaped to incorporate a theory of political change in the direction of democratization. It was a fact that since the early days ABRI had insisted on *dwifungsi*'s support for 'democracy', but it took more than three decades for ABRI to formally locate *dwifungsi* in a perceived scenario of 'democratization'.

It should be noted however that the doctrinal re-interpretation of *dwifungsi* in the face of growing social pressures for political democratization was the product of army concept-makers, especially those who had been associated with the education sector within ABRI. Their perspective did not necessarily lead ABRI's political role since it was, to a large extent, controlled by the President via his loyalist officers in the political, combat and territorial sectors. These loyalist officers were intensively recruited by Feisal, Hartono and Prabowo beginning in the early 1990s. This process was highly political and frustrated many officers, both active and retired. They were naturally motivated to express their concerns and Seskoad provided a place for them to quietly discuss their concerns. Gradually they saw their claim as legitimate in terms of ABRI's institutional interests. The revisionist approach was clearly aimed at responding to the growing democratic challenge, but the incentive was no doubt a product of internal division within the military. This political aspect is crucially important in understanding the development of post-Soeharto military reform, as we will see later in Chapter 7.

4 The security approach and human rights

Soeharto's New Order is widely recognized in civil society as the era of military repression. Literature has also proven numerous cases of ABRI's systematic human rights violations under the Soeharto polity. However, what is generally not discussed is the changing pattern of military response to human rights pressure. Did ABRI always ignore the demand for accountability in human rights? This would have been impossible. Since the late 1980s, ABRI was gradually forced to change its response to human rights abuses, as society became more assertive in seeking accountability and reconciliation. How had social forces and new institutional arrangements attempted to regulate military behaviour? How had ABRI responded to these challenges? Since *dwifungsi*'s core legitimation was the maintenance of political stability, the issue of repression was easily seen as an excess of *dwifungsi*, something which directly undermined the credibility of ABRI's role in the regime. In what ways had ABRI's human-rights abuses shaped *dwifungsi* criticism and how had the military officers tried to regain its credibility? The aim of this chapter is to examine such questions, and we deal here with ABRI's response to democratic demands in the field of internal security.

We first investigate the issue of the shooting of civilians and the way in which the so-called 'security approach' became controversial in political society. We then look at the major institutional development related to human rights – the establishment of Komnas HAM – and analyse its impact on ABRI's political stance. Third is an examination of some human rights projects introduced within ABRI, by which we assess the way in which ABRI coped with the new political paradigm and the extent to which such pressure was diffused throughout the military's organizational thinking. Throughout the chapter, we attempt to clarify how ABRI's internal security policies had been challenged in the late New Order by the growing demand for political democratization, and how ABRI's 'defensive' responses came to be adopted. Chapter 5 deals with the 'offensive' side of ABRI's response to the problem.

Shooting civilians and the security approach

The shooting of civilians has represented ABRI's 'military face' in the most visible way, and also has directly emphasized ABRI's social image as a force for terrifying

the people, despite its attempt to present itself as a force for protection of the people. However, compared with ABRI policies such as *kekaryaan* and its support for Golkar, which have long been debated since the early New Order period, the 'civilian-shooting' issue has only recently entered into popular debate about so-called 'security vs prosperity' approaches, particularly since the late 1980s. This section looks first at the genesis of criticism of the security approach, and then at four cases of shooting – Lampung (1989), Dili (1991), Haur Koneng (1993) and Nipah (1993) – which took place before the launch of Komnas HAM in 1993.

Since the early days of the New Order, social criticism of excessive security conduct had of course existed. Before the *keterbukaan* movement, however, social demands for investigation and accountability were generally repressed. As seen in Chapter 2, there was no official investigation into the Tanjung Priok incident in 1984, during which many believed that hundreds of Muslim demonstrators were killed by security forces despite an official estimate of only dozens. The demand for investigations into the military shooting of civilians did not become an established theme for open public discussion until the late 1980s, thanks largely to ABRI's efforts to suppress the rise of this sensitive issue and the unwillingness of high-ranking officers to participate in such a public debate.[1] As we saw in Chapter 2, the emergence of *keterbukaan* and the accompanying *dwifungsi* dispute contributed significantly to the opening up of previous taboo issues linked with ABRI. In particular, Soeharto's decision to scrap Kopkamtib in 1988 encouraged society to legitimately debate ABRI's repressive measures – including its shooting of civilians – in the public sphere.

Kopkamtib was officially dismantled by the Presidential Instruction (Keppres) No. 29/1988 issued on 5 September and implemented in November. The Instruction did not make clear why the organization was abolished at this particular time but only stated vaguely that 'there was a necessity to maintain national stability in a proper way to reflect the level of social development'.[2] The former Kopkamtib Commander, Gen. (ret.) Soemitro, interpreted the Keppres' vague explanation as an attempt by Soeharto to remove an unnecessary political apparatus in the face of growing demands to speed up economic growth – which in effect diminished the long-time priority given to security – and to open up the political system.[3] From a political perspective, however, it was widely believed that the liquidation of Kopkamtib was intended primarily to diminish the power of Gen. Benny Moerdani who had dominated the body since 1983. As seen in Chapter 2, the abolition of Kopkamtib was also viewed as an attempt by the presidential palace to counter ABRI's growing disenchantment with Soeharto, which was revealed when F-ABRI's Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Saleh openly disagreed with the nomination of Golkar Chairman Sudharmono as vice-president at the MPR session in March 1988.[4]

In facing mixed reactions from a society which welcomed the decision but also doubted its impact due to its replacement by the new security agency, Bakorstanas (Coordinating Agency for the Maintenance of National Stability), Soeharto emphasized that it was time to replace the security approach with the 'prosperity approach' (*pendekatan kesejahteraan*) in the country's political life.[5]

Kopkamtib was originally established by Soeharto to restore security and order immediately after the coup attempt in September 1965, but the mission was soon expanded by a Presidential Decision in December to include the restoration of the authority and integrity of the government through military and non-military operations. Then in 1969, having crushed the PKI, Soeharto broadened the definition of Kopkamtib's task 'to surmount other extreme and subversive activities in order to safeguard Pancasila and UUD45'.[6] It was through Kopkamtib that the regime arrested and detained those it considered as 'subversives', such as students, journalists, Muslim leaders, and even dissident military officers. According to Gen. (ret.) Daryatmo, former Chief of Staff for Karyawan Affairs (Kaskar) in the 1970s and later the Speaker of the DPR, 'the name of Kopkamtib had terrified society; the people became feverish even just hearing the name'.[7] The dissolution of this military agency inevitably raised the spectre of ABRI's future political stance, and Soeharto's remark about the security–prosperity 'dichotomy' provided momentum to intensify public dispute on this issue.[8]

In the ABRI newspaper, Lt. Col. Syarwan Hamid wrote a lengthy article in 1989 in which he argued that ABRI's sociopolitical role was not oriented to the use of force but to persuasion, emphasizing the belief that ABRI's stance was in line with Soeharto's recent rejection of the security approach.[9] However, the message was received with scepticism by society as it appeared only a week after military operations revealing ABRI's continuing harsh handling of security problems.

In the so-called Lampung incident, ABRI troops attacked an alleged militant Islamic sect and killed twenty-seven civilians – according to the official account. The operation was conducted by Col. Hendropriyono, the Commander of Korem 043 in Lampung, South Sumatra, against a group called Mujahidin Fisabilillah on 7 January 1989. Hendropriyono commented that 'they screamed "Allah is great" and it was really painful for me as a Muslim, so we also called "Allah is great" during the operation'.[10] This comment conjured up the image of sectarian Islam as a threat to national stability, and seemed intended to justify ABRI's attack which resulted in the killing of unarmed villagers. Since the incident happened a few months after the formal liquidation of Kopkamtib in November, the military leadership under Moerdani (Menhankam) and Try Sutrisno (Pangab) may have been creating an impression that Islamic extremism might re-emerge with the end of the organization. However, Soeharto attempted to mollify this concern by insisting that 'the activity of a small group should not harm the name of Islam in which a large number of Indonesians believe'.[11] It soon became clear that the core of the problem was the government's transmigration policy and land disputes, especially from November 1988 when the local government started to burn the houses of villagers who had ignored an agreement with the government to move off the land. By January 1989 almost a thousand houses had been burnt or torn down to make way for a government plan to use the land for a development project.[12] Despite the outburst of student demonstrations against the military shooting in Lampung, the government displayed no intention of investigating the case further.

Two years later, however, another shooting incident occurred. Dili, the capital of East Timor, attracted international attention on 12 November 1991 when ABRI troops opened fire on two thousand marchers who were commemorating the killing of a pro-independence activist. As mentioned in Chapter 2, ABRI officers in general claimed that the troops fired because the mob brutally attacked soldiers. Initially ABRI announced that the death toll was nineteen. Facing international pressure, however, Soeharto quickly decided to establish the National Commission of Inquiry (KPN) on 18 November, which later concluded that at least fifty people were killed, reversing ABRI's official account. Then, Soeharto – as ABRI's Supreme Commander – dismissed two officers, Brig. Gen. Warouw (Commander of East Timor Operations: Pangkolakops) and Maj. Gen. Sintong Panjaitan (Commander of Kodam IV/Udayana), neither of whom were directly involved in the shooting but who were considered responsible for the incident taking place within their areas of command. Soeharto also ordered KSAD Edi Sudradjat to form the Military Honour Council (DKM) and appointed Maj. Gen. Feisal Tanjung (DanSeskoad) to investigate ABRI members who had been involved in the massacre.[13] The DKM finally dismissed nineteen officers from their posts. Among ten officers prosecuted and convicted by military courts, the longest sentence was eighteen months for firing into a crowd.

It was the first time in the New Order period that officers of the rank of General had been held responsible for the shooting of civilians and also one of the rare cases where soldiers were court-martialled. This experience of the DKM caused dissatisfaction among military officers but also encouraged political society to question ABRI's repressive behaviour by referring to Soeharto's remarks about the security approach. Gen. (ret.) Rudini, for example, called on ABRI to follow Soeharto's appeal to end the security approach, as it was no longer the right time to use Kopkamtib methods.[14]

The lesson of the Dili affair and the consequent establishment of the DKM was critical for ABRI. News of the shooting of civilians had spread quickly around the world, regardless of its accuracy, and this increased pressure on ABRI's handling of internal security. At the same time, the DKM opened up political space to demand further inquiry into military shootings and to criticize ABRI's military activities. It was Kapuspen Brig. Gen. Syarwan Hamid who quickly sensed the 'debate trend' in society which identified the security approach as a fundamental cause of problems. In another long newspaper article, he insisted that there was a gap between civilians and ABRI over their understanding of the security approach concept – the former saw it as something which should decline while the latter regarded it as a 'must' in securing the process of development. Syarwan asserted that the problem did not lie with the military but with mass behaviour which forced ABRI to use repressive methods.[15] Syarwan's explanation clearly clouded his earlier assertion in January 1989 – which emphasized ABRI's declining use of the security approach – but it seemed to be a common assessment within ABRI at that time. However, a few months later, nearly a year after the Dili incident, a military shooting of civilians again provided hot news, this time on the island of Java – Haur Koneng in July

and the Nipah dam in September 1993. Furthermore, the murder of the woman labour activist, Marsinah, in May highlighted systematic torture conducted by ABRI members and became a symbol of human rights abuse. These incidents significantly influenced the direction of civil–military interactions regarding ABRI's human rights violations.

Four people, including a 12-year-old boy, in a small (15-member) religious community known as Haur Koneng (Yellow Bamboo) in West Java, were shot and killed on 29 July when troops – a joint force of more than 100 police and army personnel – attacked their meeting place in a village in the district of Majalengka. The police announcement claimed that troops had fired when the group's leader, Abdul Manan, and his followers tried to resist arrest, following an incident on the previous day in which a local police chief was stabbed and killed. The police accused the group of promoting a 'deviant sect' (*aliran sesat*) which had posed a threat to security, and justified the shooting as a necessary step to maintain order. However, the legal aid institute (LBH) in Bandung independently investigated the case and claimed that the group was not an extreme sect but that the incident resulted from a land dispute between the village head and the group. The LBH accused ABRI of an excessive use of force against a tiny religious group and asked the government to appoint another KPN, as for the Dili incident.[16] In response to public pressure, the police started its investigation but the central government rejected the demand to establish a KPN and no ABRI members were charged, while it was the surviving group members who were sentenced to jail.

This incident again invited intense criticism of the security approach. Soon after the incident, Soeharto warned that 'ABRI should wisely apply the security approach when the national life is not in crisis', implying that the approach had not been exercised wisely in the recent past.[17] The next week, however, Menhankam Edi Sudradjat seemed to be responding to the President when he insisted on the continuing need for the security approach in the process of national development.[18] Rudini, on the other hand, referred to the incident and insisted on the need to gradually reduce the security approach in the face of the democratic movement, arguing that otherwise it would be difficult for ABRI to overcome the growing criticism of *dwifungsi*.[19] Here, the conceptual issue of the security approach was linked to the legitimacy of *dwifungsi*, and for Rudini, the security approach was no longer merely a policy issue but a matter of the total system of *dwifungsi*. Following Rudini, Edi – replying to a question at the DPR's Commission I about the Haur Koneng incident – argued that the security approach should be adjusted but it could never be removed because it was essential for national stability. In fact, he said, ABRI troops had tried a persuasive approach at first in the case of Haur Koneng but it had failed so they then employed the security approach.[20] Similarly, Vice-President Try Sutrisno claimed that many people had started to argue about the irrelevance of the security approach in promoting democratization, but he insisted that without it national prosperity would be devastated.[21] Try's explanation was rebutted by Gen. (ret.) Soemitro who insisted that the security approach was now unnecessary and ABRI

should go 'back to normal' if it wanted to maintain *dwifungsi* legitimacy.[22] The different views on the security approach and *dwifungsi* among retired officers and their increasing role in public political discourse finally made the ABRI leadership invite them to military headquarters to discuss the issue. This meeting took place on 27 September, coincidentally just two days after another military shooting of civilians – the Nipah case, examined here next. As seen in Chapter 2, on this occasion Soeharto emphasized the danger of having different views on *dwifungsi* among retirees because it could invite social instability.[23]

Thus, in the midst of the debate over ABRI's security handling came news of a new military shooting, aired on 25 September, this time in a village in Sampang on Madura island, East Java, where troops opened fire on villagers who had refused to move from their lands to make way for the Nipah dam. As a result, four people were killed and three wounded. Student activists across Java immediately called for a new KPN while LBH in Surabaya conducted an independent inquiry which rejected ABRI's claim that civilians were armed and that the shooting was unavoidable to protect the security of soldiers.[24] Under pressure, the Brawijaya Command started its own investigation, interrogating those who opened fire and calling some twenty soldiers to the Kodam Headquarters. It finally decided to transfer four officers, and later in May 1996 a military court sentenced four soldiers – who actually did the shooting – to prison terms of up to 28 months.[25] In contrast to the case of Haur Koneng, Pangab Feisal Tanjung admitted that the handling of the problem by ABRI troops was wrong and not professional. Similarly, a Madurese officer and Lemhannas Governor, Maj. Gen. Hartono, emphasized his good relationship with the local communities in East Java during his term as Pangdam Brawijaya and commented that the security apparatus made mistakes in the case of Nipah.[26]

Though the response of ABRI was not satisfactory in the eyes of democratic advocates, ABRI's approach was changing. The following three aspects became apparent during the events of 1993. First, the fact that the KPN and the DKM had been formed after the Dili incident seemed to offer a new tool to the civilian sector in pressuring ABRI over policy accountability. In both cases of Haur Koneng and Nipah, legal aid institutes, student activists and Muslim leaders demanded further inquiry into the incidents via a KPN and a DKM, and the ABRI leadership – which rejected the demand in the case of Haur Koneng – was forced to respond. ABRI established its investigation team, which consequently had to demonstrate results in order to minimize demands for the appointment of KPN-DKM. Finally, some officers were transferred and four soldiers were court-martialled in the case of Nipah. This by no means eliminated military abuses in the field but it certainly established a new political rule which impelled ABRI to demonstrate its policy accountability to the public in the aftermath of shootings. As we will see later, it was significant that the routinization of this ABRI–public interaction finally pushed the military leadership to introduce officially a standard reference on human rights.

Second, the use of the term 'security approach' – popularized by Soeharto when he disbanded Kopkamtib – was taken up by grass-roots political movements

as a tool with which to criticize ABRI. During the previous ten years, it had been rare to see obvious anti-*dwifungsi* slogans in street politics, especially after the introduction of the campus-normalization policy in 1978 which had marginalized student political movements.[27] After a decade, student activists – who recognized that anti-*dwifungsi* campaigns were easily labelled by ABRI as 'subversion' and 'anti-Pancasila', and thus were targets of repression – began to echo Soeharto's use of the term 'security approach' in a way that allowed them to express effectively anti-ABRI slogans without giving ABRI an excuse to crack down on the protests.[28] This development illustrated how the term 'security approach' was used by grass-roots political sectors as a way of mobilizing anti-ABRI forces from the bottom. Unlike *dwifungsi*, which ABRI had claimed as a part of Pancasila values and which therefore could not be criticized without risking accusations of anti-Pancasila sentiment, the security approach – as a policy problem – *could* be criticized, at least on the surface, without inviting ABRI's traditional strategy of labelling the critics as 'anti-national', and so on. The events of 1993 suggested that bringing the 'security approach' to the front line of mass protests could provide more leeway for critical movements than any direct criticism of *dwifungsi*, even when the target of the criticism was in fact the same.

Third, apart from street politics, debate about the security approach expanded the elite dispute on *dwifungsi* by strengthening the basis of the critical approach to the interpretation of the doctrine. Between the two 1993 civilian-shooting incidents examined above, a political seminar was held at CIDES (Centre for Information and Development Studies), ICMI's think-tank, in September, which was attended by former Interior Minister, Rudini, and prominent intellectuals. One of the main themes of discussion was the security approach. It was Rudini who started the argument by insisting that the security approach then was seen in society as an obstacle to democratic development with the result that its relaxation was strongly called for.[29] Rudini's view was welcomed but further explanation was demanded by Dewi Fortuna Anwar, a prominent political scientist at LIPI and CIDES. Dewi replied to Rudini by arguing that the major question today was how the security approach should be replaced with a more suitable one. She sceptically asked whether the correction would be possible without changing the entire political system, because any reform by ABRI – which monopolized power – could easily fail if the rules of the game themselves were untouched.[30] Rudini responded that 'it is true that the reorganization (*perombakan*) of the security approach is needed – meaning that the security approach should be restricted both at the national and the local levels. Nationally, it has already been done by abolishing Kopkamtib, but at the lower levels, we need to formulate rules and also reorganize ABRI members' mental attitudes and behaviour, because they still use the old approach, *pendekatan kecurigaan* (suspicion approach)'.[31]

In facing the visible rise of the 'security approach' issue in open political debate, ABRI intellectuals attempted to combat the possible escalation of the critical atmosphere. It was Lukman Saksono, Feisal's civilian adviser, who insisted on the need for a clear understanding of the security approach.

According to him, the security approach could only be attributed to ABRI's 'defence' role and should never be seen as a part of the 'sociopolitical' function. It was the prosperity approach which had directed ABRI's role as a sociopolitical force, thus its political involvement was not repressive.[32] However, Soeharto himself further encouraged the debate about the security approach. On ABRI's anniversary in 1993, he re-emphasized his previous stance that ABRI should not always adopt military means in handling threats and challenges.[33]

As the security approach issue spread, prominent officers – notably Try, Syarwan and Edi in the above examples – placed emphasis on the need to continue its use. While critics tended to see the security approach in terms of the democratization process, these officers were inclined to insist on the need to maintain stability and order. While critics warned about current security handling in the light of *dwifungsi* legitimacy, ABRI leaders rejected the idea of linking the two. Lukman's initiative to 'free' ABRI's sociopolitical role from the controversy about the security approach was an interpretative attempt to uncouple *dwifungsi* from the security approach for the sake of the former – a logic adopted in facing criticism of *kekaryaan* in the late 1970s (see Chapter 3).[34]

Moreover, the spread of criticism of the security approach – which was one form of expressing resentment about ABRI's shooting of civilians – provided some new dilemmas for ABRI's *dwifungsi* management. First, the 'anti-security approach' slogans in the streets could not be branded by ABRI as anti-Pancasila, in contrast to anti-*dwifungsi* slogans. Only when more fundamental causes were identified, for example when the President was insulted, could ABRI move to smash such protests. Second, the security-approach criticism could easily mobilize street demonstrations, and thus cause problems for ABRI in two ways. On the one hand, if ABRI responded in a repressive way, this could simply accelerate the vicious circle of the security approach. On the other hand, the popular mobilization against the security approach could critically erode the basis of ABRI's self-image as 'the people's military', providing a space within ABRI and society to question further the cohesiveness of ABRI's identity. ABRI's frequent rejection of the description of its role as a 'fire brigade' also reflected such an identity problem generated by the security approach. Third, but most obviously, ABRI leadership was concerned that any downgrading of the security approach might not only undermine ABRI's capacity to maintain political stability but also directly influence ABRI's political power in practice – de-emphasizing the security approach would allow non-ABRI actors to play a relatively bigger role in handling political problems, and also give more opportunities for the civil society to raise the issue of ABRI's policy failures. It was these dilemmas which became apparent in this initial stage of the debate about the security approach – i.e. from the disbanding of Kopkamtib to the series of shootings which happened during the early years of the *keterbukaan* period. In the next section, we will discuss further cases of the shooting of civilians which coincided with the launching of Komnas HAM, a governmental body established by Soeharto in June which fully started its activities in December 1993. Komnas HAM provided a significant momentum in ABRI's response to the issue of firing on civilians.

Dialogue with Komnas HAM

The establishment of Komnas HAM was the first attempt under the New Order polity to set up an internal mechanism to promote human rights accountability, reflecting the growing criticism of repression in recent years as Indonesia became more open to the international media. The Commission was deliberately modelled on the KPN established to investigate the Dili shooting. It was widely acknowledged that the vast international pressure post-Dili was the primary factor pushing Soeharto to set up the Commission.[35] Since then, Komnas HAM has become ABRI's major counterpart in dealing with controversial security operations. Although the Commission's power was limited to investigation and advocacy, which invited sceptical opinions concerning its efficacy, its relatively easy access to the Pangab and other high-ranking officers highlighted its significant role compared with non-official human rights organizations such as LBH.[36] A few months after the appointment of its members, the Commission produced a report which refuted ABRI's account of the Marsinah case, claiming that those who were arrested on suspicion of involvement in Marsinah's murder had been tortured by security officers and suggesting the (very likely) possibility that 'other parties' had murdered Marsinah.[37] Also in 1994, Komnas HAM was engaged in high-profile activities when it denounced the violation of human rights during the Medan riot that April and in the banning of three magazines in June.[38] Alongside these expressions of concern, which were highly publicized in the media, the Commission started to investigate cases involving the shooting of civilians since January 1995. We will now look at two such cases: Liquisa (January 1995) and Timika (May 1995).

When it was announced that military troops had killed six people at Liquisa, East Timor, on 12 January 1995, ABRI's security approach once again attracted widespread public attention. ABRI claimed that those who had been shot were anti-integration Fretilin guerrillas involved in what ABRI called the 'security disturbance movement' (GPK). Moreover, it was claimed that of the six, two were killed in the exchange of gunfire with ABRI troops and four were fatally wounded when they tried to escape after being captured. However, since it became apparent that no soldier was injured during the alleged shootout and that those who were killed were in fact unarmed, there was widespread domestic and international concern about possible misconduct. In response, ABRI decided to form its own fact-finding team and started its investigation on 7 February; Komnas HAM also entered East Timor for the inquiry. A few days before publication of ABRI's report, the State Secretary Moerdiono mentioned that Feisal Tanjung had reported to the President that the actions of several soldiers had breached legal procedures, resulting in the death of six villagers in East Timor.[39] However, Feisal changed his explanation soon after he received the field report. He insisted that all the victims were shot during exchanges of gunfire with security troops and all were obviously members of the GPK.[40] He did not deny misconduct at the lowest command level but defended the circumstances of ABRI's security operation. When the result of ABRI's investigation

team was announced on 24 February, four days after Feisal's comment, it became clear that at least some soldiers had deviated from the proper military procedure in handling the case. Based on the findings, ABRI decided to start another investigation, this time led by the 36-member Officers' Honour Council (DKP).[41] It was against this background that Komnas HAM announced its findings. The team claimed that the six victims were ordinary citizens with no GPK links, and that possibly they had been tortured before being shot.[42] Komnas HAM's findings were surprisingly tough given its official position, and openly challenged investigations carried out by Mabes ABRI.

With this, pressure on ABRI's security policy intensified further. On the same day as Komnas HAM's press release, fifty academics and students in Jakarta signed a letter urging ABRI to drop its security approach in dealing with East Timor and demanding the appointment of an alternative inquiry team in place of the DKP, reporting directly to the President, to ensure the independence of the investigation. Similarly, LBH, which fully supported the Komnas HAM report, further demanded an inquiry based on the Komnas HAM findings, calling for the establishment of a KPN as in the case of Dili.[43] The scope of criticism then escalated when a Muslim organization, HMI, also called on ABRI to establish a DKM to investigate cases in Aceh, demanding that Syarwan Hamid – a devout Muslim officer newly appointed as Assistant for Sociopolitical Affairs to Kassospol – institutionalize the fact-finding system for cases of Muslim victims of ABRI shootings.[44] These demands clearly caused ABRI to worry about establishing a DKM or DKP in East Timor, because not only would they uncover ABRI's misconduct in the field but also have two other spillover effects. On the one hand, social pressure to open other DKMs would increase, and on the other hand, Muslim communities would legitimately claim that they were not treated equally with Christians who were the majority in East Timor. For the ABRI leadership at that time, which included senior devout Muslim officers, the second effect could be as serious as the first, which posed a more general threat to ABRI as an institution. Moreover, the international community called for a further inquiry into the incident. Attempts were made to raise the issue at the United Nations' General Assembly and at the conference on 'All-Inclusive Intra-East Timor Dialogue', which was to be held in Austria in June 1995.[45]

Amidst these pressures came the completion of ABRI's second inquiry – the DKP's investigation. Its findings were announced on 3 April. As if to follow Komnas HAM's report, the DKP admitted that there had been a few procedural mistakes in the conduct of troops sent from Kodim Wiradharma. Thus, two soldiers would be up in front of a military court.[46] This marked the official closure of the Liquisa investigation. However, it was during this dialogue between societal sectors and the military that ABRI demonstrated a set of techniques designed to turn aside criticism. Facing widespread censure from society, the ABRI leadership responded as follows.

First, confronting student activists who demonstrated on the Liquisa case, Feisal revived an old theme when he warned that the recent student movement

should not be exploited by 'other parties' for their benefit.[47] This assessment about the emerging student movement illustrated ABRI's increasingly hard stance with regard to *keterbukaan* and was expressed repeatedly during the next two years. Second, ABRI was concerned about the escalating criticism of the security approach and its anti-ABRI bias. Menhankam Edi Sudradjat regretted that the current political debate was coloured by the Western notion of civilian supremacy over the military, which implied the abolition of *dwifungsi* and the security approach.[48] This was a warning from Edi that criticism of the security approach could now be interpreted as criticism of *dwifungsi* which, from his perspective, was also criticism of Pancasila. Third, together with these general views on politics, Maj. Gen. Adang Ruchiatna, Pangdam IX/Udayana, who was responsible for the East Timor area, asserted that there was nothing wrong with the behaviour of his soldiers because the victims were *celula* (cells in towns, meaning the invisible supporters of GPK). Moreover, explaining how ABRI had disagreed with the plan to open up East Timor in the early 1990s, Adang – who had a reputation as a strict professional soldier – declared that the quickest way to solve East Timor's problems was simply to increase the number of ABRI personnel in the region. He was in effect challenging Komnas HAM's suggestion.[49] ABRI's vague definition of GPK was not something new, but it was after Komnas HAM's report that ABRI started to refer to the activities of *celula* and clandestine members, who were allegedly hiding in towns and hard to identify. This interpretation replaced ABRI's original explanation that the Liquisa victims were armed GPK guerrillas.[50]

In sum, three approaches could be seen in ABRI's response to the growing pressure for policy accountability, which was effectively legitimized by Komnas HAM's findings. Student movements were now openly described as possibly manipulated by 'other parties'; criticism of the security approach was treated as criticism of *dwifungsi*; and the emphasis in identifying the threat target was shifted from the visible GPK to less discernible clandestine actors. These arguments were reflected in the opinions of ABRI leaders in regard to subsequent events. Towards students, ABRI reiterated the existence of a third party in facing Ujung Pandang demonstrations in April 1996, while PRD-SMID movements during 1996 were similarly branded as being manipulated by PKI sympathizers (see Chapter 2).[51] About criticism of *dwifungsi*, the dogmatic response of ABRI leaders was evident. For example, in an airforce seminar in May 1996, Maj. Gen. Tamlicha Ali, Assistant of General Planning for Pangab, asserted that the current criticism of the '*dwifungsi*–security approach' was used by certain groups to discredit ABRI and could lead to national instability. Furthermore, in a private seminar held at Surabaya in November 1996, Gen. Hartono warned about the influx of liberal thoughts into Indonesia – the result of globalization – and labelled the current negative social view of ABRI's political role as based on a different framework of thinking, which was easily translated as anti-Pancasila in ABRI language.[52] Finally, regarding the threat of clandestine rebels, Hartono further tried to disseminate alarm by insisting that they were using the government's facilities for their underground activities.[53] Three days later, as if to show

proof, the controversial mystic-psychic Permadi – who was alleged to have made blasphemous remarks about the Prophet Muhammad – was labelled a clandestine activist by a top-ranking army general.[54]

Although it was not the sole factor, the political function of Komnas HAM – to permit criticism from within and provide legitimate political space for social sectors to express criticism – was very important for assessing the process by which ABRI's dogmatic response developed during the mid-1990s. Moreover, Komnas HAM's international link, especially with the United Nations, also seemed to contribute to the increase in international pressure, thanks largely to the widening of access to information via Komnas HAM itself.[55] Such external pressure provided direct input for Soeharto's decision-making, on the one hand, and also feedback to domestic society which legitimized its critical approach towards ABRI's lack of policy accountability, on the other hand. The Liquisa case showed that this structural flow was now in place.

We look now at another case of political contention between ABRI and Komnas HAM. The Timika shooting of 31 May 1995 provided some important insights into the civil–military struggle. Komnas HAM received complaints from five prominent NGOs concerning recent human rights abuses in the area of Timika, Irian Jaya, and called on Komnas HAM to investigate. The NGOs' request was based on the investigation conducted in cooperation with Bishop Munninghoff of the provincial capital, Jayapura, who had read a report published the previous April by the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), which exposed a series of human rights violations by the security apparatus during the period from June 1994 to February 1995.[56] After the 31 May incident in a village of Hoya in Timika, Munninghoff compiled a Catholic Church report at the end of August, which endorsed ACFOA's earlier findings, described the 31 May killing, and urged Komnas HAM to conduct an independent inquiry.[57] According to the Church report, which was made public on 29 August, soldiers from the 572nd Trikora battalion came into a Protestant Church in Hoya and started to shoot the people there while they prayed, including the minister of the Church, without any warning. Eleven civilians, among them children aged 5 and 6 years old, were killed.[58] Having received the report from NGOs, Komnas HAM started its investigation, led by Marzuki Darusman, and the Army Headquarters also sent its team to Timika to obtain further information.

The ABRI leadership reacted to this Church report in various ways. A few days before the report became public, Kapuspen Brig. Gen. Suwarno Adiwijoyo insisted that the cooperation between ABRI and Freeport was there to develop society, not to intimidate the local people, and he warned of certain overseas groups who were trying to discredit ABRI – thus, this kind of report had to be treated with care.[59] Maj. Gen. I. Ketut Wirdhana, Pangdam VIII/Trikora, accused the Bishop of distorting the facts, denied that the May incident had taken place and asserted that the happening was just a military operation against GPK members of the OPM. Meanwhile KSAD Gen. Hartono said that the Church needed to show proof of its allegations in its report, and reiterated that the events of 31 May comprised nothing more than an exchange of fire between

the security apparatus and the GPK. Further, Hartono applied his clandestine theory, stating that 'the GPK in both East Timor and Irian Jaya is almost the same, thus it is clandestine groups which are more dangerous and need to be watched'.[60] However, these assertive postures were soon neutralized by other officers who showed a more accommodating stance in facing popular criticism. Kasum Lt. Gen. Soeyono, on 17 September, stated that ABRI would form a DKM at the Kodam level in order to solve the Timika case, and two days later this was endorsed by Menhankam Edi Sudradjat at Commission I of the DPR.[61] Pangab Gen. Feisal Tanjung then announced that he had received a report from the army team sent to Timika, which indicated some procedural and legal deviations by ABRI members in the Timika incident. He asked Hartono to take legal action against those who had made mistakes.[62]

It was the next day that Komnas HAM released its results of the Timika investigation. Based on information provided by forty witnesses and fourteen sources, the statement by Komnas HAM concluded that from October 1994 to June 1995, there were recurring themes to human rights violations inflicted by elements of ABRI – namely, indiscriminate killings, torture and inhuman treatment, unlawful arrest, disappearances, excessive surveillance, and destruction of property.[63] As a result of these activities, the statement continued, sixteen citizens were murdered and four people were missing. Regarding Freeport, it reported that since ABRI's operations in the area were to control GPK and protect the mining enterprise which had been identified as a vital project by the government, Freeport had an automatic responsibility to participate in solving the problem. Given this assessment, Komnas HAM called on ABRI to investigate these events and to take disciplinary measures and legal action against those involved in human rights violations.[64] This statement largely endorsed the Church report on ABRI's abuses, but since there was no clear explanation of the link between Freeport and human rights violations, and because the Commission's recommendations were general in nature, the report created the impression that the investigation was not enough.

In response, Hartono announced that ABRI would not establish a DKP. When asked why a DKP was formed in the case of Liquisa and not this time, Hartono answered: 'we had concluded that the level of deviation [from the military procedure] and the scale of the incident was not as big as the Liquisa case, thus there is no need for a DKP'.[65] Hartono – who had just promoted Brig. Gen. Dunidja (Deputy Commander of Army Territorial Centre) to replace Maj. Gen. I. Ketut as Pangdam Trikora earlier in the month – seemed to have sufficient confidence to overrule the remarks made by Soeyono and Edi a few days earlier. It was against this background that a public statement was released by the five NGOs which had originally brought the case to Komnas HAM the previous August.[66] The group of NGOs announced that Komnas HAM's conclusions were indeed worthy of respect and support, but there were still many things which needed to be done by the Commission, including the investigation of Freeport and further pressure for a DKP.[67]

From the perspective of the political process, rather than the standpoint of human rights, the NGOs' demands seemed to have twofold implications for Komnas HAM. On the one hand, the demand was clearly an expression of dissatisfaction at the grass-roots level with Komnas HAM's ambivalent stance, which resulted largely from its nature as an instrument of the government. On the other hand, having assertive constituents was an obvious advantage for the Commission in terms of its bargaining power with ABRI since the Commission's designed role – as a built-in control mechanism – was to legitimately convey selected social pressures to ABRI. In fact, from the viewpoint of ABRI, claims made by NGOs and Komnas HAM were the same in terms of attacking ABRI's misuse of power and arbitrary killing of civilians, and Komnas HAM's endorsement of the Church report, which ABRI had already rejected, in effect provided a legitimate space for these NGOs to reveal ABRI's lack of policy accountability. Marzuki Darusman himself regarded the NGOs' growing assertiveness as a positive sign for necessary political restructuring. He argued that 'the NGOs are virtually taking over the function of political parties, which is to mobilize social movements from the bottom, so they play a significant role for national integration', dismissing ABRI's frequent claim that NGOs could have a destabilizing influence.[68]

It was a few days later that Maj. Gen. Dunidja announced a compromise measure to finalize the Timika case. He repeated Hartono's earlier remarks that ABRI would not form a DKP, thus rejecting the NGOs' demand, but stated that his Trikora Command would instead establish an investigation team to bring the soldiers responsible before a military tribunal which would take place in January of the following year.[69] On 28 October, four soldiers were arrested and Kodam Trikora formed the Timika Case Resolution Team to prepare for the military court. At the end of January 1996, these four soldiers were sentenced by the court. Second Lieutenant Mardjaka – who was mentioned in the Bishop's report as ordering his soldiers to shoot a Protestant minister even after he had raised his hands – was sentenced to sixteen months in jail for intentional disobedience and giving false information to his superiors, which damaged the image of ABRI and the nation. The other three, who had actually shot civilians, received sentences of between two and three years for making 'procedural mistakes' leading to human rights abuses.[70] The rulings marked the end of the Timika affair.

Throughout the Liquisa and Timika cases, the ABRI–Komnas HAM interaction was the focus of attention. From ABRI's perspective, the institutionalization of the Komnas HAM mechanism was a new challenge to its political control, since ABRI's lack of policy accountability was more openly and legitimately disclosed in the domestic and international arenas. Needless to say, Komnas HAM's modest role of questioning ABRI's procedural errors did not prevent the errors themselves, but the sociopolitical cost of being labelled *salah* (mistaken) was undoubtedly boosted in the era of Komnas HAM. For ABRI, ignoring Komnas HAM would only risk its social credibility. It is in this respect that Komnas HAM acquired bargaining power *vis-à-vis* ABRI and expected to gain ABRI's

cooperation in the long run. Marzuki Darusman argued that 'if they [ABRI] really assess their own "ethics and interests", they may cooperate with us. Ethically, ABRI puts the highest value on being integrated with the people; thus respecting human rights is a legitimate claim even within ABRI circles. At the same time, it is also ABRI's political interest to prevent a decline in its popularity in society'.[71]

Although these ethics and interests are matters of principle, we could also note the practical-operational interests. For ABRI, Komnas HAM's stance was more acceptable than the claim usually made by grass-roots activists, whom ABRI perceived as always confrontational. Contrary to Komnas HAM's approach to ABRI's human rights problem, the former editor of the banned *Tempo* and the chairman of KIPP, Goenawan Mohamad, argued that 'no consideration can stand before the fact that the people are killed by ABRI, and in order to stop this, we must consolidate grass-root forces, challenge the power, and fight for justice'.[72] If Komnas HAM's approach could be assessed as the elite persuasive one, the approach of Goenawan – and many NGOs – represented the grass-roots confrontational one. For ABRI, the case of Timika showed that there was a practical interest – together with the above principled commitment – in preserving Komnas HAM and cohabiting with it. As a result of this, ABRI's internal promotion of its human rights programme continued after the Timika case, and Komnas HAM's involvement was apparent in some stages. It challenged the security approach as representative of the old ABRI's thinking and expanded ABRI's internal communication space for discussing issues regarding human rights abuses. We now examine this process and its implications.

Formulating human rights assessment within ABRI

First of all, Maj. Gen. Dunidja (the Trikora Commander) prepared a guidebook on human rights protection after the arrest of four soldiers and the formation of the Timika Case Resolution Team. This was the first time the New Order ABRI had attempted to codify human rights violations, based on the UN standard, and to explain ways to avoid such violations.[73] The guidebook first stated that ABRI soldiers had to respect the UN Declaration of Human Rights, which prohibited acts of punishment without due legal process. Thus, ordering subordinates (*bawahan*) to commit human rights violations would be punished with a penalty equal to, or heavier than, the penalty given to the subordinate who fulfilled the order.[74] The guidebook explained that 'if it is hard for the field soldiers to report the violation to their immediate superior (*atasan langsung*), for example in the case that he is also involved in the abuse, they must report to the next-highest authority or directly to either Kodam Police or Kodam Legal Service (Kumdam); and once it is received, the receiver has to report it to the higher authority in the command structure'.[75] Regarding murder, rape, torture and the use of excessive force, the instruction stated clearly that they were crimes, and that even if GPK members were captured, they had the right to appeal to a

court based on the existing laws. Moreover, torturing to obtain a confession or information was a legal violation, and such a confession could not be used for the prosecution of a suspected person. Furthermore, the book insisted that military interest, national security and other reasons could not justify acts of torture.[76]

Clearly the book was a response to the Timika incident, as torture and murder occurred in this case, but it was notable also that: (1) ABRI's customary dogmatic emphasis of national security and the GPK threat was downgraded in this matter; and (2) ABRI employed the UN standard of human rights which it had long been reluctant to accept, using the excuse that Pancasila society, based on the *keluarga* (family) philosophy, had its own mode of respect for human rights. The above two points implied that ABRI's traditional political language – which was coloured by particularism and cultural relativism – had been virtually abandoned in the face of the practical need for introducing an internal reform programme aimed at raising the conduct of soldiers to meet international standards. Perhaps having sensed these new features in the guidebook, Komnas HAM – in its letter to Pangab Feisal Tanjung – praised Kodam Trikora for providing a positive sign for future cooperation between ABRI and Komnas HAM in protecting human rights, and also called on the Pangab to use the book as a standard reference text for all ABRI members in the archipelago.[77]

Coupled with this project targeted at the field-operation level, human rights became one of the central topics for ABRI's internal studies at the higher level, and contributed to the expansion of the scope for reviewing *dwifungsi* within ABRI. It was a few days after the release of the Church report on Timika that ABRI held a major national seminar to celebrate its contribution to national development. The seminar was held at Sesko ABRI and its two-day discussion focused on the management of ABRI's fundamental values for the next twenty-five years.[78] Within this context, the human rights issue was discussed as a trend in the era of globalization. The seminar concluded that, like the call for democratization, the growing demand for an improvement in human rights was an unavoidable consequence of globalization, thanks to the prevailing notion of international solidarity, and was forcing many authoritarian governments to shift their policies.[79] Unusually, the seminar provided no cultural arguments to counter this apparent global trend towards respect for human rights.

Contrary to these two events – the human rights guidebook and the seminar – which illustrated ABRI's institutional effort to cope with the new political paradigm, there was also an attempt to defend ABRI's traditional thinking based on a particularistic world-view. At a seminar held the following year by airforce headquarters to formulate ABRI's defence policy for the government's next five-year development plan, the human rights issue was labelled 'a significant obstacle'. The seminar asserted that 'the human rights problem became a popular global issue because of the Western nations which attempted to bring up the issue in order to pressure other countries. However, human rights cannot be implemented in the same way because each country has its own national interest and culture'.[80] In this light, the seminar also concluded that the NGOs – as pres-

sure groups for human rights and democratization – were obstacles within Indonesia's strategic environment.[81] While some officers accepted the need to respond to global concepts of human rights, others clearly saw them as a threat to ABRI's management of security.

It should be noted, however, that this traditional thinking now faced open criticism within ABRI. At the 1996 Army Seminar held in September, the move to assess new societal forces and new global values as threats met with strong resistance from participants. Among them, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Hasnan Habib argued that human rights did not constitute a weapon of the Western nations, but the universal interests of all human beings. Mentioning the example of the 1992 Non-Block Movement Meeting in Jakarta, Hasnan claimed that Indonesia had already confirmed the 'Jakarta message' of the meeting, which stipulated the universal validity of human rights and thus negated the cultural particularism applied by some officers currently holding rank.[82]

Furthermore, in November, a two-day seminar was again held at Sesko ABRI about ABRI's sociopolitical role and human rights. We examined the sociopolitical role of ABRI in Chapter 2. For the human rights aspect, the discussion was led by some prominent figures, including Lt. Gen. (ret.) Sayidiman and Marzuki Darusman.[83] Marzuki warned against ABRI's deepening suspicion of NGOs and argued that they represented new public aspirations resulting from New Order economic development.[84] Regarding existing human rights practice, he claimed that this was still limited to policy adjustments and proposed that it was necessary first to diffuse the idea as a national moral concept, insisting on the need for introducing an MPR decision to secure the nation's enduring commitment to *universal* human rights.[85] On the other hand, Sayidiman defended the traditional view. He believed that there was foreign intervention in domestic affairs and cited the human rights problem as one such example. For him, activating Pancasila philosophy was the most urgent task; this would help in resisting foreign pressure because human rights values were already built into the doctrine. Domestic liberal groups who were influenced by foreign thoughts would thus have no influence if Pancasila were implemented correctly.[86] At the same time, he attributed growing activity among NGOs to the penetration of Western values, and again proposed activating Pancasila philosophy as the key to overcoming the threat.[87]

The conflicting views on human rights could thus be seen in ABRI's internal discussions, indicating that a process of change was taking place. Whatever the assessment, ABRI's attempts to incorporate human rights issues into organizational learning illustrated a new phenomenon in the era of Kopkamtib-free politics, the re-emergence of student demonstrations, assertive NGOs and Komnas HAM. ABRI's human rights discussion was its response to the new political paradigm which had emerged in the late 1980s. It did not simply add another topic to the conceptual debate within ABRI but provided both a source of critical thinking in the developing *dwifungsi* dispute in society and a larger place within ABRI for those officers who had been motivated to formulate viable visions of *dwifungsi* conduct in the era of *keterbukaan*.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the case of ABRI's adaptation to the new political paradigm of human rights accountability in conducting internal security operations. Since this field exemplified the overlapping of *dwifungsi*'s first and second functions, we expected our investigation to clarify an important part of ABRI's political thinking and its application. Our discussion started with an analysis of the shooting of civilians. We attempted to elucidate the way in which such events affected the debate on ABRI's security approach which emerged in conjunction with the elimination of the extra-judicial security body, Kopkamtib. We then argued that, reflecting the *keterbukaan* movement and the revival of the student movement, the security approach debate became a major theme in the opposition's demand for policy accountability on ABRI's part. This criticism seemed to become relatively entrenched in the New Order civil–military discourse, since – unlike direct criticism of *dwifungsi* – it alone could not be interpreted by ABRI as attacking Pancasila and UUD45. The Dili incident at the end of 1991 also provided new institutional tools, namely KPN and DKM, for critics of ABRI. We also focused on the role and impact of Komnas HAM as the first legitimate mechanism within the regime to check ABRI's excessive use of force. As seen in the case of Timika, Komnas HAM became a virtual bridge between ABRI and the NGOs that first revealed the series of civilian killings. Though ABRI's recognition of 'procedural errors' was not satisfactory in the eyes of the NGOs, which gave high priority to human rights values, it could also be concluded – from the perspective of the political process – that Komnas HAM's endorsement of the NGO/Church report eventually meant that grass-roots criticism was accepted as legitimate pressure within the regime's political process. As discussed, ABRI also had rational reasons to cohabit with Komnas HAM, showing that some degree of policy accountability had by now become standard procedure for ABRI, in contrast to the 1970s and 1980s. As if to prove this, ABRI demonstrated its willingness to adopt human rights values within its organizational practice, with the creation of its first human rights manual for field soldiers – based on the UN standard – and a series of internal seminars focusing on the promotion of human rights.

These processes all indicated that ABRI's traditional framework for internal security conduct had started to erode and was subject to some institutional restrictions – again in comparison with the pre-*keterbukaan* period. This development was promoted through various steps – namely the spread of the security approach debate, the adoption of DKM/DKP as a new measure to handle ABRI's human rights abuses, and the legitimate role of Komnas HAM in challenging ABRI's earlier one-sided explanations about the military shooting of civilians. All contributed to diminishing military control over civil–military communication in the era of *keterbukaan*.

What should be noted, however, is that ABRI's perception of the human rights issue was linked in the minds of officers with the issue of globalization. This view was interesting not so much because it could affect ABRI's behaviour

but because it allowed ABRI to seek a rationale which could revive its traditional approach, when ABRI felt the necessity to defend itself. The concept of 'foreign-value penetration' was, in fact, interpreted as the influx of liberal thinking, which was then easily stamped as anti-Pancasila ideas disguised as human rights and NGO issues.

It is in this context that we can assess ABRI's dual use of the language of globalization. On the one hand, and as discussed here, the term was employed to present ABRI's posture of accommodation, its statement that the security approach and human rights assessment were being revised in the era of globalization. On the other hand, the term provided a weapon with which ABRI could attack domestic critics, by arguing that globalization allowed the influx of negative foreign values destructive to national stability and by then identifying certain groups promoting these values. It was notable that this cognitive structure seemed to run in tandem with the growing civilian use of globalization terminology – which clearly supported the activities of Komnas HAM, students, NGOs and critical intellectuals – to question ABRI's paternalistic political control and traditional security approach in dealing with societal demands for wider political participation. Therefore, although we have seen ABRI's accommodation of the new political paradigm, its traditional approach should not be ignored in our understanding of ABRI's response to democratic demands during the late New Order period. The purpose of the next chapter is to investigate the development of such hardline military thinking – the ideological projects and political reflexivity – aimed at repressing the demand for political democratization.

5 Creating new threats

Ideological dogmatization

This chapter examines ABRI's ideological adaptation in the face of growing democratic pressures during the late Soeharto era.[1] As discussed in the previous chapters, political society in the age of *keterbukaan* insisted on the need to improve human rights accountability, eliminating ABRI's praetorian political intervention, and – more generally – broadening space for political participation. It was during this process that the mass media and political figures introduced such concepts as globalization (*globalisasi*) and civil society (*masyarakat madani*) into the New Order political arena to support these demands as inevitable historical and global trends that cannot be reversed.[2] Backed by the concept of globalism, democracy advocates both within the regime and in society stepped up pressure for the elimination of authoritarian practices long adopted by Soeharto and ABRI.

In Chapter 4, we investigated how ABRI defensively accommodated such pressures for human rights accountability. This chapter, on the other hand, examines ABRI's counter-offensive against these democratic challenges by reshaping its ideological framework in a way that identified them as a national 'threat' – a legitimate target of security operations. The concept of *globalisasi* has played a decisive role in this ideological reformulation aiming to rationalize a hardline military approach to democratic movements. Our empirical question, therefore, is the how and why of such developments. We seek the answers in the contexts of both Soeharto–ABRI relations during the final decade of the New Order regime and the institutional inertia of ABRI's ideological reproduction since the beginning of the regime.

We first look at ABRI's organizational attempts to standardize its ideological format within the military and society during the decade since the late 1970s. The next section focuses on ABRI's internal efforts since the late 1980s to adjust the established framework of hardline military thinking to the changing environment – such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of social pressure for regime opening. We argue that such ideological reshaping was coloured by the shift in Soeharto–ABRI relations – from antagonistic under Moerdani's ABRI leadership to amenable under the Feisal–Hartono leadership – in the early 1990s. The way in which the reshaped ideological setting was translated by Soeharto loyalists into actual political programmes

during the final years of the Soeharto government is also examined. The range of politico-ideological dissent that emerged in this process is then investigated, followed by my attempt at categorizing three different mindsets among the military officers, reflecting the diversification of military thinking during the final years of the New Order. Throughout the chapter, I argue the significance of both political and institutional factors in evolving New Order military ideology.

Tarpadnas and the ideological setting of military *kewaspadaan*

ABRI's *dwifungsi*, which was officially adopted at the beginning of the New Order, claimed a 'permanent' role in the defence and sociopolitical fields. We showed in Chapter 3 that this permanency was a notable characteristic of the officers' role belief derived from developmentalist ideology. However, this ideological framework needed frequent reinvention to justify continuing military control of politics due to stability not having been fully achieved. The military thus claimed that it had the ability to maintain stability, but at the same time needed to say that it had not achieved complete stability. To this end, since the launching of the regime, continuous efforts were made to construct an image of instability. After 1978 this was formally programmed and routinized within ABRI on the initiative of Lemhannas. This high-level military educational institute established a programme – the so-called National Vigilance Refresher Course (Penataran Kewaspadaan Nasional – Tarpadnas) – for the indoctrination of both officers and civilians with information regarding 'potential' political threats to national stability. According to Lemhannas, this vigilance (*kewaspadaan*) programme was almost complete by February 1988.[3] Assessing the content and development of this programme during the period of 1978–1988 is helpful to clarify ABRI's standard threat image before the *keterbukaan* period.

Tarpadnas was a joint project of Lemhannas and Kopkamtib and was open to ABRI members and staff of other departments.[4] It was not coincidental that the programme started in June 1978, following the regime crackdown on the 1977–1978 student movement opposing Soeharto's presidential re-election.[5] One document prepared for Tarpadnas 1979 asserted that the 'New Left' had taken over communist activities after the banning of the PKI in 1966, through the medium of students and intellectuals. The development of the New Left in the campuses had encouraged the extreme left, which used labour and land disputes to attract supporters and had also infiltrated various mass organizations and government institutions.[6] Regarding the extreme right, or Islamic fundamentalism, the document claimed that it had become fanatic and militant because they had no attractive propaganda to expand their organization except by using religious means.[7]

From another angle, the Tarpadnas course in 1980 claimed that, in order to alleviate the latent danger of these extremes, it was necessary to reduce the

increasing economic gap between the rich minority and the poor majority, and to minimize government manipulation of power and authority – thus admitting the regime's and ABRI's own failures as a factor encouraging extremism.[8] However, in response to government policy to gradually release PKI political prisoners, Lemhannas warned that about 105 of them were still 'diehards' who were unwilling to drop communist ideology; these included the authors Pramudya Ananta Toer and Rivai Apin. Therefore, the paper concluded, ABRI should not relax its policy of *kewaspadaan*.[9] This alarmism was encouraged by the notion of 'organization without organization' (*organisasi tak terbentuk*). The construction of a network of cell members without formal organization, Lemhannas insisted, had been the strategy of PKI supporters under the New Order. They had tried to undermine national unity based on the Pancasila ideology by attempting to infiltrate the 'floating mass' and looking for opportunities among the labour, agrarian, student, women's, legal and cultural movements which had emerged in the process of national development (*pembangunan*).[10] Such *kewaspadaan* thinking, which saw the latent danger of communist resurgence in the changing society, reflected the legacy of military mindsets cultivated during the 1966–1967 elimination of PKI. These mindsets were formally standardized for use in officer indoctrination during the first few years of the Tarpadnas programme.

In 1985, the indoctrination target was expanded to include lower-level governmental bodies and official organizations such as the National Journalists Association (PWI), the National Youth Committee (KNPI), the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kadin), and so on. At the regional level, Kopkamtib officers (Laksuswil) conducted the programme for the members of the regional branches of the above organizations and also for provincial parliamentarians. Moreover, at the lower level, Kopkamtib officers (Laksusda), in cooperation with Korems, coordinated meetings of Tarpadnas alumni to ensure *kewaspadaan* indoctrination of those who had joined previously.[11] The stretching of this indoctrination programme to include society occurred in August 1984 under the instructions of General Benny Moerdani who became Pangab and Kopkamtib Commander in March 1983.[12] As Soeharto's right-hand man and the New Order intelligence czar, Moerdani endeavoured to expand the military's ideological surveillance in society for the further fortification of New Order political control.[13] Moerdani's programme was implemented by Maj. Gen. Soebijakto – another intelligence officer and a close aide of Moerdani – who was installed as the Lemhannas Governor two months after Moerdani's promotion to Pangab.[14] The *kewaspadaan* project, which was first intended to standardize the military's (and the government's) threat perception regarding national stability, was now transformed into ABRI's security-intelligence project aiming to control political ideas in society. This move resonated perfectly with the Soeharto regime's programme to enforce all social organizations to adopt Pancasila as their sole philosophical foundation.[15]

The *kewaspadaan* formula provides some interesting insights into the development of New Order military ideology. First, regime concepts, such as *pembangunan*

and floating mass, had been presented since 1966 as the antithesis of the communist-influenced Old Order led by President Sukarno. However, they were now perceived as sources of vulnerability which could provide the basis for underground extremist activities. This assessment reflected the process by which ABRI's original scheme of threat theory had been broadened to cover the 'consequences' of *pembangunan* after the first decade of the New Order. ABRI's long-term political involvement had been rationalized by a developmentalist ideology which insisted on the military's role in safeguarding the ultimate national goal (i.e. *pembangunan*). The established *kewaspadaan* doctrine – which now saw *pembangunan* as a source of threat – enhanced the ideological rationale for military domination.

Second, ABRI's internal study of the latent communist danger (*Bahaya Laten Komunisme*: Balatkom) revealed an interesting contradiction in approach. In a document dated February 1988 and formulated by Maj. Gen. Soebijakto as a standard material for the subsequent Tarpadnas, the history, thought and activities of the PKI were described in detail with the conclusion that Marxist ideology – whether it was implemented by communist or other groups – was destructive to Pancasila society. However, this 100-page paper at the same time rejected liberal capitalism by using the neo-Marxist perspective on capitalism and the world-system to argue that capitalism had made the rich richer and the poor poorer because the rich were the owners of capital. The paper asserted that the recent rise of multinational corporations also resulted in the accumulation of capital in industrial countries and that this had strengthened the structural dependency of the poor countries.[16] Logically, there was no conflict between concern about communism and concern about capitalism, since both could undermine the ideological basis of Pancasila.[17] But what should be noted is that Balatkom was juxtaposed with neo-Marxist language in the perception of the Lemhannas officers who had developed *kewaspadaan* ideology. Soebijakto – the communist expert – seemed to know the utility of Marxist ideas.

All the Lemhannas papers discussed above implied that in order to construct this Pancasila dialectic, both communism and capitalism-liberalism were 'needed' as the thesis and antithesis. ABRI's standard assessment can be found in the following comment.

> When we adopted our political system, there were two mainstreams in the world, i.e. Western democracy based on individualism and the Communist regime based on class. However, they were not suitable for Indonesia where the sense of 'togetherness' (*kebersamaan*) in society transcended both individual and class [interests]. This was the foundation of our Pancasila democratic system.[18]

This perception was upheld both by ABRI officers and the state administrators, and it was against this background that, with or without a real threat, Balatkom gradually became a built-in ritual of hypernationalism which upheld Pancasila as the absolute value.[19] In the history of New Order anti-communist thinking,

this was a major development, as the ritualization no longer needed 'real' threats – since the maintenance of the ritual itself became the end of organizational activity – and enabled ABRI to adopt Balatkom as a weapon against any societal element branded as 'anti-Pancasila'.[20]

It was, however, notable that the completion of Lemhannas' Balatkom study was followed rapidly by Soeharto's decision to abolish Kopkamtib in September 1988. In terms of military ideology, the loss of Kopkamtib was unlikely to undermine ABRI's established Balatkom thinking which had already become a standard aspect of Lemhannas courses. The Tarpadnas project was also preserved in post-Kopkamtib civil–military relations. Nevertheless, in the political context, the disbanding of Kopkamtib and the completion of Balatkom had significant reflections in the growing inner-regime contestation. As seen in Chapter 2, it was widely believed that the liquidation of Kopkamtib was intended primarily to diminish the power of Moerdani who was unhappy with Soeharto's choice of Lt. Gen. (ret.) Sudharmono as vice-president for 1988–1993. Moerdani was eased out of the Pangabship by Soeharto and transferred to the Department of Defence and Security (Dephankam) as Minister just before the presidential (and vice-presidential) elections at the MPR in March 1988. The growing disenchantment of Moerdani's officers with the President was evident when Brig. Gen. Ibrahim Saleh of F-ABRI interrupted a session in the MPR by objecting openly to the nomination of Sudharmono as vice-president. ABRI's unhappiness was expressed in other places too.

Gen. Try Sutrisno, a close ally of Moerdani, who had replaced the latter as Pangab, spoke to his officers just after the MPR session:

> This time, the atmosphere [of the MPR] was different from the past cases. There was a tendency of a certain group to force its wishes in such a way as to endanger Pancasila democracy. We have to watch out for this. Recalling the MPR session which just finished, we are almost ready to conclude that ABRI's sociopolitical activities for securing the purity and consistency of Pancasila and the Constitution will be significantly difficult in the future.[21]

In July, Sutrisno again expressed his opinion at a meeting of officers who were to be posted to non-military positions. This time, he stressed that:

> Indonesia should have a healthy and dynamic Pancasila democracy in which we can nominate more than two candidates for the vice presidency and vote to decide on one of them at the MPR. This is important to improve the professionalism of all sociopolitical forces.[22]

These two statements by the new ABRI Commander indicated the objection of the ABRI leadership to Soeharto's selection of Sudharmono. These statements were also rare cases of the ABRI Commander openly showing his dissatisfac-

tion with Soeharto's political projects. It was also the first time that ABRI accepted the idea of competition for the vice-presidency and, implicitly, for the presidency. ABRI leadership thus mobilized the established *kewaspadaan* approach – backed up by the Balatkom doctrine – against Sudharmono, who may have still intended to seek re-election as chairperson of Golkar at its 1988 Congress.

Kopkamtib was mobilized to identify 'communist penetration' in the Sudharmono-led Golkar. During the period between the March MPR session and the Golkar election in October, an intensive campaign was conducted to discredit Sudharmono by alleging his involvement in the activities of communist organizations in the late 1940s, presumably reflecting Moerdani's roll-back strategy against Soeharto and Sudharmono.[23] Soeharto's September decision to abolish Kopkamtib was made under these circumstances. From the perspective of ABRI's *kewaspadaan* development, these events showed how the intra-military programme of ideological standardization had been transformed into a tool of security surveillance in society and was finally developed by ABRI into a weapon with which to challenge Soeharto's political blueprint. It was ironic that the project, which was intended to secure the stability of Soeharto's regime based on Pancasila conformity, unintendedly turned into a military means to undermine inner-elite cohesion and threaten Soeharto. The evolving *kewaspadaan* doctrine during the decade up to 1988 strongly reflected the pre-eminence of the intelligence sector within ABRI which had long been dominated by Moerdani. It was remarkable, in this sense, that the completion of the Balatkom project was accompanied by the decline of Moerdani's power.

However, the fall of Moerdani did not mark the end of the *kewaspadaan* ideology within ABRI. It was ABRI's institutional inertia that had sustained ritualized *kewaspadaan* thinking by seeking new targets since the late 1980s. The New Order military had needed to struggle continuously to maintain the legitimacy of its permanent political involvement as derived from the developmentalist ideology – as if pumping the heart to keep sending blood into the body of the living dinosaur. It was in this context that the growing democratic movements and their frequent use of the globalization concept attracted the eyes of military extremists.

The hardline military thinking on globalization

Globalization was a concept originally popularized by the media and democratic movements in their attempts to question the legitimacy of military control of politics and to expand democratic space in the country's political arena. This new weapon for advocates of democratization – including students, legal activists, NGOs and elite critics consisting of retired generals and civilian politicians – had asserted that regime opening, or *keterbukaan*, was an irresistible global demand as it was no longer relevant for ABRI to emphasize the threat of communism after the fall of the USSR and the dissolution of the Communist Bloc commencing in 1988. ABRI's established *kewaspadaan*

doctrine faced an unprecedented challenge as its principal resource for ideological reproduction was cut off. However, as seen below, ABRI's ritualized practice invented an 'opportunity' in this new social trend to reassert the supremacy of *kewaspadaan* thinking and expand the political territory in which ABRI could enjoy relative freedom in projecting this ritual into its actual political programme. This dynamic had nothing to do with the ongoing Soeharto–ABRI friction but reflected ABRI's corporate interest in preserving its dominant political power rationalized by its long-standing role beliefs. Institutional inertia was, therefore, at work in driving the transformation of ABRI's *kewaspadaan* doctrine into a tool of popular repression since the late 1980s. However, it was the changing Soeharto–ABRI relations that had characterized the 'style' of the doctrinal application. We will look at these two developments and how the globalization concept provided ABRI with a critical opportunity to synchronize its old ideological structure with the new social discursive trend in such a way as to strengthen ABRI's hardline approach to popular democratic movements.

To assess this indication in the early stage of the *keterbukaan* movement in society, it is helpful to consider ABRI's 1988 strategic paper. ABRI's basic strategic planning consisted of three pillars, i.e. long-term (25 years), medium-term (5 years) and short-term (annual) assessments. Dephankam headed by Moerdani formulated the annual strategic assessment in 1988 which was full of *kewaspadaan* concerns. It stated, among other things, that for the next few years, when international communication would become easier and wider, special vigilance would be needed to guard against the infiltration of foreign values into Indonesia – especially communism and liberalism – which might threaten the values of Pancasila and the Constitution, and that these alien values would penetrate those places where excessive economic development had caused a widening of the social gap between the rich and the poor.[24] Therefore, the internal security threat of the early 1990s would be the spread of 'new-style communism' (*komunisme gaya baru* – KGB) into government and society.

Kewaspadaan would be urgently required to monitor the activities of: (1) social organizations which in the past had shown hesitation in accepting Pancasila as the sole principle for all social organizations, and later accepted it in an equivocal manner; (2) the fourth-generation communist group which based its tactics on the new-style communism, no longer using physical means but instead constitutional methods, intellectual activities, government administration, etc. in order to 'depoliticize ABRI'; (3) extreme groups which would try to use extra-constitutional methods – such as instigating mass riots – to further their political interests based on racial and separatist motivations; and (4) a certain group of people (*pihak tertentu*) who wanted liberal democracy with unlimited freedom, and whose activities spread through academic forums, discussions and seminars as well as via the mass media.[25] In order to counter these 'dangers threatening Pancasila, UUD45, national integration and development', this short-term strategic study advocated the vital need to uphold the *kewaspadaan* level with the

aim of eliminating any idea in society which might contradict Pancasila and the national interest.[26] Although the term 'globalization' was not used, the paper emphasized deepening international relations as the key factor which would activate these threats.

ABRI's medium-term strategy for 1989–1993 paid special attention to security management during the 1992 election and the presidential election at the general session of the MPR in 1993. Policy guidelines for the territorial apparatus stated that there existed certain groups which tried to stir up emotional issues in society, such as land disputes, and which took advantage of events such as the general elections and the presidential election to encourage demonstrations and riots oriented towards racial-religious issues in order to achieve their political interests.[27] In response to these threats, territorial commands were instructed to sustain the *kewaspadaan* effort, scrutinize the activities of former political prisoners, manage political conditions for the election and the MPR session, neutralize the negative impact of economic development and new advanced technology, and combat any effort by certain groups to manipulate religion for political interests.[28] This guidance showed that the concept of 'vigilance against certain groups' was not only a tool of ideological indoctrination but a core part of ABRI's territorial operations.

ABRI's conduct in terms of security during the election and handling of the MPR, however, gave legitimacy to society demands to relax the tight security practices of previous years.[29] ABRI responded during September 1993, on the 28th anniversary of the failed 'communist' coup of 1965 (G30S/PKI), when Lemhannas published a thick document about *kewaspadaan* and Balatkom under the instruction of Lemhannas Governor, Maj. Gen. Hartono.[30] One of Hartono's contributions to ABRI's *kewaspadaan* theory was his view that communist tactics were no longer the monopoly of communists but had now been 'borrowed and adapted' by 'certain groups for certain political interests'.[31] By distinguishing the method from the ideology, Hartono argued that non-communists also utilized communist methods in their attempts to topple the government. Needless to say, this interpretation was quite useful when condemning popular political movements for which it was hopeless for ABRI to try to blame communist ideology. Also, since the term 'certain groups' was open-ended, anyone viewed by ABRI as a political trouble-maker could be thus categorized if necessary. To support this approach, the document outlined an argument which can be summarized as follows.

First, it argued against the claim that the communist threat was an illusion in the wake of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The document explained that, with the end of the Cold War, the world had entered an era of globalization and free flow of information, and that this had had a great impact on Indonesia's development because the boundary between the domestic and international systems was rapidly becoming meaningless. This phenomenon brought with it a new spectrum of threats to every field of national life. In politics, globalism encouraged the penetration of capitalism, liberal thought and other foreign ideologies which contradicted the Pancasila philosophy and

jeopardized the Indonesian defence system, which was based on the Total People's Defence (Hankamrata).[32] In the economic field, the free-market economy impacted on Indonesia's Pancasila economy, based on *kemitraan* (partnership), while in religious life, globalization facilitated the influx of foreign values which would meet with a negative reaction from religious groups. The document concluded that these threats would damage social harmony and national resilience (Ketahanan Nasional).[33]

It was against these perceived challenges that the *kewaspadaan* campaign had to be conducted and, significantly, Lemhannas repeatedly emphasized the campaign's synchrony with Ketahanan Nasional as the 'Total Defence' policy. This policy was the invention of ABRI, which thought that Ketahanan Nasional – an indisputable national concept – could be useful in rejuvenating Balatkom and *kewaspadaan* which were, to a large extent, part of Indonesia's historical legacy. By attaching the *kewaspadaan* project to Ketahanan Nasional, ABRI found a means to resist its declining historical legitimacy after almost three decades of regime stability.

Hartono, who was promoted to Kassospol with the rank of lieutenant general in January 1994, again wrote his views on the national threat in a Lemhannas journal.[34] This time he stressed the threat from the capitalism-liberalism movement which accompanied globalism, in contrast to his previous emphasis on communism. For Hartono, the rapid development of science and technology (IPTEK) in the era of globalization greatly influenced the ideological-political-economic-sociocultural-military (*ipoleksosbudmil*) areas of national life and thus it was the task of 'professional' ABRI officers to anticipate its negative influences. The idea that global change was a threat to the nation was underlined. Hartono argued that:

> …the bipolar international system under the Cold War had ended and been replaced by a tendency to form a uni-polar system under Western capitalism-liberalism. [As a result], the global economy speeded up the penetration of foreign culture through advanced information/communication technology and made Westerners think that their cultural values were universal. They then started to push other countries over the issues of human rights and environmental protection.[35]

Hartono's assessments were not unique and were widely shared by the state administrators. However, as seen in the Lemhannas document on national vigilance, this shared perception effectively encouraged ABRI to assert the need to strengthen ideological-political control under the banner of 'latent danger'. Hartono's promotion to the position of Army Chief of Staff in February 1995 facilitated ABRI's inclination to adopt this approach in political practice. Its origins lie in the context of changing Soeharto–ABRI relations since the 1988 MPR session which, as discussed earlier, was coloured by ABRI's overt frustration with Soeharto's choice of Sudharmono as vice-president.

Soeharto's loyal military

The lingering antagonism between Soeharto and the ABRI leadership was reflected in events such as the dissolution of Kopkamtib and the creation of ICMI. For Soeharto, both would work to undermine the influence of Moerdani-linked officers and help ensure that ABRI was fully under his control. These attempts were accompanied by his move to limit the conduct of *dwifungsi* by the current ABRI leaders, as implied in his *tut wuri handayani* instruction of November 1990. Soeharto's handling of the Dili shooting was also understood as part of this political struggle.[36] Moreover, as seen earlier, the vast international pressure after the Dili killing became the primary factor pushing Soeharto to set up Komnas HAM in December 1993, which was also seen as an attempt by Soeharto to create a tool to help him publicize military problems that could be used to his political advantage.

The military leadership under Moerdani and Try Sutrisno was not silent. In the June 1992 general election, ABRI adopted a 'neutral' attitude towards Golkar and also 'tolerated' retired officers who supported the PDI. This was ABRI's reminder to Soeharto that the established New Order political system could not be maintained without ABRI's active support. ABRI's response was highlighted in the vice-presidential election at the MPR session in March 1993. As seen previously, Moerdani's aide, Lt. Gen. Harsudiono Hartas (Kassospol), announced ABRI's nomination of the Pangab, Try Sutrisno, as the next vice-president. This was a high-profile challenge to Soeharto, who is said to have favoured Habibie. As a finale to this Soeharto–ABRI antagonism, officers such as Moerdani, Sutrisno and Hartas were all removed from the military structure.

The 1993 nomination was a turning point in Soeharto–ABRI relations. From Soeharto's perspective, it was vital to reconstruct the military in such a way as to support him. Dismantling the legacy of Moerdani's ABRI and recruiting loyalist officers were the two main goals. Soeharto's political survival rested largely on how he could transform ABRI within the five years before the next presidential election in 1988. Whether he wanted to stay in office or not, establishing an amenable military was necessary for a smooth succession scenario. A structural impediment faced by Soeharto to this end was the generation gap. A remnant of the revolutionary generation, Soeharto seems to have experienced difficulty judging loyalist officers of the new generation – except for his military aides. Inevitably, he started to accept the advice of reliable circles in selecting officers who would occupy strategic positions. The role of his family, including Habibie whom Soeharto had known since Habibie was a child, became increasingly apparent in military promotion practices.[37] It was against this background that Prabowo's rise towards the top military position at the time of the 1998 MPR was widely perceived as inevitable, although it deviated from standard promotion procedures.[38]

The ABRI leadership under Feisal Tanjung, who replaced Edi Sudradjat in May 1993, further adapted itself to the direction of Soeharto's shifting political

preference, as indicated by two events: Golkar civilianization and ICMI-zation in October 1993, and the liquidation of BAIS in January 1994. The end of BAIS further encouraged the dismantling of the personal network of Moerdani, while at the same time diminishing the organizational basis of autonomous military power capable of evolving beyond Soeharto's control.[39]

It was these processes that provided for the transformation of ABRI's high command in the post-Moerdani period. Soeharto's urgent need to reconstruct President–ABRI relations on a new basis, and his search for loyalist officers to this end, were increasingly mediated by Habibie and Feisal and also by Prabowo. When Hartono was promoted to Army Chief of Staff in February 1995, the move was seen as on the initiative of the latter.[40] The renewed ABRI leadership led by Feisal and Hartono was pro-ICMI and amenable to the First Family. It was this military leadership that Soeharto relied on to prepare for the smooth conduct of both the 1997 general election – which was expected to face a serious opposition movement centred on Megawati – and the 1998 presidential election which was required to avoid repeats of 1988/1993 happenings, i.e. Ibrahim Saleh's interruption in the MPR and Harsudiono Hartas' early nomination of the vice-president.

Against this political background, the new ABRI leadership was inclined to seek a rationale to legitimize political repression against the widening popular criticism of the Soeharto regime and the growing societal demands for democratic *keterbukaan*. Relying on the routinized *kewaspadaan* approach institutionalized by the previous ABRI leadership was not considered bizarre, being regarded as legitimate practice within the military. However, it was perceived perhaps as a painful task, and as damaging to society's trust in ABRI. Nonetheless, the new military leaders rested their hopes on the *kewaspadaan* approach appealing to Muslims, if it used the Islamic cause – as did Soeharto in the mid-1960s when the army mobilized Muslim masses to eliminate PKI supporters under the flag of *jihad*.[41]

Kewaspadaan political programmes during the final years

The Feisal–Hartono leadership therefore adapted the established mode of *kewaspadaan* doctrine. As discussed earlier, the negative impact of *pembangunan* – as providing an opportunity for communist resurgence – was already a part of the standard interpretation of Balatkom. Under the new military leadership, the content was frequently adjusted to cultivate Islamic sympathy. The problem of the widening socio-economic gap, which was also raised by democratic advocates as a critique of New Order developmentalism, was instead emphasized to focus on Chinese-Indonesians. Reference to the gap was often code for appealing to Islamic sentiments against rich Chinese. Although the use of the simple dichotomy between the rich-Christian-minority-Chinese and the poor-Muslim-majority-*pribumi* could be dangerous as it stirred up ethnic disharmony, the political usefulness of this approach was still considerable. And if the approach

was coupled with hardline thinking on globalization, as officially formulated by Lemhannas under Hartono, the missing link between the Islamic cause and support for the regime could be found in the eyes of military extremists. Gen. Hartono's close associate, Brig. Gen. Farid Zainuddin, for example, wrote as follows in a Lemhannas journal:

> The West is always antagonistic to Islam. This is not unrelated to the recent international campaign for political liberalization [by the West] … which has also been promoted in Indonesia as the revival of Islam becomes apparent…. It is globalization that facilitates this [campaign]. It [globalization] also strengthens the international network of non-*pribumi* business which has dominated the Indonesian economy since the beginning [of the New Order].[42]

This threat perception adopts the concept of globalization to emphasize the 'Chinese problem' in economic life. It is expected to promote Islamic 'nationalism' and demonstrate ABRI's sympathy to it. Then, it opens space to argue that the democratic movement – which is allegedly manipulated by Western anti-Islamicism – should be treated with suspicion by Muslims.

The military leadership also strove to invent a new logic to link evolving democratic pressure from society to the need for upholding the Balatkom campaign. The opportunity came in July 1995, when Soeharto decided to release some G30S-related political prisoners, including Soebandrio, Omar Dhani and Soetarto.[43] The release of former political prisoners had been strongly demanded by the Komnas HAM based on a human rights perspective. When the Minister of Justice, Oetojo Oesman, announced Soeharto's plan to give amnesty to these figures, ABRI Commander Feisal Tanjung – who had claimed previously that there were still more than 300 PKI supporters in society – responded by showing his discontent and insisting that the issue had to be handled carefully and would take time.[44] At the same time, the military leadership reintroduced the latent danger theory to combat the opinion in society that ABRI's vigilance was no longer relevant to the current stable situation. Maj. Gen. Syarwan Hamid – who had been promoted to Assistant for Sociopolitical Affairs to Kassospol (Assospol Kassospol) in March – stated that:

> … communism has in fact become bankrupt, but its 'teaching' is still alive today. For example, when we listen to the music, ABRI does not see the singer but listens to the song, and tries to recognise whether or not the melody comes from the old song even though the musical instrument is different from the past.[45]

Having insisted that the communist song could be played on new instruments, Syarwan asserted that current political issues such as *keterbukaan* and human rights provided excellent opportunities for singing the song.

As seen above, the detachment of the 'method' from the 'ideology' of communism seemed to have become an established interpretation of Balatkom, and the concept of globalization had greatly helped ABRI in developing this technique of political manipulation. ABRI's effort to link the foreign threat to domestic political instability was nothing new, having been repeated since the beginning of the New Order.[46] What could be seen in mid-1995, however, was the renewal of its method and target. Now, in the age of the post-Soviet world order, the alleged 'outside threat' shifted from the communist doctrines to communist-type activities via the penetration of *universal* values, not communist values. The target of repression was no longer limited to communist supporters, but was expanded to include popular movements conducting anti-regime activities by identifying them as similar to the communist threat.

The political operationalization of this technique soon became apparent. In late 1995, political society was occupied with the issue of 'formless [communist] organization' (Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk, or OTB), raised by ABRI's Chief of General Staff (Kasum), Lt. Gen. Soeyono, who identified fifteen government critics as OTB figures. He publicly explained that there were two groups of communists – one consisted of former PKI supporters, and the other of those who had been influenced by the first group and who now tried to discredit the government by using the issues of human rights, democratization and environmental protection.[47] Furthermore, Soeyono insisted that the PKI had used 'agitation and propaganda' (*agitprop*) in the past, and that this was now used by the named figures to criticize the government, and that therefore they were OTB. In our analysis of the developing *kewaspadaan*-Balatkom ideology, Soeyono's interpretation seems to be the ultimate model which opened the way for ABRI to claim that virtually any demonstration against government policy used communist methods. Linking the OTB issue and the alleged impact of globalization, his theory attacked both the Internet and NGOs, asserting that current indications of communist emergence were almost the same as in 1965, except that the method was different as they could infiltrate via the Internet.[48] Regarding the NGOs, which – as seen in Chapter 4 – had already become important political actors in lobbying the government and international society to blame ABRI's frequent human rights abuses, Soeyono warned that 'we now know their colour and will scrutinize them to reveal many of their grey activities', insisting on the possible link between the transnational human rights movement and the latent danger of communist infiltration.[49]

The OTB concept was carried further by other officers who followed the Soeyono–Syarwan approach. Maj. Gen. Yusuf Kartanegara, the Commander of the Central Java Kodam, announced that five ex-PKI figures in Purwokerto had attempted to gather forces to plot the establishment of *negara Islam* (Islamic state), while Colonel Mat Ishak, Korem Commander in Padang, Central Sumatra, asserted that a recent riot in Jambi had been provoked by former PKI members, and Maj. Gen. Imam Utomo, East Java Kodam Commander, rode the wave by stating that a recent riot in his command area, which targeted the house of a local parliamentarian, was possibly led by OTB members. He also claimed that

East Java was a 'storehouse' (*gudang*) of OTB. Similarly in the West Java Kodam, its Commander, Maj. Gen. Tayo Tarmadi, warned that OTB figures had benefited from the current economic gap in society and penetrated into religious organizations as a means to conduct dangerous activities.[50] None of the three Kodam Commanders in Java provided any explanation of the dubious link between Marxist atheism and religious fanaticism. But they publicly adopted this new version of old regime language, which now included the globalization concept, as a tool to strengthen military pressure on democratic advocates. In effect, many of the major issues of the civil society movement – such as human rights, democracy, NGOs, labour/land rights, and economic injustice – were incorporated in the scope of *kewaspadaan*-Balatkom doctrine under the Feisal–Hartono ABRI leadership.

Several critics responded to the line taken by ABRI by arguing that it was merely a repetition of old language in order to promote the group's political bargaining power *vis-à-vis* emerging democratic forces.[51] Also interesting to note was the negative response to the campaign of former Vice-President Sudharmono, previously the target of rumours branding him as communist; Sudharmono warned against 'instantly labelling certain people as OTB or having an "unclean [family] environment" (*tidak bersih lingkungan*)'. The Minister of the Environment, Sarwono Kusumatmadja, a reformist Minister, similarly showed his unhappiness by saying that the campaign was reminiscent of the 1970s.[52] The father of the Tarpadnas project, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Soebijakto, also asserted in 1997 that: 'today's ABRI insists on the latent danger of PKI, or formless [communist] organizations (OTB), and always claims that there is a PKI-ghost behind democratic movements. But they are nonsense, there is no threat from the PKI any more'.[53] As widely believed, the campaign may have been motivated by practical political calculations relating to the coming general election in 1997. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of ABRI's institutional routine of *kewaspadaan* maintenance, the OTB campaign in 1995 seemed to be the final step to 'free' its doctrinal utility from the bounds of history.

In facing these criticisms, the military leadership responded in two ways. First, it reiterated the established interpretation of Balatkom. Lt. Gen. Moetojib, who had replaced Hartono as Lemhannas Governor, wrote in his house journal that the current issues of democratization, human rights and *keterbukaan* had all been strongly influenced from abroad, and encouraged the formation of critical public opinion – including criticism of ABRI's political role – which in effect threatened national stability.[54] Here, without referring to Balatkom, civil society concepts were all automatically regarded as impediments to stability and the object of *kewaspadaan*. ABRI's interpretative consolidation was also suggested by the Territorial Staff Section at ABRI Headquarters. In its regular report internally circulated in early 1996, the OTB issue became a special focus of attention.[55] After describing the chronological events leading to the emergence of public debate over the OTB in the previous year, the report claimed that OTB members believed the communist technique to be the most effective tool. The alleged technique referred to the 'theory of contradiction [*sic*]' encouraging

conflict between groups, for instance between the rich and the poor, between religious groups, between ABRI and labourers, and between old and young people. By using this, the report continued, these OTB elements created antagonistic conditions and conflicts of interests in society, which would lead to rioting and political instability.[56]

Coupled with these attempts by ABRI to consolidate the established interpretation, the second response to criticism was a search for evidence – or the construction of the reality of Balatkom in the current situation. First, academics became the target. In October 1995, Brig. Gen. Djoko Subroto, Chief of Staff of the Central Java Kodam, announced that the Kodam's investigation had found proof that three academics at the Christian University of Satya Wacana had been involved in communist activities in the distant past. Asked about possible action to be taken against the three, Djoko suggested that the university rector had the power to act, thus placing the case outside ABRI's direct responsibility.[57] The pressure on campus politics continued as Lt. Gen. Soeyono warned in November that he could ensure a military presence at any university where necessary, even without a formal request.[58] His threat was a response to the growing number of student demonstrations in recent years. This high-profile warning to students was followed in December by the arrest of Petrus Hariyanto, a prominent student activist and Secretary General of SMID (Students in Solidarity for Democracy in Indonesia) who was included in Soeyono's list of fifteen OTB figures and who was suspected of leading a recent petition movement to the Dutch Embassy.

Second, alongside the academic sector, NGO activists became the target of ABRI's effort to make Balatkom a reality. In May 1996, a book published in December of the previous year was banned by a Supreme Court decision. The title of the book was *Bayang-Bayang PKI*, or *Shadows of the PKI*, edited by Stanly, a young political activist. The ban was first suggested by the Publications Investigation Team of Bakorstanas, which concluded in March 1996 that, despite the stated purpose of the book as a general reference text for young people about G30S/PKI, the content was full of historical distortions and attempted to discredit ABRI and the national leadership.[59] As seen in the report's conclusion, ABRI labelled the book 'extremely dangerous' if read by younger people who had never experienced the G30S/PKI incident. After this, ABRI's surveillance of NGOs via the territorial apparatus from Kodam to Koramil tightened. As seen in Chapter 2, it was in the midst of such tension between NGOs and ABRI that Megawati's PDI was toppled and a physical clash between the two sides triggered a large riot on 27 July 1996, followed by ABRI's purge of NGO activists, especially targeting the People's Democratic Party (PRD), a student NGO which had recently declared itself a political party.

To conduct this campaign effectively and to sustain the pressure on the anti-regime political movement, it was vital for the Feisal–Hartono leadership to present a united front within ABRI in its interpretation of the PRD and support of the Islamic sector. The former goal was evident, for example, in the report produced by ABRI spokesman, Brig. Gen. Amir Syarifuddin, for the elite green

beret unit, Kostrad, whose role was significant in the success of any political-security project conducted by ABRI.[60] Amir insisted that it was after the liquidation of Kopkamtib that the communists saw the opportunity to revive their activities in society and that the PRD was the final product. According to him, the PRD should be seen as a communist group because: (1) its manifesto was clearly anti-Pancasila, and its behaviour resembled the PKI's attempted coup in Madiun in 1948; (2) its organization was formed in the communist way, by gathering together many labour, peasant, artist, student, intellectual organizations, which were often led by ex-PKI figures; and (3) its tactics were nothing more than communist-oriented because they organized labour/agrarian strikes and mass demonstrations in Irian Jaya, West Kalimantan, Ujung Pandang, Bogor, Surabaya, Solo and Semarang during 1996 with posters demanding 'remove *dwifungsi*'. Following the established *kewaspadaan* doctrine, anti-*dwifungsi* was identified dogmatically as an expression of communist language. Syarifuddin's clarification was circulated to the territorial commands throughout the archipelago, which were instructed to tighten regional security surveillance in anticipation of counter-actions by the underground members of the ultra-left PRD.[61]

The latter goal comprised the mobilization of Islamic support for PRD-bashing as a warning against still-active 'atheist' communism. This 'theory of contradiction' applied by ABRI was expected to work under the current military leadership which had included top-ranking officers with strong Muslim backgrounds. Among them, Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid seemed to be the most active in conducting this operation.[62] The 'contradiction theory' adopted by the military leadership was aimed at shifting the nature of the political event from an authoritarian crackdown of the popular movement to the Islamic struggle against the communist remnants.

In this way, the 'Crush PRD-Mega' campaign, which was carried out by Feisal's ABRI, relied heavily on the *kewaspadaan* approach established under the previous military empire of Gen. Moerdani – with fine adjustments of threat definition and target population for counter-mobilization. Although the colour of the two leaderships was very different, and each was antagonistic to the other, the institutional inertia was at work in rationalizing ham-fisted and praetorian military intervention in politics.

Such continuity was, significantly, rooted in the developmentalist ideology of the New Order military which viewed economic modernization as the indisputable national interest and the military's 'permanent' political commitment as an effective measure to ensure the preconditions to achieve that end. This ideology necessitated the invention of discursive techniques to produce 'national' threats which required ABRI to provide its 'professional service' to eliminate them. Routinization of this ideological activity was the role of Lemhannas, and both Soebijakto and Hartono – two very different figures – similarly made contributions to this organizational task. The former completed the standard material for Balatkom and also propagated the concept of fourth-generation communism, while the latter invented a theory which madethepopular democratic movement a

'legitimate' object of the *kewaspadaan* approach, by incorporating the idea of globalization – which was interpreted as the primary source of ideological deviation in society – as part of its doctrine. This theory 'freed' ABRI to identify the movement as inspired by communism, although it did not present communist ideology, because the penetration of foreign values in the era of globalization allegedly allowed the entry of the ideology in various forms. This thinking opened a space in which to argue that once the movement displayed methods resembling those of the communists, it could be identified as communist, and thus was a legitimate target for military operations to ensure political stability for economic development. In repressing the PRD, this legitimation was applied. These ideas were of course viewed in society as a tendency towards dogmatization in ABRI's response to growing democratic demands. For the military leadership under Feisal and Hartono, however, the effort could be justified as consistent with ABRI's long-running institutional activity to reproduce the legitimacy of developmentalist ideology, which had faced a serious challenge since the loss of USSR – the principal source of legitimation for Balatkom.

The loss of military cohesion and the rise of dissent

Whether or not the adapted *kewaspadaan* approach of the mid-1990s reflected ideological cohesion among the officer corps was, however, a different question. As discussed earlier, the transformation of Soeharto–ABRI relations after the fall of Moerdani produced issues which could accentuate cleavages within the military – for instance, the question of ABRI's autonomy *vis-à-vis* Soeharto, the rise of Prabowo, links to ICMI, the mobilization of Islamic issues in conducting military policies and the dogmatization of the military response to popular movements. Although the reproduction of *kewaspadaan* ideology was a corporate interest of the military as a whole, this did not mean that implementation measures went unquestioned or were always welcomed by the officer corps at large. The development of intra-military cleavages centred on these issues contributed to the rise of reform-minded officers who were concerned about the direction of the Feisal–Hartono leadership. Since any military organization respects discipline and command as a part of professionalism, it is difficult to find public statements by serving officers about internal problems – such criticism would no doubt put their careers at risk. But their voices were somehow represented by retired generals who had become increasingly critical in the public arena as they perceived the military leadership failing to eliminate the sources of unhappiness. As seen in Chapters 2 and 3, such developments during the final years of the Soeharto polity facilitated the perception that reshaping the role of the military in political life – including President–ABRI relations, Golkar–ABRI relations and, more generally, society–ABRI relations – was crucial in preventing ABRI's further loss of social trust.

In private, Brig. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah argued that 'many of us are concerned about today's political role of ABRI which is being used only to support Pak Harto (Soeharto). Who will pay the price of being unpopular

among the *rakyat* (people)? It is the next generation officers who will inherit the leadership in the near future'.[63] In intra-military communication, however, expressing internal criticism openly risked officers' careers, thus the wording was cautious. Even so, several concerns could be identified in officers' internal writings.[64]

For example, in mid-1995, Maj. Gen. Hari Sabarno, in his graduation thesis at Lemhannas, wrote that ABRI's support for Golkar should be reviewed to make ABRI more neutral in dealing with all political forces.[65] The problem of personnel management was also discussed. Syarwan's assistant, Maj. Gen. Suwarno Adiwijoyo (Assospol Kassospol), expressed concern about the growing uncertainty about tours-of-duty, especially at the top levels of the army. 'After getting a new position, a general needs at least one year to settle into the position and should not be replaced in a haphazard way at least during the 5-year cycle of one ABRI Commander'. He believed that this ideal had been distorted by non-objective ways of deciding on promotion and had contributed to the accumulation of dissatisfaction among ordinary officers. Suwarno stressed that the job criteria should be codified more clearly and personnel data should be computerized in order to avoid subjective promotions.[66] The fact that Suwarno had a strong Islamic orientation indicated that the concern did not arise from the cleavage along religious lines, but between officers who were close to the presidential palace and those who were not.[67]

Finally, the Army Seminar of 1996 should be noted. As discussed in Chapter 3, the seminar – which was held a day before the Soeharto-engineered Medan Congress of PDI of June 1996 – criticized the state apparatus in general as inconsistent in its policies, lacking discipline, corrupt, feudalistic, egoistic and nepotistic. Seskoad-linked army intellectuals also questioned the intervention of the executive branch in the problems of the political infrastructure and called on the former to reduce its dominance through open and democratic communication. In this light, the seminar stated that the recent governmental interventions in Golkar and political parties had been too overt. Agus Wirahadikusumah, who had coordinated the seminar, described these statements as 'an expression of concern among future-looking officers'.[68]

These suggestions, forwarded at the final Army Seminar under the Soeharto polity, were however soon buried in the subsequent repressive approach taken by the government and the army to eliminate the popular Megawati force from the formal political arena in line with Soeharto's political blueprint for his succession in 1998. Among those who were involved in the Seskoad seminar, such behaviour – which ignored concerns expressed in the seminar papers – was perceived as undermining ABRI's long-term corporate interests.[69] Revisionist views within the military were further strengthened during the next two years, continuing until Soeharto's last day on 21 May 1998. Disenchanted officers were motivated to be 'reformists' either by their deepening concern about the eroding credibility of the military in society, or by their power struggle with rival officers within Soeharto's patrimonial structure – or by both.[70]

World-view, domestic threat perceptions and the perceived role of ABRI in the age of globalism

It is not surprising that friction within the military, perceived distortions in Soeharto–ABRI relations and the escalating social criticism of ABRI all contributed to the erosion of ideological projects led by the Feisal–Hartono leadership. Let us examine this point and assess the diffusion of ABRI's ideological orientation in the late New Order. The *kewaspadaan* doctrine of the early 1990s consisted primarily of three components – the world-view, the domestic threat and the military's role perception – and these were linked in such a way as to construct a discursive technique for neutralizing democratic pressures. We summarize the structure of this hardline approach first, and then look at two other approaches developed within the military.

In the eyes of democratic activists who had tried to promote civil society in the country's everyday politics, the globalization concept was a weapon with which to legitimately claim the need for regime opening after the collapse of the Cold War environment and thirty years of New Order authoritarianism. However, ABRI's hardline approach found an opportunity in this concept to expand the category of 'political enemy' to include elements not covered by their traditional framework of threat assessment. As the issue of democratization had forced ABRI to take a defensive posture in political society, the reshaping of threat targets allowed the military leadership to reassert itself and tighten its social surveillance policy.

The adaptation of Balatkom language and the *kewaspadaan* ideological project were aimed at maintaining the discursive political power which formed the mainstay of ABRI's domination since the mid-1960s. We examined the way in which the Balatkom campaign developed to neutralize new political phenomena – such as democratization and human rights – by assuming that globalization encouraged the influx of dangerous ideas from abroad. In its advanced form, not only the international environment but problems in government too were utilized in order to expand the sphere of *kewaspadaan*. The widening socio-economic gap, government corruption, religious disharmony, industrial disputes and the decline of society's trust in ABRI were all emphasized as offering up the 'opportunity' for dangerous communist activities – rather than as problems in themselves. The OTB approach taken by Soeharto's hardline loyalists implied that those who raised such issues could become campaign targets, and their possible conduct of demonstrations could be interpreted as *agitprop*, now identified as the method of communism. Within this framework, proving a person's communist ideology was no longer necessary. This separation of method and ideology was necessary for the hardliners to reshape the concept of the communist threat – which was a legacy of 1965 – in the face of growing democratic pressure and a widening critical base.

This process resonated perfectly with the self-image of current military officers who believed that their political mission was oriented by professional

military concerns. As seen earlier, Hartono insisted that anticipating, preventing and – if necessary – suppressing the negative impact of foreign-value infiltration was the task of 'professional' officers.[71] It was against this background that ABRI's search for '*pihak tertentu*' (certain parties) could provide the operational guidance for territorial commands to mobilize the entire technology of their profession to combat the invisible threat. Brig. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin argued that:

> ABRI's commitment to the defence of national unity based on Pancasila and the Constitution is to be actualised through the preventive strategy (*strategi penangkal*) which employs the methods of early detection and deterrence. They are to encompass all individuals in this country as our informants. [I]n terms of norms and policy, such a system is well established, though it is not yet perfect at the operational level.[72]

The established norm of *strategi penangkal* had allowed the territorial apparatus to conduct intelligence operations which targeted students and activists as 'informants' to identify invisible or latent subversives.[73] The strategy exemplified how professional officers transferred their military techniques and knowledge to the conduct of political missions, although it was accompanied by the risk of public criticism when imperfect operations led to illegal activities, such as abduction and disappearance of citizens.[74]

Furthermore, in legitimizing the search for Balatkom and invisible subversives, a reformulation of ABRI's world-view was decisive. The ideology of *kewaspadaan* now targeted global change in its perceptual scope and identified this as a source of domestic instability after the fall of the Communist Second World. This broad paradigm, however, provided only a very vague definition of how the foreign penetration would take root domestically and who would be the principal sponsors. The space for arbitrary interpretation existed here, providing a licence for the hardliners to label their own political enemies as national security threats. The ideological fortification of *kewaspadaan*, via this approach, reflected the desire to control the pace and degree of political change. Moreover, the military's frequent call for Islamic solidarity could be the tactical measure to blur the conflict between regime preservation and social demands for democratic opening. The human-rights activist, Marzuki Darusman, recognized that 'the *bahaya* (hazard) campaign is an attempt to slow down the speed of *keterbukaan*, and it is not really *bahaya* for the right, left and others, but *bahaya* for the change itself. They [ABRI and government] cannot say that they do not want the change, thus they use the *bahaya* language to protect themselves from the change'.[75] It is in this context that we may conclude that these political orientations constituted the core aspect of *kewaspadaan* doctrine as applied by military extremists during the late Soeharto era.

Among ABRI circles, however, less dogmatic approaches to the link between global change and domestic threat were also developed, with resulting differences in the perceived role of ABRI. There is a set of views which emphasizes

the emergence of political threats resulting from globalization and insists on the need for ABRI to expand its scope of political control. However, Balatkom connotations were not built into this discourse. Maj. Gen. Budi Harsono, for example, explained that:

> [T]he gap between the OKB (*orang kaya baru*: the new rich) and the OMB (*orang miskin baru*: the new poor) in big cities is becoming serious. The OMB are far poorer than the people in the village … and globalization encourages this phenomenon. ABRI needs to carefully watch out for this tendency and promote professionalism in order to overcome such an impact of globalization.[76]

Another intellectual officer, Col. Syarifudin Tippe, also saw the new challenge in the global and domestic political arena, and described ABRI's increasing role as a democratizer. He wrote:

> Globalization … facilitates the linkage between democratization in foreign countries and the demands for political openness (*keterbukaan*) in our society. One obvious dimension [of this phenomenon] is the increase in accusations against the military's dominant role. This happens everywhere in the world, including Indonesia. Coupled with the wave of democratization, demands for improving human rights and civil rights in politics have become stronger. All these demands ask ABRI to share power with other [non-ABRI] parties … and to play the *demokratisator* (democratiser) role.[77]

Absorbing social demands rather than rejecting them, and transforming ABRI into a democratizing force, are Tippe's answer to the question of the political impact of globalization. But democracy here, in common ABRI language, is a democracy based on Pancasila – the state ideology of anti-liberalism. ABRI's alleged responsibility as the promoter of democracy, therefore, does not necessarily reduce its role in politics. It is in this context that the ideas presented by Budi Harsono and Syarifudin Tippe can be assessed as having the same orientation, that is, the perception that ABRI should play a more active role in facing the problems of globalization. Their emphasis was slightly different from the hardline approach which employed the distorted world-view to assert the resurgence of the old threat – communism – in order to rationalize the military repression of popular movements. This second type of approach, which does not use dogmatism but still conforms with ABRI's traditional paternalistic self-image, can be categorized as the moderate school of thought.[78]

Among ABRI circles, however, there was also another set of views which basically attached weight to the declining social space in which ABRI could carry out its political role. The view that the nature of the threat was changing in a way which reduced the role of the military is presented, for example, by Maj. Gen. (ret.) Maulani who argues as follows:

> In the past, until the 1980s, the threat was dominated by ideological conflicts, physical insurgencies, and political party conflicts…. Reflecting these, ABRI's management of stability was oriented by political and military approaches. However, the current threat is coloured by the economic gap between the rich and poor and social injustice as represented by land disputes. It is globalization which has brought these issues to the surface. In order to respond to these threats to stability, ABRI's previous politico-military approaches are useless. What is required is the improvement of distributive economic policy and a strong judicial system to implement consistent and impartial decisions, which result in a reduced role for ABRI and broader participation of social sectors.[79]

A similar view was provided by Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo, who emphasized the multidimensional impact of globalization and insisted on the need for a rational division of labour, arguing that:

> [T]he current wave of globalization pushes social values in one [universal] direction … and Indonesia is not an exception. This invites the question of the military's place in a modern society…. ABRI should not believe that it can solve all problems. That would be counter-productive. Rather, non-ABRI sectors should be empowered and, in this process, the political centre will move to the Interior Ministry [from ABRI], while security matters, especially in the big cities like Jakarta, should be handled by the Police. Thus, ABRI has to change its way of thinking … but the problem now is: who wants to lose the power? Still there are many conservatives within ABRI.[80]

These two ideas link the nature of the threat and the role of ABRI with societal change. Their emphases differ, as Maulani sees the main threat shifting from politics to economics, while Widjojo insists on the convergence of global values. They do however similarly minimize the need to defend the country from globalization and also recognize the necessity of decreasing the role of the army in facing global–domestic pressures for change. In the triple interaction between world-view, domestic threat and ABRI's role perception, these ideas seem to constitute a progressive approach which emerged during the late New Order period.

The growing diffusion of ideological orientation among officers was, in this way, reflected in their different perceptions about ABRI's future prospects. The first approach – the hardliner doctrine – was, to a large extent, the product of Soeharto's political interests, involving the transformation of military leadership from the Moerdani–Try line to the more amenable Feisal–Hartono line in order to secure Soeharto's political succession in 1998. As discussed above, the two leaderships were mutually antagonistic, but in the formulation of counter-democracy discourse under Feisal's ABRI, which aimed at supporting Soeharto's political goals, the established framework of *kewaspadaan* theory during the Moerdani period contributed greatly, although its mode of application was not the same.

Unfortunately, this ideological orientation during the Feisal period had been eroded within the officer corps, as its policy projection was accompanied by the dual risk of damaging social trust in ABRI and demoralizing the organizational life of the military – notably by nepotistic and politicized personnel transfers. Many officers were frustrated by this development and they were naturally motivated to challenge the approaches taken by Soeharto loyalists. Thus, there was a political incentive at work in the emergence of reformist views which appealed for a more accommodative response to the growing democratic demands.

6 Contesting 'inner' thoughts in civil–military discourse

Does discourse matter?

Indonesia's civil–military relations during the late Soeharto period represented a struggle between those promoting and those resisting political change aimed at wider public participation in a political arena less dominated by the military. Growing social demands to democratize the New Order regime and reduce ABRI's *dwifungsi* role emerged during the last decade of the Soeharto era. We have thus examined ABRI's various responses to such democratic pressures and discussed both accommodative and repressive approaches taken by the military under the initiatives of different groups of officers. To clarify these developments in the late New Order polity, we have examined different fields of civil–military interaction. Next we turn to the dimension of civil–military discourse.

Why does the discourse matter? The military's political activism and resistance to social pressures can be viewed as nothing but power politics. Therefore, one may argue that the most significant concern is whether the military actually reduces its power or not, whether it stops political repression or not, rather than highlighting the debate between military and civilian elites. The fact that ABRI did not withdraw from politics during the Soeharto regime diverted scholarly attention from significant developments in the field of civil–military communication during the late New Order era. However, this communication constituted one of ABRI's important political activities and thus cannot be overlooked. It was in this arena that military officers conveyed their perception about the enduring validity of ABRI's involvement in politics and their concerns about the current situation regarding ABRI's political role. Ignoring this aspect of civil–military interaction precludes an understanding of New Order military elites who vacillated in their responses to democratic challenges. This analysis of civil–military discourse therefore helps explain military thinking about democratic change and related events and policies. Post-Soeharto developments can be better understood by clarifying the legacies of ABRI's 'inner' thoughts regarding a changed role of the military preceding the fall of Soeharto.

Based on this assessment, this chapter examines the structure and patterns of *dwifungsi* discourse during the late Soeharto regime. How have the critics developed counter-discourses in order to undermine military thinking? How has ABRI developed theories to counter these? In what ways was the *dwifungsi* dialectic structured

and what was not debated? From these perspectives, this chapter deals with the thematic analysis of *dwifungsi* discourse involving both critics and ABRI. Our attempt is to analyse the contextual characteristics of this political communication, which should be clarified not only in order to demonstrate the eroding military hegemony in national political dialogue, but also to understand the inherent gaps in political perception between the military and democratic advocates in promoting regime transition after the fall of Soeharto.

We first examine several counter-discursive approaches developed by 'insider' critics in order to delegitimize the permanency of *dwifungsi*. We then look at ABRI's response to, and its efforts to develop standard theories to counter, the critical discourse. Third is an investigation of two particular topics in the discourse – ABRI's appointed seats in the parliament and its backing of Golkar; the areas are important in that they represented the most established patterns of ABRI's involvement in the formal political process (i.e. the legislative process). We will see the increasing diversification of opinions within the military on these issues and discuss how ABRI's modes of involvement reflected its organizational vulnerability to the changing society. Finally, we will focus on *dwifungsi*'s first function, i.e. defence, which was not embraced in the discursive scope, examining the problems arising from this. The difficulties encountered provide significant insight into post-Soeharto military reforms, examined in Chapter 7.

Delegitimization

In the early stages of *keterbukaan*, ABRI Commander Gen. Try Sutrisno explained his understanding of the concept.

> Recent development of *keterbukaan* may boost demands for further openness but it is natural given the rising educational level in society. Demanding more openness is an indication of our successful political development…. [B]ut it does not mean that we can express anything we want. For example, pornography and national secrets cannot be published freely since they are prohibited by laws.[1]

The reform-minded police officer, Brig. Gen. Roekmini, recalling her activities as a *keterbukaan* promoter in the DPR, discussed the topic at a private seminar in 1993:

> Why did I and my friends in F-ABRI promote the *keterbukaan*? … At that time, an open debate was hardly accepted in the DPR. You may not believe it but there was an atmosphere which did not allow politicians to raise tough questions with Cabinet members. This had to be broken to promote dialogue in the DPR, and we tried to do so by disseminating the idea of *keterbukaan*.[2]

As discussed in Chapter 2, the *keterbukaan* movement opened the door to the legitimate expression within the public sphere of problems with *dwifungsi*,

although for campaign promoters such as Roekmini the movement was originally intended to activate the function of the DPR. Indeed, the Roekmini speech quoted above invited comment from the seminar coordinator, Shobirin Nadj, who insisted that

> if ABRI truly wishes to promote democracy, it has to accept the natural result, that is the reduction of the military's political role. For the last 25 years, the people have talked in many ways but the conclusion is always the problem of military domination. Why could we not widen political participation? The thing is whether or not ABRI is ready to reduce its role.[3]

Try Sutrisno's attempt to adopt a tolerant posture towards the growing demand for more open politics was, in this way, finally interpreted by critics as an opportunity to legitimately castigate ABRI – now such criticism could not be categorized as exposing a 'national secret'.

The New Order's experiment of *keterbukaan* generated a debate on the need to reduce ABRI's political presence, but approaches differed as to how this could be done. Students and activists conducted street demonstrations against ABRI's security approach and *dwifungsi* excesses, while outspoken intellectuals (both civilian and retired officers) criticized ABRI's conduct. Active officers usually expressed their concerns either by endorsing the moderate criticism emerging in society or by insisting on the need for adjustment in the new sociopolitical circumstance. As seen previously, ABRI's human rights abuses, repression of student–labour demonstrations, support for Golkar and personnel changes all provided opportunities to air critical opinions about ABRI's *dwifungsi* orientation. Slogans such as 'ABRI should go back to the spirit of the Constitution and Sapta Marga'; 'ABRI should stand above all groups'; or '*dwifungsi* should utilize persuasive rather than repressive-security approaches' became almost ritualistic in public protests.

ABRI was also confronted by less-publicized 'everyday modes of criticism' after the *keterbukaan* movement had begun.[4] This criticism was posed by people regarded by ABRI as sympathisers (or insiders), people who constantly exchanged ideas with others in military circles. One of the features of this communication is that – regardless of events – it emphasized the declining legitimacy of *dwifungsi* in the changing sociopolitical structure. Unlike the response to event-oriented criticism, ABRI officers expressed more varied opinions in this context, probably because they felt relieved of the immediate task of presenting a unified answer. For the study of political communication under an authoritarian regime in which open critical debate is usually restricted, finding topics which invite divergent opinions from military circles is crucial for assessing the changing pattern of regime discourse/counter-discourse. In the case of the late New Order military, the legitimacy question is the topic under discussion here.

The counter-discourse conducted by sympathetic 'insider' critics of *dwifungsi* legitimacy can be divided into three broad types. The first is the most modest

approach, and does not criticize *dwifungsi* directly but merely emphasizes the way in which social change throws up challenges that tend to undermine the legitimacy of current *dwifungsi* conduct. The second approach goes further by challenging the actual conduct of *dwifungsi* and the justifications used for ABRI's political role. Finally, the third approach is one which does not explicitly oppose *dwifungsi* but acts as a 'messenger' by conveying negative public perceptions of the concept. These three approaches often overlap, but all aim to support the counter-discourse on *dwifungsi* legitimacy. Each approach had its own strengths, which need to be delineated in order to illustrate the entire structure of *dwifungsi* discourse during the late New Order.

Implicit criticism

The first approach highlights the implications of social change without explicitly questioning *dwifungsi*. For example, in 1993 Lemhannas published in one of its house journals a lengthy article written by a retired colonel, Saafroedin Bahar. His key concept was the rising middle class. The article argues that the role of the middle class has become more and more important. Even though they accept military involvement in politics as a matter of fact, they are getting sick of ABRI's heavy-handed repression of human rights and democratization.[5] He argues that although *dwifungsi* is legally protected, middle-class people now strongly question its legitimacy because they are alienated by younger-generation officers who also come from middle-class backgrounds but who enjoy special political privileges derived from *dwifungsi*. By discussing the long-term social change that has produced the middle class and the new-generation ABRI, Saafroedin provides a strong argument to counter ABRI's standard claim that minor adjustments to 'implementation' provide a way of maintaining *dwifungsi* legitimacy. Whatever the implementation, Saafroedin's logic insists that the rise of the middle class and a new generation in ABRI officers undermines the legitimacy of *dwifungsi*. The major weakness of this argument, however, is its difficulty in identifying the political orientations of the middle class whose commitment to political reform is not necessarily strong.[6]

Another example is an article by Professor Juwono Sudarsono, who emphasized the changing nature of national problems which inevitably reduced the space in which ABRI could play its habitual role. In an Army Headquarters' periodical of 1994, prior to his appointment as Lemhannas' vice-governor, he made the following points. His approach was to 'criticize by praising' ABRI, arguing that '25 years of ABRI's political role in the New Order have helped national development but the success now raises many questions about its role in the future'. He insisted that, 'because of national development and rapid population increase, social problems are now mainly concerned with land and labour issues, as seen in the fact that these issues dominate more than 70 percent of problems brought to the parliaments during 1984–1994'. Juwono stressed that these problems could not be solved by *dwifungsi*. It was, therefore, ironic to see

that ABRI's success would require it to reduce its involvement in sociopolitical areas.[7] Juwono also asserted that *dwifungsi* was doomed to lose its legitimacy as the managerial ability of civilians was acknowledged.[8]

As seen in the approaches adopted by Saafroedin and Juwono, the everyday mode of *dwifungsi* criticism constituted one stratum of late New Order discourse on *dwifungsi*, with its focus on the changing environment and challenge to ABRI's claim of 'permanent' legitimacy for *dwifungsi*.

Explicit challenges

A second approach posed a direct challenge to ABRI's *dwifungsi* legitimacy, albeit from a sympathetic position. This critical dialectic – which was also presented regardless of 'events' – can be found in the argument used by Lt. Gen. (ret.) Hasnan Habib in his paper, 'The Role and Position of ABRI in the National Political Format', a private seminar held at Surabaya in November 1996 and attended by some powerful serving officers, including the Army Chief Gen. Hartono and his security assistant, Maj. Gen. Zacky Anwar Makarim.[9] Hasnan first attacked ABRI's customary arguments which emphasized the need for *kewaspadaan* (vigilance) in facing globalization and the influx of Western liberal democracy. He asserted that there was no country able to isolate itself from globalization. And because Indonesia participated in global economic competition, its political system also had to be in harmony with the global wave of democratization. Since many developing countries already had joined this wave, it was wrong to define liberal democracy as Western democracy. Hasnan also rejected ABRI's paternalistic claim to lead the pace and degree of democratization, stressing that 'since the international system has become more and more interdependent, ABRI's role in the process of democratization is no longer self-determined, because international actors significantly influence this process'.[10]

Hasnan asserted that democracy required the abandonment of the dominant influence of the military, and that ABRI – as a non-democratic institution operating under command-and-order rather than consensus – could hardly play a political role in the democratic environment.[11] Given this assessment, he warned that 'the world trend has shifted to respect for free trade, democracy and human rights'. Thus, 'if Indonesia wants to reject these three tendencies, its [international] reputation will change from being an "influential player" in Southeast Asia to being the "biggest patient" in the region'. ABRI's standard interpretation of democratization, which placed Indonesia in the spectrum of cultural particularism, was thus rejected outright by Hasnan. The officer then shifted his focus to *dwifungsi* itself.

First, in an attempt to 'decommodify' ABRI's interpretation of its 'glorious' role during the independence war, which was used as a historical basis for legitimizing the perpetuation of *dwifungsi*, Hasnan claimed that *dwifungsi* was not a 'right' given by history. Rather, it was merely a historical 'fact' that ABRI had fought for independence, and it could not assert such a commitment as its own monopoly.[12] Second, given the global change mentioned above, Hasnan insisted

that it was time for ABRI to concentrate its role on its defence function, leaving social security and order to the police and the civilian government apparatus (i.e. the Interior Department). This suggestion meant the virtual end of *dwifungsi*. In doing so, laws should be formulated to 'normalize' the functional boundary between the military and the police, and to abolish Bakorstanas, which he labelled an extra-constitutional institution.[13] He believed these normalization processes would lead eventually to the appointment of a civilian defence minister.

Hasnan's arguments were not far from those of civilian democratic activists who also called for democratization and criticized *dwifungsi* both in principle and in its implementation. As seen in Chapter 5, such civilian activists, however, were easily labelled as 'Westernized' or 'anti-Pancasila' by military hardliners who suddenly cut previous channels of communication with them. As typically seen in the case of the argument above, the attempts of some retired officers to produce counter-discourses on *dwifungsi* legitimation must be seen as significant examples of the 'everyday' mode of criticism. As respected retired officers, they could explicitly focus on ABRI's declining legitimacy without giving ABRI an excuse to condemn their argument as non-Indonesian or subversive. It is in this context that criticisms made by Hasnan, Rudini and Maulani – to name but a few – seem to have had an impact in dehegemonizing the ideological projects of *dwifungsi*.

Gen. (ret.) A.H. Nasution performed the same function in dehegemonizing *dwifungsi* discourse. ABRI's ideological claim that *dwifungsi* is a historical 'right' was undermined when the former army leader and *dwifungsi* concept-maker presented an opposite argument.

> As KSAD, I made the so-called *Jalan Tengah* (Middle-Way) speech in 1958 in order to declare the political position of the military and it later became the basis of the *dwifungsi* concept. However, today's *dwifungsi* is not what we [army leaders of the time] intended to create. Under the New Order, extra-constitutional institutions – such as Kopkamtib and later Bakorstanas – have played the most influential role in politics, thus society believes this is the form of *dwifungsi*. This is not the *dwifungsi* I tried to develop before.[14]

In the structure of New Order civil–military discourse, ABRI's manipulation of historical interpretation for the maintenance of *dwifungsi* legitimacy seemed to face a fundamental obstacle as long as Nasution was considered a primary source of army history. To the extent that he was regarded by ABRI as the father of *dwifungsi*, this not only confirmed a 'historical fact' but could also be used by critics to delegitimize ABRI's hegemonic interpretation of *dwifungsi*.

'Messenger' approach

The third approach attempted to bring out criticisms emerging in society and then ensure these were heard by ABRI. By adopting – whether explicitly or not –

the role of 'messenger' or 'carrier' of wider opinions in society, the critical civilian might avoid being labelled as Western-contaminated at best or anti-Pancasila at worst. As an example of this approach, LIPI's *dwifungsi* study should be examined here. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this was the result of LIPI's research project in the year 1996–1997, which had been commissioned by Soeharto in February 1995. The research was almost complete by the end of 1996, and following the seminar which disclosed its main conclusions to the public, LIPI produced a final report in March 1997.[15] LIPI's research had two special aspects which made its report unique in comparison to preceding studies. First was the fact that it had been commissioned by Soeharto, the Supreme Commander of ABRI; second was that its research method was based on a wide range of interviews with national and local political leaders. It was the first time in New Order civil–military relations that civilians were given such wide official space to present civilian views on *dwifungsi*. As the 'messenger', LIPI emphasized its objectivity, neutrality and empiricism. This 'apolitical' gesture was effective in limiting ABRI's dogmatic reaction to its critical conclusions. ABRI officers could disagree with them but it was difficult to openly accuse the research of being 'anti-nationalist'. The following is the main argument of the LIPI report.

Indria Samego, the project coordinator, claimed that ABRI frequently explained the misconduct of its sociopolitical role as the responsibility of a few individual soldiers (*oknum*). This had become ABRI's way of avoiding further criticism. He argued that, if there are many such individuals who deviate from the rule, ABRI leaders should share society's view that ABRI's entire sociopolitical role should be critically examined.[16] As an example of a common viewpoint, Indria suggested that 'although ABRI keeps saying that it has never "played with fire" [provoking social riots], it is hard for society to believe this because of its long-standing political intervention. In fact, many people believe that ABRI has contributed to the outbreak of riots in Ujung Pandang, the 27 July Affair, Situbondo, Tasikmalaya and Sanggau Ledo'.[17] For Indria, ABRI's role as a 'fire brigade' was hardly unrelated to its structural involvement in politics, and he believed that it had impacted negatively on ABRI itself; for instance, by institutionalizing repressive behaviour, curtailing military professionalism, weakening military discipline, and forcing an alliance between ABRI and particular social groups.[18]

Distortions of *dwifungsi* were further suggested in the LIPI report, as if evident in all fields of military engagement. The report criticized ABRI's ideological projects which identified those with different opinions to ABRI/government as subversive and communist.[19] In the political field, the report stressed that ABRI's intervention had deepened social disharmony. This was seen in the case of the Medan Congress held by the Soerjadi–PDI, which – as admitted by the PDI staff – had the full backing of ABRI for finance and support mobilization. In the economic field, ABRI was portrayed as far from solving labour–land disputes, because it had always backed crony business, thus spreading ABRI's social image as a 'public enemy' (*musuh rakyat*). Furthermore, the report presented opinions of interviewees who criticized the poor financial condition of state enterprises led by ABRI and concluded that ABRI's economic intervention was one reason why

Indonesia was not ready to welcome the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA).[20] From the perspective of ASEAN's regional security balance, it was also suggested that ABRI, like it or not, should be forced to stop focusing on the internal security problem in order to build up conventional defence capacity corresponding to the level of neighbouring countries, and which requires a review of the current ascendancy of army *vis-à-vis* other services.[21]

All these arguments were said to reflect the voices of civilian political figures at national and local levels with whom the project team had conducted interviews. To emphasize the nature of the report as a policy paper, some recommendations were made to the President. Among other things, LIPI suggested that ABRI's political role should be limited to participation in the legislative branch, preferably only in the MPR, in order to enhance ABRI's political disengagement, and that this process should be completed by the general election of 2007. This, the authors claimed, was no more than the realization of ABRI's slogan declared at the 1995 ABRI Anniversary: 'what is good for the people is the best for ABRI'.[22] As seen in Chapter 2, this recommendation was widely questioned by ABRI officers. Most claimed that it was unrealistic and lacked a historical perspective. Such defensive reactions illustrated that the messenger approach could have a direct role in bringing public voices into the discourse arena without inviting ABRI's dogmatic response, which was apparent whenever public protests raised the same criticism.

The three approaches outlined above had their own strengths in the conveying the elite counter-discourse on *dwifungsi*. In the eyes of political activists situated outside the regime, these approaches adopted by elite insiders were not enough to dismantle the *dwifungsi* system. However, the utility of insider criticism, as seen above, was to open communication channels with ABRI and develop a mutual discourse under the authoritarian polity. This function should not be ignored in assessing the development of *dwifungsi* thinking within the military. It was only in this elite discursive space that the military officers endeavoured to defend *dwifungsi* legitimation. For the study of a military's political thinking, investigation should target this area. In our study of ABRI under the late New Order, insider criticism of *dwifungsi* was mainly via the three approaches examined above. Let us now examine the responses of ABRI officers to the critical discourse on *dwifungsi*.

Responses to counter-discourses

ABRI's discursive responses seemed to comprise three elements – labelling critics and criticism, perceiving problems and developing standard theories to defend *dwifungsi* legitimacy.

Classifying critics / criticism

At the highest level, ABRI responded to criticism by first classifying and labelling critics and criticism in order to provide a conceptual lens for ABRI officers to

interpret and rebut such criticism. At the beginning of the *keterbukaan* period in 1989, the Pangab, Gen. Try Sutrisno, summarized three major lines of criticism directed at ABRI's *dwifungsi*.

> In formal procedures, ABRI's role as a sociopolitical force no longer has a problem. But we should not close our eyes to the fact that in society there are still certain people who do not accept such a role of ABRI…, and they can be classified into three groups. The first group thinks that *dwifungsi* is only linked to the 1945 Generation, so it should decline when the generation changes. The second group believes that *dwifungsi* is ABRI's domination of civilian posts, asserting that since civilians have become capable [of state management], these posts should be passed onto them. The third group claims that ABRI is willing to adopt militarism.[23]

Later, in 1993, Try identified three sources of civilian response, two of which were critical while the third was supportive. The first group was made up of those who were influenced by liberal democratic ideas, and were mostly associated with the university campuses. They believed that the professional military should limit its role to the defence field. The second group accepted *dwifungsi* but hoped that *kekaryaan* would not close civilian career paths. The third group consisted of those who welcomed *dwifungsi* as an effort to establish the family state (*negara kekeluargaan*).[24]

Try's statements hardly acknowledged that *dwifungsi* legitimacy was facing a serious challenge and he apparently saw no need for ABRI to adjust its position. Critics were simply categorized as one of two groups. One group was identified as 'liberal' and thus automatically labelled 'Western' and unacceptable. The other group was accused of confusing *dwifungsi* and *kekaryaan* and therefore drawing inaccurate conclusions. For ABRI officers, these classifications were one way to respond to the counter-discourse on *dwifungsi* and were commonly used by officers to claim that critics were wrong and their criticisms based on misunderstanding.

Perceiving problems

Within ABRI, however, some officers acknowledged that they were facing a problem in response to the *dwifungsi* counter-discourse. Maj. Gen. Abdul Rivai, for example, acknowledged in the Kostrad journal that *dwifungsi* gave rise to a structural dilemma. He pointed out that *dwifungsi*'s first function – i.e. defence – was part of the state's security policy, but in performing its second function, ABRI was expected, like other sociopolitical organizations, to supervise government policy. He thought that if ABRI was preoccupied with performing its function as a part of government apparatus, this would risk *dwifungsi*'s second function, while at the same time its first function would not be implemented properly if ABRI was too busy performing the second function.[25] Describing ABRI's position as 'dilemmatic' implies that he perceived the current position

as not holding a desirable balance between the first and second functions. Rivai understood also that ABRI's second function was to supervise government policy itself. As discussed previously, there was a growing concern within the officer corps about ABRI's loss of independence *vis-à-vis* Soeharto during that time. It is therefore plausible to see that Rivai's concern was directed at *dwifungsi*'s perceived inability to perform its second function properly due to its preoccupation with the first function, a role it fulfilled as a tool of the government.

We can see a similar theme in the writing of Maj. Gen. Hari Sabarno. He suggested that ABRI's current role as *pejuang* (warrior) and *prajurit* (soldier) contained clear contradictions and dilemmas, especially in a situation where governmental policies did not meet the aspirations of the people.[26] If ABRI behaved as a government tool, it would harm its spirit as *pejuang*, but if officers merely followed the demands of the public, this would risk a deterioration of ABRI's internal discipline.[27] Hari believed this dilemma to be increasingly serious in the face of growing democratic demands, and urged that ABRI should re-evaluate the following questions to overcome this challenge. Was ABRI ready to give support to the emerging new groups in society which would result in the reduction of ABRI's role? Could ABRI really become a dynamizer in the process of democratization, or did it want to persist in its role as stabilizer even though other social forces were willing to play the dynamizing role? Wasn't it true that the new-generation officers trained in internal security management tended to have a negative view of social change? And weren't they overreacting in response to emerging social movements?[28]

The arguments of Rivai and Hari Sabarno indicate one direction of ABRI's internal discussion in the face of growing social demands for political openness. This expression of the dilemma was obviously not for public consumption but it implied that the current situation was not regarded satisfactory by some officers. The dilemma described above led to concern about either: (1) ABRI's excessive responsiveness to social demands, which would incapacitate its functional role in the state apparatus; or (2) its identification with state activity *vis-à-vis* society, which would undermine not only ABRI's corporate identity as the people's army but also its everyday *dwifungsi* rationale. Judging from Rivai's reference to the need for supervising the government and Hari's questions, which were those commonly asked by civilians, the two generals' concerns were focused on the latter issue, i.e. ABRI's dissociation from society. In other words, in response to the critical discourse on *dwifungsi*, some serving ABRI leaders admitted the existence of a gap between ABRI's declared role as a promoter of social interests and its practical role as a tool of the government. This perception did not necessarily propel these officers into action, for example by resisting Soeharto's political blueprint, since – as in any social organization – such a dynamic depends on other calculations in real politics. Rather, what is demonstrated in the above cases is one of the ways in which ABRI officers, who perceived the declining legitimacy of *dwifungsi*, expressed their concerns through the medium of intra-military communications. Their assessment of the dilemma, however,

did not seem to meet the criticisms launched by non-ABRI critics who saw the problem as lying in ABRI's excessive use of force and arbitrary ideological operations, which could not be explained by the mere fact that the military was a tool of the government – a common excuse.

Reformulating theories

Another way of responding to the *dwifungsi* counter-discourse was the reinvention of the logic used to defend the relevance of *dwifungsi*. Two theories were commonly employed to this end. One was 'culturalism', and the other 'developmentalism'.

Within culturalism, it is interesting to note that a booklet written by Brig. Gen. (ret.) A.S.S. Tambunan, a prominent *dwifungsi* theorist, was published in 1995 as an attempt to re-emphasize the legitimate foundations of *dwifungsi*.[29] Tambunan's work was comprehensive in the sense that several resources were mobilized to insist on the durability of *dwifungsi*. However, regarding democratization, his approach emphasized culture. He claimed that democracy takes various forms in the world and the Indonesian way includes the *dwifungsi* system. He therefore stresses the irrelevance of the civil–military dichotomy in promoting democracy in Indonesia and argues that Indonesian society recognizes no functional boundary between military and civilian tasks. Thus ABRI should participate in any social activity in accordance with social needs. This interpretation is a response to the criticism which attempts to limit ABRI's non-military activity to the MPR and reduce ABRI's *kekaryaan* practice. The rationale for this, according to Tambunan, is the culture of familism (*kekeluargaan*) rooted in Indonesian society which respects mutual assistance and organic solidarity among all social components. This conception of society is asserted by Tambunan as a prime reason for rejecting the distinction between civilian and military affairs, with the resulting justification of ABRI's perpetual involvement in non-military sectors.[30]

Significantly, this idea of civil–military fusion also helped ABRI to reject *dwifungsi* criticism based on the social-change approach which emphasized the emergence of post-revolutionary generation officers and the rise in civilian competence. It was in this context that we see ABRI's increasingly strong rejection of civil–military dichotomy in the debate on *dwifungsi* legitimacy, which was coloured by the growing demand for 'civilian empowerment'. This argument was not intended to replace ABRI's traditional emphasis of historical, stabilizing and legal justifications. Rather, it reflected the relative shift of emphasis in defending *dwifungsi* against the counter-discourse.[31]

For example, a prominent ABRI thinker, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Abdulkadir Besar, declined to assess Law No. 20/1982 as a valid source of *dwifungsi* legitimacy because he considered it to be only a confirmation of *dwifungsi* and not its source. For him, Nugroho's argument in 1984 was also less relevant in today's society because it was strongly inclined towards a historical explanation. In facing the demand for democratization which is driven by globalization, Abdulkadir regards historical emphasis as backward thinking. For him, it is the cultural legitimacy of

kekeluargaan which is the fundamental basis of *dwifungsi*.[32] Indeed, as an ultimate rejection of the strict civil–military boundary applied in many Western countries, one officer insisted that it was even a mistake to translate ABRI as the Armed Forces or the military in English.[33]

ABRI's cultural approach was essentially static and used against any criticism which insisted on the need for ABRI – which composed only 0.25 percent of the total population – to hand over its political power to civilians under stable political conditions. As a built-in New Order regime discourse, *dwifungsi* has long been explained using the four-step logical flow based on culturalism:

1 democracy has variations;
2 Indonesia is based on *kekeluargaan*;
3 democracy based on *kekeluargaan* asks all social members to participate in every field of national life with the result that the civil–military dichotomy is invalid;
4 thus *dwifungsi* has eternal legitimacy.

Tambunan's argument seems to be the simple reproduction of this logic.

However, this justification did not address the argument which stressed declining *dwifungsi* legitimacy as a result of ABRI's constant repressive behaviour against political movements. Because of this limitation, although seeking a cultural source had seemingly become the central approach in ABRI's *dwifungsi* discourse, there were other attempts to develop a more convincing explanation which could respond to the multidimensional criticism during the late New Order period. The utility of a cultural approach was felt to be questionable in this situation. A reform-minded officer in ABRI Headquarters, for example, argued:

> There is a trick in the explanation that *dwifungsi* is a reflection of *kekeluargaan* because if it is true, we should have consultation and consensus [regarding *dwifungsi* policies]. The reality, however, is the rule of the king who thinks his legitimacy comes from his own cosmos rather than from consensus made with his followers.[34]

For these officers who believed that ABRI's institutional interests had been distorted by Soeharto's private interests, the cultural approach was obviously not sufficient to respond in a practical way to the massive pressure posed by critics. One of the popular alternatives among younger generation officers was the approach emphasizing different levels of development, rather than static, cultural and legal foundations.

As a counter to democratization without *dwifungsi*, an Air Force intellectual, Vice-Marshal Graito Usodo, provided the following theory:

> Indonesia consists of four different social layers. They are stone-age, agrarian, industrial and information societies…. Inevitably ABRI's stance towards society has to be adjusted depending on the layer. For example,

> ABRI knows globalization is good for the information society but distractive for the stone-age society in Irian Jaya. Under these circumstances, political change has to be managed by those who can represent the interests of all layers, and it is ABRI…. *Dwifungsi* maintains its legitimacy as ABRI fulfils this coordinating role.[35]

Similarly, Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo, political adviser to the ABRI Commander, argued that:

> *Memberdayakan sipil* (empowering civilians) is the adopted posture of ABRI in the era of democratization, but whether it reduces ABRI's role or not may depend on the quality of people's life. We still have huge gaps between eastern and western parts of the archipelago, and between cities and rural areas. In facing these horizontal and vertical gaps, I think *dwifungsi* should be *tut wuri handayani* in places where the development is satisfactory, such as Jakarta, but other approaches should be used where the development is insufficient.[36]

Contrary to the cultural approach, which emphasized the inadequacy of democratic concepts as applied by many critics and sought perpetuation of *dwifungsi* legitimacy in the regime ideology of *kekeluargaan*, the 'level-of-development' theory envisaged political ramifications of economic change. It also tried to formulate an alternative justification for military engagement in the civilian sector in the coming decades of rapid social mobility. Regarding previous forms of *dwifungsi* legitimation, Widjojo further explained, as follows:

> How should ABRI develop the legitimacy of its sociopolitical role? A historical explanation is weak and cannot be insisted on in the future, the same as the constitutional justification which can be amended in the future. Culture? It also changes. In like manner, the legal basis is not strong since it may be revised. Now we need to develop a social legitimacy which totally relies on the needs of society.[37]

In contrast to the 'culturalists' who seemed to be less concerned with the developing counter-discourse and more inclined to interpret criticism as a misunderstanding or 'false consciousness' of critics, the flexible 'level-of-development' theory was more communicative and less deterministic in its response to criticism. It was largely a product of certain ABRI intellectuals who at least believed in rational discussion with critics in order to halt the growing scepticism about the future utility of *dwifungsi*. As information–communication technology had developed dramatically and the media network expanded in time and space around the world, there were natural concerns among military officers about ABRI's need to promote dialogue with society in order to avoid being considered a living dinosaur in the eyes of domestic and international communities.

However, this is not to argue that the pragmatic proponents of the flexible approach were ready to accept critical discourse aimed at challenging the legitimacy of *dwifungsi*. An intellectual Brigadier General who supported the level-of-development approach stressed that 'figures like Sri Bintang Pamunkas, Amien Rais and George Aditjondro are all popular, smart and have ideals. To defend *dwifungsi*'s legitimacy from their arguments, we need to develop our communication skills in domestic and international societies to let people know that their ideals are too premature to be adopted in today's society'.[38] The level-of-development approach, which attempted to 'rationally' counter the criticism linked with demands for democracy, discounted the static cultural approach, but also tended to distrust civilian institutions which ABRI thought *a priori* were not capable of representing the diverse interests of the whole society. This perception was evident in the fact that ABRI's intellectual circles, who stressed the need for *dwifungsi* reforms, simultaneously emphasized the inadequacy of civilian institutions. Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo, for example, sometimes questioned the loyalty of civilians to the nation, whereas Brig. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah believed that the frequent intellectual arrogance of civilians had disturbed communication lines between the civilian and the military.[39] ABRI's distrust of civilians was deeply entrenched, regardless of differences in approach that they took in defending the legitimacy of *dwifungsi*.

ABRI's distrust of civilians was not a major theme in the debate over *dwifungsi*. However, some critics envisaged the issue as a fundamental problem which curtailed ABRI's rejuvenation of *dwifungsi* legitimacy. It was Lt. Gen. (ret.) Bambang Triantoro, the chairman of YKPK, who insisted that ABRI leaders should not talk as if challenges stemmed from foreign cultures or new political and economic development, but should recognize that it was the aspiration of civilians which had challenged ABRI's dominant role. ABRI was inclined to forget this point due to its biased view of civilians, he asserted.[40] Moreover, former Police Chief, General (ret.) Kunarto, argued that 'comparing soldiers – who totally grow up within the military organization – with civilians with college degrees, the latter actually know much more about politics and are far closer to the *rakyat* than soldiers. This is well reflected in ABRI's ignorance and distrust of civilian aspirations, as shown by the Megawati case in which ABRI overthrew a popular political leader'.[41]

It was against this background that critics had frequently suggested the need for reviving civil–military dialogue even at the stage of cadet training, in order to alleviate mutual distrust between future military and civilian leaders.[42] ABRI's hesitation in accepting this idea was, of course, due to its concern about effective military schooling, which they felt necessitated an intensive initiation period for cadets. It was during this period that ABRI first indoctrinated regime ideologies, including *dwifungsi* and *kekeluargaan*, to the succeeding generations. Therefore, any noise from society should be eliminated in order to secure ideological consistency among generations within ABRI. This concern was well reflected in ABRI's strategic manual which emphasized a fear that generational change could be manipulated by certain elements in society to undermine solidarity within

ABRI.[43] ABRI's perceived limits in encouraging mutual dialogue indicated that it viewed rapid social mobility – resulting from economic development – as a threat to the maintenance of military ideology and *dwifungsi* legitimacy.

The *dwifungsi* counter-discourse examined earlier provided criticisms from various perspectives focusing on international, social and intra-ABRI problems. In response, ABRI developed explanations – mainly through the two approaches discussed above – about the relevance of *dwifungsi* (see Table 6.1 for a summary). Drawing a provisional conclusion from the information provided in this section, we must note that most of these explanations were aimed at the interpretation (and reinterpretation) of social conditions rather than of *dwifungsi* itself. In other words, ABRI's major efforts in the discourse on *dwifungsi* legitimacy were focused primarily on defining the direction of ongoing social change, as if to demonstrate the conditions for asserting that *dwifungsi* was still relevant under the given situation. That ABRI's essential focus in the discourse was on society – rather than *dwifungsi* – reflected the nature of current civil–military debate which was occupied with the argument about democratization. As critics continuously brought forward the issue of democratization in emphasizing the declining nature of *dwifungsi* legitimacy, ABRI was forced to counter the argument by showing alternative views on society which could explain the inapplicability of liberal democracy in the current social condition and the resulting need for maintaining the *dwifungsi* system. In doing so, ABRI mobilized the cultural approach, which was based on *particularism* and which interpreted society in a static way, blurring the ongoing social change. At the same time, some elements within ABRI employed a more pragmatic level-of-development approach, based on *relativism*, which claimed that certain social sectors still needed to receive *pengabdian*, or 'services', through *dwifungsi*.[44]

Military involvement in legislature

In their critical discourse aimed at delegitimizing the permanency of *dwifungsi*, critical elites often targeted particular ABRI policies. However *dwifungsi* was interpreted, its 'policy' problems were widely noted in political society.[45] This fact made many critics see the practical implementation of *dwifungsi* as the main obstacle to political development rather than the inadequacy of social-cultural conditions as alleged by ABRI.[46] During the late New Order era, several critical figures insisted on the need for reforming the formal political mechanism by redesigning institutional settings. For these 'institutionalists', civilian supremacy, human rights and democratization were not obstructed by cultural incompatibility or inadequacy, but by structural defects in the political system which could be solved, to a large extent, by renovating political institutions.

From this perspective, attention was given to ABRI's formal channels of political participation in the legislative branch; the arena of 'politics'. The first target was ABRI's appointed members in legislatures both at the national and regional levels. The second was ABRI's backing of Golkar during the elections in order to secure ABRI's influence in the legislative body. We examine discourses on these

Table 6.1 Major patterns of communication in cultural and level-of-development approaches

	Methods of legitimation	
Sources of delegitimation	*Cultural approach*	*Level-of-development approach*
Global wave of democratization brings universal values	Indonesia is based on Pancasila democracy with *kekeluargaan* values	Democratic needs depend on particular circumstances which vary according to place and time
Regeneration removes ABRI's revolutionary legitimacy	Indonesia is based on *kekeluargaan* which has no civil–military dichotomy	Compared with other groups, ABRI has ability to lead the nation and represent all interests in society
Middle-class civilians are tired of ABRI's dominant role	ABRI is a part of *negara kekeluargaan* and represents the interests of all family members, including the middle class	ABRI supports the middle class. They still wish ABRI to maintain stability which is needed for their economic activities
ABRI is merely a 'tool of the government'	Traditionally, ABRI as *hankam* is a part of the government, but ABRI as *sospol* is a part of society. ABRI as a whole is always for the *rakyat*	ABRI's *sospol* role is flexible depending on society's needs
ABRI always resorts to the security approach and so is nothing more than a 'fire brigade'	The security approach is only a part of the *hankam* role required to defend Pancasila. ABRI is not a 'fire brigade' because its *sospol* role provides many services	Security and prosperity approaches are used in a balanced way, and depend on the situation. For example, in the near future, security should be handled mainly by the police

two issues below and see that they are not merely a technical issue of seat numbers or the principle of ABRI's alleged neutrality in politics, but reveal ABRI's institutional vulnerability in its long-established political involvement.

F-ABRI and ABRI's non-participation in the elections

In the mid-1990s, it was already standard for ABRI to argue that the strengthening of legislative bodies was crucial in promoting democratization. Kassospol Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid presented this idea when he said that 'ABRI, in its political role, has a strong commitment to democratization and what we do at first is to encourage political institutions, namely legislative institutions, to function in

optimal ways'.[47] This commitment, however, would be doubted by critics if it were not followed by the actual reduction of ABRI's representation in legislative institutions. To achieve this, critics widely supported LIPI's proposal to demilitarize the DPR in 2004. ABRI members would no longer be appointed to legislatures and they would be allowed to vote in elections.[48]

In the development of the debate concerning ABRI representatives in the national and regional parliaments, several retired officers argued in favour of a return to the 1955 situation. Lt. Gen. (ret.) Soebijakto argued that the National Consensus conflicted with the Constitution and criticized ABRI's arbitrary interpretation of the National Consensus to legitimize F-ABRI, which he thought was just a temporary rule made more than thirty years ago. This logic led Soebijakto to conclude that 'ABRI should participate in voting at elections and withdraw from its appointed seats in the DPR in order to correct the major distortion of *dwifungsi* both in principle and in practice'.[49] Similarly, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Soedibyo also drew attention to F-ABRI's lack of legitimacy; because ABRI did not have a constituency to represent people's interests, it should therefore participate in elections if it wanted to be represented in the legislative process.[50]

The arguments of Soebijakto and Soedibyo to allow ABRI to restore its voting rights illustrated a unique case in the *dwifungsi* counter-discourse, one which criticized ABRI's participation in the formal political structure by encouraging the removal of a self-restriction. Gen. (ret.) Nasution, who actually experienced the 1955 elections, took this stance also: 'Since the Constitution guarantees the rights of all citizens to vote, it is better for ABRI to participate in elections as we experienced in 1955 with my IPKI (League of Upholders of Indonesian Freedom). Although this system was abolished by President Soekarno, I thought it was much better than having appointed seats in parliaments. If ABRI has to be "appointed", it has to be limited to the MPR'.[51]

The claims made by Soebijakto, Soedibyo and Nasution were aimed essentially at overcoming perceived contradictions in ABRI's political participation channels. In response to such an argument, ABRI's claim – which seemed to have been shared by most active officers and many retired officers – was that, if ABRI participates in elections, it runs the risk of being split by the intervention of civilian political parties and, as seen during the parliamentary democracy period in the 1950s, a split within the military might risk the country's political stability.[52] The fear of civilian intervention in the military sector not only brings into question the military's rejection of the civil–military dichotomy, but also undermines the 'self-sacrifice' argument long claimed by ABRI, which insists that ABRI gave up its right to vote in the elections in order to 'stand above all groups' and to play the role of 'national guardian'.

This point was raised by Lt. Gen. (ret.) Hasnan Habib, who argued:

> In democratic countries, soldiers can vote in elections. But in Indonesia, the National Consensus has prevented them from doing so. The time has come to review it. If there is still a concern within ABRI that participating in elections may split ABRI, as soldiers vote for different parties, it reveals that

> ABRI leaders do not trust their members and it proves the failure of current management within ABRI. [What are they scared about?] Isn't it Pak Harto who said communism was no longer active and all political parties accepted Pancasila…? I see ABRI's appointed seats in the DPR as political discrimination.[53]

All these arguments suggest that the military's paternalistic political involvement in the legislature is a reflection of its institutional vulnerability rather than its proclaimed role as a national guardian. It also implies that the military still fears being influenced by civilian political forces, as in the 1950s, thus leading to an assessment that the military has failed to develop internal cohesion. This critical discourse thus uncovers hidden problems within the military regarding civil–military relations.

As seen in the legitimacy argument, the officers' distrust of civilians is also apparent in this debate over F-ABRI and electoral participation. Hasnan insisted that 'I introduced this idea [relinquishing F-ABRI and allowing soldiers to participate in elections] to Lemhannas and Seskoad and they understood the logic, but they were really worried about the possibility of civilian political leaders conducting an anti-*dwifungsi* movement in the legislative branch, especially people around Megawati'.[54] The coupling of 'distrust' and 'fear' not only builds up the military's negative view of social evolution but also strengthens its determination to oppose attempts in society to erode ABRI's institutional solidarity.

Another argument insists that the non-participation of soldiers in elections is an insurance against military repression. If soldiers participate in the election, it is argued, they may be tempted to force people to vote for a certain party by using guns. Therefore, the appointment of military members to the legislatures and their non-participation in elections are intended to avoid such a situation.[55] The ultimate argument along these lines further insists that if the military is not represented in the legislatures and is excluded from formal participation in the political process, it may be motivated to take over power directly. By being represented in the legislatures, on the other hand, the military feels that it is already participating in government affairs and is therefore less likely to feel the need to assert itself by carrying out a coup.[56]

Resorting to the danger of a military coup seems to be the most primitive approach in the current *dwifungsi* discourse that we have examined in this study, and contradicts the official rejection of military coups in Indonesia. It has been repeatedly claimed by the military that although it had several opportunities to take over the government – as seen in the cases of Madium in 1948, 17 October 1952, Martial Law in 1958 and G30S/PKI in 1965 – it did not do so because the military placed its primary interest in national development and prosperity rather than self-interest.[57] More recently, Lt. Gen. Prabowo, Kostrad Commander, declared that ABRI never had, and never would, include the word 'coup' in its dictionary.[58] In this way, the coup issue has been used, on the one hand, to assert that the military has no intention of dominating political life, but also on the

other hand to threaten society by saying that a coup is possible if the military is not represented in the institutions of government. A similar dualism can be seen in the explanation of the non-participation of soldiers in elections. As described above, it was first argued that ABRI had sacrificed the voting rights of soldiers as 'compensation' for F-ABRI. This interpretation was then adjusted to argue that non-participation was intended to avoid the risk of intra-military disunity, which was exclusively ABRI's own responsibility. The logic was further developed to insist that there was a danger of ABRI dominating both guns and ballots, if it were permitted to participate in elections.[59]

In this way, although the problem of F-ABRI was generally discussed in terms of New Order authoritarian practice which put ABRI into parliament to control the legislative process, a close look at current critical discourse on this issue highlights the military's vulnerability in its interaction with society. This means that the military has perceived its potentially weak institutional cohesion even after three decades of military ascendancy in politics, preserving the traditional fear of being fragmented. Needless to say, such a thesis is unacceptable for the military, which has firmly stressed that the problem of F-ABRI is a matter of ABRI's commitment to national development and stability. This may be true but the goal and performance of F-ABRI are not the focus of our discussion here. Rather, we pay attention to the fact that the F-ABRI issue has a strong link with the problem of military non-participation in elections, and that the discourse concerning the two issues provides a significant insight into the military's perceptions of self and society.

The proper size of F-ABRI

Apart from the principle of whether ABRI members should be appointed to legislatures, a second issue involved the number of seats. As seen in Chapter 2, many critics viewed the reduction of F-ABRI from 100 to 75 seats – announced in 1995 and implemented in 1997 – as an insignificant reduction in ABRI's accumulated political power. In countering such an argument, ABRI turned to the idea of *tut wuri handayani*. For the military leadership, the F-ABRI reduction was a rare opportunity to propagate its commitment to visible reform of ABRI's political instruments, following the cases of Kopkamtib in 1988 and BAIS in 1994. Unlike these cases, which were replaced by new bodies (Bakorstanas and BIA respectively), the reform of F-ABRI was a physical downsizing of a formal political channel, and thus provided a better chance for the military to claim that the F-ABRI reduction illustrated ABRI's reformist posture. However, as seen below, intra-military debate on this issue revealed ABRI's perceived vulnerability in effectively managing the military's organizational life.

Since 1995, ABRI's official stance was that the number of seats held had no significance, provided that they were guaranteed in the legislative mechanism, meaning that LIPI's 'zero-option' was not acceptable. The Minister of Defence and Security, Gen. (ret.) Edi Sudradjat, stressed that 'although the number is flexible, it is impossible to cut all seats because – unlike ABRI governors and

mayors who are selected by society – ABRI members are sent to the DPR as a part of military duties'.[60] This assessment, which was shared by many officers, reflected ABRI's attempt to defend its autonomous organizational activity (i.e. F-ABRI) from social pressure. From a strategic point of view, the F-ABRI circle also believed that 75 seats was the limit of tolerance. Maj. Gen. Hari Sabarno insisted that 'F-ABRI of less than 75 is unacceptable because we will no longer be able to conduct effective parliamentary activities in all eleven committees in the DPR'.[61] Although the focus was different, both Edi and Hari had similar concerns about the effective functioning of ABRI's role in the parliament. In the late New Order, this was the standard argument within the military regarding the issue of the proper size of F-ABRI.

However, among the serving officers, some started to insist that drastically cutting ABRI's parliamentary involvement would be necessary in order to normalize the military's organizational life. This view was expressed in an article circulated in an internal military journal in 1994 and was soon read by many of the intellectual officers. The writer was Brig. Gen. Mulchis Anwar, an adviser of KSAD Gen. Wismoyo Arismunandar.[62] Mulchis argued that the proper number of F-ABRI seats in the DPR was 30. The number came from the calculation that 27 members should represent each of Indonesia's 27 provinces plus 3 more who might work as faction and parliamentary leaders – such as Head/Deputy Head of F-ABRI and the DPR Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson.[63] At the regional levels, he continued, it was enough for between 6 and 7 ABRI members to be appointed at the DPRD I (provincial parliaments), and 2 or 3 at the DPRD II (regency parliaments).[64] He stressed that a reduction would not only enhance the quality of F-ABRI but also solve the problem of the current tour-of-duty which had a tendency to disregard posts in parliament.[65] To solve the problem, he suggested cutting the number of F-ABRI and provision for officers who had served in DPRD I/II to return to military service as Danrem (Korem Commander) or Kasdam (Chief-of-Staff, Kodam), while ABRI personnel in the DPR must be given a chance for promotion to the position of Kasdam or Pangdam (Kodam Commander).[66] For him, the drastic reduction of F-ABRI would help to revitalize ABRI's organizational life, especially the coordination between *kekaryaan* and military sectors.

The fact that the possibility of drastic F-ABRI reform had been discussed within ABRI before Soeharto's initiative in 1995 illustrated the lack of consensus within ABRI about the desirable number of F-ABRI. More significantly, however, it also revealed that some officers perceived the decline of military presence in politics as not primarily a response to democratic pressure, but a means to solve internal vulnerability – notably the disparity between political (*kekaryaan*) and professional sectors within the military. Here, ABRI's incentive to curtail its formal political participation channel was derived from internal military problems rather than external pressures. Mulchis indicated that there was a motivation within ABRI to look at the problem of F-ABRI in terms of restoring the rationality of the military command structure, rather than merely in response to external political pressure. The emergence of such

professional concern was discernible during the late Soeharto period, and it implied the complexity of the military's reform initiatives. The professional concern noted above may encourage military reforms in particular fields but may resist reforms in other fields which do not embrace problems of command irrationality. From the perspective of civilian democratic promoters who want to reduce the role of the military in all areas of political life, such concern may be problematic. As we shall see in Chapter 7, generals who are recognized as 'professional' in society may behave as 'hardliner' because they share the mindset presented by Mulchis.

We have begun our argument about F-ABRI by examining the debate over ABRI's proper channel for formal political participation, i.e. the DPR or MPR. We then focused on two related issues: the military abandoning its electoral rights and the implication of reduced F-ABRI seats. Now we will examine ABRI's indirect participation channel in the formal political process, namely its backing for Golkar.

Intra-military debate on Golkar

During the New Order, ABRI's engagement in Golkar basically had two modes: internal and external. The former was through retired officers who became Golkar candidates or were associated with social organizations under the control of either ABRI's Big Family (KBA) or Golkar's Big Family (KBG).[67] The latter was through ABRI's measures to secure the victory of Golkar during elections. This includes: intelligence screening of electoral candidates which was conducted in a discriminatory way against opposition parties; Kodam 'guidance' given to the regional leaders of social organizations to mobilize Golkar votes; measures taken by territorial commands to disturb the electoral campaigns of PDI and PPP; and ABRI's intervention in the internal affairs of opposition parties to prevent the rise of popular leaders. These internal and external modes of engagement were aimed, on the one hand, at ensuring that ABRI's voice was heard in the legislative process – via the dominant party in the parliament – and on the other hand, at maintaining the virtual one-party system under the authoritarian polity which needed elections but did not need a parliament challenging government policies. However, ABRI's use of Golkar for its parliamentary engagement was accompanied by the risk of highlighting its abandonment of one of the principles of *dwifungsi* – i.e. 'standing above all groups'.

In facing this dilemma, ABRI developed various 'shock-absorbing' interpretations. For example, as seen in Chapter 2, Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid's dichotomization of ABRI's *sospol–hankam* functions and Gen. Hartono's citizen–institution dichotomy were the latest cases which stressed that ABRI's backing for Golkar was justifiable and did not endanger its proclaimed neutrality in politics.[68] Undoubtedly, denial of the apparent contradiction between support for Golkar and an insistence on neutrality was a mainstream discourse within the late New Order ABRI. However, there was also internal debate which attempted to counter this official interpretation. As we saw in the case of the F-ABRI debate

above, in which Brig. Gen. Mulchis Anwar insisted on the need to drastically reduce ABRI's direct involvement in the DPR, there was also an argument stressing the need to limit ABRI's indirect engagement through Golkar. Such a view, of course, signified the obvious contradiction between ABRI's backing for Golkar in reality and the virtue of its doctrinal neutrality. We will examine two examples below.

Lemhannas is the highest educational institute for all army officers who have successfully graduated from the military academy (AMN or Akabri), Seskoad and Sesko ABRI, and who have good records in carrying out military duties. A graduation thesis is required to pass the Lemhannas study programme, and it is interesting to note that one of the popular thesis topics since the early 1990s is about *dwifungsi*'s future prospects. Among many writings which merely reiterate the official legitimation of *dwifungsi*, there are some which try to touch on controversial issues and question official interpretations, including the ABRI–Golkar relationship. A thesis written by Maj. Gen. Hari Sabarno, who entered Lemhannas in 1995 when replaced by Brig. Gen. Syarwan Hamid as Assospol Kassospol, is one such example.

For Maj. Gen. Hari Sabarno, it is not necessary to continue with ABRI's current heavy commitment to Golkar (i.e. indirect intervention) if F-ABRI's role (direct intervention) is secured in parliament. Hari insists that ABRI's cooperation with Golkar should be reviewed in order to enhance Golkar's independence and to make ABRI more neutral in dealing with all political forces. Although it is difficult to completely detach the two political institutions, he continues, ABRI's support for Golkar should be restricted to the level of strategic policy formulation and should not extend to field operations because this only damages ABRI's position in society.[69] Interestingly, this concern of Hari's for neutrality was expressed in 1995 when ABRI Commander Feisal Tanjung was preparing to back the Habibie-influenced Golkar leadership in the 1997 election and Syarwan Hamid openly stated that ABRI could not be neutral – a comment which provoked public criticism, as seen in Chapter 2. Although it was extremely rare for an officer not to follow an order from above, the limited space for individual thinking made it still possible to produce an internal communication arguing the negative impact of ABRI–Golkar fusion on ABRI's neutrality doctrine, and therefore provide a premise in legitimizing the presence of F-ABRI. Needless to say, Hari's reference to the strategic policy cooperation with Golkar included election of the President, while his concern for neutrality was directed at the general election. In theory, having the same policy with Golkar by no means undermines the military's autonomy and neutrality, while siding with Golkar during the election clearly deviates from the neutrality principle. In assessing ABRI's perceptions of self-autonomy and political neutrality, the above differences should not be ignored or confused.

Earlier, after the 1987 election when Golkar won 73 percent of the votes, Colonel Ishak Prawiradilaga, a Lemhannas officer, also raised a question about the future Golkar–ABRI alliance. He stressed that ABRI's role as a political force was to safeguard the equilibrium between Golkar and other political parties

because a too-dominant Golkar would only distort Pancasila democracy. For Ishak, Golkar should not have won more than two-thirds of the total votes in the election.[70] The problem, which he believed was evident in the last election, was the fragility of PPP and PDI, which somehow was inconsistent with the culture of Pancasila democracy. He thus concluded that ABRI, which stood above all groups, would have to intervene in overcoming this problem, in order to secure fair play for all three contestants in the next election.[71]

The arguments made by Hari and Ishak warn against excessive siding with Golkar as this puts at risk *dwifungsi*'s legitimacy based on the neutrality principle. However, we should also note a significant difference in emphasis between Hari and Ishak. The former places weight on ABRI's non-commitment in the electoral process while the latter sees a need for ABRI to intervene in the process in order to strengthen the two opposition parties for the sake of promoting Pancasila democracy. This gap between the two provides an interesting aspect for our examination of *dwifungsi* discourse within the officer corps. It illustrates that even though officers use the same argument, such as criticizing ABRI's backing for Golkar and respect for the neutrality doctrine, the implications differ. One can stress the need to decrease commitment to the electoral process while the other may use the same terms to support such commitment.

Overall, we have examined some of the emerging revisionist thoughts within ABRI. We may understand them as a reflection of ABRI's growing internal inconsistency in the face of multidimensional pressures for political change, and also as a significant mirror of the intra-military friction at that time. From a different angle, it is also possible to see revisionist discourse as a reflection of ABRI's growing sense that even without relying heavily on F-ABRI and Golkar – or ultimately without having deep involvement in the formal political structure – ABRI's primary role of political surveillance can be maintained. Several indications back up this interpretation, as we will see below. How were the debates on formal political channels linked with informal political processes handled by ABRI?

Territorial management as non-debate

Returning to the basic fact that *dwifungsi* is a military ideology which effectively removes the functional boundary between security and political operations, the developing counter-discourse on *dwifungsi* needed to incorporate ABRI's security perception into the scope of its criticism, if it were to fully control *dwifungsi* and modify ABRI's organizational mission in such a way as not to interfere with the process of 'opening up' the regime. As expounded in third world literature on democratization, the redesigning of security doctrine is critical in order to incorporate the military into the process of political liberalization.[72] For advocates of Indonesian democracy, this process may also require bringing *dwifungsi*'s security function into the public discourse and breaking into the sanctuary of ABRI's territorial doctrine. Intellectual critics appreciate that the mere dismantling of *dwifungsi* in formal politics at the national level would not be sufficient to remove ABRI's political influence, as ABRI would still be able to utilize security operations

conducted by its territorial forces to control the political process.[73] ABRI's territorial doctrine was an area of 'non-debate' during the late New Order era. It was after the fall of Soeharto that the topic became a popular civil–military dispute. Here, we attempt to clarify the designed political functions of the territorial command in order to understand ABRI's routine political missions under its doctrine.

In terms of organization, the army's territorial doctrine involves four institutions – i.e. the Army Headquarters' Territorial Affairs Section (Sterad), the Kodams, the Army Centre of Territorial Affairs (Pusterad) and trans-territorial elite troops (Kostrad and Kopassus). First, at the central level, Sterad coordinates the basic territorial policies to be conducted by Kodams. A listing of the nine specified territorial roles shows a significant overlapping of security and political missions, since eight are overtly political tasks, as seen below.

- Design and formulate policies for territorial and sociopolitical (*sospol*) management
- Organize and coordinate activities for territorial management and help develop education and exercises in territorial and *sospol* fields
- Make technical policies for regional security management
- Design and coordinate technical activities for the army and KBA to conduct *sospol* roles
- Supervise staff for the procedural/conditional improvement of *sospol* management
- Organize and coordinate activities for the management of doctrines, regulations and goals in territorial and *sospol* fields
- Promote relationships with government departments which can be used for territorial and *sospol* management
- Conduct analysis and evaluation of territorial and *sospol* management
- Analyse trend and formulate proposals for matters related to the above tasks[74]

Based on this doctrinal setting, which removes the demarcation between politics and defence in territorial management, officers have developed a perception that military techniques and knowledge are transferable to the conduct of political missions.[75] Maj. Gen. Adang Ruchiatna, the Commander of Pusterad, insisted that early detection and prevention is a key to strengthen territorial management.[76] Since territorial management involves political surveillance, this preventive strategy of early detection provides an example of how ABRI's professional military mind transfers military techniques to the conduct of political management. Among many operations based on this strategy at the Kodam level, the biggest is the handling of political stability during the general election and the MPR sessions. It is therefore worth noting how the preventive strategy of early detection is implemented in this context.

According to an internal newsletter owned by Kodam Jaya, territorial officers are given the task of keeping watch over prominent individuals, religious leaders and youth leaders who are not associated with KBA. They are instructed to

approach these people and, using techniques of surveillance and penetration, influence them to become partners of KBA or supporters of ABRI's sociopolitical mission.[77] In this way, a strategy is devised to enable military activity to penetrate into any social field and detect the source of political disturbance. ABRI had exercised this mode of political involvement during national elections under the New Order, but this did not encourage the elite debate on the relationship between *dwifungsi* and elections – a debate which was largely limited to such issues as ABRI's appointed seats in the parliament and its backing for Golkar.

Kodam's territorial activities have significantly been supported by two elite trans-territorial forces. Kopassus' everyday intelligence operations are designed to enable its agents to penetrate areas where the adversary force is apparent, in order to secretly 'create' a situation useful for the subsequent conduct of a military operation.[78] Covert operations are designed to 'create situations', such as the manipulation of student/labour demonstrations to create circumstances allowing intervention by Kodam forces at a later stage.[79] The military's internal security operations – including covert missions – have become more sophisticated over recent decades due to professional training and the development of information/military technology. However, in the New Order *dwifungsi* debate, it was rare to see an argument aimed at establishing a transparent examination of this mode of political intervention. These practices of territorial management have been inherited by succeeding generations of officers through military education and indoctrination, and are considered by them as 'national defence' – a sacrosanct military principle.

As discussed above, the development of counter-discourse on *dwifungsi* during the late New Order period reflected the decline of ABRI's relative autonomy in society and the diminishing legitimacy of *dwifungsi* ideology. However, ABRI's territorial management also became more and more autonomous in establishing mechanisms of political surveillance. It is in this context that the absence of debate on territorial management has – in a paradoxical way – affected the military response to the growing criticism of *dwifungsi*. Based on the assessment that the military's core political role could be maintained solely by consolidating the territorial system, either with or without the concept of *dwifungsi*, a view was emerging within ABRI which envisaged that the concept of *dwifungsi* could be scrapped in such a way as to alleviate the pressure on ABRI if social criticism reached an unmanageable level. Rear Marshal Sunardi, for example, indicated this assessment by insisting that

> [W]e have noticed that *dwifungsi* is not a proper concept, causing many troubles. *Dwifungsi* has been criticised as ABRI's lack of adaptability to the changing society, but it is just a criticism aimed at ABRI's *sospol* capability which is only a small part of ABRI. *Sospol*, or *dwifungsi*, is only one of six capabilities ABRI possesses in conducting its expected role, along with intelligence, territorial, security, defence, and logistic capabilities. Therefore, *dwifungsi* is not what we want to preserve, but what we want is the total defence role to serve the nation and state…. It is such a simple matter.[80]

This self-abandoning of the *dwifungsi* concept seems to make up a progressive interpretation which goes beyond a mere reinterpretation of *dwifungsi*. However, it is based on the assumption that elimination of the second function of *dwifungsi* would not significantly limit ABRI's practical political role, since the diverse capabilities used by the military in conducting its defence function provide enough capacity to take measures to maintain its high level of political control. ABRI's 'defence' function was an arena of non-debate during the New Order but played an important role in the developing *dwifungsi* discourse.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the structure of *dwifungsi* discourse during the late New Order period. We have focused on three areas – legitimacy, political participation channels and territorial management. We first discussed various critical attempts by elite circles to delegitimize the permanency of *dwifungsi*. Our examination showed that, using various approaches, they had contributed to the institutionalization of *dwifungsi* criticism – a role which could hardly be accomplished by non-regime critics. This is the latent function of elite criticism, and is usually viewed as too moderate by political activists who confront ABRI by demanding a total dismantling of *dwifungsi*. However, we suggest that the different characteristics of moderate and progressive criticism did not undermine one another in their attempts to pressurize ABRI. Instead they should be understood as 'one goal, two necessary approaches'.

In the late New Order polity, ABRI, which only engaged in open communication with the 'moderate' side, responded to the elite counter-discourse in a threefold way – by manipulating criticism, admitting dilemmas and reshaping the framework for relegitimation. In Chapter 3, we discussed how ABRI expanded the sources of legitimizing *dwifungsi*, and here our examination showed that ABRI also reinvented techniques to counter critical discourse by consolidating cultural and pragmatic frameworks of political thinking. However, we emphasized that ABRI continued to fear social mobility, which was thought to erode *dwifungsi*'s social acceptability.

Such vulnerability was also apparent when we assessed ABRI's channels of political participation. We have argued that although ABRI has justified its parliamentary engagement via F-ABRI as a compensation for the surrender of its voting rights, its fear of recognizing the natural rights of citizens is quite evident. Many officers can imagine how easily internal military cohesion could collapse once soldiers started to participate in elections – the most legitimate political activity in a modern nation-state. 'Desuperficialization' of the F-ABRI debate also reveals a very fragile aspect of *dwifungsi* commitment as represented by the growing concern about the disparity between professional and political duties in the officers' military life. In tandem with this, we have seen the serving officers' own concerns about the declining neutrality of ABRI's role in the formal political structure, mainly due to its overt channelling of influence through Golkar. On the other hand, however, we underlined ABRI's growing conviction that it could

control the political process without relying on formal political channels. We have examined the political tasks designed under ABRI's territorial management, and concluded that, despite lack of debate, these aspects of ABRI's political role had to be included in the scope of open discourse in order for civilian elites to comprehensively question *dwifungsi*'s political engagement.

All these aspects seemed to have constituted the structure of *dwifungsi* discourse during the late New Order era. And as we shall see in Chapter 7, the post-Soeharto military command finally moved to implement some reforms targeting F-ABRI, the Golkar–ABRI relationship and territorial commands. However, these actions are not intended to indicate acceptance of civilian control of the military or a 'return to the barracks'. The military mindset examined here continues to persist, and is strongly reflected in the reforms undertaken during the post-Soeharto civilian governments.

7 Post-Soeharto

Politics and the theatre of military reform

During the late New Order period, the military response to democratic pressures was not monolithic, involving as it did different and contradictory policies and actions in different fields. Some officers made a move to soften its repressive aspects and adapt accommodating policies, while others saw democratic demands as a threat requiring a vigorous response and strengthened military control. We have tried to clarify these different initiatives within ABRI. Chapter 2 discusses the development of factional cleavage among top officers and the way in which it was reflected in ABRI's response to the escalating *dwifungsi* criticism. In Chapters 3 and 4, we examine some initiatives within ABRI to cope with democratic pressures. Chapter 5, on the other hand, investigates the development of traditional repressive policies. Finally Chapter 6 is a study of the evolution of both conservative and revisionist thinking within the military during the late Soeharto period. These all help in assessing the diffusion of military response to democratic demands. Why did it happen? The diffusion was largely a product of intra-military politics which motivated elite officers to assert policies evidently different from competing groups as a means of gaining support from Soeharto, society and the military leadership of the time. Political rivalries between Benny Moerdani and Feisal Tanjung, Feisal and Hartono, and Prabowo and Wiranto all contributed to the escalation of between-faction fighting, and the resultant power struggle generated both hardline and softline responses to society.

This chapter examines the fall of Soeharto and the aftermath. The end of Soeharto did not mark the end of between-faction fighting within the military, and the legacy of internal conflict strongly influences military responses to civilian-led governments in the post-New Order era. This continuity is a central perspective in this chapter. In earlier chapters, we examined the growing tension between Wiranto and Prabowo, a son-in-law of the President, since the mid-1990s. We will explain now how it finally led to the fall of Soeharto, and how the factional legacy – and its subsequent development – significantly shaped the process of *dwifungsi* reforms, the constellation of intra-military politics and the relationship between the military and the post-Soeharto civilian governments.

The post-Soeharto era represented uncharted waters for military leaders faced with popular resentment towards the military as an obstacle to meaningful polit-

ical reform. Observers have focused on the problems of a transition to civilian control of the military under the governments of Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid respectively. One of the key questions to emerge from this involves the impact of regime change on the military's political process – or what has and has not changed in military politics before and after the fall of Soeharto? We try to clarify these aspects by investigating the political processes of the military under the two civilian governments.

Terror and dialogue: the fall of Soeharto and the end of Prabowo

In Chapter 2, we examined the process by which Soeharto's political machinations since 1996 – i.e. the removal of Megawati as PDI Chairperson in 1996, Golkar's electoral victory in 1997, Soeharto's re-election and Habibie's vice-presidency in March 1998 – effectively contributed to the freefall of ABRI's credibility in society and undermined the legitimacy of *dwifungsi*. It was now widely criticized as *alat mati pemerintah* ('a dead tool of the government'). We have argued that the growing internal split within ABRI, especially between Lt. Gen. Prabowo and Gen. Wiranto, was a product of Soeharto's divide-and-rule strategy. Soeharto sought to prevent ABRI as an institution from acting independently of the President. However, Soeharto's scenario soon backfired. Although he managed to shift criticism about the nation's worsening economic crisis since mid-1997 by mobilizing street demonstrations by radical Muslim groups against an invented 'Chinese conspiracy', his re-election ensured that the public saw him as the principal villain, a sorcerer who had run out of tricks and was clearly unable to cope with the crisis. Ironically, the self-styled Father of Development came to be seen as the man responsible for Indonesia's economic implosion.[1] A nation-wide student movement demanding his resignation escalated quickly. How did ABRI respond? Reflecting the Prabowo–Wiranto antagonism of the time, ABRI's response was two-fold. Prabowo's group resorted to 'terror' while the Wiranto circle favoured 'dialogue'.

The elevation of Wiranto to ABRI Commander in February 1998 and to Defence and Security Minister (Menhankam) in March provoked the Prabowo circle into action. It was important that the group undermine Wiranto who now held the two top positions in the military hierarchy.[2] He was in fact expected by his followers to curtail Prabowo's influence. For Prabowo and his supporters within the military, something had to be done to either gain Soeharto's favour or discredit Wiranto. They saw the opportunity to play both ends in the widening anti-Soeharto movement in society. If Wiranto was seen as ineffective in handling the political situation, Soeharto might be forced to rely on Prabowo to solve the problem. Widespread riots created a potentially attractive opportunity for the Prabowo group.

Triggered by a government decision to cut petrol subsidies and the subsequent hike in petrol prices, mass protests were organized in the city of Medan (North Sumatra). These suddenly developed into riots on 5 May and spread to other

cities in North Sumatra, destroying many Chinese-owned properties. A week after the incident, on 12 May, four student demonstrators at a peaceful rally against Soeharto at Trisakti University in Jakarta were shot dead by 'mysterious' snipers dressed in police uniforms. The police troops were under the command of Maj. Gen. Hamami Nata (Commander of Jakarta Metropolitan Police), a close ally of Prabowo and Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, Jakarta Military Commander. It is widely believed that the snipers were military sharpshooters. The incident provoked mass protests which suddenly developed into large-scale, two-day riots in Jakarta. The rioters burned shopping centres and other commercial buildings, robbed citizens and raped many ethnic Chinese women.[3]

Similar violence also erupted in Solo (Central Java), Surabaya (East Java) and Palembang (South Sumatra). Komnas HAM later established a Joint Fact-Finding Team on the 13–15 May Riots (TGPF) and its investigation evidently concluded that in all five cases (i.e. Medan, Jakarta, Solo, Surabaya and Palembang), well-trained and organized provocateurs were involved. TGPF also noted that the patterns of rioting in each case were quite similar, pointing to the involvement of military elements in creating the unrest. The report recommended further investigation of Prabowo and Sjafrie.[4] Eyewitness accounts also revealed that the riots were orchestrated by Kopassus groups which mobilized gangs, or *preman*, to provoke attacks against and looting of Chinese enclaves.[5] Kopassus was led by Maj. Gen. Muchdi Purwopranjono, a leading ally of Prabowo, who assumed the position when Prabowo became Kostrad Commander.

In dealing with these riots, Wiranto could not rely on the elite army troops which were largely under the control of Sjafrie, Muchdi and Prabowo. Wiranto found troops under these generals too slow in stopping riots, and thus mobilized the Marines in his attempt to restore calm in Jakarta.[6] It was only after two days of mass violence that Prabowo and Sjafrie made their presence felt by standing in front of troops and insisting on the need to restore public order and stability. Prabowo sought to exploit the ineffectiveness of Wiranto's leadership by lobbying Soeharto to impose martial law under a revived Kopkamtib under the command of Prabowo or his followers. On 18 May, he advised Soeharto, via his daughter Tutut, to replace Wiranto and declare a national emergency.[7] It seems probable that the terror in May was engineered by Prabowo and his supporters to advance their interests within the military hierarchy and, in this sense, faction-fighting in the military spilled over into the public arena, dangerously fanning ethnic tensions and general unrest.

In contrast to these terror tactics, the approach taken by the Wiranto circle was basically non-violent engagement – attending dialogues on campus and other meetings led by government critics. It was Kassospol Lt. Gen. Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a leading army intellectual, who joined the fray on the front line. On 16 May, one day after the Jakarta riot, he attended an anti-Soeharto meeting at the University of Indonesia, which comprised many students, activists and critical retired generals, such as Kemal Idris, Kharis Suhud and Bambang Triantoro from YKPK. The meeting concluded with a public demand for Soeharto's resignation, and surprisingly Yudhoyono evalu-

ated it as an 'aspiration of the people' which should be listened to by ABRI and the government.[8] Wiranto also was not silent and moved against those military officers aligned with Prabowo. Having confirmed the role played by Prabowo and his allies during the riots, Wiranto – who was under a clear threat of dismissal – reported his findings immediately to Soeharto. The anger of Soeharto and his family was directed against Prabowo, and the plan to reintroduce Kopkamtib was scrapped.[9] Wiranto then followed the advice of his close allies who, after discussion with civilian leaders, finally concluded that Soeharto's resignation was the only way to restore stability and order in the nation. Wiranto explained:

> I talked to *Pak Harto* (Soeharto) on 20 May. I said to him that ABRI could no longer maintain national stability. Then I said ABRI would protect him if he was ready to step down. He then gave me a letter of presidential mandate which authorized me to take any necessary action to maintain security and stability.[10]

Following this meeting with Wiranto, Soeharto announced his resignation on 21 May. At the presidential palace, Wiranto announced that ABRI would support the new government led by Habibie, who was automatically promoted to the presidency, and would also protect Soeharto's security. The fall of Soeharto was celebrated nation-wide. Students and anti-government activists who had long voiced support for *reformasi* (political reform) finally saw their dreams come true.

After exerting his leadership in handling the transfer of power from Soeharto to Habibie, Wiranto successfully dealt with the new President in settling the problem of Prabowo, a close friend of Habibie.[11] Two days after the inauguration of the new President, Wiranto replaced Prabowo with Lt. Gen. Johny Lumintang (Operational Assistant to the ABRI Commander), a Christian and Wiranto follower, as temporary Commander of Kostrad. Prabowo was ordered to move to Bandung to head an educational institute, Sesko ABRI. Soon thereafter, rumours of a coup by the Prabowo camp spread across Jakarta.[12] Following Prabowo's transfer, Muchdi and other Prabowo followers in Kopassus, such as Brig. Gen. Gasing (Deputy Commander of Kopassus) and Col. Chairawan (Commander of Group-4 [intelligence], Kopassus), were also removed from their posts.[13]

Many factors surely contributed to the breakdown of the Soeharto regime in May 1998.[14] The currency crisis that first engulfed Thailand – an international factor – spread through the region and led to socio-economic catastrophe in Indonesia. The domestic crisis inspired *reformasi* aspirations that developed into a country-wide anti-Soeharto movement. This was a crystallization of various civil-society forces led by students, intellectuals and NGOs. Such dynamics not only pushed New Order political elites to distance themselves from Soeharto but also attracted them to jump on the anti-Soeharto bandwagon, which effectively diminished the capacity of the President to survive. All these developments contributed to the collapse of Soeharto.

However, the military also played a crucial role in facilitating and managing these developments. As seen above, internal divisions within ABRI were particularly sharpened after the appointment of Wiranto as both ABRI Commander and Menhankam. It was in this context that the Prabowo group adopted hardline tactics – for instance, kidnapping anti-government activists and manipulating riots – against demands for Soeharto's resignation and democratic reforms.[15] These terror tactics by military extremists significantly stimulated anti-government movements in society, which in turn drove the Wiranto circle to adopt conciliatory measures both in order to restore calm on the streets and to regain at least a measure of public trust. In effect, Wiranto's accommodating approach helped the democratic movement endure and preserved space for anti-Soeharto campaigns. When disorder reached a peak, Wiranto effectively neutralized Prabowo by coopting Soeharto, providing intelligence that implicated his son-in-law and exonerating ABRI from responsibility for his unsanctioned, extremist actions. By offering military protection for Soeharto if he would agree to step down, Wiranto convinced the President that his interests would best be served by accepting Wiranto's implicit recommendation, that is, to resign (*lengser*) from the presidential office and distance himself from his rogue relative. While it is true that Wiranto deserves credit for restoring stability and facilitating regime change in Indonesia, it is important to bear in mind that his calculations and actions were largely conditioned by internal faction-fighting within the military. The last days of Soeharto witnessed the desperate brinkmanship and military showdown behind the scenes of domestic political strife, a contest won by Wiranto who coopted Soeharto – a patron of both factions. Soeharto, mindful of the fate of other deposed dictators around the world, finally had to abandon his divide and rule tactics in a bid for protection from democratic forces demanding accountability and prosecution.

Purging the loser, reforming the military[16]

The end of Soeharto provided Wiranto with the winning card in his political struggle with Prabowo. What was the immediate goal of Wiranto and his staff? The post-Soeharto military faced two urgent agendas. First, the military needed to wipe out the legacy of Prabowo within the military in order to consolidate the Wiranto leadership. Second, ABRI, as an institution, also had to recover its social credibility which had been totally ruined by the series of terror operations conducted by army extremists (see above). It was urgent for the new ABRI leadership to make an attempt at rehabilitating the military in society by selling self-reform efforts to the public. In this way, *de-Prabowo-isasi*, or 'de-Prabowo-ization', and internal military reform became two substantial goals which directed the policy and perception of the nascent Wiranto leadership. It was due to these intra-military and civil–military contexts that '*reformasi* within ABRI' soon became the military's official slogan. Kassospol Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who had been at the centre of concerned reformist officers during the late New Order period, firmly declared ABRI's full commitment to reform, including a review of

dwifungsi, four days after the inception of the Habibie government.[17] As we will discuss, however, ABRI's motivations, opportunities and capabilities to move on these goals were significantly influenced by intra-military power politics under the Wiranto leadership.

De-Prabowo-isasi

Soon after the fall of Soeharto, Prabowo was demoted to the post of Sesko ABRI Commander, with his Kopassus aides also transferred to sinecure positions one after another. The second wave of reshuffling to purge the Prabowo circle came in the next month. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, who was suspected by the TGPF of involvement in orchestrating the riots, was discharged from the post of Jakarta Military Commander, but was given the position of Territorial Assistant to the ABRI Commander, still rather an important role. Sjafrie was 'saved' (*diselamatkan*) from what amounted to a virtual sacking because of Wiranto's political calculation that Sjafrie's outstanding talent in intelligence activities might be utilized in the future.[18] Maj. Gen. Kivlan Zen, Deputy Commander of Kostrad, was also replaced by Maj. Gen. Ryamizard, son-in-law of Try Sutrisno and the Commander of Infantry Division-1 in Kostrad. In this way, the process of eliminating Prabowo's influence within the military encouraged the consolidation of Wiranto's leadership. The newly installed civilian president, who seemed to have a political 'contract' with Wiranto for 'mutual support', eventually endorsed Wiranto's in-house restructuring.

The purge was almost completed in August 1998 when Wiranto ordered ABRI Headquarters to set up the Officers' Honorary Council, or DKP, which – as seen in Chapter 4 – had been established previously to penalize officers involved in the Liquisa killing in East Timor in 1995. This time the DKP was opened up to investigate the role of Prabowo and his aides in conducting abductions and the torture of political activists before the fall of Soeharto. Amid the investigation, Wiranto openly stated that the military had been involved in the recent violations of human rights, as seen in the Trisakti shootings, kidnapping of activists and May riots.[19] Following this, the DPK concluded that Prabowo, Muchdi and Chairawan were all guilty of involvement. On 24 August, it decided to discharge the three officers from the military organization and the Council also recommended that Wiranto court-martial them.[20] The discharge of these three officers was followed by the purging of lower-ranking Prabowo followers. In December, eleven Kopassus soldiers who had worked for a special team, named *Satgus Mawar* (Rose Unit), which was in charge of abducting anti-government activists, were prosecuted in a military court.[21] Through this methodical process, Wiranto successfully eliminated Prabowo's influence within ABRI. Importantly, he managed to control the fact-findings of ABRI's terror operations by limiting investigations to excesses of the Kopassus circle and deliberately omitting the possibility of the involvement of any other command. A general-ranking officer claimed that 'many of us question why Maj. Gen. Zacky Anwar Makarim has not yet been dismissed. He was working with Prabowo during the last days of Soeharto'.[22]

Wiranto's strategy of selective purging significantly helped consolidate his leadership within the military as many officers came to understand that loyalty to Wiranto was the key to survival in ABRI. In terms of civil–military relations, revealing the abuses committed by Kopassus undermined the military's already tattered credibility in society. However, in the context of intra-military politics, it facilitated Wiranto's efforts to consolidate his position of authority. Moreover, given that the public already suspected the worst of the military, by admitting culpability the military had little credibility to lose while it stood to gain a small measure of kudos for not covering up its misdeeds as was normal during the Soeharto era.

Paradigma Baru*: the first reform initiative*

In addition to strengthening his leadership within ABRI, Wiranto was given the task of restoring its credibility in society after Soeharto's resignation. Social criticism of ABRI erupted following Habibie's decision to liberate media activities and grant freedom of the press in June 1998. Reports about ABRI's past human rights abuses quickly spread through the media and its reputation suffered from a deluge of revelation. Public opinion surveys confirmed ABRI's loss of public trust.[23] After the media revealed the massacre of Muslims by the military in Aceh, calls mounted from the very core of the Habibie government, supported by ICMI, for clipping the wings of the military. Under the banner of *reformasi*, civilian political leaders, intellectuals and the general public put collective pressure on Wiranto and the military, identifying ABRI as *Paket Orde Baru*, or part of the Soeharto regime that should be blamed for past abuses and current problems. It was under these circumstances that the termination of *dwifungsi* soon became a major focus of public political demands. On the streets, demonstrators called for ABRI's return to the barracks, meaning a withdrawal from politics.

To cope with these pressures, Wiranto surrounded himself with 'intellectual' officers – such as Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Agus Widjojo and Agus Wirahadikusumah – and embarked on a reform drive designed to undercut ABRI's critics, bolster its credibility and preserve its influence. As discussed in Chapter 3, these officers had studied military reforms and insisted on the need for revising ABRI's role in society since the late New Order period. Now Kassospol, Yudhoyono immediately publicized ABRI's plan to downsize its political activities.[24] Under his leadership, ABRI presented the first reform vision in June. In the paper, entitled 'ABRI and Reform', it was argued, among other things, that ABRI fully supported the transition of national leadership from Soeharto to Habibie, and that it would have a firm commitment to reforms aimed at facilitating recovery from national crisis. Drawing on the 1996 Army Seminar coordinated by the three officers listed above, the paper emphasized the problem of concentrating political power under the Executive branch as it became a source of corruption, collusion and nepotism. Also regarding *dwifungsi*, the paper echoed the 1996 Army Seminar, insisting on the need for revising 'implementations' of *dwifungsi* in accord with the changing

demands of the time.[25] In this way, the Wiranto leadership in its first reform vision asserted that the principle of *dwifungsi* was still relevant, but contemplated an altered implementation to alleviate criticism – an interpretation widely shared among military elites during the late Soeharto period, as seen in previous chapters.

However, this limited reinterpretation of *dwifungsi* was far from sufficient to ease growing public criticism of ABRI. Distrust of the military was fanned by a constant stream of stories in the mass media about past atrocities, creating a context in which half-measures were unacceptable and viewed quite frankly as efforts by the military to retain its pervasive influence. Forced to show a more positive vision of reform, Wiranto, in August, announced ABRI's decision to reduce the troops deployed in East Timor, Irian Jaya and Aceh, and terminated the status of Military Operations Zone, or *Daerah Operasi Militer* (DOM), which had been imposed on the three regions since the late 1980s. These DOMs were seen to provide the military with carte blanche in adopting repressive measures against government opponents, and thus were viewed as vehicles of human rights abuses and military excesses against local people.[26] Regarding Aceh in particular, Wiranto apologized for the misdeeds of the past for the first time ever in Indonesian history as ABRI Commander.

In the face of lingering public criticism of *dwifungsi*, the Wiranto leadership also decided to reduce the number of ABRI representatives in the DPR from the current 75 to 38, and declared that ABRI would no longer support Golkar. Wiranto also decided to separate the police force from the military organization. It was Agus Widjojo who handled this organizational restructuring. He explained, 'although there are still many within ABRI who believe the separation is too radical, we expect this reform to be the first significant step to professionalize the military. House-cleaning should be done quickly before the resistance forces consolidate their power'.[27] Yudhoyono also endeavoured to regain the lost credibility of ABRI. He openly acknowledged that ABRI had committed numerous misdeeds in the past, publicly pledging that the military would reduce its political involvement and support *reformasi*.[28] Recalling these accommodative responses to pressures for democratization, Wiranto admitted that 'in many of these occasions I relied on my staff such as Yudhoyono, Widjojo, and Wirahadikusumah'.[29]

The basic vision for post-Soeharto military reform was presented at the ABRI seminar in September 1998, following the elimination of the Prabowo circle outlined above. At the seminar held at Sesko ABRI, discussions focused on *dwifungsi* and the future role and functions of ABRI, with civilian intellectuals from both Indonesia and overseas also participating. Like the 1996 Army Seminar, the event was convened by a group of intellectual officers, such as Yudhoyono, Widjojo and Wirahadikusumah who just became the head of the officers' education branch in the army as Seskoad Commander. The seminar officially acknowledged that ABRI's involvement in recent cases of human rights abuses, such as the abduction of student activists, the Trisakti shootings and the May riots, had totally destroyed ABRI's credibility in society.[30] Why

had ABRI become involved in such actions? Widjojo argued that 'ABRI's policy became inflexible as Soeharto used the military to protect his personal interests', and complained that by doing so the President had inflicted considerable damage on the institutional integrity and the public legitimacy of the armed forces.[31] As seen in previous chapters, his argument reflected a view shared by reform-minded officers who felt that the military was being misused and put at risk as a 'tool' of government repression. Widjojo went on to reject an official statement at the seminar that said ABRI had long been eager to reform itself, arguing that if this indeed had been the case, the reform effort should have been made earlier.[32] The 1998 ABRI seminar generated a reformist agenda outlined as the *Paradigma Baru ABRI*, or ABRI's New Paradigm. This was an effort to reinvent and reposition ABRI and articulate its fundamental stance during the ongoing regime transition. The four key aspects of this new paradigm are:

1 ABRI's disengagement from 'the forefront of politics';
2 shifting ABRI's role from that of 'controlling' politics to 'influencing' politics;
3 shifting ABRI's political commitment from the forefront of things, from a 'direct' role to an 'indirect' role; and
4 sharing power with civilians.[33]

Based on these points, the New Paradigm declares that ABRI should actively participate in developing democracy and civil society in accordance with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution; an argument which had been developed by the reform-minded officers over the previous few years.[34] The result of the seminar was soon published as a booklet on Armed Forces Day (5 October).[35] ABRI's New Paradigm, however, immediately drew criticism for being too abstract and too difficult to evaluate and monitor. A sceptical media and public were not satisfied with empty rhetoric and political posturing; the public wanted ABRI out of politics and viewed the New Paradigm as old wine in a new bottle.

In response to pressures for a more fundamental reassessment of ABRI's political role, Yudhoyono initiated further steps to promote ABRI's reform. He proposed abolishing the sociopolitical section at ABRI Headquarters and replacing it with a territorial section in November. This move gave Yudhoyono himself the position of Chief of Territorial Affairs (Kaster). The new policy promised an end to the seconding of military personnel to non-military government posts – i.e. *kekaryaan* – and thus tried to convince society that the military as an institution was serious about not meddling in *kekaryaan* activities. This decision was followed by the elimination of sociopolitical branches at Kodam, Korem and Kodim. With these reforms, Wiranto sought to meet public demands for ABRI to withdraw from day-to-day politics at both the national and regional levels. There was also an argument within his inner circle about replacing the sociopolitical section with a territorial bureau. Agus Widjojo maintained that

'even the territorial system was no longer legitimate, because it was initially established for managing political affairs now more properly the task of civilian authorities. The territorial structure is needed only during emergency situations'.[36]

This flurry of reform initiatives during the first six months after the fall of Soeharto indicates that reform-minded officers played a leading role in recasting the military and enjoyed the support of Wiranto. They emphasized the institutional need to recover public trust in ABRI which had been shattered, in their view, by military misconduct during the final years of the Soeharto government. They saw these abuses and excesses as aberrations in the institutional profile of ABRI and pinned the blame on Soeharto, Prabowo and his allies for betraying the public trust and ruining the reputation of the military. In institutional terms, Kopassus was seen as the source of instigating these self-inflicted wounds. Thus, ABRI sought to shift responsibility for the misconduct onto these personal and institutional scapegoats as a means to preserve the institutional integrity of the military and ensure its continued influence in the polity.

In addition, in terms of personal agendas, Wiranto sought to distance himself from the abuses of power and portray himself as a born-again reformer, an image deemed necessary for consolidating his position within the military. By championing reform and responding to public criticism Wiranto aimed to deflect demands for a complete return to the barracks and restore morale among officers who suddenly found themselves the object of public anger and derision. For an institution that prided itself as the custodian of national security and advocate of social development, the depth of public resentment was shocking and threatened the legitimacy of ABRI as arbiter of national affairs. ABRI deemed its legitimacy sacrosanct due to its role as 'national saviour' during the revolution for independence (1945–1949) and its 'success' in countering the alleged coup by the PKI in 1965. Now it was being blamed for political repression during the New Order, a charge that startled the 'best and the brightest', who had always rationalized their actions in terms of the nation's best interests.

Wiranto was savvy enough to realize that consolidating his leadership within the military thus involved both responding to public demands and to the needs of a demoralized officer corps eager to be viewed as competent professionals with an important role to play in the national arena. Eliminating Prabowo's influence was crucial to both ends. As ABRI's reform propaganda involved references to the 'past mistakes' of 'certain officers', emphasizing reform was aimed at distancing the institution from the abuses and served to either alienate hardcore Prabowo remnants within ABRI or encourage them to defect to the pro-*reformasi* view, in both cases speeding up the process of *de-Prabowo-isasi*. For Wiranto, purging the Prabowo circle and conducting military reform were mutually reinforcing policies. This explains why Wiranto lent his support to 'reform-minded' officers in this early stage of the post-Soeharto transition. In this sense, reform initiatives can be seen as political theatre orchestrated by Wiranto.

The Habibie–Wiranto relationship

Alat mati pemerintah

As described above, Wiranto's aides were making moves to recast ABRI's image and shed the label of *alat mati pemerintah*, or 'dead tool of the government', and restore its credibility by embracing reform. On the other hand, the Habibie government's political use of the military as its own tool was evident.

At the time of personnel changes in May 1998, Wiranto chose Maj. Gen. Johny Lumintang to succeed Prabowo as Kostrad Commander. But the ICMI camp that formed the core of the Habibie government demanded Wiranto retract the appointment because Lumintang was a Catholic, not a Muslim. Wiranto had no choice but to comply with this demand.[37] In preparation for the Golkar party congress in July, Wiranto was also instructed to secure the votes of regional representatives in favour of Akbar Tandjung, Habibie's close aide, as the party's new chairman. When the MPR's special session voted to formalize Habibie's interim government in November 1998, the government organized 'private security groups', or *pamswakarsa*, of militant Muslim groups to counter students' street demonstrations demanding the ousting of Habibie's government. The 'reformist' group within ABRI wanted to distance itself from this confrontation, due to concerns over security problems following clashes between the two camps and over the surge of radical Muslim groups. But Wiranto, at the request of the Habibie circle, instructed ICMI-linked officers such as Lt. Gen. Fachrul Razi (Chief of General Affairs to the Military Commander [Kasum]) and the once-sidelined Maj. Gen. Kivlan Zein to mobilize *pamswakarsa*. Radical Islamic groups such as Islamic Defenders Front, or Front Pembela Islam (FPI), were established and welcomed because of their relatively high motivation to 'fight' against the anti-Habibie movements which were identified by the government as communist influenced. The campaign of Balatkom, which we discussed in Chapter 5, was now revived by Wiranto who attempted to provide political support to the Habibie administration.[38] All these developments frustrated many officers who had led the reform programme within ABRI. Some claimed that 'Wiranto has turned out to be *golek* (a puppet)' and 'reform cannot move forward under these circumstances'.[39]

Wiranto's position was uneasy during the six months between the birth of the Habibie government and the MPR in November 1998. As ABRI Commander, he needed to identify with the 'new' ABRI, and thus he valued the reformist circle's opinions, for example, the rejection of 'outside' interference in military promotions and the elimination of its image as a tool of the ruling government. Yet, as a cabinet minister, Wiranto found it difficult to turn down the requests for help from the President in his own bid to consolidate his power. As the handpicked successor to Soeharto, Habibie suffered from his close ties to the unpopular former President and lacked legitimacy. To secure Wiranto's allegiance to Habibie and to strengthen the foundation of the new government, the ICMI camp within the Cabinet – notably Adi Sasono (Minister of Small Businesses and

Cooperatives), Gen. (ret.) Faisal Tanjung (Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs) and Lt. Gen. (ret.) Syarwan Hamid (Minister of Internal Affairs) – frequently tried to reduce Wiranto's power by proposing the separation of his dual posts of Menhankam and ABRI Commander and placing an ICMI-friendly general in the position of ABRI Commander. Acceptable candidates included Hendropriyono (Minister of Transmigration), Yunus Yosfiah (Minister of Information) – both active lieutenant generals – and KSAD, General Subagyo.[40] Wiranto's aides gradually understood the intention of these political machinations and insisted that 'ICMI is intentionally trying to pull the teeth of the Wiranto leadership and this is becoming the biggest threat to ABRI'.[41]

The officers taking part in the planning of ABRI's reform programme drew many lessons from the first six months of the post-Soeharto period. There was no other way to restore the military's social credibility than respond appropriately to powerful demands – both from within and outside the government – for the end to *dwifungsi*. Reform-minded officers insisted on the legitimacy of their initiatives within ABRI based on this assessment. They were also convinced in these six months that there were structural problems in the relationship between the President and the military and that the President – regardless of whoever held the post – would continue to use the military as a tool to advance his/her personal interests. As we shall see below, this lesson evolved into a reform proposal that the authority and powers of the President – the supreme commander of ABRI – should also be strictly limited.

Wiranto's political autonomy

In November 1998 the MPR conferred legitimacy on Habibie's interim government, with the President gaining temporary approval from parliament until the national elections scheduled for May 1999. From this time, Wiranto's position within the government began to change and, borrowing the words of his aides cited above, he was able to cut the wires used to control the 'puppet'.

The biggest turning point came with the personnel reshuffle in January 1999. Wiranto transferred Fachrul Razi and several other senior officers to sinecure posts, while installing Lumintang in the post of Deputy Army Chief. ICMI's newspaper, *Republika*, voiced doubts about Wiranto's intentions by running a four-day campaign about the demotion of Fachrul as Kasum and the promotion of Lumintang, which it described as Wiranto's purging of 'green' – or Islamic – officers.[42] Wiranto himself explained that the changes were made to consolidate ABRI's position for the general and presidential elections, scheduled in May and October 1999. In fact, the reshuffle was intended to pave the way for Wiranto to secure a free hand to tackle the coming big national events by reducing the influence of the Habibie–ICMI circle on ABRI via the dismissal of Fachrul who was close to Faisal Tanjung and ICMI figures.

The January reshuffle also targeted officers connected to Prabowo, including Maj. Gen. Zacky Anwar Makarim, Head of BIA, Maj. Gen. Djoko Subroto, East Java Military Commander, and Maj. Gen. Ismed Yuzairi, North Sumatra

Military Commander.[43] On the other hand, Agus Widjojo was promoted to the Commander of Sesko ABRI and Wirahadikusumah replaced Widjojo as the Assistant for General Planning to the ABRI Commander. With the rise of the reformist circle, the foundation seemed to have been strengthened for army reformers who had insisted on the need for casting off the image of *alat mati pemerintah*.

In fact, soon after the January reshuffle, Wiranto called together major civilian leaders critical of the Habibie government – namely, Megawati, Amien Rais, Abdurrahman Wahid (popularly called Gus Dur) and Nurcholis Majid – for an exchange of views. Wiranto later stated that ABRI obtained the support of these figures at the gathering, which came to be known as the 'Ciganjur-plus' meeting.[44] It was no wonder that people around Habibie grew wary of Wiranto's attempt to distance himself from the Habibie circle. Two months earlier, *Duta Masyarakat*, a newspaper owned by Nahdatul Ulama (NU) – the backbone of support for Gus Dur – played up Wiranto as 'a presidential candidate of *ulama* (Muslim teachers)'. The Ciganjur-plus confab came just as the Habibie circle started turning a suspicious eye on the Wiranto–Wahid rapprochement. At any rate, the January reshuffle effectively enhanced Wiranto's relative autonomy *vis-à-vis* the Habibie camp, and it resonated with ABRI's institutional claim of not being reduced to, or being compromised as, *alat mati pemerintah*.

But Wiranto, as an individual, did not necessarily always represent the military as an organization. It should be noted that the Ciganjur-plus meeting came against the background of the so-called '*ninja* killing', the serial murders of over 100 NU leaders by unidentified groups in East Java, Gus Dur's stronghold, from around mid-1998. Since Gus Dur was thought to be manoeuvring to make Megawati the next president at the time, the killings were believed to be an organized campaign of political terrorism aimed at undermining Gus Dur's support base, just like similar incidents in 1996 (see Chapter 2).[45] Gus Dur reportedly asked Wiranto for the removal of East Java Military Commander Djoko Subroto. The rapprochement between Wiranto and Gus Dur produced mutual benefits. For Wiranto, friendly ties with Gus Dur would enhance his bargaining power in future political negotiations while for Gus Dur, Wiranto offered protection for the NU as well as his own leadership over it.

Having gained relative autonomy from the Habibie camp, Wiranto became more active in national political affairs. Here, the utility of reform-minded assistants was very limited since his involvement contradicted their espoused principles for ABRI's curtailed political role. Having weakened the influence of generals close to ICMI as well as Prabowo, Wiranto set out to promote officers who shared the same background with him – i.e. the experience of having served for Soeharto. Wiranto appointed Lt. Gen. Sugiono to replace Fachrul as Kasum and Maj. Gen. Tyasno to succeed Zacky as Head of BIA. Along with Maj. Gen. Endriartono Sutarto whom Wiranto selected as Assistant for Operations to the ABRI Commander three months earlier, both Sugiono and Tyasno were Soeharto's ex-bodyguards. The new appointees brought fresh political dynamics

into the inner circle of Wiranto's leadership as a force quite different from the 'reformist', 'intellectual' officers began to compete with them in shaping and taking initiatives within ABRI. Those around Yudhoyono had concerns that ABRI's reform plan would be watered down if Sugiono later became Army Chief over Yudhoyono.[46] Widjojo also had misgivings, saying that 'Wiranto will choose Yudhoyono as KSAD if the weight of *reformasi* overcomes political ambitions in his mind'.[47] By diversifying his support base in the military, Wiranto seemed to have built a system under which opposing groups had to depend on him reigning over them. The method was exactly the same as that used by Soeharto, his mentor, in his day.

Politics of change and status quo

The second reform initiative

The new intra-military power balance began to affect the direction of ABRI's adaptation to democratic change. In mid-1999 Widjojo lamented, 'There is no reformist within the real core of current ABRI leadership. Without external pressures, we are unable to proceed the project'.[48] Having emphasized the 'pressure from society', reform-minded officers attempted to regain their initiative by asserting further drastic reform of ABRI. It was Agus Wirahadikusumah who moved first. Just before he left Seskoad as the Commander, he organized an internal seminar which later produced a report distributed within ABRI in March 1999. In the report, Wirahadikusumah's close friend, Brig. Gen. Saurip Kadi – Wiranto's personal adviser on special affairs and Yudhoyono's Akabri classmate – straightforwardly advocated the need for more radical reforms. Looking back on the Soeharto years, Saurip acknowledged that groups of the military elite were involved in a series of riots that occurred from around 1997 until Soeharto's resignation, blaming the involvement on Soeharto's political exploitation of the military. The assessment was harsh on former Soeharto aides who had now begun to enjoy Wiranto's backing. Saurip stressed that the military was being called upon to cease political activities voluntarily. He called for the outright abolition of *dwifungsi*, instead of its 'redefinition' as advocated by the New Paradigm, and suggested the total elimination of ABRI representatives in the DPR. Saurip then maintained that the number and function of Kopassus should be reduced and the role of the navy upgraded. In his view, through these measures, ABRI could recoup its lost credibility in society.[49]

While the reform-minded officers tended to emphasize *kepercayaan rakyat*, or social credibility, and attempted to retain their initiative within the military by asserting their reform agendas as the organizational priority, others countered by underlining the importance of strengthening ABRI's role in the transition period and playing up the crisis of 'social unrest' to justify enhanced powers. In March 1999, discussions under KSAD Subagyo led to a proposal to increase the number of Kodam from ten to seventeen; Wiranto approved the proposal.[50] The increase in Kodams was explained as a step desired by society to prevent the

nation's disintegration and to tackle the turbulence that enveloped Aceh, Ambon, Kalimantan, Irian Jaya, Sulawesi, East Timor and other places following the breakdown of Soeharto's highly repressive state.[51] The decision to expand the territorial role of ABRI invited strong criticism from civilian intellectuals and human rights groups regarding the perceived desire of ABRI to revert to its old pattern of oppression. Wiranto flatly rejected the criticism by insisting that the unity and stability of the nation was the supreme goal of the military and that the new Kodam arrangement merely reflected ABRI's commitment to it.[52] As we saw before, territorial command was not part of the major civil–military dispute during the late New Order period, and this helped officers believe that its development for dealing with new 'defence' issues had nothing to do with *dwifungsi*. Based on this logic, the increase in the number of Kodam was set to be completed within five years, with one new area already created in Ambon (Kodam XVI/Pattimula).

For the reformist officers, delaying the tempo of military reform due to political unrest was just a means of avoiding the problem. It was argued that 'unless the military pushes ahead with painstaking, piercing self-reform to realize an early restoration of our prestige, we would forever be regarded as a "second-class citizen" and even our reasonable proposals in the interests of the nation would not be accepted'.[53] Following the above-mentioned seminar at the Seskoad, led by Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, further reform proposals were prepared in April by Sesko ABRI – renamed Sesko TNI – headed by Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo.[54] Major suggestions in the internal report were as follows:

1 Conduct a comprehensive review of the traditional ground battle-based defence philosophy and strategy (i.e. guerrilla warfare and territorial management) in order to rebuild the military focusing on maritime defence.
2 Dismantle the Hankamneg, or National Security Doctrine, which has been based on territorial management, and formulate a new basic doctrine.
3 Clarify the demarcation between the *pertahanan* (defence) and *keamanan* (security) fields, with the former to be managed by the Army, Navy and Air Force and the latter by the Police. The three military forces should not meddle in security affairs.
4 Replace the existing Mabes TNI (Military Headquarters) with the Joint Chiefs of Staff System. The post of Joint Chief, who sits at the top of the military hierarchy, shall not be appointed by the President. The Joint Chief shall be a coordinator of the three forces, and with the term of office limited to three years, he shall advise the President/Supreme Commander.
5 Abolish the posts of Kodam, Korem and Kodim commanders, with the control of their troops transferred to provincial governors and appropriate regional heads. The control of police forces should be transferred similarly.[55]

These proposals were – if implemented – the obvious step towards transforming the Indonesian military into a modern armed forces. Reconsidering the defence philosophy of territorial management that historically provided the theoretical

basis for *dwifungsi* would imply overturning the legitimacy of the military's political role.[56] The curtailment of the powers of the President and the TNI Commander is a step essential to prevent the military's politicization and promote professional orientation in the military. Furthermore, the transfer of regional military authority to provincial governors and district heads should be regarded as a progressive reform vision leading to eventual civilian control of the military.

Unfortunately these proposals met with resistance from Army Headquarters. The army presented its views in a document entitled 'Basic Postures on Army Power in the 21st Century', at the 1999 Armed Forces Seminar held in May of that year.[57] The document insisted that Hankamneg was still relevant and that internal security was more important than external defence in the coming fifteen years, and thus it was necessary to enhance the army's intelligence capabilities.[58] The expansion of Kodam was also rationalized as a measure to improve territorial control capabilities which would contribute to the prevention of national disintegration.[59] Therefore, the document continued, the army had no intention of downsizing either Kostrad or Kopassus. Furthermore, the paper argued that it was difficult in purely practical terms to draw a line between *pertahanan* and *keamanan* and that the army had responsibility for both under law.[60] On the last point, the police voiced misgivings about the army's position at the seminar. It was argued that although the police should not be a tool of political power, it was still mobilized for politically tinged activities due to the lack of command authority over security matters and poor coordination with the army in the field.[61]

The cleavage between the 'reformist' and 'status quo' circles erupted into open battle at the 1999 Armed Forces Seminar. As discussed above, the reformist-led seminar in 1998 produced the New Paradigm primarily in order to modify TNI's role in accordance with democratic pressures. However, the reform initiative stagnated due to pressure from military groups favouring the status quo. Wiranto's balancing act in the TNI empowered officers who emphasized the establishment of a 'strong' military to tackle the problems of security and stability, effectively countering the initiatives of reformists. One high-ranking officer commented: 'The momentum for reform was fading in TNI as Wiranto became absorbed more in politics. Now Wiranto does not try to take a look or show any interest in reform plans we have drafted after days of careful discussions'.[62]

In fact, the political climate surrounding Wiranto took a sudden turn, largely due to the general elections and the East Timor problem. Ahead of the approaching general elections in June 1999 and the presidential election in November, civilian political elites were more or less absorbed in party politics. First, the result of the general elections weakened Golkar, Habibie's support base. Its second-place showing indicated that voters did not confer legitimacy on the existing government. As the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the top party led by Megawati, failed to win a majority, however, the world of party politics was utterly preoccupied with the question of the sort of a coalition

to be forged.[63] In terms of civil–military relations, such a situation changed the climate and vitiated political pressures on ABRI to reform. Unified pressure on the military from political society – witnessed in the six months from May 1998 – no longer existed. Both the Habibie and Megawati camps wooed Wiranto because of the block of thirty-eight DPR seats controlled by the TNI. The logic of the power game dominated the political scene, with both sides informally offering the post of vice-president to Wiranto as soon as the general elections were over.

For the reformist officers, Wiranto's move into politics was a source of concern because they feared it could stall the momentum of military reform and invite continued politicization of the military. Anticipating such developments, Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, at an open seminar held at the University of Indonesia in May, insisted that the Military/Police faction (F-TNI/Polri) in the DPR should abstain from voting in the presidential election to demonstrate the military's 'genuine neutrality'. He also asserted that those within the military who aspired to be a president or a governor should first take off their uniforms.[64] On a separate occasion, Yudhoyono predicted that politics would divide F-TNI/Polri and its thirty-eight votes would not go to a single candidate. These statements created a stir and Wiranto took immediate action to contain the dispute. In an interview with *Tempo* magazine, he said that 'the military representative would lose its being if it abstained in the voting', insisting that the TNI Headquarters would instruct the F-TNI/Polri how to vote. Touching on the principle of the New Paradigm that the military would not be at the forefront of politics, Wiranto said the presidential election would be an exception.[65] Wiranto then admonished Wirahadikusumah and Yudhoyono, telling them to keep quiet.[66] In fact, since that incident, Maj. Gen. Dradjat Sudradjat, Chief of the Military Information Centre, seemingly took over Yudhoyono's role as chief spokesman for the military. Sudradjat accused Wirahadikusumah of being 'childish' as he only became critical of Wiranto after being marginalized.[67] The widening rift between Wiranto, as a politician, and the reform-minded officers was becoming increasingly discernible.

Second, the East Timor problem brought the military closer to the forefront of politics. Detailed discussion should wait until further study, but at least the following two points should be noted in relation to our argument.[68] First, the Habibie–Wiranto relationship was reversed in Wiranto's favour during events in East Timor, from the UN-led referendum on 30 August to the declaration of a military emergency on 7 September and Indonesia's acceptance of a multinational peace force on 12 September.[69] While the Habibie camp put the option of integration to a vote with approval of independence depending on the outcome of the referendum, Wiranto's military went all out to mobilize pro-integration militias to intimidate pro-independence citizens by resorting to violence.[70] Nevertheless, Habibie took all the blame for the post-referendum turbulence in East Timor and for the acceptance of a multinational force to pick up the pieces. Demonstrators demanding his resignation swamped the streets in Jakarta. This came as a serious blow to Habibie who had already been driven into a corner by the Bali Bank

financial scandal. Amid the rising nationalist sentiment against international criticisms over Indonesia's handling of East Timor, Wiranto, portrayed as a 'patriot', had already dwarfed Habibie.

A shift in the power balance within the military was also evident with events in East Timor. TNI leaders played a part in the mobilization of pro-integration militias in East Timor and the killings of pro-independence citizens. The degree to which Wiranto was involved in these actions is not clear, but it seems certain that he directly reinstated Zacky, Sjafrie and others who previously belonged to the Prabowo clan to engage in special missions in East Timor where their 'skills' in 'black-bag' jobs could be brought to bear.[71] This fact suggests that, at the least, Wiranto had confidence in them and was both aware, and in full control, of military actions in East Timor. An army officer said before the referendum: 'We were kept in the dark as to the policy towards the referendum. Wiranto's operational assistants may know. But we have deep concerns about his deployment of such people like Zacky and Sjafrie'.[72]

The growing presence of security-intelligence specialists in Wiranto's inner circle further diluted the influence of the intellectual reformers. Accentuating this shift, Wiranto also expanded the military's intelligence sector in July 1999, reviving the Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS) of the Soeharto years – the predecessor of BIA but with greater authority – and named Maj. Gen. Tyasno to head it with the rank of lieutenant general. As the reformist circle wanted to re-establish their initiative by pushing Yudhoyono for the next Army Chief, the group had misgivings about Wiranto's promotion of Tyasno. One Wiranto loyalist dismissed the reformist group's attitude out of hand, saying, 'there are too many officers who complain when they fail to get promotions'.[73] Reflecting the growing influence of the pro-status quo group within the TNI and its success in slowing military reform, as demonstrated by the new Kodams and BAIS, civilian intellectuals increasingly complained that TNI's self-reform was 'half-hearted' and unenthusiastic about democratic change.[74] In response to such criticism, the reformist group held a meeting with academics in August, where a flurry of criticisms were voiced against the plan to increase the numbers of Kodam and the revival of BAIS. Yudhoyono admitted that the influence of the status quo elements was so strong that the reforms were now on hold.[75] In the face of resistance from these elements and the political aspirations of Wiranto, the *Paradigma Baru* group lost the initiative within the military.

Coping with the presidential election

The new balance of power within the military was supposed to give Wiranto a free hand in dealing with the political process, starting with Habibie's accountability speech on 19 October, the presidential election on 20 October and the vice-presidential election on 21 October. For Wiranto, who had consolidated his leadership and bolstered his political ambitions by sidelining frustrated reformist officers and empowering the status quo group, it was not an unrealistic dream to seek the post of vice-president. Despite general public sentiment that the military

should refrain from civilian politics, every presidential candidate, in light of prevailing political realities, had considered the possibility of having Wiranto as running mate;[76] after all, he held the command of both security forces and F-TNI's thirty-eight seats in the DPR. The developments during these three days changed with dizzying rapidity, almost by the hour, and as information cannot be substantiated so easily, it is difficult to reliably relate the full story.[77] As a result, our observations here focus on the process of Wiranto's coping with the politics of the presidential elections.

From Habibie to Gus Dur

On 18 October, the eve of Habibie's accountability speech, Wiranto appeared on TV to announce that he would not run as Golkar's vice-presidential candidate. Wiranto mentioned that he had not received a 'formal' request from Golkar to run, but also said that he was prepared to take the post of vice-president if the 'people' wanted him to do so. Wiranto would not have sent this message if he had no interest in the job. The statement was interpreted as a slap in the face of Golkar Party chairman, Akbar Tandjung. The previous day Akbar had announced that Habibie had formally asked Wiranto to run as his running mate and that Wiranto had declined Habibie's request. Puzzled and angered by Akbar's announcement, Wiranto on the following day issued the above statement to express criticism against the Golkar leader and to send a signal that he remained interested in the post of vice-president. However, he had second thoughts about teaming up with Habibie, reflecting the advice of several generals, including intellectuals, four commanders of Kodams in Java and Tyasno's BAIS, who warned of the risk involved in joining hands with the President. In their view, such a move might endanger the security situation by provoking a backlash by anti-Golkar elements and pro-democracy activists still wary of a military role in politics.

As a result of Akbar's statement and the advice of his military aides, Wiranto decided to abandon Habibie. Some insiders even believe that Wiranto then contacted Lt. Gen. (ret.) Hari Sabarno, deputy speaker of the MPR and former chairman of the military faction of the DPR, to instruct F-TNI/Polri to vote to reject the President's accountability speech.[78] Unfortunately, since it was a secret vote, there is no knowing what the actual vote distribution was, although the speech was certainly rejected.

Before dawn on 20 October, a meeting was held at Habibie's residence following the rejection at the MPR.[79] The action prompted Habibie's withdrawal from the presidential race, and led to speculation that Akbar would be the new Golkar candidate with Wiranto as his running mate. Wiranto was present at the meeting to decide Golkar's new election strategy, and in an effort to boost his political ambitions reportedly cited his helping hand in making Akbar Golkar Chairman in July 1998. However, strong Habibie supporters within Golkar, who denounced Akbar for betraying Habibie, pressed the party leadership to support Gus Dur. Gus Dur was backed by the Islamic 'Central

Axis' (*Poros Tengah*), a loose coalition of Islamic parties led by Amien Rais. After an exchange of views with Gus Dur, Akbar notified Wiranto of Golkar's decision to vote for Gus Dur at the election. Once again, Wiranto was wrong-footed and had to negotiate yet another presidential candidate. Following these talks, Wiranto instructed F-TNI/Polri to vote for Gus Dur, not for Megawati.[80]

As soon as he was elected President, Gus Dur began consultations on who should fill the post of vice-president. Megawati, who felt betrayed by Wahid, maintained her stubborn stance until the last moment, insisting that she would not take the post if she had to go through another vote in the MPR. To compound matters, Gus Dur himself said that after his election as President he would like to have a person good at practical matters, i.e. not Megawati, because of his poor health.[81] The possibility of fielding Wiranto was discussed, but Amien Rais opposed this suggestion. Wiranto proceeded to collect the signatures of seventy-four members in the MPR and announced his candidacy, adopting the stance that he was requested to run by representatives of the 'people'. Wiranto knew the seventy-four votes would not hand him a victory, but he calculated that he could at last win Golkar's backing by putting up his name as an official candidate.[82] Wiranto then reportedly became enraged when Akbar announced that he himself would run as Golkar's vice-presidential candidate. He immediately faxed a letter of withdrawal from candidacy to Sabarno, and MPR Speaker Amien Rais was to read that letter upon the opening of the vice-president election. Wiranto at the same time instructed F-TNI/Polri to vote for Megawati. However, as Akbar expressed his intention of bowing out immediately after the MPR session began, it was only after this that Wiranto's withdrawal became known to the members on the floor. The sequence of events apparently came as a shock to Wiranto, who felt that Akbar had gone out of his way to embarrass him.[83] Akbar for his part said he decided to drop out to avoid souring ties with TNI.[84] In the end, the ambitions of Akbar and Wiranto came to naught, although the former did become the speaker of DPR.

In this way, a three-day drama led to the last-minute election of Gus Dur as President, with Wiranto, once thought of as a shoo-in for vice-president, outmanoeuvred at the last. Nevertheless, Wiranto was rewarded for his support of the Gus Dur–Megawati administration with the powerful post of Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs (Menko Polkam). In order to maintain control of his political base in the military, Wiranto quickly relegated Wirahadikusumah to Kodam Wirabuana in Sulawesi, as its Commander, and also promoted Yudhoyono to Minister of Mines and Energy, a measure aimed at bringing an end to Yudhoyono's military career since ministers are required to be civilians.[85] These were Wiranto's efforts to neutralize his detractors in TNI who were increasingly critical about his backsliding on military reform and his political ambitions.

The post-election reshuffles

In addition to these measures, Wiranto further shuffled the military top brass soon after the inauguration of the new Cabinet towards the end of October

1999. This marked an attempt to further consolidate his power base within the TNI.[86] Navy General Widodo A.S., who had been installed as Deputy Commander of TNI, the post newly created by Wiranto the preceding July, was promoted to the post of TNI Commander. It was the first time in the history of Indonesia that a non-army general had taken the highest post in the military. This arrangement was expected to preserve Wiranto's influence after his departure from the TNI. As a navy officer, however, Widodo's influence at TNI Headquarters, long dominated by army generals, was limited. Eight Kodam Commanders were also replaced. For example, Maj. Gen. Djaja Suparman (Jakarta Military Commander) was promoted to Kostrad Commander, replacing Lt. Gen. Djamari Chaniago who became Deputy Army Chief. Djaja's Jakarta Command was inherited by Maj. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu (East Java Kodam Commander). Also Wiranto's operational assistant, Maj. Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, was promoted to Commander of Sesko TNI, replacing Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo who occupied Yudhoyono's previous post of Chief of Territorial Affairs. The new Operational Assistant for TNI Commander was Maj. Gen. Adam Damiri, a specialist in East Timor affairs who had worked as Commander of Kodam Udayana, and he was replaced by the Operational Assistant to Army Chief (Asop KSAD), Maj. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri, another East Timor specialist who – as we saw in Chapter 4 – was a colonel and the Korem Commander at the time of the Liquisa incident in 1995. The new Asop KSAD was Maj. Gen. Amir Sembiring, again an East Timor expert. And finally, the Army Chief was replaced a few days later. The new chief was Lt. Gen. Tyasno, Head of BAIS, who had cultivated Gus Dur's trust since the presidential election by discouraging Wiranto from running for the vice-presidency.[87]

It is important to recognize that Wiranto apparently favoured these officers affiliated with the operational sector within the military, while reformers who had been active in the education sector, such as Yudhoyono and Wirahadikusumah, were effectively sidelined. It was particularly since Wiranto's East Timor operations in early 1999 that 'reform-minded' intellectual officers were deprived of intra-military initiatives. Now the ascendancy of operation specialists, or 'security-first' officers, was evident. As seen above, internal military politics significantly conditioned the direction of military reform under the Habibie government. We have seen how the progress, stagnation and setback of reform reflected the faction-fighting among top generals. Since TNI's internal reform has been a major indicator in assessing the military's adaptation to the new political environment, one which embodied strong pressures for democratic change, we underline the continuity in the military's political dynamics since the late Soeharto regime – i.e. the military's response to democratic demands was hostage to elite officer politics. As we will see, this tendency became more pronounced under the Gus Dur government.

Gus Dur and Wiranto

As one of the 'caretakers' of the Gus Dur presidency, Wiranto was rewarded by being offered the powerful post of Menko Polkam in the new Cabinet launched

in October 1999. General Wiranto in mufti started to enjoy wider political influence under the new civilian government, and it soon motivated Gus Dur to marginalize him.

The opportunity to do so arrived when international society accelerated its pressure on Indonesia for further investigations into violence in East Timor after the UN-sponsored referendum in August 1999 resulted in a vote for independence. Gus Dur used this foreign pressure to reduce Wiranto's influence, pushing the newly established Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Violations in East Timor (KPP-HAM Timtim) to provide 'internationally acceptable' findings on the responsibility of TNI soldiers at that time, including Wiranto as the TNI Commander. During the investigation, the President stated that he would ask Wiranto to resign from the Cabinet if he was implicated in the East Timor violence. The commission report was finally completed by the end of January 2000 and it found Wiranto – and five other generals – culpable for a wave of killings and destruction across East Timor during 1999.[88] Wiranto called a press conference to accuse KPP-HAM of bias and a lack of evidence, insisting that he would fight for the 'truth' and implying that he was not ready to resign, even though Gus Dur had already in effect asked him to do so.[89] In response, Gus Dur, then in London, stated that if Wiranto refused to quit, he would remove him from office when he returned home. The President then instructed the new Defence Minister, Juwono Sudarsono, to tell Wiranto to step down immediately.[90] However, Wiranto ignored the demands for his resignation and continued to attend the weekly Cabinet meetings. The escalating tension between Wiranto and the President led to rumours of a coup attempt by Wiranto's followers.[91]

Gus Dur and Wiranto finally met face-to-face. Apparently, the President was initially persuaded by Wiranto, but he changed his mind the next day.[92] Wiranto was forced to be 'non-active' as a Minister. 'Gus Dur is *gila* (crazy). He sacked me without any notice. *Ibu Mega* (Vice-President Megawati) was also annoyed', insisted Wiranto.[93] But for Gus Dur, removing Wiranto – who had strong influence within the military – from the Cabinet was an important signal to both domestic and international audiences about his commitment to the rule of law and civilian control of the military. In fact, Gus Dur's decisions to dismiss Wiranto, and appoint Juwono Sudarsono as the first civilian to head the Defence Ministry, were seen at home and abroad as critical steps in asserting civilian supremacy in Indonesia.[94]

Following Wiranto's removal from the Cabinet on 14 February, Gus Dur moved quickly to consolidate his control of the military. He was well aware that many pro-Wiranto officers remained in positions of power and that they were displeased with his treatment of their boss. Among them, Lt. Gen. Djaja Suparman, the Kostrad Commander, openly challenged KPP-HAM and threatened retaliation if generals were kept 'embarrassed' by the East Timor issue. A strong statement was also issued by TNI spokesman, Maj. Gen. Dradjat Sudradjat – another Wiranto supporter – who insisted: 'if the current government is unable to solve the nation's economic and political crisis, TNI will

consult the DPR and take over the government temporarily and prepare for an early general election'.[95] Faced with the growing discontent of Wiranto loyalists, Gus Dur proceeded with a *de-Wiranto-isasi* of the military top echelon. As in previous purges, notably *de-Moerdani-sasi* and *de-Prabowo-isasi*, Gus Dur sought to ensure that the military leadership supported the political leadership.

'Radical' reform initiatives

In order to neutralize the remnants of Wiranto followers, it made sense for the President to replace them. Such an effort would have strengthened civilian control of the military. However, Gus Dur went beyond neutralizing the Wiranto clique and instead tried to cultivate his own 'loyalists' within the military. For Gus Dur, Agus Wirahadikusumah, Commander of Kodam Wirabuana, seemed the best candidate. An outspoken 'reform-minded' officer, who in November 1999 had been relegated by Wiranto to the remote island of Sulawesi, Wirahadikusumah had openly criticized his former boss by saying that Wiranto should step down from the Cabinet and become an opponent in the Golkar Party if he wanted to join the political fray.[96] This comment – which was made a few days before Wiranto became a non-active Minister – obviously overstepped the military's code of ethics but was welcomed by Gus Dur who wanted to eliminate Wiranto followers within TNI. Soon after edging Wiranto out, the President reshuffled the military's top brass. Djaja Suparman who had headed Kostrad for only three months was replaced, and Lt. Gen. Suaidi Marasabessy (Kasum TNI) – another Wiranto follower – was relegated without a new post. Instead, Wirahadikusumah was installed in the post of new Kostrad Commander and his close allies, such as Brig. Gen. Saurip Kadi and Col. Romulo Simbolon, were promoted and posted to strategic positions – Assistant for Territorial Affairs to Army Chief (Aster KSAD) and Chief of Jakarta Military Command, respectively.[97] They were all classmates from the military academy (graduates of 1973) and became popular figures when they published a book, *The New Indonesia and Challenge to TNI*, a few months prior to their promotions. In this book they insisted on the need for speeding up the process of military withdrawal from politics.[98]

Gus Dur's political patronage of officers close to Wirahadikusumah provoked anger among many officers who thought the reshuffle was unfair and biased. Suaidi himself expressed disappointment over the embarrassing decision to render him a jobless officer, while Brig. Gen. Max Tamaela, commander of the problematic area of Maluku, asserted that Suaidi was very popular in Maluku society and thus should not have been treated in such a way.[99] Jakarta Commander Maj. Gen. Ryamizard, who had long been in Kostrad, was also unhappy with the promotion of Agus Wirahadikusumah, allegedly suggesting that he lacked sufficient experience to assume the leadership of Kostrad.[100] Not only these officers, but Wirahadikusumah's former allies in the reformist camp also recognized the danger of Gus Dur's cosy relationship with the Wirahadikusumah group. Agus Widjojo, reflecting the concerns of others, complained that 'they approached Gus Dur and promised their loyalty to him in return for promotions'.[101]

The February reshuffle in this way produced another round of elite competition among generals and effectively divided them into three broad groupings – Wiranto supporters, the Wirahadikusumah group and the Widodo (TNI Commander) circle which was inclined to refrain from political manoeuvring – with a silent majority watching developments. The Widodo circle was not a solid group, but a passive gathering of two different lines of officers – i.e. intellectual staff officers who had worked for the reform campaign and now assisted Widodo's planning, and field-command officers who had led TNI's security operations. Therefore, officers in the Widodo circle were not necessarily close to each other, but did share a respect for Widodo's reluctance to engage in Gus Dur's politics. At this point, factional dynamics seemed to be dominated by a tug-of-war between Wirahadikusumah's 'radical' group and Wiranto's 'conservative' supporters, while Widodo's 'moderate' circle was sandwiched in-between. It was this factional constellation that shaped the direction of military reform under the Gus Dur government.

TNI's internal split was further accentuated by Army Chief General Tyasno Sudarto, whose pragmatic shift of loyalty from Wiranto to Gus Dur facilitated his promotion to the top army post in November 1999. Tyasno further curried favour with Gus Dur by cooperating with Wirahadikusumah, the presidential favourite. The two were not alike in personal style and background – in fact, they were in different camps under the Wiranto leadership – but both now recognized the value of the other: Wirahadikusumah needed a patron at the top of the military while Tyasno dreamed of strengthening his base for future promotion to TNI Commander as Widodo's successor. This was exactly what the Widodo circle had been worried about; one insider had already earmarked Tyasno as a 'time bomb' waiting to explode within the TNI.[102]

It was this Tyasno–Wirahadikusumah alliance that served as Gus Dur's channel of influence within the military. The risk was the growing discontent of a majority of officers who believed that this alliance was a distraction from the fundamental need for the TNI as an institution to be independent from political intervention. Gus Dur orchestrated intra-military friction by initiating unpopular personnel transfers. Many officers saw the President's tactics as inimical to the interests of the military, accentuating faction-fighting to consolidate his own power as had Soeharto before him. They also had fresh in their minds the dire consequences of the Wiranto–Prabowo struggle. It was natural for a majority of officers to be discouraged by the new civilian president, because they believed that Soeharto's manipulation of the military in support of his own political agenda had caused the downfall of the institution and the collapse of its credibility and public trust. The evolving three groups within the TNI were totally different in their orientations, but the shared negative perceptions about Gus Dur's manoeuvring in the Wiranto and Widodo circles led them to make common cause against the Tyasno–Wirahadikusumah alliance as the 'institutional' problem of the TNI that had to be eliminated.

Recognizing the chilly atmosphere within the military, the Wirahadikusumah circle soon realized that there were only two ways to overcome the intra-military

pressure on them. First was to rely on the support of the presidential palace, and second was to gain greater popularity in society. In doing so they sought to prevent any attempt to weaken their position in the military. To this end, the Wirahadikusumah circle cultivated its ties with Bondan Gunawan, the civilian State Secretary, who had become the mediator between Gus Dur and the Wirahadikusumah group, while at the same time publicizing a 'radical' military reform agenda – namely, the reduction of Kopassus troops and the abolition of the unpopular *dwifungsi* doctrine and territorial structure.[103] In promoting his reforms, Wirahadikusumah asserted that other factions represented the vested interests of the 'status quo' and a rejection of democratization. This gross simplification further fuelled the anger of reformers in the Widodo camp who were now arbitrarily and inaccurately depicted as sharing views on reform and democratization similar to Wiranto's supporters. The high-profile army leadership meeting in April 2000 reflected the views of Tyasno and Wirahadikusumah. The meeting welcomed and endorsed Gus Dur's proposals in the last month to downsize Kocpasuss and relinquish Bakorstanas, and also introduced a pilot project of eliminating the two bottom levels of TNI's territorial structure (i.e. Koramil and Kodim) in Jakarta and Surabaya, two big cities in Indonesia. Both Tyasno and Wirahadikusumah thus emphasized their commitment to internal reform.

It seemed that Gus Dur's political patronage effectively created incentives for the Tyasno–Wirahadikusumah group to speed up internal reform. As discussed previously, military reform started in 1998 when TNI implemented *Paradigma Baru*, but it stagnated in 1999 following the rise of status quo officers in the military leadership. Again, in April 2000, reforms seemed to regain a degree of momentum, reflecting the change in the power balance within the TNI. This erraticism in military adaptation to the post-Soeharto environment was inspired at this time by Gus Dur's political manoeuvring, which was aimed at promoting officers who were loyal to him. He had promised that sorting out the military would be his first priority as president and thus he set out to cultivate and nurture the alliance of Tyasno–Wirahadikusumah. A plan to appoint these two men to the most powerful posts in the military – i.e. TNI Commander and Army Chief – was consistent with his objective of ensuring political control over the military and keeping the military divided and weak. Given the tense situation the Tyasno–Wirahadikusumah group had to speed up reforms in order to undermine the power of their rivals and confer upon themselves a measure of legitimacy. Conversely, the other factions had an incentive to derail such efforts or see their own prospects fade accordingly. The danger for Gus Dur was that his actions alienated a majority of officers who resented his blatant attempts to sow division and weaken the military, driving many of them into overt or tacit support of the factions opposed to the Tyasno–Wirahadikusumah group.

Entombing the mutineer

As top military officers increasingly viewed Wirahadikusumah with displeasure, they started to find an effective way to prevent presidential intervention in the

military's personnel affairs. They found the answer in Vice-President Megawati who lost the chance of becoming president due to the 'betrayal' of Gus Dur. She viewed this as a betrayal because he had made a commitment at one time to work towards electing her as the first female president in Indonesia. Suspicious of Gus Dur's character, and still clinging to the dream of replacing him in 2004, Megawati welcomed these disaffected generals who came to petition her. Megawati soon became the patron of anti-Wirahadikusumah circles. It was in the midst of this that a controversial and damaging document was distributed in Jakarta, most likely by military officers.[104] It detailed the substance of a discussion held at the gathering of the Wirahadikusumah camp. Although the document was firmly repudiated by Bondan, Wirahadikusumah and Saurip, it reflected well the strategy of this group: lobbying Gus Dur to speed up the promotion of Tyasno as TNI Commander and Wirahadikusumah as Army Chief; and blaming Wiranto followers as the status quo force responsible for provoking a religious war in Maluku by supporting the activities of Laskar Jihad, a radical Islamic group advocating a 'holy war' against Christians there.[105] Megawati – who had also suspected Bondan's hand in undermining her PDI-P leadership – immediately asked the President for his dismissal and secured it in early June. According to a serving officer, 'Bondan was dangerous. He tried to use the military for his political ambitions. We could not stand it anymore. *Ibu Mega* (Megawati) quietly listened to us'.[106]

The departure of Bondan was a heavy blow for the Wirahadikusumah group. It was soon rumoured that Wirahadikusumah's days were also numbered. In fact, officers around Widodo were promoting just such a scenario. A few days after the removal of Bondan, TNI conducted a reshuffle and Saurip Kadi, whose name was also mentioned in the controversial document cited above, was transferred to a less important post. Wirahadikusumah himself was originally included in the reshuffle plan, but was excluded by Gus Dur who needed to convince the military by agreeing the transfer of Saurip.[107] Thus, Wirahadikusumah himself survived, but at a cost – Bondan and Saurip.

Wirahadikusumah was not silent, however. In mid-July, he sacked two of his staff in Kostrad due to their involvement in financial misconduct. He then invited public accountants to investigate the case and disclosed the in-house corruption to the press, claiming that about US$20 million disappeared from Kostrad enterprises during the time of his predecessor, Djaja Suparman.[108] The scandal invited harsh reactions from both the Wiranto and Widodo circles. Wiranto and Djaja lobbied the top brass in the military and the army headquarters for the dismissal of Wirahadikusumah, while the Widodo group rushed to Megawati to ask for her help in pressuring Gus Dur to discharge Wirahadikusumah.[109] Wiranto insisted that 'Wirahadikusumah tried to sell out TNI for his own political ambitions. He should be expelled from the organization'. Similarly, Agus Widjojo made the accusation that '… he finally betrayed the organization. He was a traitor'.[110] These statements reflect the united pressure being exerted by the Wiranto and Widodo circles against the Wirahadikusumah group. This cooperation pushed Gus Dur's loyalists to the brink.

Under these circumstances, the President, who had been pressured to dismiss his military ally, demanded in front of 300 officers that the military as a whole swear its loyalty to the current government. This demand was rejected by TNI, based on the view that the military is the 'guardian of the nation', not the 'tool of the government'. The F-TNI/Polri chairman, Lt. Gen. Hari Sabarno, openly dismissed Gus Dur's demand as improper because the TNI should be loyal to the people and the nation. This manner of military thinking had remained unchanged since the New Order era and had long served as the basis for a strong role of the military in the polity. It now provided grounds for officers to legitimize their challenge to the civilian government. Gus Dur's statement was intended as a clear warning and an attempt to assert civilian supremacy, but he soon was forced to back down as he found himself in need of military support to ensure the smooth conduct of the MPR's annual session, which would start in August 2000.

Gus Dur's political survival was in question as a growing number of critics from all major political parties, except his own PKB, now threatened to impeach him at the MPR session by exposing financial scandals implicating him.[111] Gus Dur needed to secure the 'institutional' loyalty of the TNI which handled public order in Jakarta and also controlled thirty-eight seats of F-TNI/Polri in the MPR. The bargaining power was obviously on the side of the TNI and Gus Dur finally agreed to the dismissal of Wirahadikusumah at the end of July, hoping that it would guarantee the loyalty of TNI during the MPR session. Together with Wirahadikusumah, Brig. Gen. Romulo Simbolon was discharged and both became generals without posts. Meanwhile, as many expected, Ryamizard took over the post of Kostrad Commander. These developments illustrated how Gus Dur was gradually forced out of managing the military. What became evident also was that the President, whose leadership was seriously challenged by rival party politicians, found himself in a position in which he was forced to make concessions to ensure the loyalty of the military, or at least to avert a show of defiance.

The new army leadership and the rise of 'security-first' generals

Gus Dur survived the August MPR session, but was forced to hand over the government's daily work to Vice-President Megawati in order to appease his critics who were eager to impeach him. This arrangement was, however, soon neutralized by Gus Dur who reshuffled his Cabinet immediately and created a new one based on his exclusive selection of ministers. Unsurprisingly the new Cabinet invited harsh criticism from many legislators in Golkar, *Poros Tengah* and PDI-P, who claimed that it did not reflect Megawati's voice and totally ignored the principle of 'coalition' government. Their incentive to dismiss Gus Dur increased, not only because of his self-centred practices, but also with the realization that if the government lasted until 2004, it meant only Gus Dur and his PKB would have exclusive access to the government's resources – particularly the state

treasury, the major source for siphoning off electoral campaign funds for all political parties. As the next general elections were scheduled in 2004 and the electoral campaign would start in 2003, all political parties needed to begin fundraising in 2002. This looming reality seemed to have strongly motivated legislators to pull down the new Cabinet and re-establish a coalition government that would provide all of the major parties with a share of the pie. They started to work for this goal and increase pressure on Gus Dur by threatening impeachment.

This political atmosphere effectively encouraged TNI's disrespect for the President. Moreover, the partial – but formal – transfer of day-to-day adminstration to Megawati suited TNI which was now able to lobby her in more open ways in order to influence critical political decisions. Megawati was seen by many generals as sharing their views on 'national' interests – upholding the unitary state of Indonesia based on a strong sense of nationalism. They found Gus Dur lacking in this respect, as his off-the-cuff remarks and accommodationist inclinations effectively had encouraged separatist movements both in Aceh and Irian Jaya.[112] Megawati also was not their ideal president but she was however preferable to Gus Dur in all respects – she was an ardent nationalist and was inclined to defer to the judgement of military officers on military matters. However, there was concern about her source of political support as her populist, grass-roots loyalists were also strong supporters of *reformasi* and as such were viewed as dangerously hostile to the military. Nevertheless, Megawati was useful in neutralizing the power of a wily and frustrating President.

The President–military struggle for power intensified again in October 2000. Gus Dur was especially frustrated by the behaviour of the security forces during the previous month. When the gangs in Atambua, West Timor, attacked the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and killed three foreign staff there on 6 September, Gus Dur was in the UN Headquarters in New York and was 'embarrassed' by the UN joint statement which accused the TNI of doing nothing to prevent the incident. Given widespread suspicions that the killings were orchestrated by rogue elements in the TNI, Gus Dur demanded that Widodo investigate the case. The TNI's response was grudging.[113] Gus Dur was particularly infuriated by the slow response of TNI Commander Widodo to his demand for accountability. The President was also frustrated by his hand-picked Army Chief, Tyasno, when it became known that the terrorist bomb which damaged the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) building on 13 September was prepared by two army soldiers from Kostrad and Kopassus.[114] In the face of military defiance and its apparent inability to keep its own house in order, Gus Dur planned the removal of both Widodo and Tyasno from their positions, replacing the latter with Wirahadikusumah, a former close associate who had been sidelined in the last reshuffle.

These plans, however, met concerted resistance from the military and politicians. As the rumour of a new reshuffle spread through in Jakarta, MPR Chairman Amien Rais – now the leading anti-Gus Dur figure – publicly warned that Gus Dur should be cautious in replacing the TNI Commander if he did not want to be called before a special MPR session with the power to impeach

him.[115] The President – who feared provoking a big confrontation with the DPR after his open clashes with legislators the previous August – decided to retain Widodo. He also confronted military resistance to his plans to replace Tyasno with Wirahadikusumah.

Tyasno – who had ambitions of becoming TNI Commander – moved quickly to mobilize the anti-Wirahadikusumah movement within the army. He arranged a meeting of forty-five generals at one of the army schools in Bandung in early October and collected their signatures to oppose the planned promotion of Wirahadikusumah to Army Chief and request that Tyasno court-martial Wirahadikusumah and his allies in connection with their violations of the military code of ethics.[116] Lt. Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, Tyasno's deputy, even proclaimed that he would leave the military should Wirahadikusumah become his new boss:[117] 'If the [President] persisted in promoting him, there would be very strong resistance [from the ranks] … and I worried it would harm the military', explained Sutarto.[118] This clearly illustrated how the army did not automatically subject itself to civilian rule; in this case it resisted the policies of a civilian president who was also the Supreme Commander of the TNI, at least from a constitutional perspective.

The petition was brought to Megawati and she promised to convey their concerns to Gus Dur. In facing such a high-profile challenge, Gus Dur had no choice but to withdraw his plan. The decision was favourable to Tyasno, but it was not satisfactory to the Widodo circle who also viewed Tyasno as a troublemaker. Widodo proposed that Tyasno be replaced by his deputy, Sutarto. The President agreed, but demanded that Wirahadikusumah be named Deputy Army Chief. 'Sutarto felt indebted to Tyasno and Hendropriyono, not to the President, in becoming KSAD', said an army officer who followed the developments closely.[119] With the support of anti-Gus Dur generals, Sutarto refused to work with Wirahadikusumah, and after a month installed a new deputy, Maj. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri, Sutarto's close friend since their academy days and a trusted Wiranto man who had commanded the martial law operations in post-referendum East Timor.[120]

In this way, TNI resisted Gus Dur's control of the military and successfully purged or sidelined politically ambitious Gus Dur loyalists from the army. This defiance of civilian supremacy coincided with the rise of hardline officers who emphasized institutional unity and organizational discipline, and discounted the agenda of reform programmes aimed at TNI withdrawal from non-military fields. Sutarto warned: 'TNI, the people and government are inseparable components of the state. If TNI is segregated or treated differently it could have a negative effect on the nation'.[121] This vision of civil–military relations which rejected the idea of military subordination to the civilian government was a reiteration of the very doctrine which had legitimized *dwifungsi* under the Soeharto regime. Sutarto also insisted that he did not want officers who talked too much, or who were 'salon' officers in the army. By salon officers, he meant those who only wanted to make themselves look good and curried political favour to gain promotions and appointments – a clear reference to the Wirahadikusumah group.[122]

The new Kostrad Commander, Lt. Gen. Ryamizard, also eliminated his predecessor's (Wirahadikusumah) soft image in Kostrad. Referring to the two soldiers suspected of the JSX bombing, he warned his subordinates that 'if their loyalty to the nation is in doubt, it means they are traitors and the sentence is death by firing squad'. Meanwhile, Sutarto told Kostrad troops not to be hesitant when performing their duties although they might have to deal with human rights issues. 'As long as you follow the procedures and regulations, killing or shooting at your enemy is not violating human rights', claimed Sutarto.[123] Kiki, as if endorsing Sutarto's approach, also claimed that the army had finally completed the process of internal consolidation and was ready to crush separatist movements by military means, especially in Aceh.[124]

The new army leadership, led by Sutarto, Kiki and Ryamizard, emphasized the need for a strong military to tackle effectively the security problems that had plagued the nation since the fall of Soeharto. They drew on their extensive field experience to initiate a process of rebuilding the army. Reflecting Sutarto's criticism of 'salon' officers, the new army leadership appointed Maj. Gen. William Da Costa, Kostrad Chief and an expert in militia mobilization since the early 1980s, to the post of Udayana Kodam Commander. Another East Timor specialist, Maj. Gen. Amir Sembiring, was installed as the Commander of the Army Education and Training Centre (Kodiklatad) which was subsequently used as a special training camp for soldiers from Kodams and Kopassus who would be sent to Aceh to combat the separatist movement. The new army leadership seemed to favour generals with East Timor experience and also upgraded the role of Kopassus which had seen its star decline with the fall of Prabowo.[125] These developments were not compatible with the proposals and inclinations of 'reform-minded' officers who were suspicious of the hardline reputation of the East Timor officer network and saw reform of Kopassus as critical to an overhaul of TNI. However, given regional instability and high levels of violence threatening the unitary state, Sutarto's emphasis on security was widely supported within the TNI.

The rise of 'security-first' generals was, to a large extent, a reaction to the politics of Gus Dur. His manipulation of military affairs contributed to the escalation of intra-military divisions. The split, in effect, produced a space within the military to legitimately emphasize the need for promoting institutional discipline from the top to the bottom. This atmosphere encouraged the rise of 'security-first' hardliners and it gradually undermined the influence of moderate intellectual officers who had worked, since the fall of Soeharto, to promote a 'soft image' of TNI consistent with popular demands for democratization in an attempt to recover the organization's lost social credibility. Caught between the politically ambitious officers – who portrayed themselves as 'reformers' – and the conservatives who were threatened by the process of democratic transition, the moderate institutional reformers became totally demoralized and lost the initiative. This shift of power within the TNI leadership after the fall of Wirahadikusumah and the rise of Sutarto greatly influenced the TNI's external stance. As we will discuss below, TNI's political policies were now dominated by

Sutarto and his 'security-first' hardliners who, in seeking a 'strong' military, resisted the civilian president and adopted strategies ranging from non-cooperation to sabotage and even open defiance. Such strategies eventually were to lead to the downfall of the Gus Dur government.

Sinking Gus Dur: military sabotage and dilemma

The direct cause of the Gus Dur administration's downfall was the president's conflict with the DPR/MPR. As discussed earlier, the process of democratic change in post-Soeharto Indonesia empowered the legislative branch and gave it strong powers to oversee the executive body and hold it accountable. Here, the state political power which had long been centralized under Soeharto was eroded and diffused. Both at the central and local political level, party politicians rapidly increased their relative political influence *vis-à-vis* the military–bureaucratic elites who had dominated the political arena during the New Order. This nation-wide reorganization of political power was, however, still in the transitional phase, and the rebuilding of political institutions that could absorb both the rapid expansion of political participation and the diversification of formal political actors lagged behind popular aspirations. These factors ensured that 'free' and 'liberal' political competition degenerated into a blatant, 'zero-sum' power struggle. Ignoring the fact that his government was based on a multiparty coalition, Gus Dur dismissed key Cabinet members affiliated with PDI-P, Golkar and PPP, as discussed above, and formed an almost exclusively pro-Gus Dur Cabinet, dubbed 'all-the-president's-men' after the MPR session in August 2000. Such a move antagonized all the major political parties, which gradually started to form a grand anti-Gus Dur alliance and moved to oust him from office in the middle of the presidential term by trumping up allegations about a misappropriation of funds (known as the Bulog scandal). The necessary constitutional step to impeach a president is simple: the DPR sends a 'memorandum' to denounce his wrongdoing and, if he is judged by the DPR as not positively responding, it may send a second memorandum, followed by a recommendation to the MPR to open a Special Session (*Sidang Istimewa*: SI) to dismiss the President. In this process of ousting Gus Dur, TNI made a significant contribution. We will now examine these developments in civilian–military relations and clarify the factional aspects of military responses in this political process.

The first memorandum was issued by the DPR in early February 2001. The military, via F-TNI/Polri, supported the DPR's decision by voting against Gus Dur. The President immediately fought back against what he believed to be an unconstitutional attempt by the DPR to topple the head of the nation. At the palace meeting for security affairs, he made a proposal to declare a 'civil emergency' and dissolve the DPR using the security forces. Sutarto, the Army Chief, rejected this proposal.[126] In the face of Sutarto's intransigence, Gus Dur considered bringing back Wirahadikusumah to replace Sutarto, dissolving parliament and arresting the resisting legislators. Sutarto quickly moved to prevent this scenario. In early March he orchestrated a high-profile meeting attended by

more than fifty army generals. Here, a consensus was reached to reject any outside intervention in the army's personnel affairs, and TNI's internal solidarity was emphasized to the public. Wirahadikusumah, who was asked to attend the meeting, endorsed the consensus.[127]

It was obvious that the TNI was unified in its 'mistrust' of Gus Dur. And because Sutarto was a 'straight-shooter' who openly sparred with the President, there was a public impression that TNI was united under Sutarto's leadership. However, it should be noted that the solidarity was merely limited to a shared recognition that Gus Dur was not a trustworthy person. Regarding the question of how to respond to him, there was no consensus within the TNI and, in fact, opposition against Sutarto's hardline approach to Gus Dur was evident. There were officers around Widodo who thought that explicit sabotage of Gus Dur's presidency might be viewed in society as indicative of TNI's overt rejection of civilian control of the military. These officers were concerned with further alienating public opinion about TNI and the prospect of heightened social pressures against their institution. 'The issue is very sensitive, but if the President really orders the TNI to implement his decision, we may have no choice now but to follow the President regardless of how terrible he is, because he was democratically elected', stated to one officer belonging to the Widodo circle.[128] Sutarto's approach was in fact open defiance of Gus Dur, and his disregard for the civilian control principle was a risky stance signalling little progress in the military's institutional adaptation to democratic change. However, allowing TNI to be a tool of Gus Dur and helping him derail democracy was also likely to generate negative public perceptions. This was the dilemma of 'reform-minded' officers who believed that TNI faced significant organizational risk in this turbulent transition period.

Based on this assessment, the officers attempted to find a 'third-way' which would enable TNI to avoid becoming embroiled in the Gus Dur–DPR political dispute. This mission was entrusted to their representative in the Cabinet, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who had been installed as Menko Polkam under the new Gus Dur Cabinet. Yudhoyono worked alongside Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo to prepare a third way.[129] The third way was to forge a compromise via dialogue between Gus Dur and the DPR. It was necessary to persuade Gus Dur to agree to become the symbol of state – a measure to secure his presidential post – while handing over all governmental functions to Vice-President Megawati, who would work as a virtual head of the government and form a Cabinet in which all major political parties were involved. This 'power-sharing' deal between Gus Dur and Megawati was viewed as a 'win–win' solution that would avert a destabilizing clash between the President and the DPR, forcing TNI to take sides and risk its position. Thus, Sutarto's hardline stance was not embraced by certain groups. 'Either way [helping Gus Dur or the DPR] will hurt TNI. Sutarto's behaviour is excessive', was how an army general summed up the situation, and such recognition determined the approach of the reformist officers.[130] Here, we again witness the sustained dynamics of TNI's internal split producing different external responses, this time to cope with the problem of Gus Dur.

While Yudhoyono had laboured to promote compromise, the Sutarto circle consistently engaged in high-profile resistance to Gus Dur, almost like a 'good cop, bad cop' scenario. When the DPR delivered the second 'warning' memorandum to the President in April, Sutarto not only rejected Gus Dur's repeated request to declare a civil emergency aimed at dissolving parliament, but called a gathering of more than 200 high-ranking officers to back a statement also endorsed by all Kodam Commanders to support Sutarto's army leadership. This was to prevent Gus Dur from plotting to replace Sutarto. Sutarto's defiance finally provoked an open objection from Wirahadikusumah, who had been silent for the previous few months. He insisted that declaring a civil emergency was the prerogative of the President/Supreme Commander of TNI, and thus refusing such an order was tantamount to supporting the overthrow of the government.[131] Wirahadikusumah's objection was blasted by Kostrad Commander, Ryamizard, who stated that '… there are traitors who sell the nation for their own benefits. If Kostrad soldiers follow them, harsh punishments are waiting'. Furthermore, he explained that TNI was loyal to the President and willing to protect his 'physical' security. But in terms of politics, TNI was not obliged to provide protection. 'If the people (*rakyat*) change their opinion', he continues, 'TNI will adjust itself accordingly'. Asked about how to ascertain the aspirations of the *rakyat*, Ryamizard pointed to the DPR.[132] His posture was an obvious signal that Ryamizard, like Sutarto, endorsed the anti-Gus Dur movement and the DPR's attempt to impeach him.[133]

Contrary to these Sutarto–Ryamizard initiatives, Yudhoyono and his military friends actively lobbied party leaders to find a third-way solution to avert an escalating conflict between Gus Dur and the DPR. Persuading Gus Dur was not possible however as he kept insisting that the appointment of Cabinet members – a crucial issue for the anti-Gus Dur alliance excluded from the Cabinet – could not be handed over to Megawati. Yudhoyono, who persistently promoted this power-sharing scenario to Gus Dur, was finally dismissed in June 2001.[134] The failure of Yudhoyono's third-way initiative automatically meant that Sutarto's hardline approach within the TNI prevailed. Sutarto relished this 'victory' and followed it by writing an article in *Kompas* which insisted that TNI was 'obliged' to reject a presidential order which conflicted with the national interest.[135] This view was widely supported by the DPR, even though it reflected the old *dwifungsi* mindset which saw the military – not the President – as the arbiter of the national interest. It was exactly this perception that had legitimized the military control of civilians during the New Order under Soeharto.[136] Widodo allegedly criticized Sutarto, but he was ineffective in reversing the recidivist mood within the military.[137]

As the hardline sabotage of the Sutarto circle remained constant, the President sought an alternative. He thus attempted to mobilize the police in executing his civil emergency order. Unlike TNI, which, as seen in previous chapters, was traditionally familiar with the President's political interventions, the less politically savvy police were easily manipulated. Knowing that the Police Chief, Gen. Bimantoro, was siding with Megawati, and that replacing him would be difficult

because it required the approval of an antagonistic DPR, Gus Dur moved to 'suspend' Bimantoro's active duty in June 2001.[138] The President then appointed Inspector General Chaeruddin Ismail – one of the police officers frustrated with Bimantoro's leadership – Deputy Police Chief, a post abolished by Gus Dur himself the previous April.[139] Gus Dur expected Chaeruddin to carry out his order to declare a civil emergency and Chaeruddin was duly appointed 'acting' Police Chief on 20 July. This was two days after Megawati, who had been customarily silent during many important political disputes, finally made her stance clear by stating that the special session of the MPR was constitutional and 'unavoidable' – a message that she was ready to take over the post of president. This declaration certainly encouraged Gus Dur to use Chaeruddin as his political tool in the fight against his opponents.

With news of Chaeruddin's appointment, parliamentary leaders were also informed – most probably by military sources – that Gus Dur would soon ask Chaeruddin to replace all regional police commanders in Java with amenable officers who could help transport fanatical supporters of Gus Dur posted in East Java to Jakarta within two days for a siege of the DPR building. 'This had to be stopped, otherwise we would see the clash between the Police, in helping the mass movement, and the TNI preventing a mass influx into Jakarta from all parts of Java', explained Alvin Lee, Deputy Secretary General of PAN, who had led the anti-Gus Dur alliance in the DPR.[140]

TNI also had its own concerns about the promotion of Chaeruddin. Elevation to the post of acting Police Chief gave him the rank of four-star general, which meant that he would no longer need to obey senior officers and would be on an equal status with Widodo and other service chiefs. Therefore, at least on paper, any possible move by Chaeruddin could not be stopped in accordance with the formal command structure. The promotion of Chaeruddin also shocked many Bimontoro followers in the police, who could easily anticipate the coming purge against them. Reflecting these concerns, TNI actively supported the DPR in front-loading the original timetable to request the MPR for the Special Session, arguing that since the DPR never approved the appointment of Chaeruddin, Gus Dur had seriously violated the Constitution. The attitude of the F-TNI/Polri in DPR, which voted for the early opening of the Special Session, was determined after strong lobbying from the faction's police members – obviously Bimantoro followers – who threatened to boycott the faction if the TNI members refused to vote against Gus Dur.[141] Consequently the MPR special session was held the next day, 21 July, and it announced that the MPR would decide the status of the President two days later, on 23 July.

As anticipated, Gus Dur supporters in PKB and other social groups, including NGOs and student activists, condemned the TNI for abandoning the self-imposed promises of political neutrality and non-involvement in 'everyday' politics. Gus Dur also resented F-TNI/Polri's active support of efforts to terminate his presidency. Widodo was called in and ordered to reverse the faction's decision in his capacity as TNI Commander, or face dismissal. Gus Dur also

thought of using a similar strategy in TNI to that used in the Chaeruddin case, namely, to appoint Lt. Gen. Johny Lumintang, Secretary General of the Defence Department, as Deputy TNI Commander, and 'suspend' Widodo's active service, then appoint Lumintang as acting Commander in charge of imposing martial law for dissolving the DPR. Lumintang was thus called to the presidential palace, not once but a few times, creating an impression that he did not firmly reject Gus Dur's offer.[142] These moves by the President provoked TNI to adopt a strategy of all-out confrontation under the leadership of the Sutarto circle.

Following a meeting at the Kostrad Headquarters on the day of the MPR special session, its commander, Ryamizard, proposed calling an alert gathering, or *apel kesiagaan*, of army troops on the next day, 22 July, at the National Monument (Monas) Park which was located in front of the presidential palace. When the *apel* started, not only army troops from Kostrad, Kopassus and Kodam Jaya joined the Monas gathering, but also the Marines and Air Force special troops, resulting in a final total of around 2,000 soldiers and several military tanks. Amid the efforts of Gus Dur to pressure Widodo to withdraw F-TNI/Polri's support for impeaching the President, Ryamizard – who orchestrated the *apel* – issued a statement insisting that TNI was unified and it would never repeat the experience of May 1998 when marines and army troops were on opposite sides.[143] Gus Dur, who had believed that Ryamizard was on his side, interpreted this *apel* as a show of force to support him.[144] However, the almost-blind President could not see that the cannon on the tanks gathered at Monas were all directed at the presidential palace, a strong indication that troops were not in favour of Gus Dur. What should be noted was the gap between Ryamizard's comment to the press, saying that the *apel* had the approval of the President, and the fact that the cannon were pointed at the palace. Since it was far beyond the authority of Ryamizard to muster non-Kostrad troops at Monas, the *apel* could hardly be seen as a show of support for Gus Dur.

Officers in both the Sutarto and Widodo circles shared a similar understanding of the Ryamizard initiative. Deputy Army Chief, Kiki Syahnakri, explained that the *apel* served as a 'warning' to Gus Dur who planned to mobilize his East Java supporters to counter the MPR and sought to manipulate TNI for his own political interests.[145] TNI spokesman, Vice-Marshal Graito Usodo, who had worked in the Yudhoyono circle in planning TNI's internal reforms, also insisted that the *apel* was aimed at delivering TNI's messages to Gus Dur: 'don't mess up TNI and don't provoke national instability'.[146] This clear military threat was an ultimate act of defiance and sabotage directed against Gus Dur. Significantly, it was Ryamizard who first proposed the action, which was then supported by Kiki, then Sutarto, and finally endorsed by Widodo, who was under threat of dismissal.[147] The Widodo leadership was in a position to succeed the Sutarto circle. The predominance of Sutarto's hardline approach was, to a large extent, the result of the failure of the Widodo circle to promote the Yudhoyono initiative.

Such internal military contestation produced a concern among the officers around Widodo about the Sutarto leadership. They suggested that the hardline response to Gus Dur was publicly welcomed as a reflection of military professionalism and for the sake of the nation, but the hidden agenda of either writing an article in *Kompas* or orchestrating the *apel* was aimed at cultivating Megawati, who would soon become president, and thus was in fact a politically motivated investment in the future.[148] Whether this assessment was accurate or not, we could at least recognize that the internal military contestation again produced different approaches in the TNI – namely, the softline compromise and the hardline confrontation – in responding to the political developments leading to the fall of Gus Dur.

Returning to the story, the *apel* was effective in preventing Lumintang from replacing Widodo. Assessing the stalemate, Gus Dur finally declared at midnight of 23 July his unilateral presidential decree demanding the dissolution of the DPR/MPR, the holding of general elections within a year and the banning of the Golkar Party which he labelled as a remnant of the New Order.[149] The decree – which was 'recommended' by a NU gathering of more than 4000 *kiai* (teachers of Islam) and supported by a segment of society, including a group of 81 leftist groups called the Alliance of Non-Contestant Political Parties (APNK) – could not expect TNI's active support. Rather, Gus Dur sought to send a message to TNI that it should reconsider its support for his impeachment because he commanded popular support. However, this desperate gambit was not successful in influencing the military. F-TNI/Polri joined the bandwagon of the MPR both in rejecting the President's accountability statement and in dismissing him from the presidential office. On the evening of 23 July the country's first democratically elected president was overthrown without completing his five-year term of office. The 21-month-old Gus Dur government collapsed and the President was succeeded by Megawati, who automatically became the country's fifth president. As seen above, TNI's escalating sabotage had significantly contributed to the fall of Gus Dur and the rise of Megawati.

There was no doubt that the sabotage was initiated by a group of officers who had become disillusioned with Gus Dur. Their disaffection was to a large extent provoked by Gus Dur himself who tried to manipulate TNI's personnel affairs. His political patronage stimulated the faction-fighting within the TNI, as two forces – one led by Wirahadikusumah who backed a radical reform agenda, and one led by Wiranto followers who became the target of a political purge – clashed face-to-face. The formal military leadership under the Widodo circle was in effect sandwiched between the two extremes. The limited influence of Widodo, a navy officer, in controlling the army contributed to the inability of the TNI Headquarters to stanch the spread of both anti-Wirahadikusumah feelings and distrust of Gus Dur within the army. As the Wirahadikusumah group became more isolated, a group of officers emerged who openly resisted Gus Dur's patronage and insisted on the need for creating a strong, 'disciplined', 'professional' military. This group of officers, led by Sutarto, the Army Chief,

soon dominated initiatives within the TNI and started to escalate military resistance and sabotage against Gus Dur. It was in this process that we saw the setback of TNI's democratic adaptation in the post-Soeharto period, for example, the revival of Kopassus, explicit rejection of civilian control of the military and a military threat to the civilian government. These hardline initiatives were disliked by the Widodo circle; the group was reluctant to embrace all-out confrontation with the civilian president. Ultimately their opinion proved powerless to reverse the trend.

Conclusion

We have examined chronologically the development of military politics from the last days of Soeharto in 1998 until the downfall of Gus Dur in July 2001. Soeharto's long-term dictatorship was over and a democratic transition took place. Society was liberated to participate in politics, and political competition which was heavily restricted during the New Order era soon became a societal norm. Under these circumstances, one may raise a significant question: what has and has not changed before and after the fall of Soeharto, in terms of military politics? In other words, what are the elements of change and continuity in the military's political adaptation to democracy?

Let us first confirm the elements of continuity that have been emphasized repeatedly in this chapter on the basis of arguments outlined in previous chapters. The continuity we have emphasized involves the dynamics of the military's internal contestation and how this persistently conditions its response to democratic demands.

During the late Soeharto era, Benny Moerdani and his followers contested power with Soeharto and his new loyalist generals, Feisal Tanjung and Hartono. The split produced two different approaches to democratic demands – one tactically supporting *keterbukaan* (political openness) and developing military reform visions, the other favouring the repression of the civil society movement. In the last days of Soeharto, competition between Wiranto and Prabowo created another two conflicting approaches – dialogue and terror. Then, after the collapse of the New Order government, the military approach to the democratic environment swung between the positive and negative responses, between reform and status quo initiatives. The reform-minded officers were first mobilized by Wiranto in the process of purging Prabowo followers. It was during this time that the 'reformers' took initiatives within the military and pushed the military in the direction of *Paradigma Baru*. Then, having consolidated his power, Wiranto moved in favour of the status quo. The reform projects were sidelined by attempts to rebuild a strong military aimed at handling social unrest. The reform initiative surfaced again under the Gus Dur government, which extended political patronage to Agus Wirahadikusumah who was eager to promote a progressive reform agenda. This attempt backfired, however, paving the way for the reactionary hardline stance led by Endriartono Sutarto whose initiatives were vital in escalating military resistance against the civilian president. In this way,

the pendulum of military responses to democratic change was a product of intra-military logic in which the competing officers were encouraged to embrace different approaches in order to take the initiative within the military. This is the consistent pattern of military politics, which remains unchanged despite the transition from the age of Soeharto to the post-Soeharto era.

Thus, what change can be seen in military politics after the fall of Soeharto? Of course the new era has introduced waves of new phenomena and issues to the country's political arena, and these may have influenced military attitudes in given fields. However, rather than identifying and juxtaposing these new issues, our attempt here is to clarify the broader and long-term impact, namely, the new structure in the post-Soeharto era that conditions the military's political process. In doing so, we pay attention to state political power.

Conceptually, the end of Soeharto's authoritarian regime provided democratic change in Indonesia. Assessing this change in terms of state political power, the end of the New Order was the beginning of the 'de-concentration' of political power which had long been personalized by Soeharto. As discussed earlier, the fall of Soeharto was followed by the empowerment of legislatures, reflecting the social demand for broader political participation. The role of the parliament both at the national and local levels has dramatically increased, and it has automatically reduced the relative political power of the executive bodies. During the Soeharto period, both central and local politics were largely dominated by military officers and bureaucrats, but in post-Soeharto Indonesia, these individuals have lost a considerable degree of political influence because of the rise of civilian party politicians. The latter have enjoyed a widening political authority in the empowered parliament, and civilian party politics now dominate the country's formal political process which in the past was monopolized by Soeharto. The collapse of the New Order thus facilitated the diffusion of state political power, empowering legislatures and strengthening party politics.

This change effectively introduced a new structural factor into the military's political process – a factor leading to military insubordination against a civilian president. As we have seen above, the post-Soeharto revitalization of party politics has led to a 'zero-sum' power struggle among political parties, particularly after the 1999 general elections which produced a caravan of minority parties in the DPR. Under these circumstances, any president may have a strong incentive to utilize the military for his/her short-term political goal of continuing the government, because the military is one of the scarce political assets he/she holds – as the Supreme Commander – and can 'command' to implement government projects. This incentive becomes particularly strong when the relationship between the President and the DPR deteriorates, creating political gridlock. For the military, resisting such presidential manipulation is now incomparably easier and less risky than during Soeharto's time, because any resistance, in the name of political 'neutrality', is very likely to be supported and encouraged by a group in parliament critical to the President. As party politics escalates and the inter-party conflict intensifies along with the five-year cycle of the

general elections, and as criticism of the President is now seen as legitimate in the 'democratic' competition, anti-presidential movements will inevitably emerge and may welcome military resistance to the President.

We could argue now that the five-year political cycle of the general/presidential elections brings periodic intensification of party conflicts that may invite possible changes in the government–military relationship, and that it could stimulate the intra-military power politics, most likely between the officers who are loyal to the incumbent president and those who are not. The end of the Soeharto era generated this new structural dynamic in military politics. As seen in this chapter, the military watched closely the developments in parliament and finally decided to desert both Habibie and Gus Dur, who were likewise criticized for using the TNI as *alat mati pemerintah*. As the 2004 general election approaches, the government under Megawati may fall into a similar trap.

If this pattern is institutionalized, a civilian government always faces the risk of military sabotage. And this constitutes an obstacle to any easy road to democratic transition. Thus, without promoting substantive military reforms and establishing a viable mechanism of civilian control of the military, Indonesia's incomplete regime transition may flounder. Given the significance of this prospect, the final chapter will discuss further the post-Soeharto problem of civilian control of the military.

8 Conclusions

> TNI should swear loyalty to the current government which embodies the national will.
>
> President Abdurrahman Wahid, at the Commanders Call 2000, Malang, 24 July 2000

> TNI is only loyal to the nation. It supports the government capable of upholding the national interest.
>
> Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, Army Chief of Staff, at the Military Academy, 11 November 2000

New civil–military power balance

The Indonesian military's political power has weakened since the fall of Soeharto. The generals no longer enjoy political hegemony and the legitimacy of *dwifungsi* is no longer sacrosanct nor, in terms of public opinion and some elements in the armed forces, a compelling justification for a pervasive military role in politics. The relative decline of the political position of the military has been one of the most important consequences of regime change in Indonesia. Why has the military been weakened after the fall of Soeharto? This is a key question. It is too simplistic to argue that the departure of Soeharto, the authoritarian patron, automatically led to the decline of military power in the Indonesian polity. A more important and substantial reason can be found in the discussion of the preceding chapters. It was not Soeharto's departure, but rather his attempts to manipulate the military for his personal interests, that progressively undermined the military's relative political power. ABRI, or TNI, remains burdened by the legacy of Soeharto's military management during his last years. Soeharto, in his attempt to secure the military's institutional loyalty to him, tactically encouraged divisions among top officers over several controversial issues, such as the influence of Islam, cronyism and nepotism, and coping with popular movements demanding democratization. Over these and a range of other issues two groups faced off in the twilight of the Soeharto era, one led by Prabowo, his son-in-law, and the other led by Wiranto – both of whom were Soeharto loyalists. It was this political conflict, instigated by Soeharto, that eroded the military's institutional cohesion and encouraged the demoralization of the officer corps. The resulting lack of

cohesion significantly diminished ABRI's ability to wield effectively its organizational power in shaping the political process. Under such circumstances civil–military relations during the transition from Soeharto to Habibie strayed outside existing patterns of military domination and became both less unequal and more adversarial. Soeharto left ABRI divided and demoralized, and thus inadvertently promoted democratization.

It was therefore urgent for Wiranto, who emerged the winner of the factionfighting in Soeharto's final months, to revive ABRI's cohesion under his leadership. This process of consolidating Wiranto's power took time – almost a year. He also needed to show ABRI's reform efforts to cope with the very hostile public pressures demanding the end of *dwifungsi*. Thus, during the time of the Habibie government, and in the run up to the general elections in May 1999, the military could not effectively mobilize its organizational power to lead the political process. Civilian political leaders, not only Habibie but also those who had competed with him during the New Order, greatly benefited from the situation where the Wiranto-led military was inward-looking and concentrated on the problem of internal consolidation and *dwifungsi* reform at the beginning of the regime transition. Civilian politicians were thus able to enhance their roles in the political process at the expense of the military.

By the time Wiranto seemed to have consolidated his leadership within the military, Indonesian politics was preoccupied with the general and presidential elections of 1999. These events were basically civilian affairs, and the space for the military to take political initiative was quite limited. Could Wiranto effectively mobilize the military in order to reverse the new civil–military power balance after the 1999 presidential election? No, because he was not adept manipulating the existing political currents to create an opportunity to reassert a paramount military role. Soon after the launching of the Gus Dur administration, Wiranto was dismissed and TNI's organizational cohesion again eroded. Widodo, the first TNI Commander with a navy background, was not able to contain the deepening cleavage between Wiranto followers and Gus Dur loyalists within the army. The consequent weak internal cohesion continuously prevented the military from gathering its organizational power to lead the country's political process. It retained a 'veto power' of last resort and was a pressure group to be reckoned with, but was unable to reverse the shift in the civil–military power balance that occurred after Soeharto's fall. During the waning weeks of Gus Dur's administration, however, military hardliners began to seize the initiative and regain political influence while consolidating their internal leadership. At the time of Gus Dur's removal, this new leadership, led by Army Chief Sutarto, was still embryonic. If, under the Megawati administration, it manages to recoup its organizational cohesion and influence, one can expect the post-Soeharto military to dramatically improve its bargaining power in dealing with the politically fragmented civilian leadership in the country's political process. Whether it will shift the new civil–military power balance in post-Soeharto Indonesia is still uncertain. However, it seems apparent that there is no reason to assume that the military will remain divided and weak and that civilian supremacy will persist.

Civilian control and the *dwifungsi* legacy

Significantly, the emphasis from the historical perspective on the political weakness of the military obscures the actual exercise of political power by the post-Soeharto military. Although it is not as dominant and hegemonic as before, the military still maintains a critical role in influencing the pace and degree of democratic reforms. Post-Soeharto civilian rule in Indonesia illustrates that the democratic transition is still incomplete. Why, then, does the military still cast such a long shadow over the emerging Indonesian polity? Partly this is by default; after three decades of a repressive New Order regime, the institutions, patterns and inclinations of civil society had withered to the point that even a weakened military remained a powerful political actor and *primus inter pares* (first among equals). Our discussions in the previous chapter revealed the reality of a weak civilian authority unable to assert its control over the military. Moreover, in the context of political instability, weak political leadership and threats to national unity, the military had ample reasons and opportunities to avoid a further retreat from political activities. The meltdown of the authoritarian New Order state exposed many long-suppressed problems in Indonesia and bequeathed a legacy of weak civilian institutions to cope with these festering, if not intractable, problems. As we have seen, the fall of Soeharto brought two significant developments – namely democratic change and national insecurity – which sent somewhat conflicting messages to the military. The process of democratization has encouraged the downsizing of the military role in the political process while escalating political violence rooted in ethnic and religious animosities, clearly indicating that there was a continuing need for a strong military presence; democracy could not flourish amidst chaos. It is the powerful logic of preserving national unity and peace that has enabled the military to neutralize pressures to return to the barracks.

Today's generals claim that TNI has abandoned *dwifungsi* after the introduction of *Paradigma Baru* in 1998. In institutional terms, the military eliminated its sociopolitical section – which had overseen everyday political interventions – from its organizational structure. In addition, the number of military representatives in the parliament was reduced and military officers no longer side automatically with Golkar. The military, in adopting an official position of political neutrality, also refrained from interfering with political parties during electoral campaigns. These changes were, to a large extent, promoted by a group of officers who understood the importance of accommodating and responding to pressures for democratic change in order to rejuvenate the ruined image of the military in society, regain the public trust and thereby facilitate its re-emergence as a key actor in the nation. However, these apparent changes in the military do not guarantee military withdrawal from politics nor an unqualified acceptance of civilian supremacy. Although the sociopolitical section was abolished, its political surveillance function was assumed by the territorial section which is responsible for 'both' defence and security. Moreover, despite the reduction of military representatives in the parliament, TNI possesses a strong

bargaining power in the DPR as a floating vote crucial to any coalition government. TNI no longer automatically sides with Golkar, but votes depending on the situation and seeks to use its leverage to promote TNI interests. Thus, to some extent critics are correct in suggesting that the military reforms have served up old wine in new bottles. It has adapted to the new, emerging political landscape and honed its political skills in accommodating, deflecting and manipulating pressures for change in ways that have enabled it to maintain political power. In this way, the post-Soeharto military is not the hegemonic political force it was, but it continues to exercise strong influence on the political process under the civilian government.

On paper, both Habibie and Gus Dur enjoyed civilian supremacy over the military. Habibie introduced policies – such as media freedom and the East Timor referendum – which challenged the military and placed it under greater scrutiny and criticism. Gus Dur named the first civilian defence minister, Professor Juwono Sudarsono, and purged Gen. Wiranto, arguably the most powerful military leader at that time, from the Cabinet. It now seems that the military as an institution accepts the principle of 'civilian supremacy' but, as we have seen, it also reserves the right to determine to what extent the writ of civilian supremacy extends in what the military considers internal military affairs. Thus, the notion of civilian supremacy that has emerged in Indonesia is circumscribed and incomplete. The military has firmly rejected its complete subordination to the civilian government, and has balked at accepting 'civilian control' of the military. Accepting civilian supremacy, but rejecting civilian control, seem to be inconsistent and a transparent justification for retaining military independence and its role as the ultimate arbiter of the national interest. However, from within the military this distinction is seen to be valid and necessary to preserve the integrity of the institution and not leave it vulnerable to the type of political machinations that wreaked such havoc under Soeharto. It seems that military leadership recognizes that the era of military supremacy is finished and there is no desire to return to this situation. Cognisant of the high costs of political involvement for the institutional integrity of the military and how this has undermined its ability to act decisively with the trust and confidence of the public, there appears to be wide acceptance among military leaders of the need for civilians to manage politics. This, however, is not to say that the generals are ready to accept civilian initiatives in the 'military' field which – in their eyes – includes personnel affairs and defence policies. Officers still see the military field as their domain. As discussed in Chapter 6, this is clearly a legacy of the *dwifungsi* mindset.

This legacy is quite significant because it keeps providing the military with incentives to oppose civilian governments over national defence–security issues and to sabotage government policies when they are deemed to infringe on military turf. This resistance is easily legitimized, in the eyes of generals, with reference to the military's self-ascribed role as patriotic defenders of the nation and Constitution. As arbiters, thus, of the national interest they see a duty to resist or subvert government policies that contradict what they define as the

national interest (see Sutarto's comment challenging Gus Dur quoted at the beginning of this chapter). It is in this context that the military sees no inconsistency between accepting the principle of civilian supremacy and resisting civilian control of the military.

Since the military has enjoyed political hegemony for over three decades, it can be expected that the process of taming the military and getting military leaders to accept that the principle of civilian supremacy also means civilian control will be lengthy. The initial years of post-Soeharto Indonesia reveal that civilian management of the military is fraught with difficulties. During the Gus Dur government, his attempts at asserting control over the military were only partially successful, and in the end backfired. This failure can be attributed largely to his own mode of governance. The President relied too much on his political skills in manipulating appointments and promotions, intervening in the sensitive area of personnel matters. The removal of Wiranto by Gus Dur in February 2000 was obviously a significant step towards asserting the principle of civilian supremacy. However, in trying to create a 'loyal' military Gus Dur intervened extensively in personnel changes in a way that was seen to be arbitrary, unfair and harmful to the military's organizational cohesion. Thus, this ad hoc process of taming the military was not done in a way that could lead to the creation of an institutionally sustainable system. Gus Dur was naturally motivated to remove the officers who challenged the President, but he undermined his credibility by actively recruiting and promoting loyalists. This politicization of promotions was not a promising gambit to establish durable civil–military interactions as it increased the sense of uncertainty and unpredictability, while compromising the neutrality of the institution. The failure of civilian leaders to provide certainty, predictability and sustainability in this critical transition period exacerbated military scepticism towards civilian leaders, in effect strengthening the position of hardline elements within the military resisting reforms and diminishing the influence of military reformers. Clumsy civilian interference reinforced existing prejudice within the ranks towards politicians and thus reduced the incentive to buy into the new arrangements and slowed the pace of reform.

Reform agendas are complex and involve various short- and long-term projects. They start from short-term organizational streamlining, involving a rethinking of doctrines and the redefinition of roles, to long-term educational reform.[1] For civilian democratizers, military reforms are aimed at reining in the military's political activism, by eliminating the legacies of *dwifungsi*'s organizational, doctrinal and ideological assumptions and implications. It is not terribly hard to juxtapose what is wrong in the military and what should be done to advance reform, but what is generally less discussed is how officers can be motivated to embrace reforms and implement them. As became obvious under the Gus Dur administration, the political use of the military significantly reduced the incentive to reform and alienated officers saw no reason to buy into the reform agenda. Unable to see the reform process leading to an acceptable or desirable outcome, there was an escalation of military resistance to and suspicion

of civilian politicians. Clearly, in making the transition to civilian supremacy, the Indonesian case demonstrates the need to create incentives and nurture the motivation of officers whose role is critical in advancing reform. Without their support there is scant likelihood of success. It remains to be seen whether civilian authorities have learned this lesson and assumed the responsibility for reaching out to and reassuring military officers.

Broadly speaking, Indonesia's post-Soeharto efforts to democratize civil–military relations seem to have two goals. First is to depoliticize the military institution which has long engaged in political matters due to the ideology of *dwifungsi*. Second is to demilitarize the political process. Both goals are linked and mutually reinforcing, but require different strategies. Depoliticizing the military is aimed at reorienting the professional tasks of the military while demilitarizing the political process depends on fostering a healthy political system which discourages civilians from seeking military support in their 'democratic' competition with rival politicians. These reforms need to proceed simultaneously in order to promote stable and democratic civil–military relations in Indonesia.

Summary of central arguments and findings

This study focuses on military reactions to growing democratic pressures during the late Soeharto era and in the transition from the New Order during the Habibie and Gus Dur administrations. Paradoxically, the military has demonstrated an ability to adapt to, and accommodate, these pressures while also digging in and resisting political change. What has been the logic conditioning behind the military's softline and hardline reactions to democratic demands? With this core question in mind, this book has tried to clarify the dynamics behind military responses to democratization. I focus on intra-military rivalries, arguing that the different responses have largely reflected faction-fighting and the power struggle among top officers. Rather than depicting a unified military institution adjusting its policies, role and position based on consensus and shared political values – a view which sees the military as a unitary actor and analyses its response from a simple dichotomous view of civil–military interaction – this study suggests the need for a more careful reading of the military's internal dynamics.

We have examined how the military, since the late 1980s, has repeatedly showed both accommodative and repressive responses to democratization. The fate of different initiatives has swung back and forth, a pendulum propelled by intra-military power struggles over time. It was President Soeharto who purged Moerdani and his followers in the late 1980s. They in turn became critical to Soeharto and responded positively to democratic demands by promoting the *keterbukaan* campaign. This initiative was however countered by Soeharto's loyalist officers who led the repression of popular movements. Military reformers emerged as a result of this process and sought a softline approach to democratic demands. It was thus Soeharto who generated the intra-military frictions and

determined the shifting power of the factions. In post-Soeharto Indonesia, it was Wiranto who kept activating military factionalism by mobilizing both reformist and status quo forces. Their political competition produced both positive and negative responses to democratic change. Gus Dur then caused the same problem as Soeharto by recruiting loyalists from the ranks. He and his followers campaigned for military reforms while the alienated officers opposed Gus Dur and took the hardline approach. In this way, the politics of Soeharto, Wiranto and Gus Dur were the principal determinant of the military faction-fighting which has been the driver of military responses to democratic demands since the late New Order era.

This book is divided into chapters each containing a detailed examination of such dynamic interactions between military factionalism and democratic adaptation over an arc of time beginning with the twilight of the Soeharto era and extending until the denouement of Gus Dur in July 2001. Thus, in Chapter 2 we examined the historical development of democratic demands, with particular focus on the *dwifungsi* criticism, and analysed how this evolved in tandem with factionalization in the late New Order military. Chapters 3 through 6 discussed the characteristics of accommodative–repressive initiatives taken by different groups of officers in different areas of military activity. Chapter 7 analysed the post-Soeharto military politics. Let us now summarize the arguments contained in each chapter.

It was in the context of the *keterbukaan* movement in the late 1980s that ABRI problems began to be discussed openly and criticism of *dwifungsi* became a central political issue in public debate. As argued in Chapter 2, political space to discuss this previously taboo issue was at first a by-product of the struggle between Soeharto and Moerdani's ABRI, each side using this space to put pressure on the other. However, the political arena was gradually seized by other groups and actors with different agendas. Following the initiative taken by outspoken, recently retired generals who had contributed to the consolidation of the New Order in the early years, criticism of the regime was endowed with legitimacy and could no longer be dismissed as a communist conspiracy. The *dwifungsi* criticism gradually became less restrained and officers found it increasingly difficult to curb the escalating critical debate and demands for *dwifungsi* reform. Criticism of *dwifungsi* was also facilitated by the rise of a new generation of officers who had made no actual contribution to the struggle for national independence, and who could, therefore, claim no special political legitimacy from that struggle. In the midst of this volatile debate, ABRI's total subordination to Soeharto's personal interests during the final few years took on critical importance and raised questions both inside and outside the military about its proper role. Discussion in Chapter 2 detailed these developments and helps us understand why – and in what ways – the criticism of *dwifungsi* developed in the public political arena during the final decade of the New Order. Facing democratic pressures, ABRI attempted to defend its *dwifungsi* legitimacy in two contradictory ways: either by accommodating criticism, or by repressing it. The chapters that follow focus on the development of these two vectors.

Chapter 3 examines ABRI's doctrinal accommodation during the Soeharto era. Since the birth of the New Order, *dwifungsi*'s sources of legitimation had been diversified in order to forge a more compelling rationale. ABRI's first systematic doctrine under the New Order – i.e. the new TUÇ, or *Tri Ubaya Çakti* – was intended both to standardize ABRI's new mode of political involvement and to eliminate PKI supporters. It was legitimized by the restoration of political order following the coup attempt. ABRI's political activism was also explained as legitimate due to the historical commitment of soldiers towards nation-building since the war of independence. However, as *kekaryaan*, the practice of sending ABRI personnel to non-military posts, was institutionalized and it could no longer be explained as a measure to restore political stability, it drew criticism from civilians who saw it as a means to achieve political domination. In response to this growing criticism, ABRI established a doctrinal distinction between *dwifungsi* and *kekaryaan* at the end of 1970s, aiming to safeguard the former from criticism directed at the latter. As the criticism intensified in the early 1980s, thanks largely to the disenchanted revolutionary-generation officers who launched Petisi 50, ABRI moved to further expand the sources of *dwifungsi* legitimacy. The 1982 guidebook was prepared specifically to explain the historical, philosophical, legal, cultural, geostrategic and national defence reasons for the legitimacy of *dwifungsi*. The diffusion of legitimacy arguments was expected to counter any and all types of *dwifungsi* criticism. Then, following the regeneration of the officer corps in the mid-1980s, the concept of professionalism was infused into the *dwifungsi* language as a means of further shoring up its legitimacy. It was argued that, with professionalism, ABRI could better manage *dwifungsi* – an interpretation which uncoupled *dwifungsi* from the historical legitimation that had been questioned by critics after the retirement of most of the revolutionary-generation officers.

Importantly, however, the 'infusion' of the professionalism concept to strengthen *dwifungsi* was taken to heart by a small group of officers who developed a campaign called 'back-to-basics' in the early 1990s. This movement, presenting itself as an effort to professionalize ABRI, raised questions about the growing gap between ABRI's institutional interests and Soeharto's political agenda, and also implicitly warned about the dangers of ABRI's declining autonomy. Younger-generation officers who had been involved in this movement began to express more explicit concerns in the mid-1990s, when the final Army Seminar under the New Order identified the problems of the current government, amidst the Soeharto-orchestrated crackdown on the popular political forces led by Megawati. There was a clear danger that the military as an institution risked being dragged down by Soeharto in his efforts to cling to power, protect his family's economic empire and halt democratization. In referring to the arrogance of government power and insisting on the need to reduce state control over society, the reform-minded officers who led the seminar now defined *dwifungsi* as a tool for restoring the distorted balance in the state–society relationship and thus modifying the military's role in the polity. Chapter 3 thus also identifies critical doctrinal developments during the late New Order aimed at

achieving this reform agenda. *Paradigma Baru* and other military reform initiatives after the fall of Soeharto all had their origin in the revisionist approach to *dwifungsi* during this period.

Chapter 4 analyses a policy dimension – internal security operations – and assesses how the civil–military struggle over human rights accountability developed and how ABRI's response to it evolved. It was soon after the dissolution of the powerful security apparatus, Kopkamtib, that ABRI's abuse of human rights became an issue for open public debate through the emergence of criticism and protest against the 'security approach'. This theme could hardly be interpreted by ABRI as attacking Pancasila and the Constitution – a logic ABRI had used previously to repress popular protests demanding *dwifungsi* elimination. This new social space for criticism of the military was institutionally entrenched by the creation of the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM), the first legitimate mechanism within the regime to challenge ABRI's excessive use of force and its one-sided explanations about the military shooting of civilians. It was this organ that protected the role of NGOs in criticizing ABRI's internal security practices. Pressures from NGOs – which were seen by ABRI as a front for radical leftists – might not have survived or gained access to the formal political process without the presence of Komnas HAM. This new political paradigm spawned a new political institution, i.e. ABRI's adoption of a disciplinary panel (the Military Honour Council/Officers' Honour Council) for the handling of human rights abuses. As a result, it gradually became standard procedure for ABRI to accept some degree of accountability, in contrast to the situation in the 1970s and 1980s. ABRI's approach to internal security came under closer scrutiny and from the early 1990s was constrained by institutional restrictions. This erosion of ABRI's freedom of action and insulation from accountability contributed to diminishing military control over civil–military interactions in the age of *keterbukaan*.

The erosion of military control unfortunately provoked a backlash of hardline initiatives within the military. Chapter 5 documents such developments. The problem of human rights was linked in the minds of officers to the issue of 'globalization'. Although ABRI had responded to the domestic reverberations of this international phenomenon by endorsing the need for revising its approach to security and conducting human rights assessments, there was also a countervailing move within ABRI to revive the more repressive aspects of its vigilance ideology in order to maintain the autonomous political power it had enjoyed since the beginning of the New Order. The threat of communism (Balatkom) was reinvented to rationalize military repression and defend the New Order state from its most 'reliable' and convenient enemy. For military extremists, the concept of globalization provided a perfect pretext to claim that the penetration of 'foreign-values', and the concomitant influx of liberal/radical thinking, would endanger Indonesia's political stability based on Pancasila values. Brandishing these bogeymen to justify repression reflected ABRI's institutional inertia and unwillingness to jettison the patterns and inclinations of outdated *dwifungsi* ideology now increasingly irrelevant in the changing political landscape.

However, it was during ABRI's total subordination to Soeharto – especially under the Feisal–Hartono leadership in the mid-1990s – that repression of popular democratic movements became the purpose of *dwifungsi*. This hardline response, however, encouraged the emergence of revisionist views within the officer corps, and contributed to the diversification of military thinking in the face of democratic pressures during the final years of the New Order.

The emergence of, and competition between, various points of view in the military is elucidated in the analysis of *dwifungsi* discourse in Chapter 6. This chapter documents the development of critical views concerning the conduct of *dwifungsi* within the New Order military. There was concern that the representation of ABRI in legislative bodies had produced a conflict between the professional and political duties of military officers. Due to ABRI's sustained support for Golkar, some officers were concerned that the military's institutional integrity was being undermined by its political involvement and bias. Although these reformist views were significant in understanding officers' professional concerns and their views on reform, they did not necessarily mesh with the views of civilian democracy advocates. Revisions were sought in terms of political programmes, not *dwifungsi* principles.

What forces propelled a reassessment of ABRI's institutional legitimacy? Apart from public protest, we have examined the role of 'insider' criticism in opening up a dialogue and in spreading awareness of *dwifungsi* criticism within ABRI – a role that could hardly be accomplished by non-regime critics. This political space provided a fertile ground for reform-minded intellectual officers to play a bigger role in civil–military relations during the late New Order. The contest over *dwifungsi* (de)legitimation was largely shaped by the interactions between three critical approaches and two defending theories. This situation clarified ABRI's discursive techniques to (re)interpret social conditions in favour of *dwifungsi* perpetuation by inventing (and proliferating) culturalist and level-of-development approaches. The former was largely an adjustment of the traditional mode of legitimation, while the latter was a product of younger-generation officers who wanted to avoid a dogmatic response but who were still committed to the organizational effort to defend *dwifungsi* legitimacy via rational communication with critics of the doctrine. ABRI's adaptation in the dimension of civil–military discourse was one of three highlights of this chapter.

The second highlight was ABRI's distrust of the civilian capacity to handle national politics and its own fears regarding intra-military cohesion. The military's claim that its political involvement stemmed from its practical role as a 'national' guardian was nothing new; its distrust of civilian politicians and confidence in its own political abilities was long standing. However, ABRI also cast doubt on its claim to the mantle of leadership by opposing voting rights for soldiers that might expose the lack of internal cohesion crucial to its self-appointed role as political guardian. ABRI's desire to retain the 'privilege' of appointing F-ABRI representatives to legislative bodies thus seemed less concerned with protecting the national interest than with preserving the appearance of its own unity.

The third highlight was the 'non-debate' over critical issues. We have examined how ABRI's territorial system has become more and more autonomous in establishing mechanisms of political surveillance that endowed it with political missions designed in accordance with the concept of territorial management. The failure to incorporate this problem into the scope of *dwifungsi* discourse represented a 'defect' in New Order civil–military communication. This political opening fostered a pragmatic view within ABRI that envisaged the possible scrapping of the *dwifungsi* concept as a measure to alleviate pressure on ABRI if social criticism were to reach an unmanageable level. The evolving discourse on *dwifungsi* provided ABRI thinkers with the prospect of maintaining ABRI's core political role solely by consolidating the territorial system, with or without the concept of *dwifungsi*. As democratic pressure intensifies in the post-Soeharto era, this new thinking already seems to have become a norm within the military elite. For democratic critics aiming to curtail the military's political influence, it is essential to subject the territorial system to open debate, civilian monitoring, transparency and accountability.

The principal contribution of this study is to empirically assess how the military navigated the uncharted waters of regime transition and responded to demands for democratization. The detailed examination of faction-fighting within the military and how this conditioned responses to pressure for reform adds an important dimension to our understanding of the dynamics of New Order civil–military interactions. Clearly, the military did not respond monolithically, and this in itself is an important consideration. Similarly, we highlight the importance of carefully tracing the ideological evolution and the institutional capacity for self-reflection and criticism within the military, an organization that is all too often simplistically portrayed as conformist, rigid and intellectually stagnant.

In fact, the officers' reform initiatives in post-Soeharto Indonesia were not solely a product of New Order breakdown; they developed during the Soeharto regime. The emergence of revisionist views among the officer corps had been encouraged by a growing perception that Soeharto's pursuit of his private political interests had exerted a deleterious impact on both civil–military relations and the military's organizational integrity during the late New Order period. As we discussed, such perceptions were found primarily among officers who had been affiliated with the military's educational sector, such as Seskoad, Sesko ABRI and Lemhannas. Institutionally, this phenomenon makes sense as these bodies exist to assess and propagate the long-term corporate interests of the military as an organization. The deterioration of the military image in society and the declining organizational coherence within the military – due to institutionally irrational personnel transfers and promotion practices – were inevitably major concerns for intellectually inclined officers whose training and job focused on corporate interests, doctrines and institutional integrity. Even in the unusual case involving its patron, Soeharto, it was not unusual to see some elements within the officer corps grow progressively concerned about its subordinate relationship with him and seek to modify this situation, a problem most apparent during the

Feisal–Hartono era of hardline leadership. Such a perception was presented repeatedly within the military community via its internal media. Concepts such as 'ABRI's dilemmas' and the 'need for professionalization' often became code to express officers' concerns. Assessing this intra-military atmosphere is significant for our understanding of the origin and orientation of ABRI's reform projects after the fall of Soeharto in May 1998. Military reform is thus not simply a reaction to the social demands for democratization in the post-Soeharto Indonesia, but was largely in response to Soeharto's manipulation and control of the military going back to the late 1980s. The pressures for reform had been accumulating for nearly a decade.

It is in this political context that the orientation of post-Soeharto military reforms should be assessed. Chapter 7 examines the development of intra-military politics under both the Habibie and Gus Dur governments. The focus is on the tug-of-war between reform and conservative initiatives within the military, because we now know that factionalism greatly shaped the logic and pattern of military adaptation to regime transition and democratic change. We found that, under the two civilian governments, the military response to the pressure for change swung like a pendulum, reflecting the shifting power balance among the competing factions. The shift was due to the changing political orientation of Wiranto and Gus Dur, two top political players who supervised the military. This demonstrated a significant continuity in the military's political process both before and after the fall of Soeharto. Since the waning years of the New Order era, the military has shown mixed responses – namely, accommodative and repressive – to democratic demands, as each faction is motivated to counter its rival and assert its own leadership. Cleavages between Soeharto loyalists and Moerdani followers, Prabowo allies and the Wiranto group, and Gus Dur loyalists and Sutarto followers all became key factors conditioning the vector of the pendulum. And significantly, it was Soeharto, Wiranto and Gus Dur who divided the military in pursuing their own political projects.

Faction-fighting also shaped the pace and degree of post-Soeharto military reforms. The promotion of reform was discernible when reform-minded officers were politically empowered to take the initiative, but when they were sidelined, the movement for reform stagnated and the initiative lost to the hardliners. This latter group tapped into existing deep-seated suspicions of civilian politicians in the military, prejudices fanned by the clumsy and repeated interventions of Gus Dur in military affairs. They have been able to leverage a strong political role by circumscribing the concept of civilian supremacy, deftly negotiating coalition politics and strengthening the army's territorial structure in response to political chaos in outlying regions. The military role in the polity has been further buttressed by rejuvenating the role of Kopassus and BAIS – two powerful authoritarian tools in the New Order. The resurgence of the military's political influence is evident in the overt military sabotage of the unpopular but democratically elected civilian president, which in effect helped opposition civilian politicians oust Gus Dur from government in July 2001.

Closing words

There is a growing literature on the political role of the military in post-New Order Indonesia. Some observers focus on military activities in the archipelago's periphery where violence has erupted and demands for autonomy and independence have escalated. Others look at military repression of labour, peasants, students and other segments of civil society. There are also scholarly attempts to understand the extent of military business interests and institutionalized corruption. These issues are undoubtedly significant, and without clarifying them our understanding of Indonesia's military politics is incomplete. Why has communal violence escalated since the fall of Soeharto and what is the role of the military in this? How do we analyse the development of military policy towards separatist movements in Aceh, Papua and East Timor? How have business interests influenced the military in politics? Questions such as these are critical in understanding the military and the emerging Indonesian polity and require separate, and extensive, research and analysis.

This text advances our understanding of another aspect of the story – the intra-military power struggle and how it tempers responses to democratic adaptation and what it portends for the future of civil–military relations. The conclusions of this research suggest that the prospects for consolidating democracy and asserting civilian control still remain tenuous as the military has shown itself remarkably resilient in guarding its prerogatives in the post-Soeharto era. The weaknesses of the civilian political leadership in depoliticizing the military and of party politics in demilitarizing the political process have facilitated this scenario. With the 'arrival' of democracy after the fall of Soeharto, Indonesia was liberated from military dominance, but was burdened given the task of finding a new place for the military in the polity. Although confining it to the barracks is difficult, and such a discussion is now unrealistic, defining the limits to military influence is essential, and perhaps now possible via civil–military negotiations.

Appendix 1

Military area commands (Kodam),
1985–1998

Kodam I	*Bukit Barisan* (North Sumatra)	Kodam VI	*Tanjungpura* (Kalimantan)
Kodam II	*Sriwijaya* (South Sumatra)	Kodam VII	*Wirabuana* (Sulawesi)
Kodam III	*Siliwangi* (West Java)	Kodam VIII	*Trikora* (Irian Jaya and Maluku)
Kodam IV	*Diponegoro* (Central Java)	Kodam IX	*Udayana* (Nusa Tenggara)
Kodam V	*Brawijaya* (East Java)	Kodam X	*Jaya* (Jakarta)


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Kodam Headquarters
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Balikpapan
VI
Sulawesi VII
Ujung Pandang
Maluku
Jayapura
Irian Jaya
VIII
Jakarta
Semarang
Bandung
Java
III
IV
X
Surabaya
V
Denpasar
IX
Nusa Tenggara

Appendix 2

ABRI's codes of ethics

Pancasila (Five Principles)

1 Belief in the One God
2 A just and civilized humanity
3 Indonesian unity
4 Populism guided by wisdom in consultation and deliberation
5 Social justice for all Indonesian people

Sapta Marga (Seven Pledges)

1 We are citizens of the unitary Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila.
2 We are Indonesian patriots, bearers and defenders of the state ideology, who are responsible and know of no surrender.
3 We are Indonesian knights who are devoted to the One God, and who defend honesty, truth and justice.
4 We are soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces, guardians of the Indonesian state and nation.
5 We soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces uphold discipline, are obedient and observant to our leadership, and uphold the soldier's attitude and oath.
6 We soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces set ourselves to perform our task with courage, and are always ready to devote ourselves to state and nation.
7 We soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces are loyal and keep our word and the Soldier's Oath.

Sumpah Prajurit (Soldier's Oath)

1 Be loyal to the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia which is based on Pancasila and UUD45.
2 Be loyal to the laws and maintain military discipline.
3 Be obedient to laws and maintain military discipline.
4 Execute duties with a full sense of responsibility to the military and the Republic of Indonesia.
5 Firmly preserve military secrets.

11 Asas Kepemimpinan ABRI (Eleven Leadership Principles of the Indonesian Armed Forces)

1	*Taqwa*	To believe in and obey the One God.
2	*Ing ngarsa sung tuladha*	To give the right example and lead from the front.
3	*Ing madya mangun karsa*	To be a driving force from the middle.
4	*Tut wuri handayani*	To guide from behind.
5	*Waspada purba wisesa*	To supervise subordinates and have the courage to correct them if necessary.
6	*Ambeg parama arta*	To be able to decide priorities.
7	*Prasaja*	To be modest and to avoid excess.
8	*Satya*	To be loyal to superiors, colleagues and subordinates.
9	*Gemi nastiti*	To live frugally.
10	*Belaka*	To take responsibility for one's behaviour.
11	*Legawa*	To be willing to hand responsibilities and positions to the next generation when the time comes.

Appendix 3

DPR seats and the elections, 1971–1999

New Order period							
		1971	1977	1982	1987	1992	1997
Golkar	vote %	62.8	62.1	64.3	73.1	68.1	74.5
	seats	*236*	*232*	*246*	*299*	*282*	*325*
	seat %	51.3	50.4	53.4	59.8	56.4	65.0
PPP	vote %	27.1	29.3	27.8	16.0	17.0	22.4
	seats	*94*	*99*	*94*	*61*	*62*	*89*
	seat %	20.4	21.5	20.4	12.2	12.4	17.8
PDI	vote %	10.1	8.6	7.9	10.9	14.9	3.0
	seats	*30*	*29*	*24*	*40*	*56*	*11*
	seat %	6.5	6.3	5.2	8.6	11.2	2.2
F-ABRI	*seats*	*75*	*75*	*75*	*100*	*100*	*75*
	seat %	16.3	16.3	16.3	20.0	20.0	15.0
Non-ABRI*	*seats*	*25*	*25*	*25*	–	–	–
	seat %	5.4	5.4	5.4	–	–	–
Total	**seats**	**460**	**460**	**464**	**500**	**500**	**500**

Post-New Order period		
		1999
PDI-P	vote (%)	33.7
	seats	*153*
	seat (%)	33
Golkar	vote (%)	22.4
	seats	*120*
	seat (%)	25
PKB	vote (%)	12.6
	seats	*51*
	seat (%)	11
PPP	vote (%)	10.7
	seats	*58*
	seat (%)	12
PAN	vote (&)	7.1
	seats	*38*
	seat (%)	8
PBB	vote (%)	1.9
	seats	*13*
	seat (%)	2
Other 42 parties	vote (%)	11.4
	seats	*33*
	seat (%)	7
TNI/Polri	*seats*	*38*
	seat (%)	8
Total	**seats**	**504**

Source: Leo Suryadinata, *Elections and Politics in Indonesia*, Singapore: ISEAS, 2002, pp.32, 103

*Civilian representatives appointed by the President

Notes

1 Introduction

1 The Indonesian military before the New Order consisted of three services – the army (TNI-AD), the navy (TNI-AL) and the air force (TNI-AU). When the Soeharto regime was launched in 1966, the police force was integrated into the military and the new four-service military forces were named ABRI, an abbreviation of *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia). In April 1999, under President Habibie, however, the police was again separated from the military, as a part of political reform in the post-Soeharto era. The name, ABRI, was also replaced with TNI, or *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*. In this study, which mainly covers the Soeharto era, I use the term 'ABRI' to refer to the military. I also use the term 'military' interchangeably with the 'army' because of its dominant power among the four services and its inclination to speak as if it were ABRI during the New Order period.

2 See Chapter 2 for references to the factors encouraging democratic demands.

2 Eroding *dwifungsi*: power politicals and democratic movement in the late New Order regime

1 By political autonomy of critical movement, I refer to the viability of political 'space' available for critics to express regime criticism under the authoritarian system without being subjected to intervention by the regime administrators. Weak autonomy means that the space is not sustainable due to its dependence on external factors – such as inner-regime contestation. In this chapter, this concept is frequently employed to evaluate the strength of *dwifungsi* criticism as a democratic movement.

2 For an account of civil–military relations during the first decade of the New Order, see Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, revised edition, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.

3 Sukarno's 'instruction' to Soeharto was conveyed through a letter, dated 11 March, which was called Supersemar (Presidential Letter of 11 March). The letter authorized Soeharto to handle the political situation. However, Supersemar is still a controversial issue because of a suspicion that Sukarno wrote the letter under duress. Regardless of the truth, Soeharto banned the PKI on the day after the issue of the letter. PKI supporters thus became political prisoners, if they were arrested, or victims of military-supervised killing. The most commonly accepted estimate of the death toll was between 250,000 and 500,000 (Crouch, *The Army and Politics*, p.155).

4 The Indonesian army had played a political role since the revolutionary war against Dutch colonialism (1945–1949) when the demarcation between political and military affairs was obscure. During this period, the army cultivated its self-image as the 'national guardian' which fought for '100 percent independence', contrary to civilian

leaders who tended to negotiate with the Dutch to achieve partial independence. Although the military was not directly involved in the government during the parliamentary democracy period (1949–1958), it became one of the most powerful political forces during Sukarno's Guided Democracy period (1958–1965). But it was during the New Order that the military dominated the political process. Soeharto's military emphasized that its political control was inevitable as it had played the role of national guardian since independence, and that *dwifungsi* was the doctrinal reflection of such a military mind. We will examine the detailed process of *dwifungsi*'s doctrinal formulation in Chapter 3.

5 Regarding Kopkamtib's techniques of surveillance, see Richard Tanter, 'The Totalitarian Ambition: Intelligence and Security Agencies in Indonesia', in Arief Budiman (ed.), *State and Civil Society in Indonesia*, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990, pp.211–288.

6 There were ten area commands (Kodams) in the ABRI structure, each controlling an individual territory (see Appendix 1 for the territorial command map). Under each Kodam, there are several Korems (regional commands) – except Kodam Jaya/Jakarta – and each Korem supervises Kodims (district commands) in its own territory. Kodims oversee Koramils (subdistrict commands) This territorial system enabled ABRI to maintain everyday control of political affairs throughout the archipelago.

7 Pancasila is a set of five principles declared by Sukarno in 1945 to oppose the idea that Indonesia should be an Islamic nation. It consists of belief in God, humanitarianism, national unity, Indonesian democracy based on consultation and consensus, and social justice. The first principle refers to God rather than Allah, thus implying that the 'Pancasila state' guarantees Indonesia as a multi-religious nation. The fourth principle, however, can be exclusionary if the state identifies the opposition as not based on principles of 'Indonesian democracy'.

8 In 1974, the largest street demonstration since the establishment of the New Order took place. Student activists opposed the government policy of introducing massive foreign investment, which they thought might undermine the opportunity for indigenous businesses and only benefit Chinese Indonesians who had close ties with Soeharto. A street demonstration in Jakarta (15 January) during the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister, Kakuei Tanaka, led to a huge riot which was repressed by ABRI. This event was called the Malari Affair. For details, see Harold Crouch, 'The "15th January Affair" in Indonesia', *Dyason House Papers*, Vol. 1, No. 1, August 1974, pp.1–5. The large student demonstrations in Jakarta during 1977–1978 opposing Soeharto's re-election in 1978 and demanding the elimination of government corruption and ABRI's *dwifungsi* were also repressed by ABRI. After Malari, the government introduced the so-called 'Normalization of Campus Life' (NKK) which banned student political activities on campus and strengthened state control over university administration. The Tanjung Priok incident occurred in September 1984 when security troops shot Muslim demonstrators and killed (at least) dozens of them in Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta. Muslim groups believed that the repression was part of anti-Islam operations led by the Catholic ABRI Commander, Gen. Benny Moerdani, and that the death toll was several hundred.

9 The history of New Order elections can be traced by consulting Harold Crouch, 'The Army, the Parties and Elections', *Indonesia*, No. 11, April 1971, pp.177–191; William R. Liddle, 'The 1977 Indonesian Elections and New Order Legitimacy', *Southeast Asian Affairs 1978*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1978, pp.122–138; Leo Suryadinata, *Political Parties and the 1982 General Election in Indonesia*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982; Harry Tjan Silalahi, 'The 1987 Election in Indonesia', *Southeast Asian Affairs 1988*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988, pp.97–105; Dwight Y. King, *'White Book' on the 1992 General Election in Indonesia*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994; and Stefan Eklöf, 'The 1997 General Election in Indonesia', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 37, No. 12, 1997, pp.1181–1196.

10 Regarding *kekaryaan* practice, see MacDougall's empirical studies (John A. MacDougall, 'Pattern of Military Control in the Indonesian Higher Central Bureaucracy', *Indonesia*, No. 33, April 1982, pp.89–121 and 'Military Penetration of the Indonesian Government: The Higher Central Bureaucracy', *Indonesia Reports*, No. 14, March 1986, pp.2–15). In 1971, for example, among higher central bureaucracy, 44 percent of cabinet members, 41 percent of Secretary Generals, and 73 percent of Inspector Generals were officers on active duty. Regional governments were also penetrated by military members. In 1977, 78 percent of provincial governors were army men, and more than half (155) of Indonesia's 294 *bupati* (regents) and mayors were ABRI men (David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975–1983*, Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, Cornell University, 1984, p.47).

11 Soeharto had relied heavily upon a group of personal advisers (Assistant Pribadi, or Aspri) for his early New Order policy-making, including the annexation of East Timor. Officers in Aspri, such as Ali Moertopo and Maj. Gen. Sudjono Humardhani, with their think-tank, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), provided enormous input to Soeharto. The dominant role of the Aspri was resented by many officers outside their circle, including Soemitro. Soemitro was said to be unhappy with the Aspri officers' business links with Chinese and foreign partners, and was sympathetic towards student demands in the Malari Affair. Soemitro was replaced just after the incident. Soemitro's suspicions of Ali Moertopo and CSIS are described in his biography. Ramadhan K.H., *Soemitro: Former Commander of Indonesian Security Apparatus*, Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1996, pp.286, 307–311.

12 Petisi 50 was founded in 1980 in response to Soeharto's speech at Pekanbaru which said that ABRI would continuously support Golkar in the next election in 1982. Petisi's members included Ali Sadikin, a retired navy admiral and the popular ex-Governor of Jakarta. They openly criticized Soeharto's arbitrary use of Pancasila as a tool to repress anti-regime opinions, and demanded that ABRI, as the 'national' guardian, return to the 'original intention' of *dwifungsi*, which was – according to them – to be neutral in conducting its political mission and 'stand above all groups' in elections. Petisi 50 called for the 'purification of *dwifungsi*'. See Kelompok Kerja Petisi 50, *Melihat Kembali: Pernyataan Keprihatian–5 Mei 1980*, Seri Mencerdaskan Kehidupan Bangsa, No. 7, 1991. Nasution was a former Army Chief who declared in 1958 that the Indonesian military would take a middle way (*jalan tengah*) between military rule and an apolitical role. This speech is said to be the origin of the concept of *dwifungsi*. For the emergence of the critical retired officers, see Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals*, especially pp.171–187 on Petisi 50 and ABRI's severe pressure on these retired officers since then.

13 All of these Soeharto loyalists served in intelligence–security sectors within ABRI. Sudomo had been running Kopkamtib after Soemitro since 1974, and had been deputy commander of ABRI since 1978. Yoga had been the head of the State Intelligence Coordination Agency (BAKIN) which had been directly responsible to the President since 1974 and had served as Kopkamtib Chief from 1978 to 1980. Moerdani was the head of the Strategic Intelligence Centre (Pusintelstrat) – ABRI's intelligence body – since 1977 and deputy head of BAKIN since early 1978.

14 The Pancasila project was resented by Muslim groups which could not accept the idea of ranking Pancasila above Allah. It was a big blow for the PPP whose constituency was mainly in the Muslim population. ABRI, led by the Catholic Moerdani, was viewed by many Muslims as antagonistic towards them. This suspicion was encouraged by the Tanjung Priok incident above. On the other hand, the five political laws concerned: (1) general election; (2) composition of the DPR and the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) (the nation's highest legislative body, consisting of all DPR members plus additional members appointed by the president, which met once every five years during the New Order to elect the president and vice-president); (3)

political parties and Golkar; (4) referendum; and (5) social organizations. Among other things, the laws: (1) banned debate over Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (UUD45) during election campaigns, and limited discussion to issues related to national development; (2) decided to allocate 100 appointed seats (previously 75) for ABRI in the DPR, while the total number of the DPR rose to 500 (from 460) and 1,000 (from 920) for the MPR; (3) determined Pancasila as the sole fundamental principle for parties and Golkar; (4) set several requirements which made it almost impossible to hold a referendum to revise the UUD45; and (5) authorized the government to dissolve any social organization that disturbed law and order or promoted ideas contrary to Pancasila and UUD45 in whatever form.

15 About the rise of Sudharmono, see Robison Pangaribuan, trans. Vedi Hadiz, *The Indonesian State Secretariat 1945–1993*, Perth: Asia Research Centre on Social, Political and Economic Change, Murdoch University, 1995, pp.58–59.

16 We will discuss ABRI's other tactics in the anti-Sudharmono campaign in Chapter 5.

17 Moerdani was replaced by his ally, Try Sutrisno (Army Chief), as Pangab but remained a powerful force as Minister of Defence and Security in the 1988–1993 Cabinet. About their cleavage with Soeharto, see Harold Crouch, 'An Ageing President, An Ageing Regime', in Harold Crouch and Hall Hill (eds), *Indonesia Assessment 1992: Political Perspectives on the 1990s*, Political and Social Change Monograph 17, Canberra: Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1992, pp.43–62. The event coloured the development of *keterbukaan*, as we will discuss in the following sections

18 For the political impact of this industrial transformation, see Richard Robison, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986.

19 'Paul Wolfowitz: Keterbukaan Politik Semakin Diperlukan', *Pelita*, 11 May 1989; 'Keterbukaan Sama Dengan Stabilitas: Paul Wolfowitz Tidak Merasa Memuji Indonesia Berlebihan', *Suara Pembaruan*, 13 May 1989. On the development of *keterbukaan* in general, see Max Lane, *'Openness', Political Discontent and Succession in Indonesia: Political Developments in Indonesia, 1989–91*, Australia–Asia Papers No. 56, Queensland: Centre for the Study of Australia–Asia Relations, Griffith University, 1991; and Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994.

20 The invitation to Soemitro followed his well-circulated article published the previous month in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (FEER), which openly insisted on the need for political reforms to end authoritarian practices. See his 'Aspiring to Normal Politics', *FEER*, 6 April 1989. Maj. Gen. Samsuddin was the Chairman of F-ABRI.

21 'DPR Akan Terus Bicarakan Keterbukaan dan Pembaruan', *Suara Pembaruan*, 2 July 1989.

22 *FEER*, 18 January 1990. Edi Sudradjat was regarded as loyal to Benny Moerdani.

23 'Dual Function Pep Talk', *Jakarta Post*, 12 February 1990.

24 'Pangdam VI: Bicarakan Dwifungsi Tidak Tabu', *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 28 March 1990.

25 'Kevokalan ABRI Karena Komitmen Pada Demokrasi', *Suara Karya*, 10 April 1990. Rudini served as Army Chief during 1983–1986 under Moerdani's period as ABRI Commander. In the Fifth Development Cabinet (1988–1993), Rudini was appointed Mendagri.

26 This dialogue had been held annually between the military leadership and intellectual figures since 1988. In the 1990 meeting, the ABRI side was represented by Try Sutrisno and Lt. Gen. Harsudiono Hartas (Chief of ABRI's Social and Political Staff, or Kassospol). The intellectual figures were, among others, Christianto Wibisono (business consultant and columnist) and Kwik Kian Gie (a prominent economist affiliated with the PDI). Both were Chinese Indonesians and regarded as outspoken intellectuals. The meeting was covered by several newspapers but the names of other participants were not provided. Like Sutrisno, Hartas was a close ally of Moerdani.

27 See 'Dialog Pimpinan ABRI dan Cendekiawan', *Suara Pembaruan*, 16 May 1990.

28 A Javanese expression describing how a father supports his young children from behind as they learn to walk. This is one of three educational principles introduced by Ki Hadjar Dewantara who was the founder of *Taman Siswa*, an educational institution established in 1924. Together with *tut wuri handayani*, there are: *ing madya mangun karsa* which means 'to be a driving force of children when in their midst' and *ing ngarsa sung tuladha* which means 'to lead from the front'. These concepts constitute part of ABRI's Eleven Leadership Principles (see Appendix 2). See, also, Soeharto's autobiography about his understanding of them (Soeharto, *Soeharto: Pikiran, Ucapan, dan Tindkan Saya*, Jakarta: PT Citra Lamtro Gung Persada, 1989, p.426).

29 According to Hefner, Try Sutrisno is said to have advised Soeharto to refuse approval. Robert Hefner, 'Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class', *Indonesia*, Vol. 56, October 1993, p.24. About ABRI's negative response to the creation of ICMI, see Douglas Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance*, London: Routledge, 1995, pp.132–149.

30 The demonstration was planned to coincide with a visit of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture. Marchers were shot as they approached the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili. Human Rights Watch/Asia assessed the death toll as nearly 100 and Amnesty International at around 270, while the Indonesian official account was at least 50. Human Rights Watch/Asia, *The Limits of Openness*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994, p.22; Amnesty International, *Power and Impunity: Human Rights under the New Order*, London: Amnesty International, 1994, p.50. For the international pressure over Indonesia's repression in East Timor, see, for example, Herb Feith, 'The East Timor Issue Since the Capture of Xanana Gusmao', Submission to the Human Rights Subcommittee, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australian Parliament, 1993.

31 Warouw was the Commander of East Timor Operations (Pangkolakops) and Sintong Panjaitan was Commander of Kodam IV/Udayana.

32 We will discuss this perception in detail in the next chapter.

33 'Perlu Konsensus untuk Ubah Model Pendekatan Keamanan', *Pelita*, 10 December 1991. We will discuss in full the escalation of criticism about ABRI's repressive approach – or the so-called *pendekatan keamanan* (security approach) – and human rights violations in Chapter 4.

34 'Hendaknya Kita Tak Terpengaruh Oleh Hak Asasi Versi Barat', *Suara Pembaruan*, 14 December 1991.

35 *Kompas*, in three related articles, noted that the conference was timely because of the Dili shooting (3 January 1992).

36 Interview with Lt. Gen. (ret.) Hasnan Habib, former Chief of Staff of the Defence Ministry (1973–1975) and Ambassador to the United States, 9 August 1996. However, it certainly did not break ABRI's ties with Golkar, as many retired officers still became the Golkar candidates and several provincial leaders came from ABRI. Although Golkar obtained the majority of votes in the 1992 election, what was prominent was the rise of the PDI, which increased its slice of the vote from 10 percent in 1987 to 14 percent in 1992. The PPP also increased its votes from 16 percent in 1987 to 17 percent in 1992. See Appendix 3 for the electoral result.

37 'Jumlah Anggota DPR yang Diangkat Sudah Waktunya Ditinjau Kembali', *Kompas*, 9 July 1992.

38 For example, *Jakarta Post* devoted its editorial to this event with the title 'Breaking Old Taboos', 10 July 1992; in its editorial *Suara Pembaruan* (10 July 1992) suggested that it was a sign of democratization.

39 'Reaksi Pro dan Kontra Soal Pengurangan ABRI di DPR', *Media Indonesia*, 10 July 1992, emphasis added.

40 'Lagi, Soal ABRI', *Media Indonesia*, 24 July 1992.

41 'Jumlah Wakil ABRI di DPR/MPR Bisa Disesuaikan Lewat Konsensus', *Kompas*, 16 August 1992.

42 'Soal Jumlah Wakil ABRI di DPR: Berhak, Masih Perlu, Jumlah Tak Soal, Sebagai Demokratisator', *Suara Pembaruan*, 16 August 1992.
43 'ABRI di DPR Cukup 10%', *Media Indonesia*, 18 August 1992; 'ABRI di DPR/MPR: Yang Penting Peranan, Bukan Jumlah', *Suara Karya*, 18 August 1992.
44 Thus, Edi was kicked 'upstairs' from KSAD to the less-powerful post of Menhankam within this short time. This was part of Soeharto's efforts to eliminate Moerdani's men from the top military structure. Feisal's promotion was said to have been recommended to Soeharto by Habibie. Feisal had known Habibie for a long time. Feisal's Islamic orientation also met with Habibie's desire to cultivate support for his ICMI. We discuss this issue later in this chapter.
45 'Change of ABRI Personnel Healthy Move', *Jakarta Post*, 10 April 1993. In April, three other service chiefs were replaced. Vice-Admiral Tanto Koeswanto became the new Chief of Staff of the Navy, replacing M. Arifin. Air Vice-Marshal Rilo Pambudi became the new Chief of Air Force, replacing Marshal Siboen, and Lt. Gen. Banurusman became the new Chief of National Police, succeeding Gen. Kunarto. Sayidiman himself was an adviser of ICMI.
46 'Profesionalisme dan ABRI Pasca-45', *Republika*, 10 April 1993.
47 'ABRI dan Demokrasi', *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 13 April 1993. *Ipoleksosbud* is a military term combining five terms: ideology, politics, economy, society and culture.
48 *Pokok-Pokok Pikiran Tentang Pengegkan Norma Dasar Keprajuritan TNI-AD (Back to Basics)*, TNI-AD, Mabes ABRI, 1993, p.41. This classified document is hereafter called the Edi Paper.
49 Ibid., p.41. Deviations ranged from the declining work ethic and discipline of the officer corps to the coordination of the command system. We will examine this project in full in the next chapter.
50 'Dua Jenderal dari Lembah Tidar', *Tempo*, 29 May 1993.
51 'ABRI Kembali ke "Basic" ', *Kompas*, 17 May 1993.
52 'Setelah Pelajaran yang mahal Itu', *Tempo*, 29 May 1993. 'Freedom-fighter' refers to the role played by the military during the independence war. It is a symbol of ABRI's nationalist orientation.
53 'Soeharto Wants Common Stand on ABRI's Dual Role', *Jakarta Post*, 28 September 1993.
54 'ABRI Harus Tahu Menempatkan Diri', *Merdeka*, 12 July 1993; 'ABRI Diminta Lapangkan Jalan Wujudkan Aspirasi yang Sah', *Pelita*, 12 July 1993.
55 'Peran Sosial Politik ABRI: Motivasi dan Perkembangannya', *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 5 October 1993. *Angkatan Bersenjata* is an ABRI-owned newspaper.
56 ABRI had insisted that *kekaryaan* was one form of *dwifungsi* implementation and, therefore, public criticism should not be directed at *dwifungsi* as a whole. We will discuss this problem of interpretation in Chapter 3.
57 Roekmini's counter-argument was also followed by a claim by ABRI that the concept of professionalism as used by civilian critics in the recent debate was applicable only in Western societies. This had led to a misunderstanding in judging ABRI's case. See 'Profesionalisme ABRI Jangan Sampai Tidak Dimengerti Rakyat', *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 6 October 1993; 'Prajurit Pejuang dan Pejuang Prajurit, Memberi Makna Bagi Profesionalisme', *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 6 October 1993.
58 For Sembiring's comment, see 'Mayjen TNI RK Sembiring Meliala: 1000 Orang DPR/MPR Jangan Dianggap Togog', *DeTik*, 27 October–2 November 1993. Rudini also claimed that the procedures of the Congress led by Habibie were not transparent and democratic. The Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs (Menko Polkam), Soesilo Soedarman, soon responded that Sembiring's and Rudini's comments were only individual opinions: 'ABRI Tak Persoalkan Hasil Munas', *Suara Merdeka*, 30 October 1993. More directly, Brig. Gen. Syarwan Hamid (Head of ABRI's Information Centre: Kapuspen) rebutted Sembiring's assessment as wrong and said that it exceeded the limits of the individual's right to free speech (see

'Pernyataan RK Sembiring Dinilai Keliru', *Kompas*, 31 October 1993). Syarwan was a close ally of Feisal Tanjung. Offering an opposing view, Professor Juwono Sudarsono at UI saw Sembiring's comment as representing ABRI's mainstream view ('Army General's Comment Whips Up Indonesian Storm', *Reuters*, 1 November 1993).

59 'Kilas Balik Hubungan ABRI–Sipil Dalam Golkar', *Kompas*, 20 October 1993. A similar argument was made by *Merdeka*'s two-day special issues: 'Sipil Tak Perlu "Minder" Dengan Generasi ABRI', *Merdeka*, 5 October 1993 and 'Kalangan Sipil Sudah Menyadari Kekeliruannya', *Merdeka*, 6 October 1993. In assessing the implication of Harmoko's leadership of Golkar, however, it should be remembered that whether a leader was civilian or military was far less important than whether he was close to the president.

60 'Bais ABRI Perlu Restrukturisasi', *Kompas*, 18 January 1994.

61 'Konsensus Peran Sospol ABRI?', *Forum Keadilan*, 17 February 1994. *Forum Keadilan* in this issue provided special coverage on back-to-basics.

62 Ibid. Pepabri is the Association of Retired Soldiers.

63 'ABRI Modern Tak Perlu Peran Sospol', ibid.

64 'Back to Basics', ibid.

65 'Manipulasi "Back to Basic" dan "Tut Wuri Handayani" Menyesatkan', *Kompas*, 22 February 1994.

66 'Antara Basic dan Barrack', *Editor*, 3 March 1994.

67 Pusjarah ABRI, *50 Tahun ABRI*, Jakarta: Mabes ABRI, 1995, n.p.

68 Even during the 1992 general elections and 1993 MPR session, two key events with potential for stirring political instability, Soeharto did not refer to the need to retreat from *keterbukaan*.

69 The official reason was provocation of instability in the case of *Tempo*, without mentioning any particular article, and administrative problems at the other two magazines. However, it was widely believed that the trigger was the article by *Tempo*, which revealed the conflict between Habibie and Finance Minister Mar'ie Muhammad over the budget to purchase thirty-nine German warships: see 'Jerman Punya Kapal, Indonesia Punya Beban', *Tempo*, 4 June 1994. This story was soon taken up by other magazines while Edi Sudradjat was reported as saying Habibie's demands were too high. This media-exposed picture of intra-regime conflict between Habibie, on the one hand, and Mar'ie and Edi with the backing of a segment in ABRI, on the other hand, was said to have made Soeharto angry, leading to his order to punish all three magazines.

70 The recall was decided by the party leadership councils, undoubtedly under pressure from the government.

71 Among those expelled were Goenawan Mohamad, managing editor of the banned weekly *Tempo*, Fikri Jufri, former *Tempo* editor-in-chief and editor of the monthly *Matra* and Eros Djarot, managing editor of *DeTik*.

72 Megawati Sukarnoputri – a daughter of Sukarno – had been Chairperson of the PDI since December 1993. We discuss the issues of Megawati's PDI later in this chapter.

73 'LIPI Akan Minta Pendapat Orsospol dan Pakar ABRI Siap Wakilnya di DPR Dikurangi', *Republika*, 24 February 1995; 'Menyoal Lagi Sistem Distrik', *Tiras*, 16 March 1995.

74 About such speculation, see the report in *Gatra*, 'Dua Puluh Lima Kursi untuk Demokrasi', in the 6 May edition. The existence of this gap was evident in an August 1995 poll conducted by *Forum Keadilan* which showed that only 47 percent of ABRI respondents supported the reduction of F-ABRI members: see 'ABRI Bicara Demokrasi', *Forum Keadilan*, Edisi Khusus 50 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, August 1995.

75 'Presiden Instruksikan LIPI Teliti Sistem Pemilu Terbaik: Perlu Dipikirkan Jumlah Anggota ABRI di DPR', *Kompas*, 22 February 1995.

76 'Sorotan Terhadap Peran Sospol ABRI Jangan Dikaitkan Dengan Jumlahnya', *Merdeka*, 11 March 1995. Hartono's promotion to KSAD, replacing Wismoyo, was

followed by a reshuffling of top posts during February and March, affecting more than 160 officers. Like Feisal Tanjung, Hartono was also a *santri* (devout Muslim) officer, and his promotion was seen as indicating Soeharto's inclination to place loyal Muslim officers in ABRI's leadership positions in the process of reconstructing ABRI's structure during a post-Moerdani period.

77 *Siaran Pers Yayasan LBH Indonesia Menanggapi Usulan Pengurangan Anggota ABRI di DPR-RI* (No. 010/SP/YLBHI/IV/1995).

78 'AH Nasution: ABRI Tak Pernah Minta Diangkat', *Kompas*, 26 April 1995.

79 'Fraksi yang Diangkat dan Dikritik', *Forum Keadilan*, 30 March 1995. Some members in the two opposition parties also showed a similar line of thinking. See comments of B.N. Marbun of PDI and Yusuf Syakir of PPP in 'Politicians Debate ABRI seats in the House', *Jakarta Post*, 26 February 1995.

80 'Fraksi yang Diangkat dan Dikritik', *Forum Keadilan*, 30 March 1995.

81 'AH Nasution: ABRI Tak Pernah Minta Diangkat', *Kompas*, 26 April 1995

82 'Menyoal Lagi Sistem Distrik', *Tiras*, 16 March 1995.

83 'Mayjen (purn.) Samsudin: Jangan Buat Pressure Terhadap MPR', ibid. The so-called National Consensus – which was adopted by the People's Provisional Consultative Assembly (MPRP) in 1967 – allowed military representatives in the DPR. Law No. 20/1982 legalized ABRI's *dwifungsi* doctrine, and – as seen above – the political law (Law No. 2/1985) ensured 100 seats for F-ABRI.

84 'Yahya Muhaimin: Sipil harus Peduli Dwifungsi', *Republika*, 7 March 1995. However, even though attendance was high, their participation was rare because – according to Muchtar Pakpahan, a prominent labour activist – the faction's majority – i.e. middle-ranking officers – hesitated to speak in deference to higher-ranking officers (see Muchtar Pakpahan, *DPR RI Semasa Orde Baru*, Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1994, p.148).

85 *Gatra*, 17 June 1995.

86 However, political manoeuvring between Sukarno and Nasution at that time should be noted. If military representatives were appointed by Sukarno, his influence would be maintained among officer-politicians.

87 We will examine the problem of ABRI's electoral participation further in Chapter 6.

88 'Ajakan Mulat Sarira', *Media Indonesia Minggu*, 25 June 1995. FKPPI (Forum Komunikasi Putra-Putri Purnawirawan Indonesia) is the Communications Forum for Sons and Daughters of ABRI Veterans.

89 *Ketahanan Nasional* (National Resilience) is a national doctrine of Indonesia which encompasses security–political–social–economic aspects to maintain Indonesia's autonomy in international society.

90 We will discuss the issue of territorial command in full in Chapter 6.

91 'Wawancara Harmoko: Tidak Ada yang Terpukul, Tidak Ada yang Kalah', *Forum Keadilan*, 25 May 1995. The concept of Big Family (*Keluarga Besar*) is an expression of Indonesian political culture. Political organizations often express their links with subordinates (organizations and individuals) by using the term 'family'. Therefore, the Golkar Big Family refers to the aggregation of Golkar-affiliated organizations in government and society. The same can be applied to ABRI, which has its own Big Family. On the political culture of the Big Family, see Saya Shiraishi, *Young Heroes: The Indonesian Family in Politics*, Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1997.

92 This strategy to place KBA individuals in KBG organizations was studied in detail by the military officers. See, for example, Badjoeri Widagdo (Letkol Inf), 'Pendayagunaan Keluarga Besar ABRI dalam Memantapkan Demokrasi Pancasila', *Widya Dharma* (Majalah Sesko ABRI), No. 16, 1991, pp.21–61. A well-known example is Pemuda Pancasila (PP), a Golkar-affiliated right-wing youth organization that also defines itself as a 'moral' member of KBA, whereas FKPPI and PPM are viewed as 'biological' members of KBA: see 'PPM: Menampik Ekslusivisme', *Pancasila Abadi*, 15 January 1995. *Pancasila Abadi* is PP's official magazine.

93 'Turun Naik Hubungan ABRI–Golkar', *Gatra*, 8 July 1995.
94 See the report in *Gatra*, 'Untuk Apa Soemitro Menggebrak', in the 8 July edition.
95 'Harmoko: ABRI Tidak "Back Up" Golkar', *Suara Merdeka*, 25 June 1995.
96 'Harmoko Menjawab Tuduhan', *Gatra*, 8 July 1995.
97 Both comments are from '"Diskusi" Harmoko dan Para Jenderal', *Media Indonesia Minggu*, 25 June 1995.
98 'KSAD Jenderal TNI R. Hartono: ABRI Akan Siapkan yang non-ABRI untuk Meneruskan Karya ABRI', *Forum Keadilan*, 17 July 1995.
99 In the above interview, Hartono insisted that certain people in Pepabri were not satisfied with Harmoko's management of Golkar. It should be noted that, unlike Feisal, Hartono had no role in appointing Harmoko as Golkar chairman in 1993.
100 'Golkar dan ABRI', ibid.
101 See 'Ada Apa di Sekitar Hubungan Golkar–ABRI?', ibid.
102 'Mencari Ketua, Menyiapkan Suksesi', *Tempo*, 8 May 1993.
103 'ABRI Tidak Bisa Netral Sebagai Kekuatan Sospol', *Kompas*, 30 September 1995. Syarwan was promoted to Assospol Kassospol in June 1995, replacing Maj. Gen. Hari Sabarno. Hari was then appointed to F-ABRI together with Maj. Gen. Haris Sudarno, East Java Military Commander (Pangdam V/Brawijaya), and Maj. Gen. Theo Syafei, Commander of ABRI's Staff and Command College (DanSesko ABRI). Haris was replaced by Maj. Gen. Imam Utomo, a close ally of Hartono, while Theo's post was taken by Maj. Gen. Yunus Yosfiah, a figure close to Feisal. Theo, a Protestant officer, had close links with former Menhankam Benny Moerdani and with Edi Sudradjat, and was therefore a target of Feisal and Hartono who were installed in the ABRI leadership as part of Soeharto's 'de-Moerdani-zation' programme.
104 'ABRI tak Berprinsip Jika Netral', *Kompas*, 4 October 1995.
105 'Pangab: ABRI Salurkan Aspirasinya ke Golkar', *Bernas*, 4 October 1995.
106 See *Amanat Presiden Pada Pembukaan Rapat Pimpinan ABRI Tanggal 27 Maret 1980 Di Pakanbaru*, Jakarta: Departmen Penerangan, 1980, pp.6–7. The debate over Soeharto's speech is analysed in vivid detail in Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals*.
107 The law stated that 'ABRI – as a social force – shall work together with other social forces in performing its tasks of safeguarding national independence and people's welfare…, and promoting Pancasila democracy and constitutional life based on the Constitution' (Article 28/Law No. 20/1982).
108 For Subagyo's comment, see 'Aspirasi Politik Keluarga Besar ABRI Tetap ke Golkar', *Suara Merdeka*, 4 October 1995. Megawati's account is from 'ABRI tak Berprinsip Jika Netral', *Kompas*, 4 October 1995.
109 A comment of Matori Abdul Djalil, the former Secretary-General of the PPP, taken from 'Langkah Mundur Jika ABRI Tetap Memihak Golkar', *Bernas*, 1 October 1995.
110 'ABRI Tak Bisa Hanya Memihak Salah Satu Kekuatan Sospol', *Suara Merdeka*, 1 October 1995.
111 'ABRI's Political Stance a Setback, Scholar Says', *Jakarta Post*, 6 October 1995.
112 'Diskusi Lima Pulu Tahun TNI/ABRI: Kredibilits ABRI adalah Segala-galanya', *Kompas*, 5 October 1995. The panellists were: Gen. (ret.) Rudini, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Soebijakto Prawirasubrata (former Governor of Lemhannas), Syarwan Hamid, Juwono Sudarsono (Vice-Governor of Lemhannas), Yahya Muhaimin, Marzuki Darusman, Indria Samego and Mochtar Pabottingi (the latter two from LIPI).
113 'Yang Terbaik Bagi Rakyat, Terbaik Bagi ABRI', *Forum Keadilan*, 23 October 1995.
114 'Kemal Idris: ABRI Terlalu Terlibat di Segala Bidang', *Forum Keadilan*, 23 October 1995. About the significance of the 1966 Army Seminar in formulating the *dwifungsi* doctrine, see Chapter 3.
115 Maulani's assessment of Golkar might be not unrelated to the Habibie–Golkar connection.
116 See 'ABRI Emas dan Tantangannya', *Kompas*, 6 October 1995.

117 'Arbi Sanit: Memiliki Tanggungjawab Penuh', *Bisnis Indonesia*, second week, October 1995.
118 'Feisal Tanjung: Dwifungsi Lestari Sepanjang Masa', *Forum Keadilan*, 23 October 1995.
119 Hartono was East Java Kodam Commander when ICMI was established in Malang (East Java) in December 1990, and since then he had been viewed in ICMI circles as an ICMI activist. He himself acknowledged ICMI as a national political organization equivalent to the PDI. See his interview with *Forum Keadilan*, 'Aku Bukan Satu-satunya yang Islam di ABRI', 2 March 1995.
120 Special report by *Tiras*, 'Dari Hotel Aryaduta Sampai ke Enteos Club', in its 2 November edition.
121 They included, for example, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Kharis Suhud (former Speaker of DPR/MPR, 1988–1993), Maj. Gen. (ret.) Samsuddin (former Head of F-ABRI), Gaffar Rachman (former Secretary General of Nahdlatul Ulama, or NU, the biggest Islamic organization in Indonesia), Hasjim Wahid (brother of Abdurrahman Wahid, the NU Chairman), Marzuki Darusman (former Golkar politician, now Deputy Chairman of the National Human Rights Commission, or Komnas HAM, established by Soeharto after the Dili incident) and Kwik Kian Gie (a prominent PDI economist).
122 'Menhankam: YKPK Sudah Lama Dinanti', *Kompas*, 25 October 1995.
123 'Kredibilitas ABRI Tergantung Sikap ABRI Sendiri', *Kompas*, 21 July 1995; 'ABRI: Berdagang, Jangan Berdagang', *Forum Keadilan*, 28 August 1995. Golkar had received backing from many business tycoons, including the Soeharto family.
124 'ABRI Harus Bersih dan Berwibawa', *Bernas*, 9 September 1995. The proceedings of this seminar were later documented using a different title, 'Aktualisasi Nilai-Nilai Kejuangan Bangsa dalam Rangka Menyukseskan Pembangunan Nasional Jangka Panjang Kedua' (Makalah Hasil Seminar Nasional 50 Tahun ABRI, 6–8 September 1995, Sesko ABRI, Bandung). The content of this document will be examined in Chapter 4 for our analysis of ABRI's nationalist perception in the age of international interdependence.
125 For the social backgrounds of YKPK members, see 'Profile YKPK: Merah, Kuning, Hijau, di Langit YKPK', *Tiras*, 2 November 1995.
126 'New Group to Counter Habibie Influence', *Reuters*, 25 October 1995. Bambang explained that both he and Moerdani were concerned about some groups in the regime which put religious interests before national causes (interview, 16 December 1996).
127 'Mayjen Syarwan Hamid: Yang tak Bermanfaat akan Layu Sebelum Berkembang', *Republika*, 9 December 1995.
128 See his interview in 'Ini Kan Suatu Kebutuhan', *Tiras*, 2 November 1995.
129 'KSAD: Setiap Anggota Abri Kader Golkar', *Kompas*, 14 March 1995. Officially Siti Hardijanti was only one of eight chairpersons (*Ketua-Ketua*) under General Chairperson (*Ketua Umun*) Harmoko. Thus Hartono's statement, which bypassed Harmoko in declaring ABRI–Golkar fusion, could also be understood as a statement of his personal loyalty to Siti.
130 'Hartono: Frivolous Questions About Golkar Allegiances Cause of Concern', *Kompas Online*, available: http://www.kompas.com, 15 March 1996.
131 'Feisal Tanjung: ABRI Tetap ABRI', *Kompas*, 16 March 1996.
132 Along with Syarwan's promotion, a large-scale personnel change was conducted during January and February 1996 which affected about 100 officers. Prior to this major personnel rotation, replacement of the Army Special Force Commander (DanKopassus) occurred in December 1995. Presidential son-in-law Brig. Gen. Prabowo Subianto (Deputy Commander of Kopassus) replaced Maj. Gen. Soebagyo as Commander of Kopassus, while the latter moved to Pangdam IV/Deponegoro. Both Prabowo and Soebagyo were said to be closer to Hartono than to Feisal. Prabowo and Hartono operated jointly a political think-tank, CPDS. According to

Feisal, ABRI would have no major reshuffle until the general elections in May 1997. However, there were subsequent waves of personnel rotation in March and August 1996, contradicting Feisal's earlier statement. These changes generated a concern about ABRI's weakening cohesion. It was Maj. Gen. Theo Syafei who openly questioned this issue. At a DPR meeting in March, this anti-ICMI general (and a Moerdani follower) pointed out the growing distortion in current personnel management caused by political influence; he was referring to Soeharto's political manoeuvring, which had placed loyal officers in top military posts. Theo insisted that the recent reshuffling had resulted in the 'inflation of generals' (*inflasi jenderal*) and a shortage in the number of posts available for the general-ranking officers. See *Forum Keadilan*'s special report on this issue, 'Bila Gerbong Mutasi Macet di Atas', in the 25 March edition. Edi Sudradjat responded to Syafei by saying that the question now was whether the pace of transfer was too fast or not, thus admitting there was a problem in personnel management ('Pangab Mengenai Tiga Letjen tak Punya Jabatan', *Kompas*, 6 March 1996). Maulani also agreed that the pace of transfer during this period was abnormal; see his 'Regenerasi ABRI 1995–1996', *Profile Indonesia* (Jurnal Tahunan CIDES), No. 2, 1996, p.139. Kammen and Chandra argue that the problem of quick transfer was an inevitable consequence of recruiting huge numbers of cadets during the 1960s (Douglas Kammen and Siddharth Chandra, *A Tour of Duty: Changing Patterns of Military Politics in Indonesia in the 1990s*, Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1999). But, as will be seen in Chapter 3, many serving officers recognized the problem as a reflection of Soeharto's political manoeuvring.

133 'ABRI Sebagai Kekuatan Sospol dan Hankam', *Suara Pembaruan*, 18 March 1996.

134 'ABRI tidak Hanya Berjuang dengan Golkar', *Suara Pembaruan*, 25 March 1996.

135 Edi's comment, however, should be interpreted in the context of a power struggle with the pro-ICMI forces, rather than as a simple legal argument. Note that he had suggested the nomination of ABRI candidates for the position of the Golkar Chairman in 1993, which would work to secure ABRI's influence in Golkar.

136 'Sekadar Menghebohkan Hubungan ABRI–Golkar', *Forum Keadilan*, 8 April 1996.

137 Ibid.

138 'Army Stance on Golkar Draws Fire', *Jakarta Post*, 15 March 1996.

139 'Petisi 50 Menggugat Hartono', *Indonesia-L* (online mailing list), available from the e-mail address: apakabar@clark.net, 29 March 1996. Literally, Sapta Marga is ABRI's Seven Pledges to dedicate itself for the national interest, and Sumpah Prajurit is the Soldiers' Oath. Both are ABRI's traditional ethical codes. See Appendix 2 for details.

140 'Debat: Dalam Sospol, ABRI Netral atau Tidak?', *Forum Keadilan*, 22 April 1996.

141 'Kasad Jenderal (TNI) R. Hartono: Pakai Jaket Kuning, Itu Hak Saya', *Tiras*, 7 November 1996.

142 Main officers who were involved in this affair were Brig. Gen. Agum Gumelar (Director of Internal Affairs Section in BAIS and later Kopassus Commander), Maj. Gen. Hendropriyono (Pangdam Jaya) and Colonel Zacky Anwar Makarim (Assistant of Intelligence at Kodam Jaya). See note 39 in Chapter 5 about Agum's prominent role in this event.

143 MARI's (Majelis Rakyat Indonesia: People's Council of Indonesia) founding members included Muchtar Pakpahan of SBSI, the unofficial trade union; Mulyana W. Kusmah of FLBHI, another legal aid institute, and also the Secretary General of the newly established independent election monitoring group, KIPP, led by former *Tempo* editor, Goenawan Mohamad; Budiman Sujatmiko of PRD, a student NGO which had recently declared itself a political party, and Yulius Usman of PUDI, another unofficial political party led by Sri Bintang Pamungkas. MARI soon declared its anti-*dwifungsi* manifesto.

144 'Pangdam Jaya: Ganggu Kamtibnas, Aksi Politik akan Dihentikan', *Kompas*, 26 July 1996; 'Kassospol ABRI: Aksi-aksi Akhir-akhir ini Merupakan Gerakan', *Suara Pembaruan*, 26 July 1996.

145 *Harian Terbit*, extra edition, 28 July 1996. According to the final report of the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM), the riot resulted in 5 deaths, 149 injured and 23 missing. For the full Komnas document, entitled 'Pernyataan Komnas Mengenai Peristiwa 27 Juli', see Santoso (coordinator), *Peristiwa 27 Juli*, Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi (ISAI) and Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (AJI), 1997, pp.59–65. The government banned this book on 14 February 1997.

146 The PRD was one of the most active participants in the *mimbar bebas*. The PRD had escalated its anti-New Order campaigns since the previous year and also led several labour–student demonstrations.

147 See 'Pemerintah akan Tindak Pelaku Kerusuhan 27 Juli' and 'Gerakan Destruktif Ditunggangi Marxisme', both in *Kompas*, 31 July 1996.

148 See Amir Syarifuddin, 'Mewaspadai Bangkitnya Kembali Gerakan Komunis di Indonesia', *Darma Putra*, Vol. 37, 1996, pp.24–29; Staf Teritorial ABRI, *Tinjauan Teritorial*, Mabes ABRI, No. Triwulan II, T.A. 1996/1997, pp.11–19. *Darma Putra* is Kostrad's internal magazine, and *Tinjauan Teritorial* is the quarterly report of Ster ABRI (ABRI Headquarters' Territorial Section). Ster was headed by Territorial Assistant (Aster Pangab) Maj. Gen. Arie J. Kumaat at that time.

149 'Ketua DPR/MPR: ABRI Harus Kurangi Reaksi-reaksi Represif', *Kompas*, 1 August 1996.

150 'Rudini: Semua Pihak Harus Menahan Diri', *Kompas*, 2 August 1996.

151 'Australian Labor Party's Link with PRD Studied', *Jakarta Post*, 5 August 1996. *Sinar*, in its 3 August edition, printed an organizational map of the PRD, which showed ALP's indirect link with the PRD via Amnesty International. However, this allegation ignored the fact that the ALP government was headed by Keeting, who was very sympathetic to Soeharto. The map was not the original work of *Sinar*, but a reprint of a paper sent to some press centres by fax from the Centre for Information and Development Studies (CIDES), the think-tank of ICMI. This CIDES paper emphasized the PRD's links with the PKI, by suggesting the PRD's closeness to Sabron Aidit, a nephew of an ex-PKI leader, D.N. Aidit. However, D.N. Aidit, who had died thirty years previously, had only one younger brother (no nephew) whose name was Sobron (not Sabron) and who lived in Paris.

152 YLBHI, for example, declared in a statement that ABRI allegations about ex-PKI offspring in the PRD, such as Budiman Sudjatmiko, Garda Semiring and Andi Arief, were inaccurate because none had fathers linked with the PKI. In fact, their fathers were, respectively, an activist in the Hisbullah Moslem movement during the independence war, a retired army officer and a member of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU); see 'Soeharto Labels PRD Insurgent', *Jakarta Post*, 8 August 1996. The inaccuracy of ABRI information, especially the BIA source, is suggested in Santoso, *Peristiwa 27 Juli*, p.39.

153 Soeyono, replaced by Lt. Gen. Tarub on 8 August, recalled that he was informed by Police Chief Dibyo Widodo that Soeharto was angry with him, and that he was not considered supportive of the operation of 27 July. When asked about why an ardent anti-communist campaigner, who had alerted attention to alleged communist infiltration in society earlier that year, would have his loyalty questioned, he answered that it was perhaps related to the 'killing the sitting duck games'. This was a popular expression to describe a trend to exclude officers close to the former ABRI leadership during the Edi Sudradjat and Benny Moerdani eras (see 'Ini Killing the Sitting Duck Games', *Tiras*, 22 August 1996). It was also alleged that Soeyono rejected a request for funding (around 500 million rupiah) from Maj. Gen. Sutiyoso to conduct the 27 July operation (see 'Dan Letjen Soeyono pun Diganti', ibid.). *Tiras* experienced severe pressure from ABRI's information section when this edition was published.

154 'Adi Sasono: Dagelan Kalau Saya Diisukan Ikut PRD', *Media Indonesia*, 23 August 1996.

155 The fact that the PRD leader, Budiman Sudjatmiko, was arrested at the house of Romo Sandyawan, director of a Catholic-linked NGO, the Jakarta Social Institute, became the basis of this theory. It was argued that Romo was a follower of liberation theology, which took a Marxist approach to social problems ('Bayang bayang Teologi Pembebasan', *Gatra*, 31 August 1996). Din Syamsuddin of the CPDS argued that the situation of East Timor could be the fertile soil for liberation theology in Indonesia, and criticized Romo's backing of Budiman ('Romo Sang Pelindung', *Gatra*, 31 August 1996). Amir Santoso, the director of the CPDS, argued the point in broader terms: 'many Muslims now believe that the coalition between left-wing and secular groups is aimed at undermining the political influence of Islam and replacing Soeharto–ABRI which is thought to give an opportunity to Islam' (see his article 'Kegeraman 27 Juli', *Forum Keadilan*, 9 September 1996). These men saw the shadows of CSIS – a think-tank led by Chinese Indonesians (many of whom were Catholics) – and Benny Moerdani, who associated with the CSIS after retirement, in the recent emergence of secular-nationalist groups.

156 Personal observation, Jakarta, 1 October 1996. Note that the posters placed the PRD next to the 1965 event, deliberately omitting other cases during the previous thirty years which had been claimed by ABRI as communist-led events. This was to create propaganda promoting the belief that the current issue was as serious as the attempted coup in 1965. We will examine ABRI's ideological projects in Chapter 5.

157 Both Buyung Nasution and Goenawan Mohamad believed that, under the anti-PRD campaign, ABRI could easily arrest them regardless of possible international criticism. Buyung also said that KIPP's activity to enlighten people about the need for fair conduct of the 1997 election virtually stopped due to these pressures, whereas Goenawan insisted that KIPP just decided to take a low-profile approach. Interviews with Buyung Nasution, 11 September 1996; Goenawan Mohamad, 5 December 1996.

158 'Menhankam: Stabilitas Nasional tak Dibangun di Atas Kekuasan yang Otoriter', *Kompas*, 6 July 1996.

159 Soeharto's comment was not announced by the man himself, but through Tantyo AP Sudharmono, the son-in-law of former vice-president Sudharmono and head of the youth wing in MKGR, one of the three founding organizations of Golkar. Tantyo had just had a meeting with Soeharto and quoted his words at a press conference. However, those who knew Soeharto questioned the credibility of Tantyo's comment. Gen. (ret.) Benny Moerdani, for example, argued that 'such a comment could never come from Soeharto because it was totally against his political style' (interview, 23 September 1996).

160 For the above comments, see 'Criticism from Retired Officials Needed, Edi Says', *Jakarta Post*, 13 September 1996; 'Letjen TNI (Purn) Solichin GP: Sikap Kritis Semata-mata Membantu', *Kompas*, 25 September 1996; 'AH Nasution: Ketidakadilan Sosial Musuh Paling Besar', *Suara Pembaruan*, 28 September 1996.

161 For above comments, see 'Di Depan Presiden Soeharto, Soesilo Akui Ada Purnawirawan Kurang Konsisten', *Republika*, 26 September 1996; 'Ketua DPR Sudomo: Bila Ingin Melakukan Koreksi, Lebih Baik Langsung ke Presiden', *Kompas*, 26 September 1996; 'Pangab, Soal Purnawirawan tak Konsisten: Mereka Ekstradisiplin dan kontraloyalitas', *Republika*, 27 September 1996. Feisal, however, did not identify the retired officers.

162 Special coverage on this issue can be found, for example, in 'Aksi dan Reaksi Para Mantan Jenderal', *Forum Keadilan*, 7 October 1996, and in the weekly tabloid, *Swadesi*, 'Tuding-menuding Siapa yang Tidak Konsekuen Melaksanakan UUD45 dan Pancasila' (4–10 October 1996). For the next few months, the media contained many interviews with outspoken retired generals – all of whom condemned Feisal's statement.

163 See Hasnan Habib, 'Pembangunan Nasional Bidang Hankam Pada Pelita-VII (Tanggapan)', paper prepared for ABRI Seminar, Jakarta, 3 September 1996. This ABRI seminar is discussed in detail in the following chapters.
164 See Rudini, 'Legitimasi Sosial Peran Sospol ABRI', paper presented at Sesko ABRI Seminar, Bandung, 4–5 November 1996.
165 'Penerapan Dwifungsi ABRI Masih Sering Menyimpang', *Kompas*, 5 November 1996.
166 See Z.A. Maulani, 'Implementasi Fungsi Sospol ABRI pada Masa Kini dan Masa yang Akan Datang', paper presented at the panel discussion, Forum Kajian Dwifungsi ABRI, Seskoad, Bandung, 5 November 1996.
167 'Pangab Tentang Dwifungsi: ABRI Dipaksa Tanggung Beban dari Keberhasilannya Sendiri', *Kompas*, 23 November 1996.
168 'Presiden Instruksikan LIPI Teliti Sistem Pemilu Terbaik: Perlu Dipikirkan, Jumlah Anggota ABRI di DPR', *Kompas*, 22 February 1995. When the project was announced by Sekneg Moerdiono, he emphasized the point that LIPI was a government body which should behave in a responsible manner.
169 For a contextual analysis of the report, see Chapter 6.
170 Author's observation at the seminar, entitled 'Seminar Hasil Penelitian 1996/1997: Pengkajian Masalah-Masalah Strategis di Bidang Politik dan Sosial Budaya', LIPI, Jakarta, 26 February 1997.
171 See Indria Samego (coordinator), 'Peran Sosial Politik ABRI: Masalah dan Prospeknya', paper presented at the Seminar Hasil Penelitian 1996/1997 Pengkajian Masalah-Masalah Strategis di Bidang Politik dan Sosial Budaya, LIPI, Jakarta, 25–27 February 1997. In the evolving *dwifungsi* dispute, critical opinions from civilians had frequently been attacked by ABRI as an 'outsider's view', implying that such criticisms were not based on Indonesian values, and thus could be interpreted as anti-Pancasila and a legitimate target of security operations. As seen above, such an 'interpretational overstretch' was most recently applied in the case of the PRD which overtly criticized *dwifungsi* in its political manifesto.
172 See Indria's interview, 'Peran Itu Harus Jelas', *Gatra*, 8 March 1996.
173 See, for Maulani's comment, 'Gugatan Baru Untuk Dwifungsi ABRI', and Hari's interview 'Perlu Reformasi Kultural', both in *Gatra*, 8 March 1997.
174 Both comments are from 'Dwifungsi Jalan Terus', *Tiras*, 24 April 1997.
175 See his article, 'Mengakhiri Dwifungsi?', *Gatra*, 8 March 1996.
176 Cited in Hendropriyono, 'ABRI Sebagai Prajurit Pejuang Menghadapi Era Globalizasi', paper presented at the seminar 'Perspektif Peranan ABRI Memasuki Abad 21', Lemhannas, Jakarta, 11 March 1997. For media coverage on this seminar, see 'Dwifungsi Masih Relevan Untuk Dikaji', *Suara Pembaruan*, 3 April 1997. Hendropriyono at that time held a civilian post, Secretary for Operational Control of Development (Sekretaris Pengendalian Operasional Pembangunan, or Sekdalopbang), which was directly under Soeharto, but he was still on active duty. He participated in the seminar on behalf of Syarwan Hamid.
177 Notable riots are as follows: Situbondo (10 October 1996), Dili (24 December), Tasikmalaya (26 December), Sanggau Ledo (30 December–2 January 1997), Tanah Abang (9 and 27 January), Pontianak (29 January), Rengasdengklok (30 January), Rancaekek (31 January), Bandung (2 February), Sungaikunyit, near Pontianak (18 February), Ambeno (21 February), Pekalongan (24–26 March, 6 April), Temanggung (6 April), Rembang (6 April), Warung Buncit and Bekasi (20 May), Ciputat (23 May) and Banjarmasin (23 May).
178 For Wahid's covert operation scenario, see special reports in *Sinar* (11 January 1997), *Forum Keadilan* (10 February 1997) and *Tiras* (23 January 1997); see also his comment on a coalition in 'Gus Dur Predicted Presidential Election Will be Influenced', *Jakarta Post*, 30 January 1997.
179 Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid, 30 January 1997. It was not surprising if ICMI-linked generals found interest in discrediting Wahid. Situbondo, for example, was in

the territory commanded by Maj. Gen. Imam Utomo (Pangdam Brawijaya) and his chief-of-staff, Brig. Gen. Muchdi Purwo Pranyoto at that time. Apart from Imam's closeness to Hartono, Muchdi was later known as Prabowo's partner. The anti-Wahid posture of the Hartono–Prabowo line was also strongly reflected in the orientation of their think-tank, CPDS, which saw Wahid as undermining Islamic aspirations by maintaining ties with CSIS and Benny Moerdani (communication with a CPDS staff member, 18 September 1996).

180 This comment implied that Syarwan identified Kopkamtib as an organization which had instigated social riots to achieve certain political goals. This was the implicit criticism of Moerdani and his followers who had developed Kopkamtib until the late 1980s.

181 See 'ABRI tak "Main Api" ', *Kompas*, 17 January 1997. Sudomo, former commander of Kopkamtib, then expressed his opinion that Tasikmalaya could have been instigated by the group of extreme right (Islamic fundamentalists), such as the younger generation of Darul Islam which had been destroyed in the 1960s. Syarwan denied this account since it was against his image-manipulation that those who were involved in the riot were not Muslims but the radical left ('Ekstrem Kanan tidak Terlibat', *Republika*, 22 January 1997).

182 After field research, Komnas HAM also concluded that a *pihak ketiga* (third party) instigated the riots in Tasikmalaya and Sanggau Ledo in West Kalimantan ('Third Party Masterminded Riot, Rights Body Says', *Jakarta Post*, 9 January 1997). These facts invited a view among Jakarta-based journalists that the 'hit-and-run' tactics of 'the plotters' were more professional than ABRI's territorial staff: 'If we think of who could make such a job, there is only one answer; the special unit within the military' (communications with anonymous journalists, January–February 1997).

183 'Danjen Kopassus: Saya Paling Anti-Preman', *Suara Pembaruan*, 26 January 1997. The Tanah Abang case was one of inter-gang conflict. Hercules, who led one of the largest *preman* groups in Jakarta, embraced many *pemuda* (youth) from East Timor, allegedly overlapping with those who were brought from East Timor by military officers to conduct pro-integration Timorese campaigns in Jakarta. Eagle Unit or *Ninja* is their code name in East Timor (*Tempo*, 7 March 1992). For information about Hercules, Timorese *pemuda* and their connection with the security apparatus, see 'Preman Menguasai Tanahabang', *Kompas*, 2 February 1997. Also, see Chapter 4 (note 38) for the military use of *preman*.

184 'Danjen Kopassus: Ada Kelompok yang Sengaja memicu Huru-hara', *Kompas*, 27 February 1997. Beyond such training, Garda Paksi Chairman, Marcal de Almeida, admitted that the organization was set up with financial assistance from Prabowo to help find decent jobs (see 'Viqueque Street Brawl Arrests Rise to 109', *Jakarta Post*, 15 February 1997). We will discuss further the role of Prabowo and his Kopassus in provoking riots in Chapter 7.

185 'Mitos Dwitunggal-Dwifungsi', *Suara Pembaruan*, 12 December 1996.

186 About the New Order's long attempt to establish a corporatist network of interest articulation and political control, see, for example, Dwight Y. King, 'Indonesia's New Order as a Bureaucratic Polity, a Neopatrimonial Regime or a Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regime: What Difference Does It Make?', in Benedict Anderson and Audrey Kahin (eds), *Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate*, Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1982, pp.104–116, and MacIntyre's theoretical review (Andrew MacIntyre, *Politics, Policy and Participation: Business–Government Relations in Indonesia*, PhD thesis, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1988, pp.17–20).

187 Hartono was appointed to replace Harmoko as Minister of Information with the latter awarded the position of Minister for Special Affairs, a post newly created by

Soeharto, while retaining the Golkar Chairmanship. In October, Harmoko was appointed Speaker of DPR/MPR.

188 Maj. Gen. Prabowo is the husband of Soeharto's second oldest daughter, Siti Hedijat Hariyadi. Soeharto relied much on Prabowo in handling internal military affairs – e.g. personnel transfers – especially after the fall of Moerdani. As we will discuss in later chapters, the rise of Prabowo, who had special access to the President, since the mid-1990s created uncertainty in the promotion system within the army and became a major source of internal friction.

189 The National Military Academy (Akademi Militer Nasional: AMN) was established in 1958 as a three-year school. In 1969, however, the programme was extended to four years and given a new name, the Military Academy (Akademi ABRI: Akabri). Thus, graduates post-1970 are called the Akabri generation. Wiranto graduated from the last AMN class in 1968.

190 Among others, Maj. Gen. Arifin Tarigan (Seskoad Commander), Maj. Gen. Budi Harsono (Assospol Kassospol), Maj. Gen. Sedaryanto (Pangdam I/Bukit Barisan), Maj. Gen. Namoeri Anoem (Pangdam VI/Tanjungpura), Maj. Gen. Tayo Tarmadi (Pangdam III/Siliwangi), Maj. Gen. Imam Utomo (Pangdam V/Brawijaya), Maj. Gen. Ahmad Rivai (Pangdam IX/Udayana). For the complete list, see '54 Jenderal Akan Isi Kursi F-ABRI DPR-RI', *Media Indonesia*, 12 July 1997. Syarwan was the only three-star general among them, implying that he would eventually lead F-ABRI in the MPR session in March 1997.

191 See Salim Said, 'Dari Syarwan ke Yunus dan Yudhoyono', *Republika*, 16 July 1996. Yudhoyono, during his stint as Korem Commander in Yogyakarta, established contact with academic circles and intellectuals. Yunus was viewed as a temporary bridge with Yudhoyono, given the fact that Yunus' promotion was against the direction of generation change, or *regenerasi*, which was insisted on by the ABRI leadership in explaining this reshuffle. Syarwan was an AMN graduate of 1966. Apart from the generation change, significant political aspects of this massive transfer were: (1) the replacement of six of the ten regional commanders and eight of the ten regional chief-of-staffs; and (2) the total reshuffle of Kostrad's top six positions. The former implied the elimination of Hartono-appointed officers while the latter worked to undermine the substantial power of Wiranto who was Kostrad Commander before being promoted to KSAD.

192 'Kolom Rudini: Angkatan 70-an Tanpa Prinsip Pokoknya', *LPSI Online*, available: http://www.lpsi.org, Edisi No. 2, 21 August 1996. For media coverage of Akabri-generation officers, see 'Bintang-bintang ABRI Zaman Baru', *Gatra*, 25 November 1995; 'Empat Mutasi di Tubuh ABRI dalam 50 Hari', *Republika*, 18 March 1996; and 'Meneropong Bintang Yang Kian Kemilau', *Forum Keadilan*, 9 September 1996

193 'Perwira ABRI dan Keluarganya Tetap Dilarang Berbisnis', *Media Indonesia*, 16 July 1997. Perhaps having felt the need to defend his fellow soldiers, Pangab Feisal Tanjung soon responded by saying that they could do business 'if' they had special permits both from Pangab and Menhankam ('Pangab: Perwira ABRI Boleh Berbisnis Dengan Izin Khusus', *Suara Pembaruan*, 22 July 1997). It was not, however, a strong argument since Edi had already rejected such a possibility.

194 Overseas Masters degree holders were, for example, Feisal's adviser, Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo (Akabri 1970) (MAs, Georgetown University and Manchester University); Maj. Gen. Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Akabri 1973) (MA in Management, Webster University); and Brig. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah (Akabri 1973), nephew of former vice-president Umar Wirahadikusumah, who assisted in ABRI's strategic planning, as Deputy Assistant for General Planning (Waasrum Pangab) (MA in Public Policy and Management, Harvard University). They worked together to design the back-to-basics curriculum in 1993, while Yudhoyono and Wirahadikusumah also coordinated the 1996 Army Seminar which formulated the Army's strategic plan for the next GBHN. We will examine their roles in full in Chapter 3.

195 'Wawancara J. Kristiadi: ABRI Sangat Tergantung pada Pangti', *Tempo Interaktif*, online, available: http://www.tempo.co.id/min/07/utama2.htm, Edisi 07/02, 19 April 1997.

196 The relationship between Soebagyo and Prabowo was cultivated when they served, respectively, as Commander and Deputy Commander of Kopassus. Also an officer with a link to CPDS, Brig. Gen. Robik, Head of Army Information Service (Kadinaspen AD), soon announced that the new leadership under Wiranto would continue Hartono's policy line (see 'Tidak Ada perubahan Kebijakan di TNI-AD', *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 17 June 1997).

197 He said that his idol was Habibie whom he believed capable of leading the nation (see Yunus' interview, 'Wawancara: Dari Suksesi Hingga B.J. Habibie', *Tiras*, 14 July 1997).

198 'Dwifungsi ABRI Dilaksanakan dengan Hati-hati', *Media Indonesia*, 29 July 1997.

199 This movement was a scheme in which Feisal had asked conglomerates to bring their overseas US dollars back to Indonesia and convert them to devalued rupiah to prove their sense of nationalism. For details, see 'Kontroversi Sofjan Setelah Ledakan', *Forum Keadilan*, 23 February 1998. For an English source, see Human Rights Watch/Asia, 'Indonesia Alert: Economic Crisis Leads to Scapegoating of Ethnic Chinese', New York: Human Rights Watch, February 1998.

200 Feisal Tanjung became Menko Polkam, replacing Soesilo Sudarman. Wiranto's promotion to Pangab was followed by the promotion of Soebagyo as KSAD. It was also announced that Prabowo would become Kostrad Commander and Yudhoyono would take the post of Kassospol after the MPR session in March. Meanwhile, Wiranto's attempt to consolidate his power could be seen, for example, in the replacement of Lt. Gen. Tamlicha Ali by Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo as Assistant for General Planning to Pangab (Asrenum Pangab) in January. Widjojo's previous position as the political security adviser to Pangab was occupied by his friend, Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah.

201 See 'Soal Permainan Politik di Balik Krisis Rupiah Mereka Pengkhianat', *Republika*, 24 January 1998. ' "Us" and "Them": Muslim Activists Say It's Time to Seize Economic Power', *FEER*, 12 February 1998. On 8 February, a large Muslim meeting was held at the Al Azhar Mosque in Jakarta. Anti-CSIS speeches were given and as a result it was labelled as a 'conspirator' or traitor of the nation. Speakers called for a closing of the ranks of Islam and ABRI against them ('Dibentuk Front Solidaritas Nasional Muslim Indonesia', *Kompas*, 9 February 1998). As mentioned in the *FEER* article cited above, Prabowo, in particular, had a close link with one of the radical groups at the meeting, the Indonesia Committee for World Muslims (KISDI), which was actually involved in the CSIS demonstrations. For KISDI's anti-CSIS declaration in which the think-tank was named as a Frankenstein and a Vampire which should be banished from Indonesia, see an article in its internet homepage, 'Kebohongan Liem Bian Koen', *KISDI Interaktif*, online, available: http://www.kisdi.com/edisi1/aktual1.htm, 8 February 1998.

202 'Kontroversi Sofjan Setelah Ledakan', *Forum Keadilan*, 23 February 1998.

203 See, for example, 'Jangan Sebarkan Sentimen SARA', *Kompas*, 10 February 1998.

204 'MUI Serukan Jihad Nasional', *Republika*, 11 February 1998. The ICMI newspaper *Republika* also conducted a campaign which linked such a conspiracy theory with CSIS, utilizing its editorial for three days to write about the role of CSIS in manipulating politics during the Ali Moertopo era.

205 See 'ABRI Has Candidate In Mind for Veep, Feisal Says', *Antara*, 12 February 1998 and 'Soal Calon Wapres ABRI Tidak Ingin Ulangi Masa Lalu', *Media Indonesia*, 12 February 1998.

206 See, for example, 'Kassospol Tepis Kemungkinan Anggota F-ABRI Interupsi', *Kompas*, 27 February 1998.

207 'Kassospol ABRI: Stabilitas Tidak Ditentukan oleh Wapres yang ABRI', *Republika*, 26 January 1998. 'ABRI's Trust in Soeharto Part of a "Strategic Plan" ', *Jakarta Post*, 3

February 1998. Amien Rais, chairman of Mohammadiyah (the country's second-largest Muslim group), was a popular opposition leader who had insisted publicly on the need for presidential succession since the early 1990s. It was, of course, inconceivable that Soeharto would nominate Amien Rais.

208 Their activities and political attitudes since the early 1990s are discussed in the following chapters.

209 The history of struggle refers to the pre-New Order Indonesia which experienced the independence war (1945–1949), a communist upheaval in Madium (1948), a series of separatist movements (1957–1959) and the failed communist coup in 1965.

3 Reinventing legitimacy: doctrinal adaptation in a changing society

1 No equally comprehensive work appeared after the 1982 guidebook, and *dwifungsi* indoctrination within ABRI was conducted based on this material in the late New Order. The guidebook is entitled *Buku Petunjuk Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia Tentang Dwi Fungsi ABRI*, Jakarta: Dephankam, 1982.

2 *Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI 'Tri Ubaya Çakti'* (Hasil Seminar Angkatan Darat Tgl 2 s/d 9 April 1965 di Seskoad, Bandung), Departmen Angkatan Darat, 1965, pp.4, 11. This doctrinal paper is the product of the First Army Seminar. The concept of Golongan Karya was depicted in UUD45, which stated that all functional groups had the right to participate in politics. It was introduced into the political system by Soekarno when he formed the National Council (Dewan Nasional) in 1957, aiming to consolidate his political power and limit the space for party politics which was seen as a cause of instability. Golongan Karya consisted of several 'functional' groups and the army was given this status with the resulting expansion of its formal role in politics. For details, see, for example, Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945–67*, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp.134–135 and Leo Suryadinata, *Military Ascendancy and Political Culture: A Study of Indonesia's Golkar*, Athens: Ohio University, 1989, p.8.

3 *Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI 'Tri Ubaya Çakti'*, p.11.

4 See Surat Keputusan Men/Pangab Nomor: KEP-1169/11/1966 Tanggal 11/November 1966, in *Doktrin Perjuangan TNI-AD 'Tri Ubaya Çakti'* (Hasil Seminar AD ke-II Tanggal 25 S/D 31 Agustus 1966 di Graha Wiyata Yudha/Seskoad, Bandung), Seskoad, Bandung, 1966, pp.13–14. Hereafter this will be called the New TUÇ Paper.

5 *Tri Ubaya Çakti* literally means Three Sacred Vows and consists of three subdoctrines in the 1965 (First Seminar) version – Doktrin Kekaryaan TNI-AD (Doctrine of the Non-Military Function of the Indonesian Army), Doktrin Perang Revolusi Indonesia (Doctrine of the Indonesian Revolutionary War) and Doktrin Pembinaan Potensi Perang Revolusi Indonesia (Doctrine of Fostering Potential for the Indonesian Revolutionary War). The New TUÇ Paper of 1966 was based on three renewed subdoctrines, i.e. Doktrin Pertahanan Darat Nasional (National Land Defence Doctrine), Doktrin Kekaryaan (Non-Military Functional Group Doctrine) and Doktrin Pembinaan (Fostering Doctrine) plus, as their practical doctrine, Doktrin Perang Rakyat Semesta (Perata), or People's Total War Doctrine. This doctrinal package effectively relinquished revolutionary terminology which accompanied the image of left-wing radicalism (ibid., pp.10–12).

6 Ibid., p.17.

7 Ibid., pp.17–21.

8 Ibid., p.20.

9 Panggabean, the deputy army commander at that time, later succeeded Soeharto as the army commander in 1968 and ABRI commander in 1971. The comment cited above is from Panggabean, 'Pidato Pembukaan Ketua Seminar AD ke-II/1966', in *Amanat/Pidato Pra-Saran Dalam Seminar AD ke-II/1966*, Bandung, Seskoad, 1966, p.61.

10 *Doktrin Perjuangan TNI-AD*, pp.40–41. *Sipersos* was designed to mobilize two non-military organizations: People's Resistance (Wanra) and Civil Defence (Hansip). However, this army doctrine remained essentially unchanged since the First Army Seminar, given the basic continuity of the defence environment and the army's available resources.

11 Ibid., pp.45–46. For the Golongan Karya role under the New Order, the doctrine stated that the army needed to restructure its organizations to penetrate its programmes in ideological, religious, sociocultural, political and economic fields (*Buku Petundjuk Tentang Pokok-Pokok Doktrin Kekaryaan* (No. 56–5-B), KEP-1169/11/1966, Markas Besar Angkatan Darat, 1966, p.16).

12 *Doktrin Perjuangan TNI-AD*, pp.52–60.

13 Ibid., pp.65–115. Perata was based on the concept of Territorial War which was applied during the war of independence for the total mobilization of resources in a given territory to conduct guerrilla warfare against the Dutch force. Later, the guerrilla strategy was transformed into anti-guerrilla operations for internal security surveillance. For details, see Abdul Haris Nasution, *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*, Jakarta: Seruling Masa, 1970.

14 *Doktrin Perjuangan TNI-AD*, pp.31–38. Under Hankamnas doctrine, each service had its own defence doctrine, namely the army's Hanratnas, the navy's Pertahanan Maritim Nasional (National Maritime Defence: Hanmarnas), the air force's Pertahanan Udara Nasional (National Air Defence: Hanudnas), and the police's Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat (Security and Social Order: Kamtibmas). Hankamnas coordinated all four of the doctrines.

15 Soemitro was also army commander in East Java at that time. For his speech, see 'Sambutan Ketua Sindikat Tri Ubaya Çakti', in *Amanat/Pidato Pra-Saran Dalam Seminar AD ke-II/1966*, pp.261–273. General Nasution, at that time the Head of MPRS (the provisional version of the MPR), also argued that the new TUÇ was intended to wipe out PKI supporters who emerged through Nasakom (the doctrine used to fuse nationalist, religious and communist forces advocated by Soekarno) which he said contradicted Pancasila and Sapta Marga (A.H. Nasution, 'Sambutan Ketua MPRS Pada Seminar AD ke-II/1966', in *Amanat/Pidato Pra-Saran Dalam Seminar AD ke-II/1966*, p.168). This document – composed of eighteen articles written by the major participants of the seminar, including civilian intellectuals – is extremely helpful in assessing personal views (rather than institutionally adopted views) during the building stage of the New Order regarding the future role of ABRI.

16 CDEK (Four Missions, One Deed) meant that four services were united by one doctrine. This first Dephankam seminar in November 1966 later produced a doctrinal paper, *Doktrin Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional dan Doktrin Perdjuangan Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, 'Tjatur Darma Eka Karma'*, Staf Pertahanan Keamanan, 1967, hereafter called the CDEK document.

17 Ibid., p.35.

18 Maynald also saw CDEK as embodying the *dwifungsi* concept. Harold W. Maynald, *A Comparison of Military Elite Role Perceptions in Indonesia and the Philippines*, PhD dissertation, The American University, 1976, p.156.

19 CDEK document, p.57.

20 Details of the posts in the central government are as follows: Ministers/Heads of High State Institutions (42%); Secretaries General (73%); Inspectors General (29%); Directors General (78%); Heads/Chiefs of Non-departmental Institutions (44%); and Ministerial Secretaries/Assistant Ministers (84%). Data are from Notosusanto (ed.), *Pejuang dan Prajurit: Konsepsi dan Implementasi Dwifungsi ABRI*, Jakarta: Penerbit Sinar Harapan, 1984, pp.378–379. Percentages of ABRI governors were: 73% (1968–1973); 76% (1973–1978); 59% (1978–1983); 51% (1983–1988); 44% (1988–1993); and 48% (1993–1998).

21 In the 1967 negotiations to establish new laws on elections, and the composition of the DPR/MPR, political parties and functional organizations, the Deliberation Committee (Panitia Musyawarah Kelompok) – consisting of the main groups in Parliament – argued in favour of reaffirming the appointment of ABRI members to the DPR/ MPR; this move was named the 'National Consensus of 1967'. The Consensus finally became a decision of the Speaker of the Parliament on 16 December 1967. For details of the process, see Notosusanto, *Pejuang dan Prajurit*, pp.136–138.
22 Keputusan Menhankam/Pangab Nomor: KEP/04/III/1977 Tanggal 5–3–1977 in *Doktrin Operasi Sosial Politik*, Dephankam, 1977.
23 *Doktrin Operasi Sosial Politik*, pp.10, 23. The concepts of security and prosperity approaches had no clear definitions, but they referred essentially to the ways in which ABRI responded to sociopolitical change. The security approach saw it in terms of security, and thus tried to repress any change which might threaten the status quo. The prosperity approach, on the other hand, viewed the change as a reflection of national development, which should not be treated as a threat but as a positive social dynamic. Criticism of the security approach became a topic of popular political debate in the late 1980s, as will be discussed in Chapter 4.
24 Ibid., pp.14–15. For a discussion of ABRI's Big Family (Keluarga Besar ABRI – KBA), see Chapter 2. For example, the Organization of Wives of Soldiers, Bureaucrats in the Defence Department, Pepabri (Association of Retired Soldiers), FKPPI and the League of Veterans are the members of KBA.
25 *Dasar Hukum Dwi Fungsi dan Identitas ABRI (SKEP/1382/X/1977, Tanggal24-10-1977)*, Dephankam, 1977, pp.6–7.
26 Ibid., pp.7–8.
27 Ibid., p.18.
28 *Kekaryaan Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*, Dephankam, March 1978. It stated at the beginning (see p.4) that the purpose was to rebut growing criticism towards *kekaryaan* within society. The doctrine regarding *kekaryaan* was exceptional among several ABRI doctrines because it had been repeatedly upgraded or supplemented during the previous decade. The 1978 version was the fourth attempt following August 1966, November 1966 and November 1975 versions. The 1975 version was *Doktrin Kekaryaan ABRI* (Kep. Menhankam/Pangab 40/XI/1975 Tanggal 17–11–1975), Dephankam, 1975. Such frequent revisions indicated the high sensitivity of this political doctrine to public criticism.
29 *Kekaryaan Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*, p.10.
30 Ibid., p.11.
31 The sociologist, Morris Janowitz, defined two types of militarism: designed militarism and reactive militarism. The document insisted that neither were applicable in the case of Indonesia, where ABRI's involvement was from the very beginning (ibid., pp.20–26). As seen below, along with Janowitz, ABRI officers – even among Akabri-generation officers – selectively make use of Western political scientists, such as Huntington, Amos Perlmutter and others from the functionalist school, to back up *dwifungsi* legitimation.
32 Ibid., pp.42–43.
33 In response, Fosko-AD (the Army's Communication Forum) was set up by the army to establish a communication channel for retired officers who became increasingly critical of ABRI leadership. Dharsono, an outspoken ex-Commander of West Java Miltary Command, was Secretary General of Fosko-AD. Another grouping, LKB (Institute for Constitutional Awareness), was not army-sponsored but was led by Nasution as the adviser, Ali Sadikin and Dr Hatta, the country's first vice-president who declared Indonesia's independence together with Soekarno in 1945, as well as several of the most prominent retired officers and civilians. For details, see David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975–1983*, Ithaca: Cornell

Modern Indonesian Project, Cornell University, 1984, pp.102–112 and also Ulf Sundhaussen, 'Regime Crisis in Indonesia: Facts, Fiction, Predictions', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 21, No. 8, August 1981, pp.815–837. Later in 1980, Petisi 50 was established.

34 *Pelaksanaan Kebijaksanaan Kekaryaan ABRI Tahun 1979/1980 dan Kebijaksanaan Kekaryaan ABRI Tahun 1980/1981* (Pada Rapat Pimpinan ABRI 1980), Dephankam, March 1980, pp.4, 19. This document was signed by Lt. Gen. Kharis Suhud, ABRI's Chief of Kekaryaan Staff (Kaskar Hankam), who – as seen in Chapter 2 – later became a critical figure in YKPK.

35 Ibid., pp.10, 25. Pepabri's role included its mobilization of members to support Golkar during the elections. All retired officers are automatically registered as a member of Pepabri, but their commitment varies. Lt. Gen. (ret.) Hasnan Habib, for example, argues that channelling government instructions via Pepabri is not acceptable, and that this is a reason for his failure to join Pepabri (interview, 9 August 1996).

36 Ibid., p.13.

37 Ibid., p.16. However, according to the data mentioned in this report, in Renstra Hankam I 1973–1978, the total number of posted serving officers was 8,107, revealing the fact that ABRI set the higher target at the beginning of the Second Strategic Plan. If both active and retired personnel ('organic' and 'non-organic', in ABRI terms) are included, the total number of *kekaryaan* posts during the First Renstra was 22,245 whereas at the time of this meeting, it was 17,167.

38 Ibid., pp.22, 24, 26. Concerning the third decision, it did not however eliminate the possibility that the Golkar faction would nominate an ABRI member as the candidate.

39 The project carries out many labour-intensive works such as digging tertiary irrigation canals, making new village paths and erecting bridges, schools, village meeting halls and religious centres. However, it also aimed at disseminating information and conducting public discussions concerning ideology, and Yusuf's ABRI believed that AMD, under the slogan *kemanunggalan ABRI–Rakyat*, was essential for the preservation of ABRI's *dwifungsi* (see *Kemanunggalan TNI-ABRI Dengan Rakyat Menghadapi Dasa Warsa 1980-an*, Dephankam, 5 October 1980, pp.22–24).

40 See Jenkins, pp.138–159.

41 ABRI's Rapim 1980 document was prepared on 10 March 1980, and the decisions above were supposed to be adopted during the Rapim. Soeharto's speech was made on 27 March, the first day of the Rapim.

42 See *Amanat Presiden Pada Pembukaan Rapat Pimpinan ABRI Tanggal 27 Maret 1980 di Pakanbaru*, Departmen Penerangan, 1980, pp.6–7. Note: Pekanbaru is also called Pakanbaru, but Soeharto's speech is popularly known as the 'Pekanbaru' speech.

43 Ibid., pp.8–9.

44 *Buku Petunjuk Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia Tentang Dwifungsi ABRI* (No. SKEP/614/VI/1982 Tanggal 1 Juni 1982), Dephankam, 1982, hereafter called the guidebook.

45 Ibid., pp.15–30.

46 Article 2 in UUD45 referred to the functional group representatives in the MPR, while Article 30[1] stated that all citizens had rights and duties to participate in national defence. Here, ABRI interpreted national defence as including political management.

47 In Chapter 6, we will examine how ABRI strategically employed these different sources in the *dwifungsi* dispute depending on the context. The growing social criticism was reflected in the 1982 report of the National Defence and Security Council (Wanhankamnas), a presidential advisory body, which recommended that ABRI leadership review the implementation of *dwifungsi*. The Council stated that there was still a worry in society that *dwifungsi* would some day become militarism and totalitarianism and, although *dwifungsi* had already been accepted in the 1978 GBHN (Broad Outlines of State Policy), such a concern would remain as long as *dwifungsi* implementation was not strictly regulated by law (see *Perkiraan Strategik Nasional Jangka Pendek*

1983–1985: Aneka Bidang Politik, Sekretariat Jenderal, Dewan Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional, 1982, p.24). The weight of the recommendation from the Council can be assessed by the fact that Wanhankamnas' prime role was to prepare the GBHN, including broad defence and security considerations, which become the president's policy directive issued by the MPR (Robert Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996, p.16).

48 See *Sejarah Seminar TNI-Angkatan Darat III dan Lahirnya Dharma Pusaka 45*, Dinas Sejarah TNI-AD, 1973, pp. 27–28.

49 For a very detailed study of the processes of the seminar, the above document is valuable. For a brief explanation, Notosusanto's work (*The Transfer of Values in the Indonesian Armed Forces*, Jakarta: Centre for the Armed Forces History, Department of Defence and Security, 1974) is useful. When Try became KSAD in 1986, the spirit of the 1972 Seminar was again confirmed (Try Sutrisno, 'Ceramah Proses Perumusan Dharma Pusaka 45', *Yudhagama*, No. 27, 31 October 1986, pp.5–18). Here, by providing a detailed map of how the 1945 values had been transferred, he insisted that the process was going well. As we shall see later, some other leaders took the opposite view.

50 When Moerdani was promoted to Pangab, the dual position of Pangab and Menhankam and the integrated Dephankam/ABRI structures were all abolished based on Law No. 20/1982. Dephankam, headed by the Minister Gen. Poniman, was mainly in charge of administrative matters whereas ABRI, led by Pangab Moerdani, inherited all of the command and operation responsibilities, formerly held by Dephankam, which gave the levers of power and authority to the Pangab. In this new configuration, Dephankam – unlike every other ministry of importance – lost its own independent eyes and arms outside the capital and across the vast territory of Indonesia (The Editors, 'Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite (Continued)', *Indonesia*, No. 37, April 1984, p.146). As a result, Dephankam was clearly relegated to a secondary position (John B. Haseman, 'The Dynamics of Change: Regeneration of the Indonesian Army', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 36, No. 8, August 1986, p.892).

51 *FEER*, 24 October 1985; see also *Indonesia Reports* (No. 1, November 1984, p.3) for the officers' concerns about their post-retirement jobs affected by the reorganization. Reorganization of the military had a special meaning in Indonesian history, as seen in the cases of 1948, 1950 and 1956 where the officers to be discharged reacted violently against army authority. For details of these events, see Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*. Utrecht's detailed study argues that the reorganizations and rationalizations (*re-dan-ra*) until the end of the 1950s failed mainly due to the strong patrimonial tradition within the army, especially the *bapak-anakbuah* (father–children) relationship (Ernst Utrecht, *The Indonesian Army: A Socio-political Study of an Armed, Privileged Group in the Developing Countries*, Southeast Asian Monograph Series No. 4, James Cook University, 1980, pp.21–105).

52 Interview with Rudini, 4 September 1996. In ABRI, the term rationalization had a negative connotation as it was associated with demobilization and a reduction in senior positions. Rudini's emphasis on professionalization aimed to counter this. Before the reform was implemented, however, Rudini had clearly explained that the planned reorganization was intended to streamline ABRI, revealing his shifting interpretation of reorganization after facing internal questions; see Rudini's earlier speech in 1984, 'Ceramah Pembekalan Kasad bagi Siswa Sekolah Staf & Komando Gabungan ABRI Susreg ke-X dengan Judul "Reorganizasi TNI-AD"', *Yudhagama (Media Komunikasi Pembinaan TNI-AD)*, No. 17, 31 March 1984, pp.4–11.

53 See Moerdani's biography written by Pour (Julius Pour, *Benny Moerdani: Profil Prajurit Negarawan*, Jakarta: Yayasan Kejuangan Panglima Besar Sudirman, 1993, p.479).

54 L. Benny Moerdani, *Menegakkan Persatuan dan Kesatuan Bangsa: Pandangan dan Ucapan Jenderal TNI (purn) L.B. Moerdani 1988–1991*, Jakarta: Yayasan Kejuangan Panglima Besar Sudirman, 1992, p.69, emphasis added.

55 The term *pejuang* literally means a fighter for a principle, implying the freedom-fighters' spirit, whereas *prajurit* refers to the soldier as profession. Thus in ABRI language the term *prajurit pejuang* emphasizes ABRI's self-esteem as 'soldiers with the spirit of warrior' to distinguish themselves from other militaries. Similarly, the term *pejuang prajurit* was used to stress ABRI's traditional mentality that soldiers were warriors first before being professional soldiers. These concepts have always been utilized when ABRI denies the perceptional gap between the two generations and asserts the continuing legitimacy of *dwifungsi* regardless of the generational change. About the interaction of the two concepts, see Notosusanto (*Pejuang dan Prajurit*, pp.171–173) which became the established reference of *dwifungsi* theory among ABRI officers.
56 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Benny Moerdani, 23 September 1996.
57 Interview, 23 September 1996.
58 The seminar published a document, *Pokok-Pokok Pikiran ABRI untuk Menyukseskan Pembangunan Nasional*, Mabes ABRI, 1986.
59 Ibid., p.67. Moerdani was still Pangab at that time. Presumably he agreed with this assessment. The conflicting interpretation is not a matter for us as we now attempt to see the evolving process.
60 See Try Sutrisno (Letjen TNI), 'Ceramah KASAD Tentang Kepemimpinan dan Profesionalisme ABRI', *Yudhagama*, No. 28, 31 January 1987.
61 Ibid., pp.6–7.
62 Ibid., p.10.
63 See G. Simanora (Kol Czi), 'Laporan Studi Banding Tim Akabri ke Jepang, Korea Selatan dan Muangthai (Proyeksi Akabri Tahun 2000)', *Yudhagama*, No. 24, 31 January 1986, pp.15–16.
64 *Laporan Perkembangan Sosial Politik* (No.06/Lapbangsos/VII/1988), Mabes ABRI, August 1988. This is a monthly report of ABRI's sociopolitical section signed by Maj. Gen. Muchtar (Assistant for Sociopolitical Affairs to Kassospol), providing analysis on the latest political developments. It is notable that regeneration was covered in this issue, implying its political significance as perceived by the sociopolitical sector within ABRI.
65 Ibid., pp.1–2.
66 Ibid., p.4.
67 Ibid., p.5.
68 This campaign involves programmes such as neighbourhood watch, the rehabilitation of criminals, moral regulation of car drivers and promotion of other public morals.
69 *Dwifungsi ABRI dan Disiplin Nasional*, Jakarta: Puspen ABRI, Mabes ABRI, 1990.
70 Ibid., p.8, emphasis added.
71 Ibid., p.43.
72 For the public dissemination of ABRI's discipline campaign, see, for example, 'Pangab Jenderal Try Sutrisno: Tingkatkan Kadar Disiplin di Lingkungan Satuan ABRI', *Kompas*, 18 January 1990; 'SMA Taruna Nusantara: Membina Disiplin dan Wawasan Kebangsaan', *Kompas*, 13 July 1990; 'Disiplin Nasional Merupakan Tuntutan Kebutuhan Masyarakat', *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 9 November 1990.
73 See *Buku Petunjuk Seminar TNI-AD Tahun 1990 'Strategi Pembangunan Sumber Daya Manusia Dalam Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Tahap ke-Dua'*, TNI-AD, Mabes ABRI, 1990.
74 See *Pengarahan Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata Republic Indonesia Pada Acara Pembukaan Seminar TNI AD Tahun 1990 di Bandung, Tanggal 15 Desember 1990*, TNI-AD, Mabes ABRI, 1990, pp.5–9. In this five-day seminar, twenty papers were discussed but there were only four papers arguing the political aspects. These were presented by Alfian (from LIPI), Sarwono Kusumaatmadja (Minister of Reform of State Apparatus), Harry Tjan Silalahi (Director of CSIS) and Juwono Sudarsono (UI). Feisal Tanjung was Seskoad Commander at that time.
75 Ibid., pp.9–10.

76 Ibid., p.12.
77 Ibid., p.16.
78 At the closing session, Try emphasized that these aspects were the major themes of discussion during the seminar (*Sambutan Pada Penutupan Seminar TNI Angkatan Darat Tahun 1990*, Seskoad, Bandung, 18 December 1990, pp.9–10).
79 See *Pokok-Pokok Pikiran ABRI Tentang Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Tahap Kedua (Hasil Seminar ABRI 1991)*, Jakarta: Mabes ABRI, September 1991, p.40. These six components are the basis of Hankamnas doctrine designed in Law No. 20/1982.
80 Ibid., p.64. ABRI's evolving threat perception will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
81 Ibid., p.112.
82 *Doktrin Pertahanan Keamanan Negara Republik Indonesia*, Jakarta: Dephankam, 5 October 1991. Moerdani also split the responsibilities of doctrinal developments between Menhankam and Pangab in 1992. Now, the new doctrine of Hankamneg (*Pertahanan Keamanan Negara*: National Security and Defence) was defined as the basic doctrine authorized by Menhankam, and CDEK which was renewed in 1988 became ABRI's main doctrine for which the Pangab was responsible (see *Keputusan Menteri Pertahanan Keamanan (No: KEP/17/X/1991) Tentang Doktrin Pertahanan Keamanan Negara Republik Indonesia*).
83 *Revisi Program Lima Tahun Pertahanan Keamanan Negara 1989–1993*, Dephankam, 1992, pp.7–8. This document was also a revision of ABRI's strategic design following the above ABRI seminar and the tightening budgetary allocation for ABRI's operational tasks, though it did not significantly affect budgets for *sospol* and territorial operations, which consisted of less than 1 percent of the total annual budget.
84 *Pokok-Pokok Pikiran Tentang Penegakan Norma Dasar Keprajuritan TNI-AD (Back-to-Basics)*, TNI-AD, Mabes ABRI, 1993. Hereafter call the Edi Paper.
85 The previous moral-improvement campaign was more inclined to emphasize historical values, especially the importance of Sapta Marga, rather than the problem-solving approach employed by the Edi Paper. For example, a Seskoad educational document of that time was devoted entirely to the reiteration of Sapta Marga as a guide for army officers to behave in efficient, effective and moral ways rather than dealing with any problems (see *Naskah Departmen Tentang Kode Etik TNI-ABRI untuk Kursus Reguler Staf Umum dan Komando TNI-AD* (No. 52–07-B1-F1301), Bandung: Seskoad, 1991). The Edi Paper thus illustrated a quite unusual approach.
86 Edi Paper, p.4. Deviations were said to be caused both by environmental and internal factors.
87 Ibid., p.11.
88 Ibid., pp.11–12. The defence–security budget had declined as follows: 14.8% (1974/1975); 11.3% (1979/1980); 11.1% (1984/1985); 7.4% (1989/1990); and 6.6% (1992/1993).
89 Ibid., p.13.
90 Ibid., p.14.
91 I bid., p.14. NEM (Nilai Ebatanas [evaluasi belajar tahap akhir nasional] Murni) is an integrated examination for high-school students who want to go to university. Sipenmaru is the abbreviation of Seleksi Penerimaan Mahasiswa Baru. According to an Akabri document, since 1993 one requirement necessary to apply for Akabri was the attainment of at least 35 points in the NEM, so on paper, applicants with 30 points are no longer able to apply (*Sejarah Akademi Angkatan Bersenjata RI (1972–1993)*, Buku II, Mako Akabri, 1993, p.95). The declining quality of Akabri students is also discussed in Kristiadi's work, which instead emphasizes the growing alternative job opportunities rather than the declining value of *kejuangan* in society (Josef Kristiadi, 'The Armed Forces', in Richard W. Baker, Hadi Soesastro, J. Kristiadi and Douglas E. Ramage (eds), *Indonesia: The Challenge of Change*, Leiden: KITLV Press, 1999, pp.99–114). Some also argue that the decline in quality is due to the patronage factors in recruitment, especially for the children of ABRI officers. Bribe-giving is also mentioned.

92 Edi Paper, p.17. The paper did not mention these prohibited places, but according to a previous document they included nightclubs, public steambaths and other places which might harm the image of ABRI (*Instruksi Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (No: INS/03/IX/1986) Tentang Pelaksanaan Pola Hidup Sederhana di Lingkungan ABRI*, Mabes ABRI 1986, pp.39–40). This document, compiled under Moerdani's leadership, also imposed strict regulations on their interaction with society.

93 Edi Paper, pp.24–25. This claim revealed that the project of the Third Army Seminar in 1972 was still incomplete. According to Brig. Gen. (ret.) Abdulkadir Besar, former Deputy Commander of Seskoad (1976–1978) and author of the 1972 Seminar document, the intent of the seminar had virtually failed and *dwifungsi* already had become *dwiporsi* (dual portion), meaning merely seeking a wider role in politics without virtue (interview, 30 July 1996).

94 Ibid., p.18.

95 Ibid., pp.21–23.

96 Ibid., p.24.

97 Ibid., p.27.

98 Ibid., p.28.

99 Ibid., p.34. As seen in Chapter 2, the process of eliminating the influence of Moerdani which was called 'de-Moerdani-zation', created concern among many serving officers about their career uncertainty. Edi's assessment might reflect this reality. Lt. Gen. (ret.) Soebijakto expected that such distortion in promotion practice would only be normalized after Soeharto (interview, 8 January 1997).

100 Edi Paper, pp.38–42.

101 The Edi Paper explained some problems resulting from Moerdani's reorganization package. Among others, the elimination of Kowilhan reduced the effectiveness of the army's line-structure; the dissolving of infantry brigades caused major problems in maintaining infantry battalions in Korems due to a lack of training and readiness; and the structure, capacity and tasks of all army organizations were too uniform (*diseragamkan*), especially in territorial commands, due to the failure to consider demographic, geographic and social factors, thus making it difficult for many organizations to conduct their tasks well (Edi Paper, p.20). After nine years of Moerdani's reorganization, Edi revealed the technical problems (apart from concerns about the job reductions we discussed earlier). The uniformity of the Kodams could also be found in the fact that their *hankam-sospol* conduct was designed to be based on the Pangab's directions and, again at least on paper, some flexibility was only given in the case of combat, logistic and education policies; for details of official Kodam tasks, see *Penyempurnaan Pokok-Pokok Organisasi dan Prosedure Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat (TNI-AD)* (KEP:08/X/1992), Mabes ABRI, 1992, pp.102–104.

102 Interview, 4 March 1997.

103 Interview, 4 July 1996.

104 Interview, 8 January 1997.

105 Written Interview with Gen. (ret.) Nasution, 4 January 1997.

106 Interview, 30 September 1996. Widjojo was an Adviser to the Pangab, Feisal Tanjung, in Political and Security Fields (Sahli Pangab bidang Polkam). Earlier he had produced an article which was selected as the best working paper in the Sesko ABRI Regular Course XVIII 1991/1992. Sesko ABRI is the Joint Staff Command College, which is open for officers who have graduated from an appropriate service Staff and Command College (for example, Seskoad for army officers) and have a good record in their duties. Widjojo's working paper discussed the various impacts of internal problems in conducting *dwifungsi* (Agus Widjojo, 'Upaya Peningkatan Kualitas Personil ABRI Sejalan Dengan Upaya Peningkatan Kaulitas Sumber Daya Manusia', *Widya Dharma (Majalah Sesko ABRI)*, No. 18, 1992, pp.47–89). Widjojo (class of 1970) is the son of Brig. Gen. Sutojo, who was one of six generals killed in the abortive coup of 30 September 1965.

107 Interview with Brig. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, Deputy Assistant for General Planning to Pangab (Waasrenum Pangab), 24 January 1997. Wirahadikusumah – who was the Korem Commander in Denpasar, Bali, before his current post – was a member of the same Akabri class as Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono. This first Harvard MPA holder in ABRI is a nephew of the former vice-president Umar Wirahadikusumah who commanded the Jakarta region during the coup in 1965. That Gen. Sutojo and Gen. Umar were key players in the formation of the New Order army and their relatives were now involved in its reform project illustrated the ongoing generational change within the New Order.
108 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Edi Sudradjat, Menhankam, 19 February 1997.
109 The Editors (1995, pp.104–105) assessed that Wismoyo was eager to protect army business interests against the encroachment of presidential crony Bob Hasan in order to show that he was not a puppet of Soeharto. However, soon after Hartono replaced Wismoyo as KSAD in 1995, he scrapped the back-to-basics plan (interview with Agus Widjojo, 27 October 1998).
110 As seen earlier, Seskoad was the institute which held major army seminars in the 1960s and 1970s to formulate core political doctrines of the military.
111 See *Naskah Departmen Tentang Kepemimpinan ABRI Untuk Kursus Regular Staf Umum dan Komando TNI-AD* (No. 52–07-B1-F1201), Bandung: Seskoad, 1993, p.21. The paper also noted that officers often failed to show their respect for higher-ranking officers by dropping 'siap' (Yes Sir) into conversation at meetings.
112 This description of authoritarian and democratic leadership is from ibid., pp.7–8.
113 See *Kepemimpinan ABRI dalam Pembangunan Negara-Bangsa: Masa Lalu, Masa Kini, dan Masa Mendatang*, Mabes ABRI, 1993, p.52. Pangab Try Sutrisno explained that this 64-page document was the latest reference for ABRI officers to improve the professionalism of *dwifungsi* in order to take the leadership in guarding Indonesia from foreign ideologies.
114 See *Tantangan Pembangunan: Dinamika Pemikiran Seskoad 1992–1993*, Bandung: Forum Pengkajian Seskoad, 1993. Agus Wirahadikusumah, who had just come back from Harvard University in 1992 and joined Seskoad's teaching staff at the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, was Secretary of the Forum. In producing this book, the Forum selected several key contributors, all from Seskoad, except one who had been posted to Kodam III/Siliwangi as Assistant for Operations to Kasdam. This was Agus Widjojo (Col.) whom Agus Wirahadikusumah evaluated as the best intellectual officer among the Akabri-generation officers (interview with Brig. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, 2 October 1996).
115 See Agus Widjojo, 'Upaya Peningkatan Kualitas Personil ABRI Sejalan Dengan Upaya Peningkatan Kaulitas Sumber Daya Manusia', p.55.
116 Ibid., p.56.
117 Ibid., p.65. The quotation from Juwono is provided without the source.
118 Ibid., p.66.
119 Ibid., p.71.
120 Ibid., p.85.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid., p.88.
123 Confidential interview, January 1997.
124 Heru Sukmadi was a 1974 graduate of Akabri and a member of the teaching staff of Seskoad at that time. He was then posted as Edi's adviser (Staf Ahli Menhankam).
125 See Bambang Heru Sukmadi (Letkol), 'Tantangan Etika Militer ABRI Dalam Era Pembangunan', in *Tantangan Pembangunan*, pp.34–35.
126 Ibid., p.35. We will examine further the impact of the Dili affair and the DKM on the subsequent civil–military relations in Chapter 4.
127 Agus Wirahadikusumah (Letkol), 'Kejuangan dan Profesionalisme Prajurit TNI AD: Suatu Tinjauan dan Analisis Kritikal', in *Tantangan Pembangunan*, pp.43–71.

128 Ibid., p.54.
129 Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Letkol), 'Profesionalisme Perwira ABRI Masa Kini dan Masa Depan', in *Tantangan Pembangunan*, pp.91–149.
130 Ibid., pp.101–102. He suggested six points which comprised the characteristics of ABRI's professionalism: (1) a high moral quality based on ABRI's code of ethics; (2) expertise in *hankam* and *sospol*; (3) being leaders and managers with a sense of justice; (4) having deep insights, awareness and responsibility in national life; (5) a strong spirit of solidarity and compactness; and (6) solidarity with people in national life. As we have seen earlier, these slogans were not new in ABRI's thinking. Interestingly, Yudhoyono integrated them all within his conception of professionalism.
131 Interviews with Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo, 30 September 1996. A serving officer of the rank of general also asserted that 'ABRI can never be professional since it plays politics' (confidential interview, January 1997).
132 Ibid., pp.108–109.
133 Ibid., p.120.
134 Ibid., p.125. Yudhoyono, with Wirahadikusumah, also wrote another chapter in *Tantangan Pembangunan*, this one focusing on international politics concerning the Non-Block movement and the role of Indonesia in it. This highly academic writing gave the impression that they themselves embodied the 'officer as thinker', which Yudhoyono mentioned.
135 Ibid., pp.135–136.
136 Ibid., p.147. As seen in Chapter 2, the term *pemadam kebakaran* has been used by critics to describe ABRI's role in reality as a mere watchdog of stability, despite its proclaimed role as the dynamizer of development. In this context, the term is used to criticize ABRI's shortcomings in implementing *dwifungsi*. However, the term is also used to criticize ABRI's day-to-day involvement in non-military sectors. In this context, critics insist that ABRI's prime role should be like that of a fire extinguisher, which is only needed in an emergency situation.
137 Interview with Maj. Gen. Hari Sabarno, Deputy Head of F-ABRI, 5 February 1997. Hari then became the Head of F-ABRI in September 1997 and was given the task of leading F-ABRI in the March MPR session in 1998.
138 See *Gema Jayakarta (Media Komunikasi Kodam Jaya/Jakarta)*, edisi VI, December 1995, p.37. The role of ABRI was generally interpreted to be *tut wuri handayani* during this period, but ABRI saw some programmes, such as GDN, gave *dwifungsi* a chance to perform the role of *ing ngarsa sung tuladha*. See Chapter 2 for a definition of these Javanese concepts.
139 This year's Study Forum members were different from the previous year. However, noted officers included Col. Rizal Nurdin – who later became Kasdam I/Bukit Barisan and Pangdam in the same Kodam in the 1997 July reshuffle – and Lt. Col. Syarifudin Tippe who was the best graduate (*lulusan terbaik*) in the Seskoad 1989–1990 class and became the Coordinator of Pangab's Personal Staff (Korspri Pangab) under Feisal Tanjung. The 1994 edition is *Tantangan Pembangunan: Dinamika Pemikiran Seskoad 1993–1994*, Edisi Kedua, Bandung: Forum Pengkajian Seskoad, 1994.
140 Ibid., pp.231–233. As mentioned above, however, this admission policy was reversed by Hartono when he became KSAD in 1995.
141 *Tantangan Pembangunan III – Dinamika Pemikiran Seskoad 1994–1995: Strategi Pembangunan Koperasi dalam Menghadapi Era Perdagangan Bebas pada Awal Abad ke-21*, Bandung: Forum Pengkajian Seskoad, 1995. The promotion of *koperasi* was a major national policy from 1993.
142 See Imam Maksudi (Kol), 'Peran ABRI Sebagai Kekuatan Sosial Politik Dalam Mempercepat Kemajuan Usaha Koperasi', in ibid., pp.239–265. Also in *Tantangan Pembangunan III*, see pp.266–268. These claims were aimed at improving ABRI's image in society which viewed ABRI as an agent of big business. As seen in Chapter 2 in

1996 Menhankam Edi Sudradjat publicly warned of the danger of becoming a tool of the rich, reflecting one concern of the third edition.

143 *Tantangan Pembangunan – Dinamika Pemikiran Seskoad 1995–1996 (Edisi ke-IV): Semangat Mempedomani Pancasila dan UUD 1945 Dalam Setiap Gerak dan Langkah Menjamin Adanya Harmonisasi Pembangunan Politik Pada Pelita VII*, Bandung: Forum Pengkajian Seskoad, 1996. This edition was the result of a seminar held by the Study Forum in May 1996.

144 Maj. Gen. Arifin Tarigan (AMN 65) also played an important role in the LIPI project (see Chapter 2). As mentioned earlier, the LIPI project consisted of two studies – one on *dwifungsi*, the other on the electoral system – and Arifin was a key ABRI informant who provided input regarding the electoral system. His proposals, which opposed the single-seat district system, can be found in Arifin Tarigan (Mayjen), 'Kajian Tentang Sistem Pemilu', *Yudhagama*, No. 50, Vol. 17, July 1996, pp.14–33. In the July 1997 reshuffle, he was replaced by Brig. Gen. Affandi, Deputy Commander of Seskoad, and became a member of F-ABRI. In June 1998 he became the Chairman of Wanhankamnas (National Defence and Security Council), a body to advise the President.

145 See Arifin Tarigan, 'Visi Tentang Globalizasi dan Perubahan pada Aspek Poleksosbud Serta Pengaruhnya pada Ketahanan Nasional', in *Tantangan Pembangunan – Dinamika Pemikiran Seskoad 1995–1996*, p.49.

146 Ibid., p.53.

147 Tayo Tarmadi, 'Pembangunan Politik, Pemberdayaan Masyarakat dan Masa Depan Pembangunan', in *Tantangan Pembangunan – Dinamika Pemikiran Seskoad 1995–1996*, pp.57–70. In the July 1997 reshuffle, Tayo (Akabri 1971) – like Arifin – was transferred to F-ABRI.

148 Ibid., pp.62–66.

149 See Ade Djamhuri (Letkol), 'Komunikasi Politik Antar Infra dan Suprastruktur Politik untuk Memelihara Stabilitas Keamanan yang Mantap dan Dinamis', in *Tantangan Pembangunan – Dinamika Pemikiran Seskoad 1995–1996*, pp.199–227. Ade, who worked under Tayo's Siliwangi Command, is an Akabri classmate of Yudhoyono and a holder of an MA from University of Indonesia.

150 AMN graduates were those who finished the three-year course at the military academy (AMN) during 1961–1968. In 1969, the course was extended to four years and AMN was renamed Akabri. Thus, Akabri graduates were those who entered the academy after the army became the dominant power in 1966 and graduated after 1970. In our discussion, I often call them the New-Order-generation officers, or third-generation officers. The second-generation officers are AMN graduates who entered the academy during the Sukarno period, and followed the 1945 generation.

151 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Soemitro, 23 July 1996.

152 The seminar's Steering Team was headed by Brig. Gen. Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Kasdam Jaya; the Discussion Team was led by Brig. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, Deputy Assistant for General Planning to Pangab (Waasrenum Pangab). The material preparation was under the responsibility of Maj. Gen. Adang Ruchiatna, Dan Pusterad (Commander of Army Territorial Centre) whose leadership in East Timor as Pangdam IX/Udayana had boosted his reputation within ABRI as a professional territorial manager. All of them worked under the Chief Organizer, Maj. Gen. Arifin Tarigan. Yudhoyono and Wirahadikusumah were also the moderators of seminar discussions which had four speakers: Rudini, Juwono Sudarsono, Sayidiman, and Gen. (ret.) Awaludin Djamin.

153 The three documents were: *Perspektif Pembangunan dan Pengembangan Bidang Politik pada Pelita VII* (Hasil Seminar TNI-AD, Bandung, 18–19 Juni 1996), TNI-AD, Mabes ABRI, 1996; *Bahan Perbandingan GBHN 1993 Dengan Konsep GBHN 1998 Bidang Politik* (Hasil Seminar TNI-AD, Bandung, 18–19 Juni 1996), TNI-AD, Mabes ABRI, 1996; and *Suplemen Substansi Materi Dalam Perspektif Pembangunan dan Pengembangan Bidang Politik pada Pelita VII* (Hasil Seminar TNI-AD, Bandung, 18–19 Juni 1996), TNI-AD, Mabes

ABRI, 1996. Each document was also presented in summary version, thus there were six documents in all. They were brought to the ABRI Seminar in September to provide a unified formulation of ABRI thinking.

154 See *Perspektif Pembangunan*, pp.50–52 and *Suplemen Substansi*, p.38. The summary version of *Perspktif Pembangunan* also referred to a tendency towards 'power arrogance' (*arogansi kekuasan*) in the superstructure, which resulted in the erosion of trust in national leaders. Interestingly, this point was not mentioned in the complete version of *Perspektif Pembangunan*, implying that the summary version (*Narasi*) was not a mere summary of the full text.

155 *Perspektif Pembangunan*, p.18.

156 *Suplemen Substansi*, p.11. As seen in Chapter 2, a government-engineered PDI conference in Medan – which dismissed Megawati as Party Chairperson – was held one day after this army seminar. Considering the timing, the seminar seemed to express the concern about the negative political impact of the government's attempt to overthrow Megawati.

157 Ibid., p.28.

158 This reference is from the *Narasi* version of *Perspektif Pembangunan*, p.16.

159 *Suplemen Substansi*, pp.14–15.

160 Ibid., pp.36–40. It was claimed that of 4.5 million civil servants, nearly 2 million were teachers who belonged to educational institutions controlled by the Department of Education and Culture (Depdikbud). According to official statistics, the number of civil servants was 3.9 million in 1994 and 4 million in 1995 (*Statistik Indonesia 1995*, Biro Pusat Statistik, 1996, p.67). The seminar claimed 4.5 million in 1996 but official data for 1995 were not published until September 1996 and thus the official 1996 count could not be checked at the time of the seminar.

161 *Perspektif Pembangunan*, p.42; *Suplemen Substansi*, p.40.

162 *Suplemen Substansi*, p.8.

163 *Perspektif Pembangunan*, pp.11, 20. KIPP – the Independent Election Monitoring Group – was established in March 1996 by former *Tempo* editor, Goenawan Mohamad, to watch out for possible manipulation of electoral procedures by government officials in the coming general elections of 1997. PUDI was a newly formed unofficial political party led by Sri Bintang Pamungkas, a vocal Muslim parliamentarian who was expelled from parliament.

164 *Suplemen Substansi*, p.4.

165 Ibid., pp.4–5. It is not clear whether middle society is identical to the middle class in the seminar documents. From the context, it may be vaguely described as a group of people in the middle and upper classes who have influential roles in political society.

166 Ibid., pp.5–6.

167 *Bahan Perbandingan*, pp.1, 11. Here, the term middle class was used, instead of middle society, thus indicating that ABRI supports both the middle class and middle society.

168 According to a telephone poll conducted by *Kompas*, nearly 50 percent of 928 'middle-class' respondents in Jakarta supported KIPP ('Hasil "Polling" Mengenai KIPP: Sekitar 50 Persen Mendukung', *Kompas*, 27 March 1996). On the other hand, ABRI's territorial staff produced its report on KIPP, suggesting that it was unconstitutional but hard to ban because of possible attack by foreign countries which would brand Indonesia's election as unjust. The report instead ordered the territorial apparatus to carefully observe KIPP's activities and report them to ABRI Headquarters (Staf Teritorial ABRI, *Tinjauan Teritorial*, Mabes ABRI, No. Triwulan II, 1996/1997, pp.10–11). One of the NGOs, PRD, openly declared 'anti-superstructure' slogans demanding abolition of *dwifungsi* and the five political laws of 1985 (Siaran Pers PRD, No. 40/c/Sta/PRD/VII/1996). PUDI listed its agenda in its greeting card for the Islamic holiday in 1997: boycott the election in 1997; boycott nominating Soeharto for the next president; prepare for the new order after Soeharto in 1998. Sri Bintang was soon arrested on the charge of insulting the president.

169 Herman Ibrahim, 'Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Melalui Implementasi Dwifungsi ABRI yang Antisipatif dan Sesuai dengan Tuntutan Zaman', *ABRI-Net*, available: http://www.abri.mil.id/index5, 1997.

170 Emphasis added. It is still hard to judge whether he is simply warning of such a possibility or describing the current reality. However, since he uses the term 'always', we could assume that his warning includes the latter also. Moreover, the phrase 'ABRI is not always made…' seems to have a connotation that ABRI was 'pushed' to be the fire brigade, implying a perception within ABRI that the failure of the government's political management had forced ABRI to take costly action. The term fire brigade here indicated a less-independent security tool of the government, a role which ABRI had rejected. Brig. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, who was involved in the maintenance of ABRI-Net, evaluated Herman's article as one of the best writings on *dwifungsi* he had recently read (interview, 24 January 1997).

171 Confidential interview with a General-ranking officer, January 1997.

4 The security approach and human rights

1 For example, Gen. (ret.) Benny Moerdani argued that the recent escalation of debate on the 'ABRI problem' was encouraged by the tendency of officers to speak too much. He said that during his period as Pangab and Menhankam ABRI was not interested in responding to each criticism (interview, 4 March 1997).

2 See presidential consideration 'c' (*menimbang* c) in *Keputusan President Republik Indonesia No. 29 Tahun 1988 Tentang Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional*.

3 See 'Sumitro: Gagasan Untuk Hapus Kopkamtib Sudah Lama', *Kompas*, 13 September 1989.

4 Also a few days before the Golkar Congress in October 1988, Kopkamtib had announced that the head of a Golkar branch in West Sumatra had been involved in PKI activities, thus effectively discrediting Sudharmono's management of Golkar.

5 'Prosperity, Bukan Security', *Tempo*, 19 November 1988. Bakorstanas relied on the civilian and military regular staffs in Kodams, BAKIN and BAIS, and was nominally a civilian advisory body to the president. However, its operational chain of command was linked with the army's territorial system and each Kodam Commander headed Bakorstanas' regional body (Bakorstanasda). Thus, the disbanding of Kopkamtib in effect reinforced the power of the ten Kodam Commanders.

6 'Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 19/1969', articles 1–2. Based on the expanded role, Kopkamtib conducted covert action in sociopolitical fields.

7 'Fungsi Kopkamtib Sebaiknya Ditentukan oleh Pendirinya', *Suara Pembaruan*, 21 March 1989.

8 As if to emphasize the reduced reliance on the security approach, in January 1989 Soeharto decided to abolish East Timor's status as a 'special territory' and open up the region to foreign visitors while providing easier access for Indonesians.

9 'TNI-AD Dengan Fungsi Sospolnya Tak Mengenal Pendekatan Kekerasan', *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 13 January 1989.

10 'Sebuah Letupan di Lampung Tengah', *Tempo*, 18 February 1989.

11 Ibid.

12 See 'Islam's Hidden Warriors', *FEER*, 23 February 1989; 'Lampung Villagers' Home Burnt', *Tapol*, February 1989. It was said that the actual death toll was more than 100. Similar cases emerged in other areas, for example in Central Java where the government–World Bank project to construct the Kedung Ombo dam was launched in January 1989. In the process, peasants were forced to move. It was said that Korem and BAKIN threatened to put ex-prisoner's (ET) stamps on the residential cards (KTP) of those who resisted and even to carry out extra-judicial killing at night (see ELSAM, *Revealing Tortures by Public Officers*, Jakarta: ELSAM, 1996, pp.89–97). ELSAM is the Institute of Social Research and Advocacy, a prominent human rights NGO in

Jakarta. The background of these incidents in recent years was the increasing demand for land to further accelerate economic development projects, which coincided with: (1) the lack of any legal system to clarify land possession; (2) inadequate compensation for the local people asked to move; and (3) the authority's forceful (rather than persuasive) approach with regard to locals.

13 Warouw and Panjaitan were both close to Benny Moerdani, and the former – a Menadonese Protestant – was said to have conducted a disciplinary campaign, including the charging of over 300 ABRI personnel since he took office in December 1989. For details of their background, see 'Dunia Menuding Kita Berdua', *Tempo*, 4 January 1992. This 'clean up' campaign was said to be opposed by local Mafia with military links (called *ninja*), and by Lt. Col. Prabowo Subianto – Soeharto's son-in-law – who had served for some time in East Timor (see The Editors, 'Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite', *Indonesia*, No. 53, April 1992, pp.98–99). Many believed that Prabowo had established a strong tie with *ninja*, especially after he was rescued by a gang led by a man called Hercules when kidnapped by pro-independence guerrillas (Fretilin) in the mountains.

For the conflict between the Moerdani and Prabowo groups in the Dili incident, see, for example, Herb Feith, 'East Timor: The Opening up, the Crackdown and the Possibility of a Durable Settlement', in Harold Crouch and Hal Hill (eds), *Indonesia Assessment 1992: Political Perspectives on the 1990s*, Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1992, p.70. It is also suggested that the order to shoot did not come from the two dismissed generals in East Timor, but possibly from an officer with the rank of lieutenant colonel in Jakarta. For this account, see Takashi Shiraishi, 'Kokugun: Sonosedaikoutai to henbou' [Indonesian Military Elite: Generation Change and Its Implications], in Akio Yasunaka and Norio Mihira (eds), *Gendai Indonesia no Seiji to Keizai: Soeharto Seiken no 30 nen* [30 Years of Soeharto Government: Its Political and Economic Performance], Tokyo: the Institute of Developing Economics, 1995, p.119. It has been suspected therefore that the shooting order came from Prabowo himself in an attempt to discredit Warouw and to speed up the elimination of Moerdani-linked officers from ABRI's top positions. Prabowo's close friend, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, was the commander of Kopassus' Intelligence Unit in East Timor at that time – a unit in charge of conducting covert operations outside the Kodam's command hierarchy.

14 See 'Cara-Cara Kopkamtib Sudah Tidak Zamannya', *Tempo*, 28 December 1991.

15 Syarwan Hamid, 'Pendekatan Keamanan Dalam Proses Pembangunan Bangsa', *Suara Pembaruan*, 2 June 1993.

16 See 'Setelah Mereka Belajar dari Peristiwa Dili', *Tempo*, 16 October 1993. It was revealed that, after a land dispute with the group, the angered village head reported to the local security apparatus that the group was a deviant sect that could threaten the government. ABRI's raid occurred after receiving this report. *Tempo* also reported that, having noted the process of establishing the KPN in the Dili incident, people started to demand the reopening of the investigation into the 1984 Tanjung Priok case, in which many Muslim demonstrators were shot by soldiers under the command of Try Sutrisno (Pangdam Jaya). This clearly demonstrates the institutional impact of the KPN-DKM in 1991, which gave political society a weapon to publicly pressure ABRI and the government concerning excessive military operations.

17 'Presiden: Kita Harus Pandai Menerapkan Pendekatan Hankam', *Suara Pembaruan*, 3 August 1993. Here, he emphasized the need to review the functional relations among ABRI commands, governmental bodies and social sectors. This comment also referred to the Haur Koneng incident in which ABRI relied only on the report by the village head before conducting a repressive operation.

18 'Menhankam: Pendekatan Keamanan Tetap Diperlukan', *Suara Karya*, 11 August 1993.

19 'Rudini: Pendekatan Keamanan Harus Dilakukan Proporsional', *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 5 September 1993.
20 'Menhankam di Depan Komisi I DPR: Pendekatan Keamanan Berubah Menurut Waktu', *Merdeka*, 10 September 1993.
21 '"Mau Tenteram, Tertib Dulu…" Wapres: Pendekatan Keamanan Komitmen Nasional', *Jawa Pos*, 17 September 1993.
22 'Fungsi Polisi Sebagai Penegak Hukum, Perlu Dikedepankan', *Kompas*, 24 September 1993.
23 Nine retired officers were invited, including Soemitro, Moerdani, Rudini, Sayidiman and Moerdiono. State Secretariat Moerdiono, in his paper, insisted on ABRI's need – in conducting *dwifungsi* – to understand the fact that society was not based on 'instruction/order', as was ABRI, but on 'rights'. He warned about ABRI's attitude in handling social problems. Moreover, he claimed that ABRI's concept of *rakyat* was very general and abstract; it needed to respect the diverse characteristics of the people and avoid a monolithic attitude towards *rakyat* in the field. These claims were directed at problems with the recent security approach (see Moerdiono, 'Bagaimana Mengaktualisasikan Dwifungsi ABRI Dalam Zaman Yang Berubah Cepat: Misi, Kebijakan, Strategi, Tolok Ukur', paper presented at Sarasehan Sesepuh ABRI, Mabes ABRI, Jakarta, 27 September 1993, p.8). Menko Polkam Soesilo Soedarman, in his comment about the meeting, revealed that the security approach was a hot topic in society and there was new input, although the details could not be disclosed because the meeting was not open to the public. He added that the active and retired sectors in ABRI should consolidate their opinions ('ABRI dan Purnawirawan Harus Terus Konsolidasi', *Kompas*, 28 September 1993). However, Edi Sudradjat denied any gap between the two sides ('Tak Persoalkan Makna Dwifungsi: Menhankam Jelaskan Lagi Pertemuan Sembilan Jenderal', *Jawa Pos*, 30 September 1993).
24 See 'Ny'on Odik, Lalu Robohlah Mereka', *Tempo*, 9 October 1993 and 'Priok, Sampang, Apa Lagi', *Tempo*, 16 October 1993. The LBH reported that one soldier on the previous day threatened the protesting villagers by saying that 'if you don't give up, you will see many people die tomorrow' ('Harga Satu Nywa dan Sepuluh Waduk', *Tempo*, 16 October 1993). A noted human rights NGO, ELSAM, also stressed that the troops were prepared to shoot the demonstrators (ELSAM, *Revealing Tortures by Public Officers*, p.85). Virtually all leading *kiai* (Muslim religious leaders) in Madura signed petitions to Soeharto, demanding a full inquiry and prosecution of the soldiers responsible, which was backed by the East Java branch of NU. It seemed obvious that ignoring the demand would further harm ABRI–Islam relations which were said to have become closer after Feisal – a devout Muslim general – was installed as Pangab in May. Moreover, as one of the traditionally influential commands, any lingering confrontation between the East Java Military Command (Kodam V/Brawijaya) and leaders of Muslim communities would not help support Feisal's image of a desirable ABRI–Islam relationship.
25 Those who were transferred were the commanders of Koramil Banyuates (a subdistrict of Sampang), Kodim Sampang, Sampang police and the chief of the Banyuates police. In addition to these four, at least six others in the subdistrict military command were reported to have been transferred ('Setelah Pertemuan dengan Jenderal Tanjung', *Tempo*, 23 October 1993). Because there remained a question mark over the impartiality of the Kodam's investigation, and the official reasons of transferring four officers was not given as the killing of civilians, many still claimed the need to establish KPN (see 'Perlu atau Tidak Dibentuk Tim Pencari Fakta?' *Forum Keadilan*, 11 November 1993). However, it seems obvious that the men took responsibility for the event.
26 For Feisal's comment, see 'Pangab: Aparat Keamanan Terbukti Salah', *Suara Merdeka*, 15 October 1993. Hartono's interview is in 'Karena Tak Paham Orang Madura', *Tempo*, 16 October 1993. Also an intellectual police officer, Anton Tabah, referred to

the Nipah incident as a very expensive lesson for ABRI because not only the relevance of the security approach was questioned in society, but also the human rights issue was highlighted and ABRI's lack of professionalism was revealed. In the cases of Tanjung Priok, Lampung, Dili and Nipah, he saw the source of problem as almost the same, i.e. ABRI's handling of crowds, and suggested the need to improve professionalism to defend ABRI's credibility (Anton Tabah, 'Profesionalisasi ABRI', *Republika*, 6 October 1993).

27 The policy was called NKK (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus: Normalization of Campus Life) and banned any political activity on university campus. As *Tempo* argued in 1989, student movements after the introduction of NKK seemed to avoid raising issues such as *dwifungsi* in order to prevent ABRI's dogmatic responses ('Aksi Mahasiswa: Dengan Isu Lokal Membentuk Opini Nasional', *Tempo*, 22 April 1989).

28 For example, in the demonstration by FAMI (Forum Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia: The Action Forum for Indonesian Students) at the DPR on 14 December 1993 when twenty-one students were arrested for 'insulting the President' (under the preserved Dutch criminal code 134), the students' demand was to meet Wahono, the Speaker of the DPR, to protest to him about the security approach. Regarding the arrest, Maj. Gen. Hendropriyono (Commander of Kodam Jaya) commented that in the recent case of the anti-SDSB (state lottery) demonstration, ABRI was quiet because they did not break the law, but this time FAMI had exceeded the limit. The F-ABRI Head, Abu Hartono, also explained that talking about the security approach was no problem but their speech at the lobby room in the DPR was beyond tolerance ('Demo di Luar Koridor', *Tempo*, 25 December 1993). However, according to Aspinall, it was only when the students began to abuse the military that they were immediately attacked (Edward Aspinall, 'Students and the Military: Regime Friction and Civilian Dissent in the Late Suharto Period', *Indonesia*, No. 59, October 1995, p.38). For a detailed outline of the growth of student movements during this period, see YLBHI, *Catatan Keadaan Hak Asasi Manusia 1994*, Jakarta: YLBHI, 1995, pp.67–81. There were more than fifteen large-scale student demonstrations in 1994 alone.

29 Rudini, 'Peran ABRI Dalam Pengembangan Kehidupan Demokrasi', paper presented at Seri Dialog Pembangunan Politik 1993/1994, CIDES, Jakarta, 4 September 1993, p.6.

30 See the seminar paper, *Dialog Pembangunan Politik 1993/1994: 2 Aspek Pertahanan dan Keamanan dalam Pengembangan Demokrasi*, Seri Dialog Pembangunan, CIDES, 1993, p.28. Dewi later became the Presidential adviser for foreign policy under the Habibie government.

31 Ibid., p.37.

32 See Lukman Saksono, 'ABRI Profesional dan Profesionalisme ABRI', *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 5 October 1993.

33 See, for example, 'Amanat Presiden Pada Peringatan Hari ABRI ke-48: Jangan Selalu Pakai Cara Militer', *Media Indonesia*, 6 October 1993.

34 However, this time the attempt was partly counter-productive since in effect it allowed critics to say that it was therefore the 'defence' aspect which caused the problem for *dwifungsi*. This contradicted ABRI's long-established claim that the *hankam* role was not a problem in the conduct of *dwifungsi*.

35 Human Rights Watch/Asia also sees the ongoing ABRI–Soeharto antagonism as another factor which encouraged Soeharto to create a tool to publicize other military abuses that could be used to his political benefit (Human Rights Watch/Asia, *The Limits of Openness*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994, p.126).

36 Interview with Marzuki Darusman, Deputy Chairman of Komnas HAM, 31 March 1997. For example, Komnas HAM's contacts during 1995 included Pangab, DPA, Kodam Jaya, Menko Polkam, Department of Labour and Police Chief. For details, see Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, *Laporan Tahunan Kommnas 1995*, Jakarta: Komnas HAM, 1995, Chapter 7.

37 See 'Keterangan Ketua Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia', Komnas HAM, Jakarta, 2 April 1994, in Saafroedin Bahar, *Hak Asasi Manusia: Analisis Komnas HAM dan Jajaran Hankam/ABRI*, Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1996. Marsinah, a woman labour activist, was killed in May 1993 during a dispute at a factory in East Java. When the nine people originally convicted of murdering Marsinah were released by the High Court in May 1995, Komnas HAM requested that ABRI establish a DKM to investigate ABRI members suspected of being involved in the incident. The East Java Police Chief, Maj. Gen. Roesmanhadi, rejected the Commission's request but promised to reopen its own investigation, and ABRI Headquarters also formed an inquiry team. However, neither of them could provide new evidence and they finally announced the closure of the investigation in February 1996; see *Republika*'s special reports: 'Marsinah, Sampai Kapan Riwayatmu Jadi Misteri', 'Tenten Masduki, Ketua Divisi Perburuhan YBHI: Akan Ada Pihak Yang Tercoreng' and 'Clementino Dos Reis Amaral, Anggota Komnas HAM: Mungkin Mereka Tidak Berani Mengungkap', all in the 12 February 1996 edition.

38 In the Medan case, an estimated 15–20,000 workers took to the streets in Medan, North Sumatra, demanding higher wages. This large-scale demonstration, which was led by the independent labour union, SBSI (Indonesian Welfare Trade Union), turned into an anti-Chinese riot on 14 April, resulting in the death of a Chinese businessman. ABRI crushed the riot and arrested hundreds of workers along with Muchtar Pakpahan, Chairman of SBSI, who was accused of instigating the riot. However, as SBSI claimed, and was widely believed, the labour demonstration was manipulated by local *preman* (gang members) who were said to have been instructed by the local military command to provoke riots and thus provide ABRI with an opportunity to crack down. Muchtar himself stressed that it was SBSI which planned the demonstration but that the riot itself was instigated by the *preman* (*Reuters*, 24 April 1994; *Financial Times*, 17 May 1994). *Preman* were also said to have been used in the June demonstration against the banning of magazines, which was also put down by the security apparatus. According to Buyung Nasution, one of those who led the June demonstration, this tactic went back to the Malari affair in 1974 in which he – as a legal activist – recognized some of the gangsters paid by the military (interview, 14 March 1997).

In 1994, when the June riot broke out, Yorrys Raweyai was head of the Jakarta branch of Pemuda Pancasila (PP) and declared his active support for *Operasi Bersih 1994* (clean-up operations targeted against those who might disturb public security) conducted by Maj. Gen. Hendropriyono, Pangdam Jaya (see his article, 'Meningkatkan Kewaspadaan', *Pancasila Abadi*, January–February 1994). Hendropriyono himself, in his regular three-monthly meeting with PP, also asked for the support of PP in conducting Kodam Jaya's security maintenance projects. 'Pangdam Jaya: Kekuatan Pengamanan Berada di Fihak Rakyat Lemah', *Pancasila Abadi*, December 1993. The riot in Jakarta on 27 July 1996 was also (allegedly) conducted according to this established procedure. In the free speech forum held by Megawati's PDI, some PP faces, including Yorrys', could be seen. On PP, see Loren Ryter, 'Pemuda Pancasila: the Last Loyalist Free Men of Suharto's Order?', *Indonesia*, Vol. 66, October 1998, pp.45–73. ABRI's use of *preman* and paramilitary organizations increased in the *keterbukaan* period. This helped create the impression that ABRI merely intervened in the clash between civilians.

39 Pangab Feisal Tanjung, according to Moerdiono, explained that immediate measures would be taken based on military regulations, including the possibility of a court martial ('Soldiers Said Out of Line in East Timor Killings', *Jakarta Post*, 12 February 1995; and 'DKM untuk Liquisa', *Gatra*, 18 February 1995).

40 'Penjelasan Pangab: Tindakan ABRI Sudah Tepat', *Tiras*, 9 March 1995. He then defended the conduct of Kodim Liquisa which had dispatched a team of thirty soldiers to conduct the operation on 12 January.

41 For details, see 'Tim Pencari Fakta Mabes ABRI Temukan Penyimpangan Prosedure Operasi Militer', *Kompas*, 25 February 1995. The DKP (Dewan Kehormatan Perwira),

according to Kapuspen Syarwan Hamid, was functionally the same as the DKM appointed in the Dili case. He also asserted that 'it is a problem if ABRI is always put into a corner by the human rights concerns; who can guarantee the security of social life there?' ('Kapuspen ABRI Tentang Kasus Liquisa: Lumrah Kalau Terjadi Perbedaan Hasil Temuan Tim ABRI dan Komnas HAM', *Kompas*, 23 February 1995).

42 The team also insisted that ABRI should reduce its presence in East Timor for the solution of the East Timor problem ('Wawancara TIM Komnas HAM: Temuan Kami Bisa Berbeda dengan ABRI', *Tiras*, 9 March 1995). The results of Komnas HAM's inquiry were announced on 1 March; for details see 'Keterangan Pres Tentang Peristiwa Liquisa, Timtim Pada Tanggal 12 Januari 1995', Komnas HAM, Jakarta, 1 March 1995, appended in Bahar, *Hak Asasi Manusia*, pp.146–148.

43 *Reuters*, 2 March 1995; 'Kasad: Tak Ada Prajurit Salah, yang Salah Perwiranya', *Republika*, 10 March 1995.

44 See 'Pangab: Stabilitas Keamanan Bukan Untuk Pertahankan Kekuasaan', *Kompas*, 3 April 1995. This call was made at the national alumni meeting of the HMI (Islamic Student Association) held on 2 April. In fact, unlike the case of East Timor where international attention was high since its annexation, ABRI's heavy security operations against Aceh's rebel movements were rarely publicized. ABRI in 1989 decided to declare Aceh a Military Operations Area (Daerah Operasi Militer: DOM) in order to intensify the security operations against the separatist movements. Under this status, everyday human rights abuses were committed by security forces.

45 The dialogue had been agreed upon at a UN-led meeting of 9 January – three days before the Liquisa killing – held between the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and Portugal. It was the first official meeting between pro-integration and pro-independence East Timorese groups (the latter were the overseas activists, including some Fretilin leaders) since the annexation of East Timor. Held on 3 June, as anticipated ABRI's presence in the region was a central issue. Following the dialogue, the 52nd UN General Assembly considered a written report on the East Timor issue, describing the heavy-handed security pressure of ABRI, including the use of *ninja* groups to terrify society. For details, see the UN Secretariat, 'East Timor', working paper prepared by the Secretariat for the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, A/AC.109/2026, 22 June 1995, pp.2–20.

46 'DKP Laporkan Hasil Penyelidikan Kasus Liquisa: Dua Orang Diserahkan ke POM ABRI', *Republika*, 4 April 1995. Marzuki said that 'it showed the DKP result was to endorse Komnas HAM's conclusion' ('Mengadili Siasat Jeremias dan Raimundo', *Forum Keadilan*, 27 April 1995). The two soldiers were First Lieutenant Jeremias Kasse – a former intelligence officer of the Kodim 1638/Liquisa – who had led the operation in the incident, and Private First Class Rusdin Maumere. Kasse was sentenced to four years and six months in jail and dismissed from the military service, while Maumere received four years in jail at the end of June 1995 (*Reuters*, 21 June 1995).

47 'Pangab: Keterlibatan Mahasiswa di Bidang Politik Akhir-akhir Ini Disinyalir Menggelisahkan', *Kompas*, 29 March 1995.

48 'Evaluasi Dwifungsi Diintensifkan', *Republika*, 25 February 1995.

49 See his interview, 'Kalau Dianggap Salah, Saya Siap, Silakan Tindak', *Forum Keadilan*, 16 March 1995. Also in the lower command, Korem Wiradharma, its commander Col. Kiki Syahnakri asserted that his soldiers were '200 percent correct' during the operation, based on the military procedures ('Melacak Enam Nyawa di Liquica', *Forum Keadilan*, 16 March 1995). Although the definition of military procedure was not given in these interviews, Adang – who later became Commander of the Army Territorial Centre, Danpusterad – explained it in the light of the ideal function of ABRI's territorial system which was: (1) to have high ability to detect local trends negative to national development; and (2) to communicate analysis and information quickly to the upper commands (written interview with Maj. Gen. Adang Ruchiatna,

Danpusterad, 18 December 1996). Perhaps from this perspective, Adang and Kiki asserted that their command line had no problem in the case of Liquisa. Kiki was however transferred in the month after the announcement of the DKP findings. Adang was succeeded by Maj. Gen. Abdul Rivai in September, three months after the military court heard charges against two of his soldiers.

50 The new Army Chief Gen. Hartono, who was in charge of conducting the DKP, explained that clandestine members were more dangerous than GPK because they had two faces and could live anywhere, not only in East Timor but also in other major cities (see 'Mengadili Siasat Jeremias dan Raimundo', *Forum Keadilan*, 27 April 1995).

51 Student demonstrations in Ujung Pandang (the capital of South Sulawesi) were originally protests against a government decision to increase public bus fares. They developed into a large-scale protest with thousands of demonstrators, including minibus drivers, who finally clashed with the security apparatus. Hundreds were wounded and six were killed, according to student figures, while the military insisted that the death toll was three. ABRI interpreted the incident as having been manipulated by the unidentified 'agents of chaos'. Later, after the 27 July 1996 incident, ABRI identified the PRD – and its student wing, SMID – as the mastermind of the Ujung Pandang riot.

52 Tamlicha Ali's assessment is found in Mayjen TNI Tamlicha Ali, 'Prasaran Asrenum Pangab Pada Pra Seminar Tentang Perspektif Pembangunan dan Pengembangan Bidang Hankam Pada Pelita VII', paper presented at Pra Seminar TNI Angkatan Udara Tentang Perspektif Pembangunan dan Pengembangan Bidang Hankam Pada Pelita VII, Mabes ABRI, TNI-AU, 29–30 May 1996, p.9. For Hartono's remarks at the Surabaya seminar, entitled 'The Role and Position of ABRI in National Political Life', see Hartono (Jenderal TNI), 'Peran dan Posisi ABRI dalam Format Politik Nasional', in Selamat Ginting, *et al.* (eds), *ABRI dan Demokrasi*, Jakarta: Dharmapena Nusantara, MIZEN, 1997, p.4. We will discuss ABRI's hardline mindset in Chapter 5.

53 Hartono's remarks about clandestine activists were delivered at the launching ceremony of ABRI's AMD programme for 1995/1996 on 7 April. He added: 'we have received reports about their existence and we are working together with related government agencies to combat the group which threatens stability' (*Reuters*, 11 April 1995; 'Rapat Paripurna ABRI AMD XV Dibuka: Kopassus Diminta Ikuti Perkembangan Politik', *Media Indonesia*, 8 April 1995). He made the same warning at Akabri two days later when he attended a ceremony to install the new governor (*Antara*, 5 April 1995).

54 The accusation against Permadi was made by Lt. Gen. Soeyono, Kasum (Chief of General Affairs), who accused Permadi of conducting clandestine activities behind his disguise as a soothsayer. 'He is a dangerous clandestine member using tactics that could endanger the stability and security of the nation, and have clear targets – these are ABRI, the President, Golkar, and Islam', said Soeyono ('Permadi Engaged in Clandestine Activities: ABRI', *Jakarta Post*, 11 April 1995).

55 For Komnas HAM's international activities, see Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, *Laporan Tahunan 1995*, Chapter 4.

56 ACFOA is the coordinating body for some 100 Australian NGOs. Its April document is titled, *Trouble at Freeport: Eyewitness Accounts of West Papuan Resistance to the Freeport–MacMoRan Mine in Irian Jaya, Indonesia and Indonesian Military Repression, June 1994–February 1995*, Canberra: ACFOA, April 1995. This eleven-page report listed the names of twenty-two civilians killed by ABRI during the six months (see p.10).

57 The Catholic Church's August report is titled, 'Violations of Human Rights in the Timika Area of Irian Jaya, Indonesia: A Report by the Catholic Church of Jayapura', online, available: http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/boyer/fp/bishop irian-jaya.html. The report (Section 4, Executive Summary) stated that the people had been interrogated and tortured by the security apparatus for allegedly giving food and other supplies to anti-Indonesian rebels, or OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka: Free Papua

Organization), sometimes in containers owned by the Freeport copper mine and at the security post of this US-based company. This report was brought to the Indonesian Bishops Conference to disclose the fear in Timika to the wider public.

58 For details, see Report 1, ibid.

59 'Komnas HAM Kirim Tim ke Timika, Kapuspen: Tak Benar ABRI Lakukan Pelanggaran', *Jawa Pos*, 21 August 1995.

60 For Wirdhana's comment, see 'Laporan dari Timika', *Gatra*, 2 September 1995. He also said in a magazine interview that the Church report relied on misguided reports ('Pangdam Trikora, Mayjen I Ketuk Wirdhana: "Saya Akui, Penembakan Untuk GPK Memang Ada" ', *Forum Keadilan*, 11 September 1995). Hartono's remarks are from 'KSAD: Langkah ABRI di Timika Tak Salahi Aturan', *Republika*, 31 August 1995. In facing these reactions, Bishop Munninghoff commented cynically that 'for them [ABRI], I am one who discredits the name of ABRI, and maybe they think I am also the OPM. But as a Bishop, I had to report this problem of human rights' (see 'Kasus Timika: Laporan Uskup, Komnas HAM, dan ABRI', *Forum Keadilan*, 11 September 1995).

61 For Soeyono's comment, see 'Komnas Sambut Upaya ABRI Bentuk DKM Kodam Trikora', *Kompas*, 18 September 1995. At the DPR meeting, a youth group in Irian Jaya demanded that Edi not form the DKM at the Kodam level but at the Mabes ABRI level ('Menhankam Soal Timika: Di Sana Memang Ada GPK', *Republika*, 20 September 1995).

62 'Pangab Tentang Kasus Timika: Ada Pelanggaran Prosedur', *Kompas*, 21 September 1995.

63 See Paragraphs 1 and 2 in Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, 'Keterangan Pers Hasil Pemantauan dan Penyelidikan Atas Lima Peristiwa di Kecamatan Timika dan Satu Peristiwa di Desa Hoea, Irian Jaya, Dalam Masa Antara Oktober 1994–Juni 1995', Jakarta, 22 September 1995, attached as Appendix 5 in Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, *Laporan Tahunan Komnas HAM 1995*.

64 These points are from Paragraphs 4, 5 and 10, ibid. For the press conference, see 'Temuan Komnas HAM Soal Kasus Timika: ABRI Lakukan Enam Pelanggaran HAM, 16 Tewas dan Empat Hilang', *Suara Merdeka*, 23 September 1995.

65 'KSAD: Tidak Perlu Bentuk DKP', *Kompas*, 23 September 1995.

66 They were the Institute for Social Research and Development (Lembaga Penelitian dan Pembangunan Sosial: LPPS), the International NGO Forum for Indonesian Development (INFID), ELSAM, YLBHI and the Indonesian Environmental Network (WALHI: Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia). Their statement was titled, 'Response to the Results of Komnas HAM's Report on the Human Rights Violations in Timika, Subdistrict of Fak-Fak, Irian Jaya', signed on 27 September 1995 in Jakarta. The full text was available at: http://www.cs.utexas.edu/ users/boyer/fp

67 The statement especially insisted that: Freeport surely knew of these violations of human rights and allowed its facilities to be used by ABRI, so Komnas HAM should take a firm stand on Freeport's involvement in these events; there was an urgent need for Komnas HAM to push for the formation of a DKP at Mabes ABRI as the authoritative body to handle matters that occurred in Kodam Trikora.

68 Interviews, 27 and 31 March 1997. A prominent sociologist and democratic activist, Arief Budiman, says that there are informal contracts between Komnas HAM and NGOs. 'If the Commission [members], as a state institution, can not work in the formal way, they may pass operations to the NGOs' ('Human What?', *Inside Indonesia*, No. 46, March 1996, p.7).

69 'Pangdam Trikora: Kasus Timika Akan Dituntaskan Secara Hukum', *Suara Pembaruan*, 4 October 1995.

70 See 'Three Soldiers Tried for Killing', *Jakarta Post*, 30 January 1996; *Reuters*, 15 February 1996. Needless to say, NGOs claimed that the term 'procedural mistake' was too vague. Also, due to the frequent disciplinary measures taken against ABRI

members in recent years, the relevance of the existing military law was more often discussed even within ABRI. One of the military law experts in ABRI, retired Brig. Gen. Amiroeddin Sjarif who served as head of the Army Legal Service (Dinas Hukum TNI-AD) for three years from 1980, insists that ABRI's existing disciplinary laws (*hukum disiplin militer*) are unsuitable in current social conditions and also do not meet the standard of a modern legal system, as seen by their unclear explanations about deviations from discipline (see Amiroeddin Sjarif, *Hukum Disiplin Militer Indonesia*, Jakarta: Rineka Cipta, 1996, pp.9–11).

71 Interview, 27 March 1997.

72 Interview with Goenawan Mohamad, 5 December 1996.

73 The guidebook is *Petunjuk (Direktif) Pangdam VIII/Trikora Tentang Hak Asasi Manusia* (No. SKEP/96/XII/1995), Markas Komando Daerah Militer VIII/Trikora, 1995. An English extract of this twenty-one-page document is given in *Inside Indonesia* (No. 46, March 1996, pp.6–7).

74 *Petunjuk*, pp.4–5.

75 Ibid., pp.5–6. Soldiers in the field are also instructed in the book to ask for an explanation from the commander who has issued the order, and if there is a possibility of human rights abuses, they are expected to show disagreement with it (p.7).

76 Ibid., pp.11–12. Soldiers were also instructed not to violate individual rights such as freedoms of thought, expression and association.

77 Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia Indonesia, 'Petunjuk Pangdam VIII/Trikora tentang Hak Asasi Manusia', No. 95/TUA/III/96, 11 March 1996. This is a letter from Ali Said, Chairman of Komnas HAM, to Pangab Feisal Tanjung.

78 The seminar paper was titled, *Aktualisasi Nilai-Nilai Kejuangan Bangsa Dalam Rangka Menyukseskan Pembangunan Nasional Jangka Panjang Kedua*, Makalah Hasil Seminar, Bandung, Seskoabri, 6–8 September 1995.

79 Ibid., pp.42–43.

80 *Perspektif Pembangunan dan Pengembangan Bidang Hankam Pada Pelita VII* (Naskah Awal Pra Seminar), Mabes TNI-AU, April 1996, p.24. This airforce seminar ran parallel with the Army Seminar of 1996 which we examined in Chapter 3. The former discussed defence issues while the latter identified political issues. Both results were brought to the ABRI seminar in September to finally formulate ABRI's input to the 1998 GBHN.

81 Ibid., p.33.

82 Hasnan Habib, 'Pembangunan Nasional Bidang Hankam Pada Pelita VII (Tanggapan)', paper prepared for Seminar ABRI, 'Pokok-Pokok Pikiran ABRI Tentang Pembangunan Nasional Pada Pelita VII', Mabes ABRI, 3 September 1996, p.3.

83 Presentations were also made by Edi Sudjana, Head of the Human Rights and Environment Department at CIDES, Indria Samego of LIPI and Professor Muladi, a law professor at the University of Diponegoro.

84 Marzuki Darusman, 'Konsepsi Peningkatan Hak Azasi Manusia dan Demokrasi Pancasila', paper presented at Sarasehan Sesko ABRI Tentang Aktualisasi Peran Sospol ABRI, Bandung, Sesko ABRI, 5 November 1996, p.3.

85 Ibid., p.4, emphasis added.

86 Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, 'Hak Azasi Manusia dan Demokrasi di Indonesia', paper presented at Sarasehan Sesko ABRI Tentang Aktualisasi Peran Sospol ABRI, Bandung, Sesko ABRI, 5 November 1996, pp.1–2.

87 Interview, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Sayidiman, former Lemhannas Governor, 5 December 1996.

5 Creating new threats: ideological dogmatization

1 For a more extensive version of the argument used in this chapter, see Jun Honna, 'Military Ideology in Response to Democratic Pressure During the Late Suharto Era: Political and Institutional Contexts', *Indonesia*, No. 67, April 1999, pp.77–126.
2 Although it is hard to trace exactly when the popular usage of these terms started in Indonesia, we can suspect that, as elsewhere, these concepts were widely used after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union during 1988–1991. One of the earliest discussions in Indonesia can be found in late 1990. A leading evening newspaper demanded ABRI's adjustment of its role in facing globalization (see 'Tugas ABRI dan Era Globalizasi', *Suara Pembaruan*, 5 October 1990). ABRI, in its own newspaper, reacted to this by insisting that the role played by ABRI to safeguard the national ideology was crucial to prevent national disintegration, as had happened in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe ('Dalam Era Globalizasi, Ideologi Tetap Diperlukan', *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 12 November 1990).
3 'Surat Keputusan Gubernur Lemhannas No: SKEP/07/II/1988, Tanggal 24–2–1988, Tentang Penggunaan Buku Materi Penataran Kewaspadaan Nasional dan Kegiatan Semacamnya', in *Materi Balatkom*, Jakarta: Lemhannas, Mabes ABRI, 1988.
4 The programme was launched following a leadership change within the military in June 1978. Lemhannas had been headed by Lt. Gen. Sayidiman who was widely believed to be critical of Soeharto's inner-circle officers who dominated ABRI's intelligence sector, such as Admiral R. Sudomo, Gen. Yoga Sugomo and Maj. Gen. Benny Moerdani. In the 1978 reshuffle, which placed Gen. Mohammad Yusuf as the new ABRI Commander, Sudomo became Kopkamtib Commander while holding concurrently the post of Deputy Commander of ABRI. Yoga, the Head of BAKIN (State Intelligence Coordination Board), who was directly responsible to the president, was posted as the Chief of Kopkamtib in October without losing his BAKIN position. Similarly Moerdani held the posts of Assistant for Intelligence in the Defence Ministry, Head of the Strategic Intelligence Centre (Pusintelstrat) in the Defence Ministry, Assistant for Intelligence at Kopkamtib and, since 1978, Deputy Head of BAKIN. In October 1978, soon after the implementation of Tarpadnas, Sayidiman was transferred to an ambassadorship (Japan). The new governor of Lemhannas was Lt. Gen. Sutopo Juwono, former Head of BAKIN. Thus, the Tarpadnas project reflected the ongoing dominance of the intelligence sector within ABRI.
5 On nation-wide student demonstrations, see The Editors, 'White Book of the 1978 Student's Struggle', *Indonesia*, No. 25, April 1978, pp.151–182.
6 *Naskah Induk Tentang Subversi dan Penanggulangannya*, Jakarta: Lemhannas, Dephankam, 1979, pp.23–27. The definition of New Left was not provided in this document, but it should be noted that, as Anderson argues, people who had been with the Left before the New Order were rarely university-educated (Benedict Anderson, *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World*, New York: Verso, 1998, p.290). Thus, perhaps ABRI identified the increasing role of universities as a new development for the Left.
7 *Naskah Induk Tentang Subversi dan Penanggulangannya*, p.26.
8 *Pengamanan Ideologi Pancasila Terhadap Pengaruh Ideologi-Ideologi Besar di Dunia*, Jakarta: Lemhannas, Dephankam, 1980, n.p.
9 *Perkembangan Bahaya Laten Ex-Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)*, Jakarta: Lemhannas, Dephankam, 1980, pp.23–24. This document was also part of the Tarpadnas material. There is, however, no explanation of how '105' people could be a threat to national security.
10 *Taktik-Taktik Komunisme*, Jakarta: Lemhannas, Dephankam, 1981, pp.1–2, 5. The concept of the floating mass was introduced in the early New Order period. It required that the mass of the people should express their political preferences only in

general elections held every five years, so that their daily activities could be spent on economic development. The major advocate of this theory was Maj. Gen. Ali Moertopo (see Ali Moertopo, *Some Basic Thoughts on the Acceleration and Modernization of 25 Years' Development*, Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1973).

11 For details, see *Pengarahan Aster Kasum ABRI Pada Rakorter ABRI Tahun 1985 Tanggal 1 Agustus 1985 Tentang Kebijaksanaan Pembinaan Teritorial*, Jakarta: Staf Teritorial, Mabes ABRI, 1985, pp.25–32.

12 'Surat Telegram Pangkopkamtib No:STR. 61/Kopkam/1984 Tanggal 18 Agustus 1984 Tentang Pelaksanaan Tarpadnas dan Kegiatan Semacamnya'.

13 For details of Moerdani's power within the intelligence sector, see The Editors, 'Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite (Continued)', *Indonesia*, No. 37, April 1984, pp.149–152.

14 Significantly, Soebijakto was a former military attaché to Moscow (1977) and regarded as a 'communist expert' within ABRI.

15 Soeharto had proposed this plan in his Independence Day speech in August 1982 and the legislation was formally adopted in 1985. This was widely perceived as Soeharto's attempt to undermine the influence of political Islam. A month after Moerdani's instruction, violent riots broke out in Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta, where hundreds of angry Muslims were killed by security forces. This event encouraged a growing perception among Muslim groups that Gen. Moerdani, a Catholic, was aiming to de-Islamicize Indonesia. Regarding this series of developments, see, for example, John Bresnan, *Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, pp.218–244.

16 *Materi Balatkom*, pp.3–5.

17 As Weinstein's vivid 1976 study illustrated, one world-view shared by political elites since the time of the Revolution was the fear of dependence on the capitalist countries – as an expression of imperialism. Thus the officers' suspicions of capitalism were not new (Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno to Soeharto*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976).

18 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Edi Sudradjat, Minister of Defence and Security, 19 February 1997.

19 Maj. Gen. Soebijakto, Lemhannas Governor, at the opening of the Tarpadnas meeting in 1988, explained that the PKI had revolted three times, so a fourth attempt might be possible. However, he said, it was difficult to detect (see 'Mewaspadai yang Keempat', *Tempo*, 5 November 1988). Such a threat assessment was far from professional but represented well the ritualistic nature of the *kewaspadaan* campaign. For a similar account which stresses the ritualization of the anti-communist campaign, see Rob Goodfellow, *Api Dalam Sekam: The New Order and the Ideology of Anti-Communism*, Working Paper 95, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1995. It should also be noted that the three revolts start with the famous 1926–1927 uprising against the Dutch colonial government. This suggests that the New Order (and ABRI) subconsciously identify themselves as a late reincarnation of Dutch colonial rule. For an account which suggests this point, see Benedict Anderson, 'Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective', *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XLII, May 1983, pp. 492–493.

20 As if to maintain the ritual, Pangab Try Sutrisno, again at Lemhannas, explained that Balatkom's present target was 'non-formal' social groups which were supposed to have links with PKI sympathizers ('Inti Amanat Pangab: Waspadai Kegiatan-Kegiatan Politik Praktis dan Kelompok Non Formal', *Mimbar Kekaryaan ABRI*, Edisi 213, September 1988, pp.7, 63). Regarding the developing anti-communism campaign, Goodfellow sees four historical phases. The first three were between 1965 and 1971, and comprise the physical annihilation of the PKI, the consolidation of army dominance in central politics, and the use of the campaign as a weapon of coercion against any individual or group which objected to the New Order. The fourth phase is from

the late 1980s when the campaign was utilized mainly as a means of suppressing popular political expression by NGOs and students (see Goodfellow, *Api Dalam Sekam*, pp.1–15). Our focus is, however, on how the military has reshaped its ideological framework to legitimize the transformation of the campaign from one target to another.

21 Try Sutrisno, 'Amanat Panglima ABRI Pada Upacara Penutupan Susyawan ABRI Angkatan ke-XIV di Bandung Tanggal 14 March 1988', *Mimbar Kekaryaan ABRI*, Edisi 208, April 1988, p.47.

22 Try Sutrisno, 'Amanat Panglima ABRI Pada Acara Pertemuan Dengan Pakokar dan Karyawan ABRI Eslon-1 di Markas Besar ABRI Tanggal 15 Juli 1988', *Mimbar Kekaryaan ABRI*, Edisi 211, July 1988, p.44.

23 A few days before the Golkar Congress in October, Kopkamtib announced that a head of a Golkar branch in West Sumatra had been involved in PKI activities, thus effectively discrediting Sudharmono's management of Golkar. This Balatkom campaign was also encouraged in April by retired Lt. Gen. Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, who announced his resignation from the DPR/MPR in protest against what he believed were ex-PKI figures in key governmental posts. Sarwo's action was widely seen as an attempt to label Sudharmono as communist. For the rest of the year, the 'latent danger' campaign was conducted under the banners of *bersih diri* (clean-self) and *bersih lingkungan* (clean-environment) and aimed at seeking out those in government who (themselves or their family) had any link with past PKI activities. Sudharmono finally decided not to run for the Golkar chairmanship. For details of this extraordinary campaign, see 'The Latent Danger of the PKI', *Tapol Bulletin* 87 (June 1988); 'The "Clean-Self" and "Clean-Environment" Witch-Hunt', *Tapol Bulletin* 90 (December 1988); and Goodfellow, *Api Dalam Sekam*, pp.15–28.

24 *Analisa Lingkungan Strategi Pertahanan Keamanan Negara 1988–1989*, Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal, Perencanaan Umum dan Penganggaran, Dephankam, 1988, pp.126–127.

25 Ibid., pp.128–130. The second point here showed how ABRI had perceived the criticism of *dwifungsi* as an attempt to depoliticize ABRI, which could be interpreted as anti-Pancasila and anti-national integration; thus, in short, possible subjects of security operations. Also reflecting the third point, the government and ABRI decided in 1989 to award Aceh the status of Military Operation Area (Daerah Operasi Militer: DOM) in order to intensify security operations against the separatist movements. The two other areas with this status were Irian Jaya and East Timor.

26 Ibid., p.166.

27 *Pokok-Pokok Kebijaksanaan Pembinaan Teritorial Tahun 1989–1993* [No: Kep/04/VII/1990], Jakarta: Mabes ABRI, 1990, pp.10–11.

28 Ibid., pp.20–23.

29 We discuss the events of the 1993 MPR in the next section.

30 The document is *Sekitar Padnas, Bahaya Latent & Tapol G.30.S./PKI*, Jakarta: Lemhannas, Dephankam, 1993. Hartono had been appointed to this position in February 1993. As discussed in Chapter 2, he was an ICMI-linked officer and his promotion was widely viewed as a tactical shift by Soeharto from the military to Islam, thus ensuring his political power base. The move resonated with Soeharto's alienation of Moerdani-linked officers.

31 Ibid., p.III. As a logical consequence, Hartono insisted that such a new trend became the target of *kewaspadaan* in the ideological, political, economic, sociocultural and defence fields.

32 Despite the worry about capitalism in the early 1990s, it was a reality that the regime had invited massive foreign investment by Western capitalists since the mid-1960s.

33 Above explanations are from ibid., pp.V, 1–10.

34 R. Hartono (Letjen TNI), 'Pengaruh Perkembangan IPTEK Terhadap Aktualisasi Pengabdian Generasi Penerus ABRI', *Majalah Ketahanan Nasional*, No. 60, 1994, pp.43–56. As seen in the next section, Hartono's appointment to this position – which

controls ABRI's political policies – reflected the rise in fortunes of Muslim officers typified by the promotion of Gen. Feisal Tanjung who replaced Try Sutrisno as ABRI Commander in March 1993.

35 Ibid., pp.43–45.

36 As discussed in Chapter 4, both the sacked generals – Brig. Gen. Warouw and Maj. Gen. Sintong Panjaitan – were thought to be Moerdani's men, and it has been suspected that Lt. Col. Prabowo, who had special access to the President and was helping in the purge of Moerdani-linked officers, engineered the incident in Dili to encourage the process.

37 Apart from Feisal Tanjung, Wismoyo Arismunandar who replaced Edi Sudradjat as Army Chief in May 1993 was a brother-in-law of Soeharto's wife. In February 1995, Wismoyo was replaced by Hartono, who had been close to Prabowo and Siti Hardijanti Rukmanan, also known as Mbak Tutut, Soeharto's eldest daughter.

38 Such a trend was already apparent in December 1995 when Prabowo was promoted to Commander of Kopassus and became a brigadier general. According to the codified promotion standard, it normally takes between 20 and 25 years after graduation from the military academy to attain the rank of colonel and a minimum of 23 years to become a one-star general (*Buku Petunjuk Dasar Tentang Pembinaan Prajurit ABRI* [Kep/06/X/1991], Jakarta: Mabes ABRI, 1991, pp.81, 96). Prabowo, who was a graduate from Akabri in 1974, clearly deviated from the norm. One retired officer put it as follows. 'Prabowo has a toll-road ticket – meaning he can bypass the jam of waiting officers. We are concerned about the impact of his case on lower-ranking soldiers. … I am not surprised if young soldiers dream of Prabowo and gradually disregard the moral disciplines they have believed until today' (confidential interview, August 1996). Such concerns are reflected in the comment by Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo, who insisted that '… today's ABRI faces declining independence from the President, and ABRI can never be professional under the current situation' (interview, 30 September 1996). Widjojo himself had experienced conflict with Prabowo, who objected to Widjojo's promotion to Commander of Kodam II/Sriwijaya in 1995.

39 Admiral (ret.) Sudomo, who was Moerdani's old ally and still belonged to Soeharto's inner circle, explained the scrapping of BAIS as a necessary step because it had deviated from its original task as seen in its manipulation of sociopolitical organizations (see 'Bais ABRI Perlu Restrukturisasi', *Kompas*, 18 January 1994). Perhaps, the deviation here only meant activities which were perceived as not reflecting Soeharto's vision. In this light, the 1993 PDI Congress which elected as the new chairperson Megawati Sukarnoputri, a daughter of Sukarno whom Soeharto overthrew, was interesting. Moerdani's trusted man in BAIS, Brig. Gen. Agum Gumelar (Director of the Internal Affairs Section in BAIS and simultaneously Kopassus Commander) was one of the army officers handling the case. ABRI issued permission to the PDI to hold the congress in Jakarta which was almost certain to elect Megawati – a popular opposition figure – as chairperson. The liquidation of BAIS took place immediately after this event, and Gumelar (Kopassus Commander) was also sidelined to the post of Chief of Staff of the North Sumatra Division in September 1994. This was commonly viewed as reflecting Soeharto's unhappiness with Gumelar's role in the PDI issue. However, according to an officer who knew Gumelar well, the Brig. Gen. told him: 'how was it possible for me to act without Soeharto's order?' Soeharto, at that time, told Gumelar to settle the PDI's leadership problem, so he interpreted Megawati's elevation as acceptable. It was then that Col. Prabowo informed the President that the operation was unfavourable, and Soeharto decided to sideline him (personal communication, 1998). Agum's successor as Kopassus Commander was Brig. Gen. Soebagyo Hari Siswoyo, whose promotion was also said to be recommended by Prabowo (Deputy Commander of Kopassus at that time). This promotion was seen as a part of Prabowo's factional consolidation within ABRI.

40 Both Hartono and Prabowo established a political think-tank, the Centre for Policy and Development Studies (CPDS), in 1995, which had a strong Muslim and anti-Moerdani orientation. As mentioned earlier, Hartono also cultivated a very close relationship with Tutut, the eldest daughter of Soeharto.

41 See, for example, Geoffrey Robinson, 'The Post-Coup Massacre in Bali', in Daniel S. Lev and Ruth McVey (eds), *Making Indonesia: Essays on Modern Indonesia in Honor of George McT. Kahin*, Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1996, pp.127, 140; and Robert Cribb (ed.), *The Indonesian Killings 1965–1966: Studies from Java and Bali*, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990.

42 Brig. Gen. Farid Zainuddin, 'Reaktualisasi Peran Sospol ABRI Dalam Rangka Memantapkan Kemandirian Bangsa', *Majalah Ketahanan Nasional*, No. 63, 1995, p.109. Non-*pribumi* refers to ethnic Chinese Indonesians. Zainuddin was Hartono's assistant for political–security affairs, and then promoted to Head of BIA in August 1997.

43 Soebandrio was former deputy prime minister and Omar Dhani was former Air Force Commander, while Soetarto was a police intelligence officer during the Sukarno era. None of the three were members of PKI.

44 'Silang Pandangan Mengampuni PKI', *Gatra*, 22 July 1995. However, there was no explanation of how 300 people could threaten national stability.

45 See Syarwan's interview in 'Dengar Lagu, Bukan Orangnya', *Gatra*, 22 July 1995.

46 For example, soon after the launch of the New Order, a BAKIN-sponsored weekly, *Chas*, conducted a campaign to link the *Wall Street Journal* – which had published a series of articles on military corruption – with the Soviet KGB as the 'outside threat' to Indonesia's domestic stability. The remnants of the PKI were then regarded as the hypothetical domestic agent of the threat. I am indebted to Professor Ben Anderson in making this point.

47 See 'ABRI Names Faces Behind Incidents', *Jakarta Post*, 17 October 1995 and 'Letjen TNI Soeyono: Cara-Cara PKI Sudah Dilakukan Terang-Terangan', *Forum Keadilan*, 23 October 1995. Soeyono was a former Presidential adjutant. The fifteen alleged communists comprised: five academics (George Adicondro, Arief Budiman, Kuwat Triyanto, Harsono, Lie Sing Tew – all of whom had links with the Christian University of Satya Wacana); a labour activist (Mochtar Pakpahan); an anti-regime novelist, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, who received the Roman Magsaysay Award in 1995; a vocal Muslim parliamentarian who was kicked out of parliament (Sri Bintang Pamungkas); two human rights lawyers (Mulyana Kusumah and H.J.C. Princen); a former minister during the Sukarno period and long-time political prisoner (Oei Tjoe Tat); a Chinese student living in Canada and active in the Internet (Paul Salim); a hugely popular public speaker and supporter of Megawati (Permadi); a retired general purged after 1965 for his links with Moscow and his leftist past (Soehario Padmodiwirio); and an undergraduate student (Petrus Hariyanto). Many of them were prominent advocates of democratic reform, and those who had conducted popular political activities outside the regime were now easily labelled as potential threats to regime stability by utilizing the OTB concept.

48 'Letjen TNI Soeyono: Cara-Cara PKI Sudah Dilakukan Terang-Terangan', *Forum Keadilan*, 23 October 1995. ABRI's concern about the Internet – which was beyond the state's control of information – led to the establishment of a special Internet unit in ABRI headquarters. This was announced a few days after Soeyono's OTB statement on 16 October ('Perangi Info Sampah ABRI Masuk Internet', *Republika*, 20 October 1995). On the political impact of the Internet 'revolution', see David T. Hill and Krishna Sen, 'Wiring the *Warung* to Global Gateways: The Internet in Indonesia', *Indonesia*, Vol. 64, October 1997, pp.67–89. It was thought that the main objective of this unit was the collection of information about anti-government activities and – as described by an officer involved in this project – 'counter-information' on the Internet (interview, October 1996).

49 Quotations are from the interview cited above (see note 47). This view was supported by Syarwan Hamid, who insisted that Liem Soei Liong, an activist of Amnesty International in London and General Secretary of *Tapol* magazine, was an OTB figure who had tremendous influence on all NGOs in Indonesia. According to Syarwan, ABRI had already identified thirteen NGOs which exploited the issues of human rights and democratization (see his interview in 'Assospol ABRI Syarwan Hamid: PKI Kini Sedang Bermetamorfosa', *Forum Keadilan*, 6 November 1995). The prominence of NGOs in late New Order politics reflected the growing wave of labour strikes that started about 1990. These strikes had been supported and encouraged by many human rights NGOs. For details, see Vedi R. Hadiz, 'Workers and Working Class Politics in the 1990s', in Chris Manning and Joan Hardjono (eds), *Indonesia Assessment 1993: Labour – Sharing in the Benefits of Growth?* Canberra: Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1993, pp.186–200. ABRI's hostility to these NGOs may have been enhanced by the fact that military personnel were often hired by organizations as security guards, i.e. strikebreakers. (See Lambert's study of this issue: Rob Lambert, *Authoritarian State Unionism in New Order Indonesia*, Working Paper No. 25, Perth: Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, 1993.)

50 All comments are from 'Mewaspadai Lawan Baru: Tanpa Bentuk', *Forum Keadilan*, 6 November 1995.

51 Many critics also saw that the campaign had political goals. A human rights activist, H.J.C. Princen, argued that the campaign was ABRI's effort to emasculate government critics before the 1997 general elections, while Paul Salim, an Internet commentator, saw that the government – which had been relying on repressive measures – needed the campaign to legitimately insist that stability was endangered. Both Princen and Salim were included in Soeyono's list of fifteen OTB members (see note 47). For their responses to the campaign, see 'Curiga Lima Belas Dalam OTB', *Forum Keadilan*, 6 November 1995. On 5 January 1996, as if to sustain the campaign, the ICMI-sponsored newspaper, *Republika*, published an article which indicated that many children of ex-PKI figures had a tendency to vote for the PDI in elections. This was obviously aimed at discrediting the PDI – particularly Megawati. The growing pressure on the grass-roots movement was soon rebutted however by a group of sixteen NGOs which published 'A Joint Statement on the New Order Culture of Violent Approach Toward Indonesian Citizens' (English), in May 1996. The statement strongly condemned Soeyono and Syarwan Hamid for their OTB labelling of NGOs, and insisted that NGO activities were based on the Constitution.

52 The comments of Sudharmono and Sarwono are from 'Mewaspadai Lawan Baru: Tanpa Bentuk'. Komnas HAM – a 'government' body to monitor human rights abuses – also complained at a meeting with the Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs (Menko Polkam), Soesilo Sudarman, and Lt. Gen. Soeyono, and warned of the baseless argument developed in OTB polemic ('Komnas HAM Minta Klarifikasi Soal OTB Pada Menko Polkam', *Kompas*, 26 October 1995).

53 Interview, 8 January 1997. Soebijakto's rejection of OTB seemed to be derived largely from his antipathy – strongly shared by former Moerdani allies – to Soeharto and the new ABRI leadership.

54 Moetojib (Letjen TNI), 'Stabilitas Nasional Sebagai Landasan Kokoh Bagi Pembangunan Politik dan Ekonomi', *Telstra*, No. 38, January–February 1996, p.10. Since March 1996, Moetojib served as the head of BAKIN until replaced by Lt. Gen. (ret.) Zein A. Maulani in September 1998, after the fall of Soeharto.

55 Staf Teritorial ABRI, *Tinjauan Teritorial*, Jakarta: Mabes ABRI, No. Triwulan I 1996/1997. *Tinjauan Teritorial* is the quarterly report of ABRI Headquarters' Territorial Section (Ster ABRI).

56 References are from ibid., p.3. The theory of contradictions is Mao's contribution to modern political language.

57 See 'Kodam IV Teliti Dugaan Tiga Dosen UKSW Sebagai Eks PKI', *Suara Merdeka*, 26 October 1995. The three faculty members were Kuwat Triyanto, Harsono and Lie Sing Tew. They faced this accusation in October 1994 when the faculty conducted a 'democratic' strike against the dismissal of Dr Arief Budiman – a sociologist and long-term New Order critic – who had protested against the unclear process in selecting the university's new rector. The allegations against the three re-emerged in the military's attempt to seek evidence for Soeyono's OTB approach.

58 'Saya Bisa Bawa Tank ke Kampus', *Kompas*, 28 November 1995.

59 The assessment by Bakorstanas can be found in Staf Teritorial ABRI, *Tinjauan Teritorial*, pp.5–12, with the title, 'Hasil Penelitian Tim Karya Tulis Bakorstanas Terhadap Buku "Bayang-Bayang PKI" '. The report demanded that the Supreme Court immediately ban the book, and also asked ABRI's territorial apparatus to watch out (*mewaspadai*) for circulation of the book in society. In branding the book a 'historical distortion', Bakorstanas pointed to some remarks in interviews with old political figures conducted by the project team of the book. For example, Manai Sophiaan, former Secretary General of the pro-Sukarno Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), recalled the situation in 1965, and insisted that Soeharto surely knew about the coup attempt because one of the plotters, Colonel Latief, was an old friend of Soeharto and let him know the plan a day before it happened (Stanly (ed.), *Bayang-Bayang PKI*, Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi, 1995, p.90). In his autobiography, Soeharto himself admits that Latief came to see him, but there is no description of the talk between the two (Soeharto, *Soeharto: Pikiran, Ucapan, dan Tindkan Saya*, Jakarta: PT Citra Lamtro Gung Persada, 1989, p.118).

This book also discussed a survey conducted in Jakarta by a team from Institut Studi Arus Informasi (Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information) – a research and publishing house established by Goenawan Mohamad, editor of *Tempo*, which was banned by the government in 1994. Of the 100 respondents (not randomly selected as many were students), more than 70 per cent disagreed with the government policy of broadcasting its semi-official G30S/PKI film every year, showing that the Balatkom programme was rejected by those who were born in the 1970s. These points may be one of the reasons which made Bakorstanas decide to ban the book.

60 See Amir Syarifuddin (Brigjen: Kapuspen), 'Mewaspadai Bangkitnya Kembali Gerakan Komunis di Indonesia', *Darma Putra*, No. 37, 1996, pp.24–29. *Darma Putra* is Kostrad's internal media.

61 Staf Teritorial ABRI, *Tinjauan Teritorial* (No. Triwulan II, T.A. 1996/1997), pp.11–19.

62 A week before the 27 July riot, Syarwan had a meeting with sixty-one pro-government youth organizations, including many Islam-oriented ones such as MDI (Majelis Dakwah Indonesia) and Pemuda Muslim Indonesia, urging them to watch out for OTB activities and condemning as illegal the free-speech forum held by Megawati's wing of the PDI. These organizations publicly announced their support for ABRI were it to take action against the PRD and PDI-Mega (see 'Kassospol ABRI: ABRI Minta PDI Hentikan Mimbar Bebas', *Kompas*, 21 July 1996). Also, on 30 July Syarwan held a meeting with a delegation of Islamic youth groups, including Pemuda Ansor, AMII (Angaktan Muda Islam Indonesia) and Pemuda Tarbiyah. The next day these groups declared their willingness to fight against communism and condemned the PRD as a dangerous element which had instigated the 27 July riot. More Muslim organizations – Pemuda Muhammadiyah, HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam), and the government-sponsored MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) – also released statements endorsing ABRI's red-purge campaign after the riot. For details, see 'Terlalu Naif, Kalau Anggap ABRI Jadikan PRD Sebagai Kambing Hitam', *Kompas*, 1 August 1996; 'Pernyataan Bersama dan Trauma Ormas Islam', *Forum Keadilan*, 26 August 1996.

Furthermore, on 6 August, Syarwan had a three-hour talk with the key figures in the PPP regarding the 27 July riot. This was his first meeting with a political party after the riot, indicating the pressure on Muslim organizations to mobilize support for

ABRI's PRD-bashing. The Head of PPP, Ismail Hasan Metareum, expressed his full backing for ABRI's effort ('Syarwan: Kita Sudah Ingatkan Tetapi Dituduh Mengada-ada', *Suara Pembaruan*, 7 August 1996). Finally, on 11 August, more than 10,000 people from major pro-government mass organizations gathered in Jakarta to release an official declaration of support for the government and urge ABRI to ban the PRD as communist. Syarwan-led ABRI delegates at the meeting insisted that the declaration was spontaneous and not requested by ABRI, but emphasized the danger of the communist PRD and the need to promote close cooperation between ABRI and Islam ('Apel Kebulatan Tekad Dukung Orde Baru', *Suara Pembaruan*, 12 August 1996).

63 Interview, December 1996. Wirahadikusumah was Deputy Assistant for General Planning to the ABRI Commander at that time.

64 I am indebted to a retired officer who suggested to me the importance of understanding *kromo* in officers' writings, as a technique to read 'read words' behind the established formality. *Kromo*, or *krama*, is the Javanese language form characterized by politeness, officiality and formality which was used by *priyayi*s (indigenous civil servants) during the colonial period. Opposite to *krama* is *ngoko*, which represents informality, proximity and emotionality and is used in daily social life. Anderson describes *krama* as like a mask whereas *ngoko* is like the heart (Benedict Anderson, *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990, pp.131–132). Apart from cultural habit, there seem to be two practical factors which push serving officers towards formality when publishing their articles in ABRI journals. First, journals such as *Ketahanan Nasional* of Lemhannas and *Yudhagama* of Army Headquarters are the arenas in which many officers demonstrate their level of mental discipline and ideological conformity, and their actions here may affect their chances of promotion. Second, it is clearly mentioned in these journals that editors reserve the right to edit submitted papers without obtaining the permission of the authors in order to 'meet the purpose of the journal' – which is indoctrination. Given this, prospective intellectual officers who are given the opportunity to present their opinions adapt their writings to the perceived limit of acceptance – which fluctuates along with the civil–military relations of the time – and determine the correct balance between 'mask' and 'heart', or the way to infuse the latter into the former.

65 Mayjen Hari Sabarno, *Reaktualisasi Fungsi Sosial Politik ABRI Dalam Perspektif Indonesia 2020*, Jakarta: Kertas Karya Perorangan (Taskap) Kursus Singkat Angkatan V Tahun 1995, Lemhannas, 1995, p.71. The summary version of this 82-page thesis was soon published in a Lemhannas journal, but the reference to Golkar cannot be found here, indicating that Hari perceived it as not following ABRI's *krama*. Interestingly, his concern for neutrality was expressed in 1995 when Feisal was preparing to back Golkar and Syarwan Hamid openly stated that ABRI could not be neutral (see also Chapter 2). Although it was extremely rare for an officer not to follow an order from above, limited space for individual thinking made it possible to produce an internal communication arguing the negative impact of policies adopted by the military leadership. Hari was replaced by Syarwan Hamid as Assospol Kassospol in March 1995 and joined the Lemhannas course. After the course, he moved to be deputy head of F-ABRI, then became the head of F-ABRI, and, under the Habibie government, was given the post of deputy chairman of DPR/MPR.

66 Mayjen Suwarno Adiwidjoyo, 'Pemandu Bakat Kepemimpinan Perwira TNI-AD Yang Handal di Era Globalizasi', *Yudhagama*, No. 59, July 1996, p.61. He was later replaced by Maj. Gen. Budi Harsono after serving eight months as Assospol Kassospol. After the fall of Soeharto, the retired Suwarno joined the party executive of PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional: National Mandate Party), headed by Dr Amien Rais, a popular Muslim opposition leader.

67 An interesting remark was made by Feisal Tanjung in August 1998 when he said that during his term as ABRI Commander, no one – even himself, a four-star general – could freely visit the Kopassus sites controlled by Prabowo, a major general ('Feisal:

Saya Tidak Terlibat Kasus Penculikan Para Aktivis', *Media Indonesia*, 25 July 1998). This showed how ABRI's command structure had been distorted by Soeharto's special preference given to his son-in-law.

68 Interview, 2 October 1996.

69 For example, at Seskoad, which studies ABRI's long-term political strategy, an instructor (colonel) said that the Kassospol of today (Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid) did not represent ABRI's institutional interests as he was preoccupied with the political game (personal communication, October 1996).

70 For convenience, I use the term 'reformists' to refer to those officers who were concerned about the direction of the military leadership at that time. However, their views were not necessarily in synch with the reform visions of civilian democratic activists, especially those of officers who were preoccupied with the second type of reform motivation. Although the boundary between the first and second types was not clear, as both overlap significantly, the distinction should not be ignored because it was reflected in the officers' different attitudes towards social demands for political *reformasi* (reform) under the post-Soeharto civilian governments, as we shall see in Chapter 7.

71 It should however be noted that many of the elite officers had been trained in the US and thus had received the benefit of foreign ideas.

72 Written interview with Brig. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, Chief of Staff of Kodam Jaya, 23 December 1996. Sjafrie, a close ally of Prabowo, was then promoted to Commander of Kodam Jaya in September 1997.

73 For details of on-campus intelligence activities, see Human Rights Watch/Asia, 'Academic Freedom in Indonesia: Dismantling Soeharto-Era Barriers', New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998, Chapter 9. The idea that 'the people' consists entirely of 'informants' – i.e. people who supply information about the others – comes straight out of the occupation of East Timor where kidnappings, executions and tortures were commonplace. These East Timor practices seeped into Indonesia in the 1990s and, of course, ABRI's East Timor 'experts' contributed greatly to the penetration. On these experts, see Kammen's detailed study (Douglas Kammen, 'Notes on the Transformation of the East Timor Military Command and its Implications for Indonesia', *Indonesia*, No. 67, April 1999, pp.61–76).

74 As seen in Chapter 2, the Kopassus Commander, Maj. Gen. Prabowo, was promoted to the Kostrad Command with three-star rank just after the presidential re-election of Soeharto – with Habibie's promotion to vice-president – at the MPR's general session in March 1998. In conducting security operations to 'prevent instability' at this MPR event, Prabowo and his aides in Kopassus had, since February 1998, conducted abductions of student activists who had staged anti-Soeharto demonstrations. Sjafrie's involvement was also suspected. We will discuss subsequent developments in Chapter 7. Kopassus had received professional military training from the US and Australia. Even after the official ban in 1992 – due to the Dili incident – more than twenty instances of US training had been reported, the most recent conducted just before the 1998 MPR. The training was said to have specialized in torture, disappearance, urban combat techniques, psychological warfare and night raids on civilian homes – all sugar-coated by the term 'counter-terrorism'. For details, see 'U.S. Aids Killers in Indonesia', *Sacramento Bee*, 29 March 1998 and 'Jakarta Opposition Leader Decries U.S. Role in Troop Training', *Chicago Tribune*, 25 March 1998. It is easy to suspect that such training contributed to the professionalization of disappearance and abduction.

75 Interview with Marzuki Darusman, Deputy Chair of Komnas HAM, 27 March 1997.

76 Interview, 31 January 1997. Maj. Gen. Budi Harsono was Assospol Kassospol at that time, serving the hardline Syarwan Hamid. He was replaced by Maj. Gen. Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono in July 1997 and posted to F-ABRI. Yudhoyono's entry to ABRI's sociopolitical section might reflect a willingness of Gen. Wiranto – who had replaced Hartono as Army Chief in June 1997, after the general election – to consoli-

date his power base with reform-minded intellectual officers, against the hardline group around Prabowo.

77 Syarifudin Tippe, *Peran Sosial Politik ABRI Dalam Meningkatkan Kualitas Pengamalan Wawasan Kebangsaan di Tengah Kecenderungan 'Global Paradox'* (Narasi), Bandung: Forum Pengkajian Seskoad, Orasi Ilmiah Pada Ulang Tahun Seskoad Ke-44, 25 May 1995, p.6. Tippe, at that time, served Gen. Feisal Tanjung as Personal Staff Coordinator for the ABRI Commander, and was also a devout Muslim. As if reflecting the anti-Moerdani posture of many ICMI-linked officers, this Feisal follower (a graduate of Akabri in 1975) criticized the old intelligence policy of the 1980s which compelled officers to obtain permission before writing in the mass media, and which he thought had killed the officers' intellectual creativity (see his interview, 'Syarifudin Tippe: Banyak Perwira yang Pinter', *Forum Keadilan*, 3 July 1995).

78 This is by no means to attribute the idea to the individual officer and judge his entire political views based on the category. Rather, the classification is intended to systematically assess existing perceptions within ABRI. Thus, it is not a problem if one expresses different opinions on different occasions.

79 Interview with Maj. Gen. (ret.) Zein Maulani, Adviser for Military Affairs for B.J. Habibie, Minister of Research and Technology, 28 November 1996. Maulani became Chief of Staff of the Vice-Presidential Office when Habibie was elected as vice-president in March 1998, and, in September, was appointed head of BAKIN – a body directly responsible to President Habibie. His claim for the lesser role of ABRI may reflect his support for the civilian Habibie.

80 Interview, 15 January 1997. Widjojo was Feisal's adviser for political and security affairs at that time. The term 'conservatives' used here may be identical to hardliners.

6 Contesting 'inner' thoughts in civil–military discourse

1 Try Sutrisno, 'ABRI dan Keterbukaan Politik', *Majalah Ketahanan Nasional*, No. 51, 1989, p.55.

2 Roekmini's speech at the seminar, 'Democracy and Problems of National Integration', held at the Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information (LP3ES), Jakarta, 21 September 1993. Cited in *Laporan Seminar: Demokrasi dan Masalah Integrasi Nasional*, CESDA-LP3ES, 1993, pp.6–7.

3 Citations are from ibid., pp.13–14. Shobirin Nadj is a researcher at LP3ES.

4 In the analytical framework of this chapter, 'everyday modes of criticism' is an operational concept to distinguish between the nature of criticism examined here and criticisms based on particular 'events' of the time. The concept is taken from the classic study by Scott and Kerkvliet, which developed the notion of 'everyday forms of resistance' in suggesting the need for assessing various types of hidden peasant opposition to the state, which were usually ignored or disregarded in the traditional conceptions of peasant revolt and rebellion. Although the subject of analysis is different, the concept of 'everyday form' provides a significant analytical perspective in assessing various modes of *dwifungsi* criticism which we tend to ignore by only following well-publicized big political events (see James C. Scott and Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, *Everday Forms of Peasant Resistance in Southeast Asia*, London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1986).

5 See Saafroedin Bahar, 'ABRI dan Proses Demokratisasi: Pengalaman, Prospek dan Strateginya', *Persepsi*, Edisi Khusus, 20 May 1993, pp.71–112. Bahar has served as an official of the State Secretariat since 1989, and from 1995 also works as a Komnas HAM member.

6 Scholarly debates on the role of the middle class under the New Order have been popular since 1984 when a social science journal, *Prisma*, published a special issue in its 2 February edition. Crouch compared Southeast Asian countries and generalized that if the middle class was too small, it could neither be an effective pressure group

nor a supporting base for the state (see Harold Crouch *Domestic Political Structures and Regional Economic Cooperation*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984, p.5). In 1986, Monash University held a symposium on this topic (Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young (eds), *The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia*, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990). Here, Lev saw that the notion of 'private' had emerged within the middle class and thus they were likely to raise the issues of political access, social equality and control over state power (Daniel S. Lev, 'Notes on the Middle Class and Change in Indonesia', in Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young (eds), *The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia*, p.48). Liddle argued that they were rather responsive to state paternalism and could easily be included in the corporatist network of the government (R. William Liddle, 'The Middle Class and New Order Legitimacy: A Response to Dan Lev', in Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young (eds), *The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia*, pp.50–51). Budiman underlined the state's effort to keep 'disorganizing' civil society led by the middle class (Arief Budiman, 'Indonesian Politics in the 1990s', in Harold Crouch and Hall Hill (eds), *Indonesia Assessment 1992: Political Perspectives on the 1990s*, Political and Social Change Monograph 17, Canberra: Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1992, pp.134–136). Most recently, Robison endorsed Liddle's position and insisted that the middle class was rather conservative in political reform due to their economic benefits in preserving authoritarianism (Richard Robison, 'The New Middle Class and the Bourgeoisie in Indonesia', in Richard Robison and David S.G. Goodman (eds), *The New Rich in Asia*, London: Routledge, 1996, pp.85, 98). These pessimistic opinions seem to be dominant in studies of the Indonesian middle class, and are shared by domestic society in general, as reflected in the title of a book, *Kelas Menengah Digugat* [Middle-Class Accused] (Jakarta: Fikahati Aneska, 1993), published a year after the 'middle-class' revolution in Thailand in 1992. However, this is not to deny the deepening dissatisfaction of the middle class with the New Order's 'implementation' of authoritarianism, as seen in many opinion polls conducted by the media (see, for example, note 168 in Chapter 3). The increasing possession of private telephones in the middle-class layer, for example, seems to have made it much easier to survey public opinion immediately after any political event – something which could not be done before due to the lack of sampling numbers.

7 Explanations are from pp.34–35 and pp.37–39 in Juwono Sudarsono, 'Peranan Sosial-Politik ABRI: Perkiraan ke Depan', *Yudhagama*, No. 46, 31 October 1994, pp.33–39.

8 Interview with Juwono Sudarsono, Vice-Governor of Lemhannas, 17 June 1996.

9 Seminar papers were later published as a book, entitled 'ABRI and Democracy'. The following citations are from his chapter in it (Hasnan Habib, 'ABRI dan Demokrasi Politik', in Selamat Ginting, *et al.* (eds), *ABRI dan Demokrasi*, Jakarta: Dharmapena Nusantara, MIZAN, 1997, pp.15–48).

10 Citations are from ibid., pp.16, 19, 21.

11 Ibid., pp.28–30.

12 Ibid., p.48.

13 Ibid., pp.44–45, emphasis added.

14 Written interview with Gen. (ret.) A.H. Nasution, 4 January 1997. His 1958 speech declared that the army would neither become a direct political force like in Latin American states nor be a dead tool of the government as in the European states; for the speech and its background, see C.L.M. Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen (eds), *Abdul Haris Nasution: A Political Biography*, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1985, pp.133–134.

15 According to a LIPI staff member, the research result was first submitted to Moerdiono, Secretary of the State, at the end of 1996 but because the content was so critical, the report was stopped at the level of Sekneg (State Secretariat) for further consideration and it took several months before it was finally delivered into the hands

of Soeharto. Moerdiono also told LIPI not to publicize the report before the president accepted it (see Indria Samego, 'Penelitian Peran Sosial Politik ABRI', *Studi Politik*, LIPI, No. 1, 1996, p.160). A book – based on a LIPI discussion of the report – was printed in March 1997 (see Indria Samego, *et al.*, *Peranan Sospol ABRI: Masalah dan Prospeknya*, Jakarta: LIPI, March 1997).

16 Indria Samego, 'Demokratisasi Peran Sosial Politik ABRI: Catatan Pendahuluan', in Indria Samego, *et al.*, *Peranan Sospol ABRI*, p.15.

17 Quotations are from ibid., pp.18–19. For information about the riots which broke out in 1996–1997, see Chapter 2.

18 Ibid., p.27.

19 Riza Sihbudi, 'Dampak Perubahan Lingkungan Domestik Terhadap Peran Sosial Politik ABRI', in Indria Samego, *et al.*, *Peranan Sospol ABRI*, p.129. Needless to say, this criticism strongly reflected ABRI's OTB theory and its implementation in the PRD affair in July 1996.

20 Above points are from ibid., pp.128–131. ASEAN is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

21 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 'Lingkungan Internasional, Demokratisasi dan Peranan Sosial Poltik ABRI', in ibid., p.165. Dewi became the Presidential adviser for foreign policy under the Habibie government.

22 See Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, 'Masa Depan Peran Sospol ABRI', and Indria Samego, 'Kesimpulan dan Rekomendasi Penelitian', both in ibid., pp.191, 212, 231.

23 Try Sutrisno, 'Amanat Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia Pada Pembukaan Sussospol ABRI Angkatan-1 1988/1989 di Sesko ABRI Bandung', *Mimbar Kekaryaan ABRI*, Edisi 222, June 1989, pp.68–69.

24 *Kepemimpinan ABRI dalam Pembangunan Negara-Bangsa: Masa Lalu, Masa Kini, dan Masa Mendatang*, Mabes ABRI, 1993, pp.52–53.

25 A. Rivai, 'Aktualisasi Peran dan Sikap Mental Aparatur Pemerintah dalam Era Pembangunan', *Darma Putra*, Edisi Khusus, No. 32, 1995, p.77. Rivai is a graduate of AMN's class of 1965, and served as Pangdam IX/Udayana until the July 1997 reshuffle. He then became a member of F-ABRI at the DPR.

26 About the concepts of *pejuang* and *prajurit*, see Chapter 3.

27 Hari Sabarno, 'Tantangan Demokrasi dan Sikap ABRI', *Yudhagama*, No. 46, October 1994, pp.19–20.

28 Ibid., p.21.

29 The booklet is A.S.S. Tambunan, *Sociopolitical Functions of the Indonesian Armed Forces: An Effort to Outline the Issues*, Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1995. The original text was written in 1980 but the publisher, in the Introduction to the book, stresses that it is still highly relevant in the contemporary context and it soon became a standard reference among ABRI intellectuals. In my conversations with ABRI officers, many – though not all – nominated the book as one of four writings they recommended civilians to read. The other three are: Notosusanto (ed.), *Pejuang dan Prajurit: Konsepsi dan Implementasi Dwifungsi ABRI*, Jakarta: Penerbit Sinar Harapan, 1984; Soebijono, *et al.*, *Dwifungsi ABRI: Perkembangan dan Peranannya dalam kehidupan Politik di Indonesia*, Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1992; and Salim Said, *Genesis of Power: General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics 1945–1949*, Singapore: ISEAS, 1991. Since Tambunan's work was revised in 1995, we will look at this 'latest' work which discusses issues of *dwifungsi* in democratization.

30 Above citations are from Tambunan, *Sociopolitical Functions of the Indonesian Armed Forces*, pp.31–34. However, it does not provide an answer to the counter-discourse which says civilians, in that case, should also take part in military organizations, such as occupying the post of Minister of Defence and Security.

31 In the author's interviews with the serving officers during the late Soeharto period, there was not one who did not mention this denial of the civil–military dichotomy in explaining the place of *dwifungsi* in democratization, although a variety of opinions

were expressed regarding the strategy to manage the military commitment to the political process.

32 Interview with Brig. Gen. (ret.) Abdulkadir Besar, 30 July 1996. Criticism of Nugroho's work in 1984 was also posed by the late Lt. Gen. (ret.) Simatupang, a prominent 1945-Generation army intellectual who saw *Pejuang dan Prajurit* as not paying attention to the reason why *dwifungsi* would not be geared towards militarism, but would encourage Pancasila democracy in the future (see T.B. Simatupang, 'Renungan Atas Tempat dan Peranan TNI/ABRI', *Teknologi & Strategi Militer*, No. 2, 1987, p.17). Abdulkadir's former student at AMN, the Defence Minister Gen. (ret.) Edi Sudradjat, also emphasized *kekeluargaan* culture as the strongest basis of *dwifungsi* existence (written and oral interviews, 19 February 1997). In this line of thinking, there was also an argument stressing the need for academics to develop a social science theory of *negara kekeluargaan* as the basis of *dwifungsi*'s legitimacy (see Achmad Roestandi, 'Masa Depan *Dwifungsi* ABRI', *Persepsi*, No. 1, 1990, pp.24–25).

33 Interview with First Admiral Joost Mugho, Expert Staff for Navy Chief-of-Staff in the Field of National Zone (Staf Ahli KASAL bidang Wilayah Nasional), 3 October 1996. He later became Assistant of Intelligence to the ABRI Commander, Gen. Wiranto.

34 Confidential interview, October 1996. Obviously this was an attack on Soeharto.

35 Interview with Vice-Marshal Graito Usodo, Expert Staff for the ABRI Commander in the Field of Industrial Development (Staf Ahli Pangab bidang Inbang), 26 November 1996. He later became military spokesman (Kapuspen) under the Gus Dur government.

36 Interview, 15 January 1997.

37 Interview, 15 January 1997.

38 Confidential interview, February 1997.

39 Interviews with Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo, 30 September 1996, and Brig. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, 24 January 1997.

40 Interview with Lt. Gen. (ret.) Bambang Triantoro, 16 December 1996.

41 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Kunarto, Vice-Chairman of BPK (Supreme Audit Agency), 23 January 1997.

42 At Seskoad, formal communications with civilian intellectuals were closed down in 1969 and replaced by informal ones. At Akabri, there were formal opportunities to exchange political views with university students, but again these were abolished. For details, see 'Komunikasi ABRI dengan Para Cendikiawan (Wawancara Khusus dengan Wakil Gubernur Lemhannas oleh Alex Dinuth)', *Majalah Ketahanan Nasional*, No. 51, 1989, pp.57–58, 61. Maj. Gen. Arifin Tarigan, Seskoad Commander, admitted that since the closure of communication, the gap between civilian and officers' thinking had widened (interview, 17 October 1996). In Akabri, the ABRI side noticed that the dialogue with university students was not productive because Akabri cadets were trained by doctrines while students had free minds (interview with Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo, 30 September 1996). Today, Akabri cadets have only a few opportunities to exchange views with civilian students at the AMD-like village camp organized by Akabri once a year. About this camp, see 'Marching to a Crossroad', *FEER*, 3 September 1992.

43 *Telaahan Strategik Nasional 1983–1993* (Slide), Lemhannas, n.d., p.23.

44 Ramage had already pointed out that ABRI's emphasis on Pancasila and its integralistic ideology became apparent in its effort to maintain *dwifungsi* legitimacy (Douglas E. Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance*, London: Routledge, 1995, pp.124–130). Our examination of military thinking suggests that ABRI also found an approach less reliant on the culture-oriented integralism. As just discussed, this was a consequence of ABRI's growing need to strengthen its interpretation of the current social change process, which could not be carried out by a cultural explanation alone.

45 ABRI's backing for Golkar during elections and its policy of *kekaryaan* were notable cases raised by the civilian elites. In fact, despite ABRI's long-time claim that *kekaryaan* had decreased, the 1987 Kekaryaan Seminar concluded that it was imperative for ABRI to increase immediately its personnel in legislative, executive and judicial branches as well as in social sectors in order to prevent a vacuum after the 1987 election. As the result, total *kekaryaan* staff numbered 15,680 by the end of 1987, a slight increase from 14,819 in 1984 ('Hasil Seminar Susyawan ABRI Legislatif III Tentang Strategi Pembangunan Politik dalam Sistem Demokrasi Pancasila', *Widya Dharma*, No. 9, 1987, pp.69–70; Try Sutrisno, 'Amanat Panglima ABRI pada Acara Pertemuan dengan Pakokar dan Karyawan ABRI Eselon-I di Markas Besar ABRI Tanggal 15 Juli 1988', *Mimbar Kekaryaan ABRI*, Edisi 211, July 1988, p.41).

46 Interview with Marzuki Darusman, Vice-Chairman of Komnas HAM, 27 March 1997.

47 See his interview, 'ABRI Punya Komitmen Terhadap Demokrasi tapi Tidak Mau Dijadikan Hanya Sebagai Alat', in *Sintesis*, No. 15, May–June 1996.

48 In the political history of Indonesia, members of the military were permitted to vote in the first general elections in 1955. But this right was abolished in the second election conducted in 1971 under the Soeharto regime, following the so-called 'National Consensus' that provided appointed seats for ABRI in parliament. The rationale at that time was to secure political stability, Pancasila and the Constitution in the parliamentary process, and it was widely claimed by officers as a *quid pro quo* for giving up their right to vote.

49 Interview, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Soebijakto, Chief Executive of Indonesian Institute for Strategic Studies (LPSI: a think-tank headed by Gen. (ret.) Rudini), 8 January 1997. The principle he refers to here is ABRI's identity as the people's military. He believes that such an identity is distorted by the act of taking over the legislative place rightfully belonging to political parties.

50 Interview, 22 July 1996. Soedibyo was also affiliated with LPSI.

51 Written interview with Gen. (ret.) Nasution, 4 January 1997. IPKI was a political party which nominated 73 officer-candidates for the 1955 election. Officers affiliated with Petisi 50, such as Lt. Gen. (ret.) Mokoginta and Maj. Gen. Azis Saleh, were Nasution's partners in establishing IPKI. When Soeharto instructed LIPI to conduct research on *dwifungsi*, Petisi 50 lobbied LIPI to make a proposal beyond the simple reduction of F-ABRI numbers (see Kelompok Kerja Petisi 50, *Demokratisasi Politik: Pokok-Pokok Pikiran Untuk Perubahan dan Penyempurnaan Paket Per Undang-Undang tentang Kehidupan Politik Nasional*, Seri Mencerdaskan Kehidupan Bangsa, No. 9, May 1995, pp.41–43).

52 For example, interviews with Gen. (ret.) Rudini, 4 September 1996; Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo, 30 September 1996; Maj. Gen. Arifin Tarigan, 17 October 1996; Maj. Gen. Budi Harsono, 31 January 1997.

53 See Hasnan Habib, 'ABRI dan Demokrasi Politik', p.47. Ruslan Abdulgani, former chairman of Pancasila Propagation Board (BP-7) – the agency in charge of disseminating the state-ideology of Pancasila – also stressed that 'ABRI should now participate in the election because there was no longer a threat to Pancasila. ABRI's ideological-political functions to safeguard Pancasila were already unnecessary (*menguap*). So the ABRI seats should be reduced or simply dismantled' (cited in Muchtar Pakpahan, *DPR RI Semasa Orde Baru*, Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1994, p.204).

54 Interview with Lt. Gen. (ret.) Hasnan Habib, 9 August 1996. Aberson Marel Sihaloho, a PDI politician on the Megawati side, embodied the fear of ABRI. He stressed that Megawati wanted to implement Pancasila and the Constitution in a pure way, which would result in the liquidation of F-ABRI and *dwifungsi* because they were clearly in contradiction to the Constitution (see his interview in Santoso (coordinator), *Megawati Soekarnoputri: Pantang Surut Langkah*, Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi, 1996,

pp.141–143). Megawati herself explained vaguely in 1994 that *dwifungsi* became a problem if it deviated from the basics – i.e. it was only a 'fish' which could live in the 'water' (*rakyat*) (Megawati Soekarnoputri, *Bendera Sudah Saya Kibarkan!: Pokok-Pokok Pikiran Megawati Soekarnoputri*, Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1994, pp.33–35).

55 Interviews with Gen. (ret.) Benny Moerdani, 4 March 1997 and Maj. Gen. (ret.) Z.A. Maulani, 28 November 1996.

56 See Chapter 2 for Soeharto's use of this argument in justifying the existence of F-ABRI.

57 See, for example, *Dasar Hukum Dwi Fungsi dan Identitas ABRI* (SKEP/1382/X/1977, Tanggal 24-10-1977), Dephankam 1977, pp.11–12; Notosusanto (ed.), *Pejuang dan Prajurit*, pp.215–216; and Tambunan, *Sociopolitical Functions of the Indonesian Armed Forces*, p.41.

58 'Jangan Ada kudeta di Indonesia: Pesan Pak Nas Kepada Prabowo', *Jawa Pos*, 21 March 1998.

59 Judging from the logical resemblance, we may also think of one hypothesis in explaining ABRI's opposition to coups in Indonesia – i.e., the hidden message is that it is not ABRI's sense of national interests but its fear of internal splits that has deterred its takeover of the government in the alleged opportunities listed.

60 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Edi Sudradjat, Menhankam, 19 February 1997.

61 Interview with Maj. Gen. Hari Sabarno, Deputy Head of F-ABRI, 5 February 1997.

62 Mulchis Anwar (Brigjen), 'Aktualisasi Dwifungsi ABRI Pada Era PJP II', *Majalah Ketahanan Nasional*, No. 61, 1994, pp.39–49. I am indebted to a Lemhannas staff member who informed me of the existence of this article. Mulchis was then promoted to Major General and served as KSAD Hartono's assistant for personnel affairs before, in July 1997, becoming coordinator of expert staff for the ABRI Commander, Gen. Feisal Tanjung.

63 Ibid., p.44.

64 Ibid., p.45.

65 In practice within ABRI, parliamentary positions were regarded as the end of one's career. Except positions such as F-ABRI head and deputy head, other officers only became 'politicians-in-uniform', and their status was regarded as lower than those who were of the same military rank but who became governors or regents. For example, a major general who became governor after retirement was more prestigious than a major general who served as a DPR politician with his active duty status. Mulchis saw this career pattern as a problem of diminishing work incentives for serving officers who are sent to parliament, with a resultant negative influence on the entire officer corps.

66 Ibid., p.46.

67 In establishing Golkar in 1969, mass organizations under the KBG were placed in seven main organizational groups, or KINO (Kelompok Induk Organisasi). One of these was Ormas Hankam (Mass Organizations under the Department of Defence and Security). KINO was dissolved after the 1971 election but since then it has been understood that the Golkar Family has three streams – ABRI, Bureaucrats, and Functional Groups. Technically, soldiers in service were not allowed to join the ABRI stream which was under the control of the ABRI Commander. For the organizational development of Golkar, see DPP Golkar, *30 Tahun Golkar*, Jakarta: DPP Golkar, 1994, pp.93–126 and Leo Suryadinata, *Military Ascendancy and Political Culture: A Study of Indonesia's Golkar*, Athens: Ohio University, 1989.

68 On the question of ABRI's siding with Golkar, there was also a criticism of the style of these two generals. For example, Gen. (ret.) Benny Moerdani argued that 'Hartono's way [of approaching Golkar] is too overt. ABRI's support for Golkar should not be done in such an open way' (interview, 4 March 1997).

69 Citations are from Hari Sabarno, *Reaktualisasi Fungsi Sosial Politik ABRI Dalam Perspektif Indonesia 2020*, Kertas Karya Perorangan (Taskap) Kursus Singkat Angkatan V Tahun

1995, Lemhannas, 1995, p.71. The summary version of this 82-page thesis was soon published in a Lemhannas journal, but, as suggested in Chapter 5, the above reference to Golkar can not be found here, indicating that Hari perceived it as not following ABRI's official line. See also Hari Sabarno, 'Reaktualisasi Fungsi Sosial Politik ABRI Dalam Perspektif Indonesia 2020', *Majalah Ketahanan Nasional*, No. 63, 1995, pp.115–123.

70 The sentences are from Ishak Prawiradilaga, 'Peranan ABRI dalam Pembangunan Politik', *Majalah Ketahanan Nasional*, No. 52, 1990, p.59. Two-thirds of the total votes means 66 percent. This, therefore, is a direct criticism of Golkar, which received 73 percent in the previous election under Sudharmono.

71 Citations are from ibid., pp.61–62. These opinions also confirm the cleavage between ABRI, led by Moerdani and Try Sutrisno, and Sudharmono at that time.

72 See, for example, Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988, pp.45–54; David Pion-Berlin, 'The National Security Doctrine, Military Threat Perception and the "Dirty War" in Argentina', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1988, pp.382–407; David Pion-Berlin, 'Latin American National Security Doctrines: Hard- and Soft-line Themes', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1989, pp.411–429; and Michael C. Desch, 'Threat Environments and Military Missions', in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds), *Civil–Military Relations and Democracy*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, pp.12–29. ABRI is analysed from this perspective in Jun Honna, *Military Doctrines and Democratic Transition: A Comparative Perspective on Indonesia's Dual Function and Latin American National Security Doctrines*, Working Paper No. 22, Canberra: Department of Political and Social Change, RSPAS, Australian National University, 1999.

73 Interview with Marzuki Darusman, Deputy Chairman of Komnas HAM, 27 March 1997. The security approach debate, discussed in Chapter 4, was a case of raising the problem of ABRI's security function during the late New Order era. However, the debate was limited to the level of policy rather than challenging the utility of territorial doctrine.

74 See *Penyempurnaan Pokok-Pokok Organisasi dan Prosedur Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat (TNI-AD)*, KEP/08/X/1992, Mabes ABRI, 1992, pp.36–38. In a broader doctrinal design, the army's territorial operation is defined as one of four pillars – along with intelligence, combat and social order operations – constituting the System of Internal Security Operation (Pola Opskamdagri), which is one of two pillars – together with the System of Defence Operation (Pola Opshan) – in ABRI's designated role as a 'defence' force, not as a sociopolitical force. Thirty years of ABRI's political involvement in the New Order polity resulted in the expansion and differentiation of cell defence doctrine (Hankamnas) which now has an enormous number of functional, coordinating and operational doctrines. In the mid-1990s, KSAD Gen. Hartono finally felt the necessity to draw a clear map of this complicated network of doctrines, and instructed his staff to write a reference book, *Kapita Selekta Sosial Politik ABRI* (Mabes ABRI, 1994); see especially pp.185–191 for details of the doctrines.

75 See a reference made by Brig. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin on the political use of *strategi penangkal* (preventive strategy) which treats all individuals in the country as ABRI's informants, as discussed in Chapter 5.

76 Written interview, 18 December 1996.

77 See 'Peranan Koter Dalam Menyukseskan Pemilu 1997 dan Sidang Umum MPR 1998', *Gema Jayakarta (Media Komunikasi Kodam Jaya/Jayakarta)*, October 1995, pp.33, 58. KBA was based on clear membership while Supporters of ABRI's Sociopolitical Missions (Pengemban Misi Sospol ABRI, or called PMS) was a concept to categorize those people who were – in the eyes of ABRI – cooperative to ABRI's *sospol* conduct. These included intellectuals, government officials, religious leaders, journalists, people in business circles, and other informants and followers of ABRI in society. The recruit-

ment of PMS is said to be made either by organizational units within ABRI or at the discretion of individual officers.

78 'Sejarah Singkat Korps Baret Merah Kopassus', *Cahaya Chandraca*, No. 1, 1987, p.23. *Cahaya Chandraca* is Kopassus' internal newsletter. The most prominent example of this was the operation before the annexation of East Timor in 1976 when red beret troops (at that time using the name Kopassandha) were training Apodeti, a pro-integration party of Portuguese Timor, before the formal invasion by Kostrad and Kodam troops. For details, see Hamish McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia*, Victoria: Fontana Books, 1980, pp.189–215. It is also suggested that Kopassandha played a central role in the so-called 'mysterious killings' in the early 1980s when 3,000–4,000 suspected criminals were killed in extra-judicial ways to curb a rising crime rate.

79 As seen previously, cases such as the Medan riot in 1994 and the 27 July Affair in Jakarta in1996 are said to have involved Kopassus operations. We will see more examples in Chapter 7.

80 Interview with Rear Marshal Sunardi, Expert Staff for the Minister of Defence and Security, 13 December 1996.

7 Post-Soeharto: politics and the theatre of military reform

1 For a comprehensive assessment of economic crisis in Indonesia, see World Bank, *Indonesia in Crisis: A Macroeconomic Update*, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 16 July 1998.

2 Wiranto's appointment as both ABRI Commander and Menhankam did not mean that Soeharto gave his full support to Wiranto in the competition with Prabowo. It was more like a strategy of buying the loyalty of Wiranto, while at the same time motivating Prabowo to more effectively defend Soeharto's political interests. Also, Soeharto might have learned from his bitter experience with the former Menhankam Edi Sudradjat, who had voiced criticism of Soeharto within the Cabinet during his term, and thus decided to return to the one-man–two-post system – a system adapted before Moerdani became ABRI Commander.

3 More than 1,200 people were killed. For details of the riots, see TGPF, *Laporan Akhir Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta Peristiwa Tinggal 13–15 Mei 1998* (Ringkasan Eksekutif), Jakarta: Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta, 23 October 1998.

4 Ibid. The head of TGPF, Marzuki Darusman from Komnas HAM, also argued that riots in previous years – for example the Jakarta riot of 27 July 1996, and Situbondo and Tasikmalaya in 1997 – could have links with the 1998 riots ('Marzuki Darusman, Ketua TGPF: Persepsi Para Perwira itu Berlainan', *Tajuk*, No. 17, 1–15 October 1998). See also Chapter 2 for details of the 1996–1997 riots and their possible links with the military.

5 For details of Kopassus' recruitment and training of hoodlums to organize the riots, see 'Saksi Saksi Setelah 100 Hari', *Tajuk*, No. 14, 1–3 September 1998. Like the case of 27 July 1996, members of Pemuda Pancasila were identified as participants in the series of May 1998 riots.

6 According to Mietzner, on 14 May Wiranto asked Sjafrie to obey his order or be dismissed (Marcus Mietzner, 'From Soeharto to Habibie: the Indonesian Armed Forces and Political Islam during the Transition', in Geoff Forrester (ed.), *Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos?* Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999, p.79). Actually, operation commands in Jakarta were confused, as troops located in North Jakarta were ordered to go to South Jakarta and troops in the South were instructed to go to the North. 'This reflected the manoeuvres of the Jakarta Military Commander and his operational assistant', according to a general in the Wiranto camp (confidential interview, October 1998).

7 For these accounts, see Prabowo's interview, 'The Scapegoat?', in *Asiaweek*, 3 March 2000.

8 '15 Perwira Tinggi Purnawirawan Serukan Sidang Istimewa MPR', *Suara Pembaruan*, 16 May 1998; 'Bangsa Berada pada Titik Sejarah yang Menentukan', *Kompas*, 18 May 1998.

9 Prabowo admitted that Mamiek, Soeharto's youngest daughter, called him 'traitor' and asked him not to come to Soeharto's palace anymore. Prabowo accused Wiranto of playing politics against him (see his interview, 'The Scapegoat?', and *'Buku Putih' Prabowo: Kesaksian Tragedi Mei 1998*, Jakarta: Majalah Berita Populer 'Totalitas', 2000, pp.22, 35).

10 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Wiranto, 20 March 2001. This story, which relies exclusively on Wiranto, cannot be cross-checked for its validity. However, it is widely believed that, whatever words he used, Wiranto 'recommended' that the President step down.

11 Habibie approved Wiranto's removal of Prabowo, and in return Wiranto assured his support for the Habibie's new government. For details, see Takashi Shiraishi, 'The Indonesian Military in Politics', in Adam Schwarz and Jonathan Paris (eds), *The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999, pp.82–83.

12 Lumintang only held the position for 18 hours for reasons discussed later in this chapter. This extremely unusual arrangement was due to the urgency of Wiranto to prevent an angry Prabowo from mobilizing his troops for protest. Prabowo actually led his Kostrad soldiers and tried to meet with Habibie, but the President refused to have the meeting. Habibie later revealed that he was informed by Wiranto in advance about Prabowo's attempt to capture him, a claim denied by Wiranto for obvious reasons. According to Prabowo, he wanted to 'talk' with Habibie because he had long been promised the post of ABRI Commander by Habibie if he became president (see his interview, 'The Scapegoat?').

13 The post of new Kopassus Commander was filled by Maj. Gen. Syahrir MS (Udayana Military Commander). Gasing was replaced by Brig. Gen. Zamroni, Commander of Group-5 (anti-terrorism) in Kopassus. Lumintang, after spending 18 hours at Kostrad, handed over his post to Maj. Gen. Djamari Chaniago (Siliwangi Military Commander), who also was a member of Wiranto's circle.

14 For a useful discussion of these factors, see, for example, Donald K. Emmerson, 'Exit and Aftermath: The Crisis of 1997–98', in Donald K. Emmerson (ed.), *Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Social Transition*, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999, pp.295–343, and Edward Aspinall, *Political Opposition and the Transition from Authoritarian Rule: The Case of Indonesia*, PhD thesis, Australian National University, 2000, Chapter 9.

15 From February to May 1998, more than twenty-three activists disappeared. In July, Wiranto admitted that Kopassus was responsible for kidnapping nine of them. The rest are still missing.

16 Many of the discussions in this section are drawn from Jun Honna, 'The Military in Transition: Between Reform and Political Struggle', in Yuri Sato (ed.), *Indonesia Entering a New Era: Abdurrahman Wahid Government and Its Challenge*, Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 2000, pp.26–36.

17 'ABRI Bahas Dwifungsi', *Kompas*, 26 May 1998; 'Kassospol ABRI: ABRI Akan Dukung Pelaksanaan Pemilu', *Suara Pembaruan*, 26 May 1998.

18 Interview with a general-ranking officer, July 1999. Suspicions of Sjafrie's involvement in the staging of the May riots are well analysed in 'Teka-teki Jenderal Sjafrie', *Tajuk*, 1–3 September 1998.

19 He made this comment at the Commander's Call on 21 August. For details, see 'Wiranto Menyesal ABRI Terlibat Berbagai Pelanggaran HAM', *Republika*, 22 August and 'Pangab Akui Terseret Politik Orba', *Jawa Pos*, 22 August 1998.

20 The three were discharged 'with honour'. Prabowo, at the DPK, claimed that he had conducted the covert operations because he received the order from his superiors when he was Kopassus Commander, probably referring to ABRI Commander Feisal Tanjung or President Soeharto. However, this claim was not investigated further, and

the court-martial of the three was also not opened later, suggesting a deal within ABRI. About the DKP, see *Tajuk*'s special investigation in 'Kisah Sebuah Bintang Jatuh', *Tajuk*, 23 July 1998.

21 The Rose Unit was said to have been established under the Group-4 of Kopassus in July 1997. Its task was to terrorize NGO and student activists who were mainly Megawati supporters and PRD members. At the military tribunal, the eleven soldiers received maximum twelve-year sentences. It is, however, still not clear whether the unit kidnapped all of the disappeared activists, or, as Prabowo claimed, only nine people who were later released. For information about the Rose Unit, see S. Sinansari Ecip, *Siapa 'Dalang' Prabowo: Kronologi Situasi Merebaknya Berbagai Kerusuhan Sejak Soeharto Lengser*, Jakarta: MIZEN, 1999, pp.123–126. One careful investigation concluded that Kopassus was working with Kodam Jaya under Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin in conducting the abductions ('Memilah-Milah Komando Penculikan', *Tajuk*, 1–3 September 1998).

22 Confidential interview, 1998.

23 'Survey Reveals ABRI's Poor Public Image', *Jakarta Post*, 29 September 1998; 'Jajak Pendapat Kompas tentang Citra ABRI: Sebagian Besar Masyarakat Ingin Dwifungsi Ditanggalkan', *Kompas*, 4 October 1998. Anti-military feelings and demands for the abolition of *dwifungsi* in society were openly expressed by the mass media soon after the fall of Soeharto; see, for example, 'Saatnya ABRI Mereformasi Diri', *Panji Masyarakat*, 29 July 1998 and 'Dwifungsi Harus Diakhiri?', *Ummat*, 3 August 1998.

24 'Kassospol: Peran Sospol ABRI akan Makin Surut', *Bisnis Indonesia*, 21 July 1998; 'ABRI Must Trim Political Role, says Yudhoyono', *Jakarta Post*, 5 August 1998.

25 The paper is 'ABRI dan Reformasi: Pokok-Pokok Pikiran ABRI Tentang Reformasi Menuju Pencapaian Cita-Cita Nasional', Markas Besar Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, June 1998; see p.13 about *dwifungsi*.

26 For the cancellation of the DOM category and the history of ABRI's violence in these regions, see 'Soeharto, ABRI dan Kisah Tiga Daerah', *Tajuk*, 20 August 1998.

27 Interview with Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo, Assistant for General Planning to the ABRI Commander (Asrenum Pangab), 27 October 1998. The police was integrated with the military at the beginning of Soeharto's New Order. The enforcement of this re-separation took place in April 1999.

28 'Kassospol ABRI Mengungkapkan Kekeliruan ABRI', *Media Indonesia*, 3 September 1998.

29 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Wiranto, 20 March 2001. Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah was Expert Staff for the ABRI Commander in political and security fields (Staf Ahli Pangab bidang Polkam) in August 1998.

30 See the seminar report, *Peran ABRI Abad XXI: Redefinisi, Reposisi dan Reaktualisasi Peran ABRI dalam Kehidepan Bangsa* (Makalah Awal Seminar ABRI), Bandung: Sesko ABRI, September 1998, p.29.

31 See Agus Widjojo, 'Redefinisi, Reposisi dan Reaktualisasi Peran ABRI dalam Kehidupan Bangsa Dengan Objek Bahasan pada Paradigma Baru', paper presented at Seminar ABRI Tentang Peran ABRI Abad XXI, Sesko ABRI, Bandung, 23 September 1998, pp.5–6.

32 Ibid., pp.10–11.

33 For details of the New Paradigm, see *Peran ABRI Abad XXI*.

34 On the analysis of *Paradigma Baru*, see also Harold Crouch, 'Wiranto and Habibie: Civil–Military Relations since May 1998', in Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley and Damien Kingsbury (eds), *Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia*, Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1999, pp.127–148, especially pp.137–139.

35 The booklet is *ABRI Abad XXI: Redefinisi*. Reposis, dan Reaktualiss: Peran ABRI Dalam Kehidupan Bangsa Mabes ABRI, 1998.

36 Interview, 27 October 1998.

37 Wiranto's assistant in ABRI determined that two Habibie loyalists – Feisal Tanjung as Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs and Adi Sasono as Minister of

Small Businesses and Cooperatives – led the intervention (confidential interview, October 1998).

38 For a discussion of the campaign, see '"Hantu" PKI di Era Reformasi', *Tajuk*, 1 October 1998; Jun Honna, 'Military Ideology in Response to Democratic Pressure During the Late Suharto Era: Political and Institutional Contexts', in Benedict Anderson (ed.), *Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia*, Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2001, pp.85–89. It was later revealed that the government had provided Wiranto with Rp 10 billion for the mobilization of *pamswakarsa*.

39 Interviews with three serving army and navy officers, October–November 1998.

40 Among them, many Habibie allies recommended Hendropriyono for the post of ABRI Commander. Regarding this, see The Editors, 'Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite: January 1, 1999–January 31, 2001', *Indonesia*, No. 71, April 2001, p.140.

41 Interview with a general-ranking officer, October 1998. This image of ICMI is of course biased, as there are many moderate intellectuals in ICMI, such as Nurcholis Majid, as well as Habibie's close aides already mentioned.

42 For *Republika*'s articles, see 'Penilaian Pakar Tentang Mutasi ABRI: Usaha Penguatan Rezim Soeharto', 5 January; 'Mutasi di Tubuh ABRI', 6 January; 'Mutasi di Tubuh ABRI sudah melalui Prosedur yang Sah', 7 January; 'Soeyono: Mutasi ABRI Tanpa Melalui Rapat Wanjakti', 8 January. For a detailed analysis of this reshuffle, see also 'Dulu "Hijau", Kini "Merah Putih?"', *Forum Keadilan*, 25 January 1999.

43 Although Zacky was removed from ABRI's command structure, he was given the post of Special Staff to the ABRI Commander. This new post was linked to ABRI's East Timor operations after Habibie's surprising announcement on 27 January 1999 permitting the referendum for independence there. It is widely believed that Zacky was in charge of Operation Clean-Sweep, or *Operasi Sapu Jagad*, aimed at eliminating key pro-independence supporters in East Timor. For details, see 'The TNI's "Dirty War" in East Timor', *Tapol Bulletin*, June 1999 and Geoffrey Robinson's vivid research and analysis in his 'The Fruitless Search for a Smoking Gun: Tracing the Origins of Violence in East Timor', paper prepared for the Symposium on Violence in Indonesia, University of Leiden, 13–15 December 2000.

44 '"Ciganjur Plus" Temui Wiranto: Mendukung Langkah ABRI', *Media Indonesia*, 25 January 1999. The meeting was said to have been arranged by Yudhoyono.

45 For investigations and analysis of *ninja* killing, see, for example, 'Teror Santet: ABRI Sampai Menteri Kabinet kena Tuduh', and 'Operasi Ninja, Operasi Intelijen', in *Forum Keadilan*, 31 October 1998. About the possible link between the state authority and *ninja*, see also Robert Cribb, 'From Petrus to Ninja: Death Squads in Indonesia', in Bruce B. Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner (eds), *Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability*, New York: St Martin's Press, 2000, pp.181–202. Wiranto's close assistant had long suspected the role of Gen. (ret.) Hartono, former Army Chief and ICMI-supporter, in orchestrating the systematic terror which started in Banyuwangi, East Java (confidential interview, 1998). Despite these speculations, the truth is not yet clear and is probably more complicated than simple 'conspiracy' explanations suggest.

46 Interview with a general-ranking officer, July 1999.

47 Interview with Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, Commander of Sesko ABRI, 20 July 1999.

48 Interview, 20 July 1999.

49 Saurip Kadi, 'ABRI di Masa Depan: Sebuah Konsep Reformasi Internal ABRI', in *ABRI dan Agenda Perubahan: Bunga Rampai Seskoad*, Bandung: Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat, 1999, pp.159–176.

50 Interview with Brig. Gen. Dradjat Sudradjat, Deputy Chief of ABRI's Information Centre (WaKapuspen), 11 August 1999.

51 For detailed and perceptive analysis of this unrest, see the Brussels-based International Crisis Group's research series: *Indonesia's Maluku Crisis: The Issues*, 19 July 2000; *Aceh: Why Military Force Won't Bring Lasting Peace*, 12 June 2001; *Communal Violence in Indonesia:*

Lessons from Kalimantan, 27 June 2001; *Indonesia: Ending Repression in Irian Jaya*, 20 September 2001. For an excellent analysis of the escalation of communal battle in Sulawesi, see Lorraine V. Aragon, 'Communal Violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi: Where People Eat Fish and Fish Eat People', *Indonesia*, No. 72, October 2001, pp.45–79.

52 'Menghidupkan Kembali Kodam Maluku dan Aceh', *Suara Pembaruan*, 19 March 1999; 'Kontras: ABRI Berencana Perluas Kekuasaan', *Suara Pembaruan*, 23 March 1999.

53 Interview with Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, 20 July 1999.

54 The renaming was due to the change in the name of the military from ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*) to TNI (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*) after the separation of the police from the military on 1 April 1999.

55 Sesko TNI, 'Sarasehan-1 Upaya Pertahanan Keamanan Negara dan Struktur Kekuatan TNI dan Polri Abad 21', Bandung: Sesko TNI, 16 April 1999, pp.8, 9, 10–12,

56 Sesko TNI's proposal to dismantle the doctrine of Hankamneg was a criticism against Wiranto's Defence Department which announced, in its 1999 defence–security planning, that the TNI still maintained Hankamneg as the core doctrine and thus it would need to conduct political–economic–social–cultural (Poleksosbud) activities designed by the army's territorial function (Departmen Pertahanan Keamanan Republik Indonesia, 'Struktur Program dan Anggaran Pertahanan Keamanan Negara', Dephankam, 1999, p.6).

57 The document is Mabes TNI-AD, 'Pokok-Pokok Pikiran Tentang Postur Kekuatan TNI AD Abad XXI', Bandung: Sesko TNI, 12 May 1999.

58 Ibid., pp.13–14.

59 Ibid., p.17

60 Ibid., p.15.

61 Mabes Polri, 'Postur Kekuatan Polri Abad XXI', Makalah Asrena Kapolri Pada Seminar TNI 1999, Bandung, Sesko TNI, 12 May 1999, p.23.

62 Interview, July 1999.

63 The voter ratio of major parties in the 1999 elections was as follows: PDI-P (33.8%); Golkar (22.5%); PKB, or National Awakening Party, led by Abdurrahman Wahid (12.6%); PPP (10.7%); PAN, or National Mandate Party, led by Amien Rais (8.5%); PBB, or Crescent and Star Party, led by Yursil Ihza Mahendra (1.9%). PPP, PAN and PBB constituted a loose coalition based on Islamic principles, naming themselves *Poros Tengah* (Central Axis); see Appendix 3 for the distribution of seats in DPR/MPR.

64 See his seminar paper, Agus Wirahadikusumah, 'Hubungan Sipil-Militer: Visi, Misi dan Aksi', paper presented at Mencari Format Baru Hubungan Sipil-Militer, FISIP UI, Jakarta, 24–25 May 1999, p.7. Although he was only one of the invited participants, this seminar was almost totally the idea of his civilian friends, who encouraged Wirahadikusumah to be a popular figure in society.

65 Citations are from 'Jenderal Wiranto: TNI Tak Akan Abstain', *Tempo*, 12–18 July 1999.

66 Interview with a general-ranking officer, July 1999.

67 Interview, 11 August 1999.

68 For an overview of TNI's East Timor policy during this time, see Harold Crouch, 'The TNI and East Timor Policy', in James J. Fox and Dionisio Babo Soares (eds), *Out of the Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor*, Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2000, pp.151–179.

69 These events were vividly studied in a book written by Ian Martin who headed the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), a mission to safeguard the referendum (Ian Martin, *Self-Determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the Ballot, and International Intervention*, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001).

70 TNI's use of militias in East Timor has a long history since the 1970s. For details, see Robison's 'The Fruitless Search for a Smoking Gun', which argued that TNI, at least at Korem-level, systematically supported the major violence conducted by pro-integration militias in East Timor before and after the 1999 referendum. For an analysis of the militias, see also Tapol, 'East Timor under the Indonesian Jackboot: an Analysis of Indonesian Army Documents', Occasional Report No. 26, October 1998.
71 About Zacky's and Sjafrie's roles in Wiranto's East Timor operations, see, for example, *Panji Masyarakat*'s special report, 'Dua Jenderal Satu Misteri' and 'Yang Terimbas Prabowo', *Panji Masyarakat*, 25 August 1999.
72 Interview, 1999.
73 Interview, August 1999.
74 This criticism was widely publicized by LIPI academics (see Tim Peneliti, 'ABRI dan Gerakan Reformasi: Reposisi Setengah Hati', Makalah Pengantar Untuk Seminar Hasil Penelitian ABRI dan Gerakan Reformasi, LIPI, Jakarta, 27 July 1999).
75 Author's observation at the seminar, 'Sarasehan TNI: Mengkritisi Pelaksanaan Reformasi Internal TNI', The Darmawangsa Hotel, Jakarta, 19 August 1999.
76 Interview with Wiranto, 20 March 2001.
77 For an overall analysis of the political process during the presidential elections, see Marcus Mietzner, 'The 1999 General Session: Wahid, Megawati and the Fight for the Presidency', in Chris Manning and Peter van Dierman (eds), *Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000, pp.38–57.
78 Interview with a member of F-TNI/Polri, December 1999.
79 On this meeting, see, for example, 'Gus Dur Pilihan Terbaik bagi Bangsa', *Forum Keadilan*, 31 October 1999.
80 Again, as the voting was secret, whether or not all votes from F-TNI/Polri went to Gus Dur was unknown. Agus Widjojo recognized that the actual votes might be divided (interview, 17 December 1999).
81 He had two strokes in 1998 that affected his mobility, mental acuity, stamina and eyesight.
82 'Kronologi Drama Voting Gus Dur-Mega', *Tempo*, 31 October 1999.
83 For a detailed description of Wiranto's political activities during the vice-presidential race, see 'Daftar Kekesalan TNI', *Tekad*, 25–31 October 1999.
84 'Akbar Tandjung: Kalau Saya Maju, Tidak Mungkin Menang', *Forum Keadilan*, 31 October 1999.
85 Yudhoyono himself admitted that he preferred to continue his military career: 'Siap, Tidak Siap', *Gatra*, 13 November 1999; 'Dari Kaster ke Mentamben', *Tekad*, 1–7 November 1999.
86 Wiranto had already become Menko Polkam when the reshuffle was announced on 4 November. However, it was planned before he left the military and it was obvious that Widodo, who had just become the new TNI Commander, had no say in the plan. Wiranto's role in this reshuffle is detailed in 'Reposisi TNI di Luar Dugaan', *Perspektif*, No. 55, 11–17 November 1999.
87 See, for example, 'Jenderal Pilihan Segitiga Emas', *Tempo*, 28 November 1999; 'Telik Sandi Berkibar Lagi', *Forum Keadilan*, 28 November 1999. Wiranto then doubted Tyasno's loyalty to him. When Tyasno was installed as KSAD, Wiranto – who was invited as a former KSAD – did not attend the ceremony.
88 The report identified Wiranto as responsible for 'doing nothing while he fully acknowledged and realised the extent of the violence in East Timor'. For details, see KPP-HAM Timtim, 'Ringkasan Eksekutif: Laporan Penyelidikan Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia di Timor Timur', Jakarta: KPP-HAM Timtim, 31 January 2000, p.17.
89 See Wiranto's interview, 'Wiranto: Harus Bicara Dulu Dengan Gus Dur', *Forum Keadilan*, 13 February 2000.

90 Under the Gus Dur administration, the Minister of Defence and Security (Menhankam) was renamed the Minister of Defence (Menhan). Professor Juwono was the first civilian to take up the post which previously had been dominated by the military.

91 Army Chief General Tyasno warned that he would monitor any suspicious moves within the army during the President's overseas visit and take appropriate measures where warranted. The Jakarta Military Commander, Maj. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, also claimed that he was ready to counter any coup attempt in Jakarta ('Saya Akan Hadapi', *Gatra*, 12 February 2000). About the Wiranto–Gus Dur confrontation and the rumours of a coup, see, for example, 'Permintaan di Tengah Muhibah', *Forum Keadilan*, 13 February 2000; 'Dari Lautze Hingga Skenario "Jiji Tibeh"', *DeTAK*, 22–28 February 2000.

92 For details, see 'Saat Wiranto Tergilas Burdoser Zig-Zag', *Forum Keadilan*, 27 February 2000; 'Gus Dur, Wiranto, dan Drama Kejatuhan Itu', *Tajuk*, 17 February 2000.

93 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Wiranto, 20 March 2001.

94 For example, see the International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control*, Jakarta/Brussels: ICG, 20 September 2000.

95 Both comments are from 'East Timor is Enough', *Tajuk*, 22 December 1999; see also 'Kalau Genting, TNI Akan Turun', *OPOSISI*, 6 June 2000.

96 'Wiranto Lebih Baik Jadi Oposan di Partai Golkar', *Media Indonesia*, 14 February 2000.

97 Suaidi, who was a member of the committee on officers' ranks and posts (Wanjakti), announced just before the reshuffle that there would be no change for lieutenant generals. He also insisted that Wanjakti had never discussed the change in the Kostrad post. These comments clearly suggest Gus Dur's direct intervention.

98 The book is Agus Wirahadikusumah, *et al.*, *Indonesia Baru dan Tantangan TNI: Pemikiran Masa Depan*, Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1999. Yudhoyono was also a classmate and was invited to write a chapter in the book but is said to have refused to join because the book was politically motivated and contained no serious reform proposals.

99 'Mixed Responses Greet Latest TNI Reshuffles', *Jakarta Post*, 29 February 2000.

100 Interview with a general-ranking officer, August 2000.

101 Interview, 8 August 2000.

102 Confidential interview, December 1999.

103 The Widodo leadership did not reject these reform agendas but insisted on their 'gradual' implementation, because – it argued – the rapid transformation would certainly result in chaos.

104 On the leaked document, see, for example, 'Bertarung di Tengah Kegasaran Tuan Presiden', *DeTAK*, 20–26 June 2000.

105 Laskar Jihad consists of many *jihad* fighters recruited from the Islamic Defenders' Front (FPI), a mass organization widely believed to be supported by Djaja Suparman. About the growing number of radical mass groupings and their links with the TNI, see Togi Simanjuntak (ed.), *Premanisme Politik*, Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi, 2000, pp.43–87; see also the International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Keeping the Military under Control*, regarding military involvement in the regional conflicts.

106 Confidential interview, August 2000.

107 Interview with a general-ranking officer, August 2000.

108 'Korupsi Kostrad Terkuat, 2 Kolonel Dipecat', *Jawa Pos*, 15 July 2000.

109 'Pati Geni Jenderal Wirahadikusumah', *Tempo*, 6 August , 2000.

110 Interviews with Wiranto, 20 March 2001 and Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, 8 August 2000. It is an open secret that every officer who heads a command needs to secure extra-budgetary funds for various activities. Perhaps the situation is the same in other government agencies and private organizations, such as universities and hospitals. Many observed that Wirahadikusumah himself had been involved in this 'tradition' but suddenly, and opportunistically, became a whistleblower.

111 Criticism increased not only because of Gus Dur's alleged corruption case in the National Logistics Agency (Bulog), but also because of his decision to remove several Cabinet figures who were associated with other political parties. He removed Hamzah Haz (PPP) in November 1999, and Yusuf Kalla (Golkar) and Laksamana Sukardi (PDI-P) in April 2000. Their removal angered party leaders who believed that Gus Dur was acting against the sharing of power implicit in coalition government.

112 Gus Dur, when he became President, said: 'We permitted referendum in East Timor, why not in Aceh?' On Irian Jaya, he allowed the pro-independence group to hang out the separatist flag, and also financed an organization, the so-called Papuan Congress, which he expected to work with the government, but which actually became the major promoter of the separatist movement. In January 2000, Gus Dur approved the changing of the province's name Irian Jaya to Papua in order to alleviate the demand for independence.

113 Attorney General Marzuki Darusman stated on 20 October that some TNI soldiers were detained at the local police in connection with the Atambua killing. But two days later, all suspects were released.

114 For a detailed account, see 'Siapa Dalang Bom: GAM, Militer, atau…', *Tajuk*, No. 16, 28 September–11 October, 2000, and 'Sipil Aceh: Teroris atau Kambing Hitam?', *Tempo*, 1 October 2000. During the first year of the Abdurrahman government, twelve bomb explosions terrified the country. Because most were conducted in a professional way, it was widely suspected that the military elements were involved.

115 'Presiden di Antara Dua Karang', *Tempo*, 15 October 2000. A decree which passed the August MPR session clearly stated that appointments and sackings of the TNI Commander and Police Chief must have the approval of the legislators. Amien's claim was echoed by many anti-Gus Dur legislators. See, for example, 'Wahid Warned Not to Replace Military Chief', *Indonesia Observer*, 6 October 2000.

116 For the most accurate account of the event, see 'Drama Gus Dur vs TNI AD', *Tajuk*, No. 17, 12–25 October, 2000.

117 'Endriartono Sutarto: Saya Khawatir TNI Akan Pecah', *Tempo*, 15 October, 2000.

118 Ibid.

119 Personal communication, November 2000. Lt. Gen. (ret.) Hendropriyono, who had served for the Habibie government as a Cabinet member but who could not get a post in the Gus Dur government, started to consolidate a close relationship with Megawati at that time. As seen in Chapter 2, Hendropriyono was Jakarta Military Commander when Megawati was elected as PDI Chairperson at the party's National Congress held in Jakarta in 1993. Their friendship had been maintained since then. He joined PDI-P in September 2000 and became a private political adviser to Vice-President Megawati. Against this background, he is said to have recommended Megawati to support Sutarto's promotion to KSAD.

120 Sutarto was ranked No. 4 among the graduates of 1971 and Kiki No. 5. During their careers, Kiki overtook Sutarto three times on the career ladder.

121 'Syahnakri Tipped for Army Promotion', *Indonesia Observer*, 1 November 2000.

122 'KSAD Tidak Ingin Perwira Banyak "Ngomong" ', *Media Indonesia*, 20 October 2000; see also Chapter 3.

123 'Megawati Tells Soldiers Not to Feel Inferior', *Jakarta Post*, 28 October, 2000.

124 Interview with Lt. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri, Deputy Army Chief, 20 March 2001.

125 About these East Timor specialists in the army and their roles up to the 1999 referendum, see Moore's detailed study. Samuel Moore, 'The Indonesian Military's Last Years in East Timor: An Analysis of its Secret Documents', *Indonesia*, No. 72, October 2001, pp.9–44.

126 For details, see Sutarto's interview, 'Endriartono Sutarto: TNI Tidak Mau Terjebak', *Tempo*, 4 March 2001.

127 Interview with Maj. Gen. I. Made Putu Rai, Assistant for Political and Security Affairs to Army Chief (Aspam KSAD), 21 March 2001.

128 Confidential interview, March 2001.
129 See Kurdi Mustofa and Yani Wahid, *Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono: Dalam 5 Hari Maklumat*, Jakarta: PT Aksara Karunia, 2001, pp.75–86. Yudhoyono particularly appreciated Widjojo's deep concern about having national leadership change in such a confrontational manner.
130 Confidential interview, March 2001.
131 'TNI Chiefs Say No to Dissolving DPR', *Jakarta Post*, 18 May 2001.
132 For Ryamizard's comments, see 'Ikrar Kesetiaan Kostrad: Tetap Loyal kepada NKRI', *Kompas*, 21 May 2001; 'Kostrad Vows to Side with People', *Jakarta Post*, 21 May 2001.
133 However, Ryamizard's comments reached Gus Dur via his palace staff who informed the President that Ryamizard was loyal to him. As seen above, however, this was only a partial story. Such misinformation was transmitted to Gus Dur who was then convinced that Kostrad would side with him (interview with a general-ranking officer, August 2001).
134 The recommendation to Gus Dur was officially presented by Yudhoyono and his Cabinet colleagues. For details of this recommendation, which was announced on 25 May, see 'Rekomendasi Tim Tujuh', *Media Indonesia*, 28 May 2001. Yudhoyono was sacked and replaced by Lt. Gen. (ret.) Agum Gemelar on 1 June.
135 See Endriartono Sutarto, 'Kewajiban TNI menaati Perintah', *Kompas*, 20 June 2001.
136 On the problem of this mindset in democratization, see Jun Honna, *Military Doctrines and Democratic Transition*.
137 Interview with Widodo's assistant, August 2001. Sutarto was also frustrated with TNI Headquarters, especially with Widodo and Agus Widjojo who did not clarify TNI's stance to the public. Both were rather engaged in the Yudhoyono initiative which was – in Sutarto's view – full of ambiguities. In making this point, I am indebted to an anonymous journalist.
138 Bimantoro had known Megawati since he was posted to the East Java Police in 1993 when the PDI opened the Congress there and nominated Megawati as Party Chairperson.
139 Bimantoro was a police academy graduate of 1970 and he had looked after his classmates during his time as Police Chief, thus effectively blocking any prospect of promotion for the 1971 graduates, including Chaeruddin, and thereby fuelling their frustrations. The internal split within the National Police was also encouraged by the competition between two different police factions – namely 'militaristic' police and 'civil' police. The riot police (Mobile Brigade, or Brimob) represented the former and the detective police the latter. Since the separation of the police from the military in April 1999, the two factions had competed for internal leadership. Bimantoro stood for the traditional Brimob culture and Chaeruddin embodied the detective sector which was eager to establish a new image for the police in the era of civilian government. The cleavage between the two sectors had been growing since the early 1990s when the sophistication of criminal economic activities, such as money-laundering, bank corruption and drug dealing, became major concerns for the detective sector which thus insisted on the need for the police to develop the 'Cyber-Police' instead of the traditional Brimob sector (interview with former Police Chief, Gen. (ret.) Kunarto, 27 January 1997).
140 Interview, 28 August 2001.
141 Interview with a general-ranking officer, August 2001. In fact, the F-TNI/Polri abstained from voting for the second memorandum in April based on the judgement that even without TNI's support, the anti-Gus Dur legislators outnumbered the pro-Gus Dur side. Thus it was a low-risk strategy for the TNI to abstain and feign political 'neutrality'.

142 Confidential interview with a general-ranking officer, August 2001. Agum Gemelar stated however that Lumintang had rejected Gus Dur's offer ('Agum Benarkan Gus Dur akan Angkat Johny Jadi Wapang TNI', *detikcom*, 23 July 2001).
143 'Cerita di Balik Apel TNI di Monas', *detikcom*, 23 July 2001. He merely appealed for solidarity within TNI and carefully avoided clarifying his position – whether he supported Gus Dur or rejected his orders.
144 Ryamizard later explained that he telephoned Gus Dur one hour before the *apel* to let him know that it was nothing that would threaten him (see Ryamizard's interview in 'Letjen TNI Ryamizard Ryacudu: "Saya Bukan Palembangisme"', *Tempo*, 7 April 2002).
145 Interview, 29 August 2001.
146 Interview, 21 August 2001.
147 Interviews with Agus Widjojo, 21 August 2001 and Kiki Syahnakri, 29 August 2001.
148 Confidential interview with a general-ranking officer, August 2001.
149 See, for example, 'President Berlakukan Dekrit', *Kompas*, 23 July 2001.

8 Conclusions

1 Actual reform designs are not analysed here as they require somewhat lengthy discussion extending beyond the scope of this concluding chapter. Regarding the reform agendas, see, for example, International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Next Steps in Military Reform*, Jakarta/Brussels: ICG, 11 October 2001.

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Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia

The military has been a powerful political player in Indonesia; it has played a key role in its recent history and may well have a decisive role to play in the future. It was the dominant power under Soeharto's authoritarian regime and continues to influence post-Soeharto civilian rule. Understanding the dynamics of military politics is essential to understanding the nature and prospects of Indonesia's transition to democracy. Jun Honna reveals how politics amongst generals shaped the direction of military adaptation to democratic challenge during the late Soeharto era and the succeeding governments, led by B.J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid.

Drawing on military documents and interviews with key military figures, Honna depicts the development of faction fighting within the military and the way in which, since the late 80s, it has produced both accommodative and repressive demands. To explain the workings of such dynamics in detail, Honna examines five different dimensions of civil-military interactions: regime maintenance; doctrinal adaption; internal security; the development of military ideology; and civil-military discourse – both in the twilight of the Soeharto era and after his fall.

The author also examines such key features as human rights, reconciliation, civic-military discourse and ongoing security dilemmas. The book is unique in providing the best overview of the role of the military in the world's fourth most populous nation.

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ROUTLEDGE